Two of my colleagues from Ambassador Rolf Ekéus’ Submarine Investigation, Göran Wallén and Jerker Widén, have accused me of writing ‘fiction’. They claim that I have been ‘using dubious second and third hand sources, anonymous sources or oral statements from now deceased persons, sources that the reader was unable to verify. [They have] also criticized [me] for considering entries in war diaries or statements by military individuals on various levels as sacrosanct facts.’ Wallén and Widén accuse me of ‘a selective and uncritical use of sources to fit [my] hypothesis’.
These are harsh words, but what is behind them? One will easily find that there is no substance in Wallén’s and Widén’s criticism. Let us look at the relevance of their statements. From 1990, a huge amount of evidence and indications forced me to change my original hypothesis that these specific submarine intrusions originated from the Soviet Union. To argue that I have been unwilling to change my position when evidence is presented to me is simply not true. Unlike Wallén and Widén, I have felt it necessary to reconsider my hypothesis because of new evidence. And to argue that a former Director of the CIA and a Deputy Director of the CIA, former US Secretaries of Defense, a former British Minister of Navy and a Chief of British Defence Intelligence, a former Chairman of NATO Military Committee and a former Commander of BALTAP are dubious second-hand sources is just nonsense. Yes, these individuals were not first-hand sources, because they were not there, in Stockholm archipelago, when the relevant events took place, but they still may have something to say. If these prominent people state something of importance that contradicts their own interest, this must be taken seriously. I have made hundreds of interviews with first-hand sources: with local and regional naval commanders, with naval officers dropping depth charges and detonating mines and with divers that investigated the scene afterwards, with naval intelligence personnel and analysts who collected and analyzed the empirical data, and with the sonar operators who made the tape-recordings. I have looked into the war diaries (the real time or almost real time protocols) and a huge amount of other classified or formerly classified documents (technical reports, protocols, analyses, diaries and larger internal investigations). The problem is that the first-hand sources and the documents tell us something very different from what Wallén and Widén would like to hear.
But why do these two former colleagues of mine come up with all these accusations? Jerker Widén is a young historian with no specific knowledge of or background from the study of submarine activity, and I believe he was simply uncomfortable with the facts that I presented. Göran Wallén, on the other hand is important, but he is no neutral observer. Wallén himself was the Regional Operative Commander (for the Eastern Military District) during the very operation we investigated. He and his close colleague Chief of Staff Admiral Bror Stefenson gave orders that created a storm of reactions among local and other regional commanders. They believed that Stefenson and perhaps Wallén may have collaborated with or consulted a foreign power, because in practical terms these orders forced the local commanders to release the submarines. These allegations, combined with statements made by US former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger on US operations in Swedish waters after US-Swedish navy-to-navy consultations, were the very background for the appointment of the Ekéus Investigation. If this had been a criminal investigation, we would have had the suspect investigating himself. Curiously enough, Stefenson was the Military Expert to the 1982-83 Commission, while Wallén became the Military Expert attached to the Ekéus Investigation of 2001. When Wallén entered the Investigation in April 2001, he tried in every respect to cover up every single piece of information that could be disturbing for himself and his close colleagues. And now, he is not even trying to present a credible analysis. He is simply trying to discredit my work by stating things that are not true.
To set the record straight, I will say a few words on my background and than present some more details about our work. In the 1980s, I wrote a doctoral thesis on naval strategy and the geopolitics of the Northern waters, I wrote a report for the Swedish Defence Research Establishment (FOA) with a similar focus,[2] and I wrote articles on submarine activities in Swedish waters. I gave lectures at the Center for Naval Analysis in Washington and at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey. A professor at the Naval War College told me that he used my book Cold Water Politics (London: Sage, 1989)[3] as a text book, and my FOA Report was used as a text book at the Swedish National Defence College. In all these works, I accepted, as a fact, the very clear statements on Soviet intrusions made by the 1983 Submarine Defense Commission.[4] My hypothesis was that the large majority of the intrusions were of Soviet origin.[5] But, already from late 1980s, things changed. I received more and more information pointing to Western activity. Senior US officials spoke about US submarine activity in Swedish waters. In 1995, a Government-appointed Submarine Commission[6] established that every single statement on Soviet intrusions made by the 1983 Commission (referring to visual sightings, acoustic information, signal intelligence) had been either misinterpreted, manipulated or invented. Except for the stranded Soviet submarine in 1981, there was no evidence of Soviet activity in Swedish waters. Neither had there been any clear indication supporting such a hypothesis. Of course, there might very well have been and most likely were Soviet intrusions, but the Swedish Defense Staff and the Naval Analysis Group had nothing to support their claims. When the diary of Swedish Commander-in-Chief, General Ljung was declassified in mid 1990s, one found that Sven Andersson, Chairman of the 1983 Commission, had decided to blame the Soviet Union for political reasons.[7]
From mid 1990s, I decided to go into depth into these issues, and I went through a large amount of archival material, and I conducted a number of interviews with military officers, civil servants and political leaders involved in these incidents. In March 2000, a 15-minute interview with Caspar Weinberger was shown on Swedish TV.[8] This interview confirmed much of what a number of anonymous sources already had told me. Shortly after this interview, Weinberger’s statements were confirmed by the former British Chief of Defence Intelligence Sir John Walker and, in a longer TV-interview, these statements were confirmed by former British Minister of Navy Sir Keith Speed.[9] Weinberger stated that Western submarines had operated ‘regularly’ and ‘frequently’ in Swedish waters to test Swedish coastal defenses after US-Swedish navy-to-navy consultations, but Weinberger himself had not brought these ‘tests’ up with the Swedish Prime Minister or Minister of Defence, he said. Weinberger continued: ‘[the Soviet submarine in 1981 had stranded in an area where it was] not wanted, and that is exactly why we made this defensive testing and these defensive manoeuvres to ensure that they [the Soviets] would not be able to do that without being detected… We had to test from time to time to make sure that our defensive planning was adequate and up to date and capable of resisting any changes in Soviet strength and Soviet capabilities, and that was done on a regular basis…. [In Swedish waters it was done frequently enough] to comply to the military requirements for making sure that they were up to date. We would know when the Soviets required a new kind of submarine. We would then have to see if our defenses were adequate against that. And all this was done on a regular basis, and on an agreed upon basis,’ Weinberger said.[10] Sir Speed added that there were British-Swedish consultations for similar British activities, and that the British operated Oberon class submarines in Swedish waters.[11] Sir Walker said that NATO was ‘allowed a certain amount of intrusions during a given period’.[12] Former Chairman of NATO Military Committee General Vigleik Eide told me that these operations were rather US and UK operations in collaboration with one or more allies. Several former chiefs of intelligence told me that primarily the British operations were run within the framework of the Stay-Behinds. In other words, they were decided by representatives of the Allied Clandestine Committee (ACC), which was a secret allied committee that included the neutral countries and was ‘superimposed’ on NATO. The US operations in Swedish waters, however, seem primarily have been run within the framework of the CIA-DIA liaison office called the National Underwater Reconnaissance Office (NURO) under the chairmanship of the Secretary of Navy.[13] This has been stated by two sources at a similar high level as above mentioned sources, but I cannot quote them by name, and in this case it is up to the reader whether he/she will trust me or not. The DIA representatives were recruited from the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI).[14]
Wallén and Widén describe Weinberger’s statements as ‘remarkable’ and exceptional as if there hadn’t been any other similar statements or documents supporting him. True, Weinberger was very clear in this interview, at least as clear as Speed and Walker and some others, and he knew what he was saying. The interview with Weinberger reveals that he had been briefed on the development of the Swedish case before the interview took place (he was aware of recent statements by former Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson). And Washington knew that information on US submarine activity in Swedish waters would turn up relatively soon, because the former Assistant to the US Secretary of Navy and the US Assistant Naval Attaché to Oslo had approached me. We had met at my office and at the US Embassy in Oslo, and I then presented some of my information on US activity in Swedish waters. The US Defense Attaché had also approached senior Norwegian naval officers and asked if they were collaborating with me. Washington knew that information on US activity in Swedish waters would turn up, and for obvious reasons Weinberger wanted to present this in less dramatic terms, which he did very well.
However, in Sweden, Weinberger’s attempt to reduce the submarine intrusions to ‘a test of Swedish coastal defenses’ was not appreciated, because these intrusions had totally changed Sweden. They had radically increased the Swedish perception of a Soviet threat, and if a couple of admirals in the Swedish naval leadership had participated in such US-Swedish ‘navy-to-navy consultations’ to facilitate US submarine operations in Swedish waters, so much worse, because neither the Swedish Government nor the Foreign Ministry or the military forces in general were informed. The background for this is easy to understand. Prime Minister Olof Palme had been trusted neither by the Reagan Administration nor by the close network of the Swedish Chief of Navy Admiral Per Rudberg. One could not go with certain information to the Commander-in-Chief General Ljung, because Ljung went immediately to the government, Rudberg told me. Rudberg’s ties were not primarily to the Swedish Prime Minister but to Rudberg’s Western partners, to his friend Admiral Bobby Inman, Deputy Director of the CIA, whom he had known since mid 1960s, when Inman had been Assistant Naval Attaché to Stockholm. Declassified documents indicate that neither Prime Minister Palme and his government nor the military forces in general had been aware of the US ‘testing operations’.[15] It seems that (except for a handful of naval officers; one Swedish source says more than a dozen) everyone in Sweden believed that the intrusions were run by the Soviets, which means that these ‘test operations’ were developed into so-called ‘false flag operations’ – psychological operations that put the Prime Minister on the defensive. Palme’s proposals for changing the security architecture for Europe, his program for ‘Common Security’ from summer 1982 was no longer credible even to his own followers, because he was seemingly not even able to defend his own territory against the ‘Soviets’.
A precondition for this US ‘false flag’ activity was that no US submarine surfaced in Swedish waters. In other words, there had to be someone or some commanding officers on the Swedish side able to release a submarine if necessary to avoid a catastrophe.[16] This is seemingly also what happened. A couple of senior naval officers with close US ties (the chief of navy, the chief of staff, the regional operative commander and the commander of the naval base) had been able to limit the use of the more forceful weapons (like the 600-kilo mines). On a couple of occasions, the local commander was ordered cease fires, while submarines approached the mine barrages. In a TV-interview following immediately after the interview with Weinberger, the local commander Lieutenant-Colonel Sven Olof Kviman described the cease-fire order he received when a submarine approached the mine-barrage.[17] He was forced to let the submarine pass out during a five hours cease-fire, and immediately after the submarine had passed the mine barrage Kviman was denied permission to attack with a credible volley of depth charges seconds before those depth charges were about to be dropped. The first order had been given by Admiral Stefenson directly to Kviman, because an earlier order by Wallén had been blocked by Stockholm Coastal Defence Staff.[18] In a subsequent TV-conversation between former Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson and myself, I was able to confirm that everything Kviman had said was documented in the war diaries. Actually, the internal navy investigation from the autumn of 1982 stated that these orders had been ‘given by higher commands [Stefenson and Wallén] without competence and knowledge’.[19] But neither Stefenson nor Wallén were totally incompetent officers. The implication of the interviews with Weinberger and Kviman was that the above-mentioned admirals might have released the submarines after ‘US-Swedish navy-to-navy consultations’, something that other sources had confirmed to me.
Shortly after the Weinberger interview, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus was appointed to investigate these allegations. Some of his colleagues argued that this should rather have been a criminal investigation, because of the very serious accusations made against above mentioned admirals. I was of the opinion that one should not primarily place the blame on these admirals but rather try to understand the general strategic developments in the 1980s, although their activity, from a legal point of view, might be described as ‘high treason’. Later, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Lennart Bodström said publicly that, given these allegations, the responsible commanders had possibly committed ‘high treason’. My interest was rather to uncover what had happened during these confusing years. In October 2000, I was recruited as an Expert by Ambassador Ekéus, who had read some of my material. However, for private reasons I did not accept the offer of a full-time work for the Investigation, and I already had an agreement with Frank Cass to write my book, which I gave first priority.
My work for the Investigation started in December 2000. I was then alone with Ambassador Ekéus in his small office at the Swedish Ministry of Defense. We also used the Minister’s own room for high-level conversations. I invited military officers and civilians for interviews. I continued to do that in the following months, but now with a larger staff supporting Ekéus. In early 2001, Ambassador Mathias Mossberg was appointed main secretary, and the three of us made several interviews. I was the only one that had studied the submarine intrusions in Swedish waters, and for obvious reasons I conducted much of the interviews. My work became the main thrust of the Investigation in its early phase. Also in early 2001, a young historian Jerker Widén was recruited to the Investigation, because we realized that we had to have someone to work primarily with archival material. He had no specific knowledge of submarine activity or naval matters, but he had started work on a doctoral dissertation on US-Swedish political relations. After our early interviews, rumors seem to have spread that we were going to take the task seriously. Ambassador Ekéus received signals of discontent, which worried him. In March (or perhaps already in February) 2001, he proposed that we should recruit a naval officer of some seniority. Ekéus himself had worked with a Swedish Rear-Admiral, Göran Wallén, in Iraq and also before that in Vienna, and Wallén was Ekéus’ obvious candidate. Wallén had a considerable experience from the navy, and he had earlier proved to be a capable person. I myself had met Wallén at Ekéus’ home, but I did not know him, and I proposed another, more senior, admiral that I considered trustworthy. Wallén, however, started his work as a Military Expert attached to the Investigation in late April, and he started going through all material I had collected. From now on the Investigation changed character.
As mentioned above, Wallén was the Regional Operative Commander during the operation we had focused on, and he had close ties to the Americans. This could have been an advantage, but it also meant that he was investigating himself. He himself and a couple of his very close colleagues had given the controversial orders that, together with the Weinberger interview, had provoked the Investigation. Wallén was in fact at the center of the very problem we were supposed to investigate: the remarkable orders and the links to the US rather than to the Swedish Government. By the time this problem was identified, he had already been recruited, and it would have been a catastrophe for the Investigation to force him to resign. I have to admit that I was fascinated as I found document after document demonstrating a manipulation of the official version as well as evidence pointing to a Western operation. However, on every single occasion, Wallén tried to find arguments, sometimes absurd ones,[20] to contradict statements by these first-hand sources and documents (and now accuses me considering these first-hand sources and documents as ‘sacrosanct facts’). When I told him that we were going to analyze the tape-recordings from 12 and 13-14 October 1982, he said that this was not ‘a high priority issue’. I said that we already had decided to do that and that we had appointed two sound experts to do the analysis. As soon as he understood that Ekéus wanted to make this investigation, Wallén took over this task himself. When the sound expert brought up evidence proving that the tapes had been manipulated, Wallén was able to prevent this information from reaching Ekéus.
When one studies the single most important tape-recording from 18.00 on 12 October, 1982, one gets into the depth of the problem. This tape has been presented as the only acoustic evidence of a submarine in Swedish waters,[21] and in 1983 it was presented as a Soviet submarine.[22] Officially, this was the tape that Prime Minister Carl Bildt had brought to Moscow in 1993 to convince the Russians that Soviet submarines had operated in Swedish waters.[23] The Ekéus Investigation found that this ‘Moscow tape’ had also been in the USA, and that the Americans had told that it was not possible to draw any conclusion from the tape. However, when I was able to study the circumstances surrounding the tape in more detail I found a number of remarkable facts. Anders Karlsson, the sound expert from the submarine Sjöhästen and sonar operator for the bottom-mounted hydrophones, said that he had tape-recorded about half an hour of submarine sounds between six and seven o’clock p.m. on 12 October 1982. According to the local war diaries (or the real-time protocols) the tape-recording of a ‘submarine’ or a ‘certain submarine’ started at 18.00 and went on irregularly until perhaps 19.00, but already at 17.52 Karlsson had reported a ‘possible submarine’.[24] On the speaker channel of the tape, Karlsson reports (in real time) that he starts the tape-recording of a ‘probable submarine’ at 17.50 (the war diary speak about ‘possible submarine’ because ‘probable submarine’ was a term not yet used in the official Swedish ‘navy speech’). Karlsson speaks later of a ‘submarine’ or ‘certain submarine’ also on the speaker channel. After changing tape at about 18.20, he says: ‘continued recording of submarine’. He says that it sometimes lies down on the bottom to hide from anti-submarine forces. At 18.40, he says: ‘Very weak sounds from submarine, possibly lying still’. Six minutes later, he states: ‘it has started up again’. At 19.00, he says: ‘I cannot hear the submarine any longer’.[25] Karlsson’s recording of up to half an hour of submarine sounds within a time span of one hour is seemingly confirmed by these documents (both the war diaries and the speaker channel). However, the tape-recording Prime Minister Bildt took to Moscow is only 3.47 minutes.
The sonar operator Karlsson says that he did not tape-record this specific sequence of 3.47 minutes. This is not my tape-recording, he says. After Karlsson’s one-hour tape-recording had been analyzed the same night (12 October) the Chief of the Defence Staff Security Division Erland Sönnerstedt speaks of 30-40 rotations per minute (or 30-40 rpm) and submarine sound maximum or increased amplitude in the area of 80-120 Hz.[26] In a document dated two days later (14 October), Karlsson himself is quoted as saying that the analysis of the tape shows that this submarine had low rotations per minute (fewer than 60 rpm) and a speed of 1-2 knots. Submarine sound maximum was registered in the area of 80 Hz.[27] Also on the speaker channel of the tape he speaks in real time of an increase in amplitude in the area of 80 Hz. In an analysis of the same tape the following day (15 October), Swedish submarine sound specialist Arne Åsklint compares the sound of this submarine with a Swedish Hajen, which at 1-2 knots has 25-50 rpm. Åsklint says that the cavitation sounds were very clear and there were also distinct hydraulic sounds from the rudder. These are typical for a submarine.[28] After the first analyses of the tape, all these specialists agreed that the original tape had low rotations per minute (30-40 rpm or 25-50 rpm), but the 3.47 minutes tape-recording has about 200 rpm according to the Swedish-Russian talks (190 rpm according to the FOA analysis and 201 rpm according to the Russian analysis).[29] A concluding document from the Swedish Defence Research Establishment (FOA) written by Bengt Granath (dated the 20 October 1982) states: ‘the announced increase at 80 Hz cannot be found on the tape’.[30] Anders Karlson’s half an hour tape-recording (at about 30-40 rpm with increased amplitude in the area of 80 Hz) has seemingly been replaced by a short, 3.47 minute-long sequence with high rotations per minute.
When one studies the speaker channel and the FOA document more in detail, one finds that the 3.47-minutes sequence was tape-recorded before and perhaps hours before Karlsson made his tape-recording at 18.00. The 3.47 minutes is a totally different tape-recording earlier on the same tape, and nobody seems to know who recorded it. When Karlsson is doing his one-hour tape-recording and speaks of a submarine on the speaker channel, there are only sounds from the sea on the other channels of the tape (one channel for each hydrophone). Some people have proposed that Karlsson may have forgotten to turn on the tape-recorder, but then there would not have been anything on the speaker channel either. All submarine sounds from this very clear tape-recording, the most important recording in Swedish history, had been filtered away. The tape-recording that had provoked a lot of high-level activities, with the Chief of Staff Admiral Stefenson visiting the Chief of Navy Admiral Rudberg and after that the Commander-in-Chief General Ljung, no longer existed.[31] It had been replaced by a totally different 3.47-minute tape-recording with an unclear origin. Theoretically speaking, one could imagine that the original tape had been erased by mistake, but this was not possible with the tape-recorder they had. It did not have an erasing button.[32] The submarine sounds from 18.00-19.00 on 12 October 1982 must have been filtered away after Swedish submarine sound expert Arne Åsklint had analyzed the tape on 15 October but before 20 October when the FOA document was drafted (most likely during the weekend 16-17 October).
Arne Åsklint listened to the 3.47-minute sequence in connection with the tape was brought to Moscow. He said at the time and still insists that this was not the same tape he listened to in 1982, and the typical sounds on the ‘1982 tape’ (the very clear hydraulic sounds and cavitation sounds) were not to be found on the 3.47-minute sequence. And when Karlsson on the speaker channel reports that ‘the submarine starts up again’ and ‘is increasing speed’, there is nothing on the other channels. The submarine sounds had been filtered away. Åsklint, also sound expert to the Ekéus Investigation, reported this to Wallén, but Wallén was not interested in this information. Wallén took care of the tape-recordings inside the Ekéus Investigation. When he criticized me afterwards, he claimed that Karlsson could have stopped the tape-recorder by mistake after 3.47 minutes.[33] The fact that the 3.47-minute tape-recording was made much earlier on the same tape, with a totally different frequency and rotation per minute and with totally different sounds documented at the time, did not concern Wallén. In the Investigation Report (the part written by Wallén) states that the ‘Investigation has not found that the tapes have been manipulated.’[34]
I realized already when I joined this Investigation that it would not be easy, but the work was certainly more difficult than I had anticipated also for private reasons. When the sonar operator Anders Karlsson came back to Sweden in connection with the Ekéus Investigation, he stayed in his caravan for some months. One night he woke up finding the ceiling melting above him. He rushed out in the winter cold in his nightclothes. A few seconds later, the caravan exploded. Cars and buildings around were damaged. The arsonist had seemingly used several kilos of explosives. The police said that there had been an attempt on his life. Karlsson had been an important source that also had become a friend during these interviews, a person from whom I have learned much and I could trust, because what he said was confirmed by documents and by other interviews. And I am happy that he was not included among the deceased sources that Wallén and Widén described as less relevant. But some others were. For ten years, I had been working closely together with Captain Robert Bathurst, a former US Assistant Naval Attaché to Moscow, while Bobby Inman had the same position in Stockholm. Bathurst used to visit Inman in Stockholm, and he also knew something about the Swedish case. A few years later, Bathurst became Deputy Commander US Naval Forces Europe (for Intelligence). He knew very well the leading naval intelligence officers that were involved in the Swedish operations. In April 2000, a month after the Weinberger interview had been shown on Swedish TV, Bathurst took a transcript of the interview with him to the USA to discuss it with his Navy intelligence colleagues. Bathurst was then, in clear wording, told that he had to stop asking questions, and that certain named people were ‘physically dangerous’. The following month he had a contact with a retired US Navy SEAL officer. One month later, he died suddenly in his bed in Norway. I gave a speech at the funeral and wrote his obituary. Nobody from the US Embassy attended the funeral despite his high rank, but soon afterwards a man linked to the Embassy went through his computer and his files. A few months later, I started my work for Ambassador Ekéus. I told him about what Bathurst had said and about the information I had received from another friend, Einar Ansteensen, the éminence grise of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and its longtime Director of Division (Policy and Planning). I had had regular contact with Ansteensen and he used to call me at my office in Oslo. He had been in Stockholm during the anti-submarine operation in 1982. Ansteensen told me that the operation 1982 was American and that a US submarine had been damaged on this occasion. He said it was a sad story, and that he had been informed by his US Navy colleague when it happened. Ekéus himself knew Ansteensen from his time in Stockholm. We agreed that I should contact him when I was back in Oslo the following week. However, he died a couple of days before I arrived in Oslo, and I participated at his funeral. Yes, I refer to a couple of deceased persons, but I would very much have preferred that they had remained alive.
If someone still believes that the CIA and the US Navy never have been occupied by this kind of operations and that my work would have been of no interest to them, one has to ask oneself why the US Navy was the single most frequent visitor to our website in the months before my book appeared. There was no significant number of visits by the US Army or US Air Force, but for ten months before my book appeared there were more than 30,000 visits by ‘us.navy.mil’, on average more than 100 visits per day. This is a little too high to be general interest.
OLA TUNANDER is Research Professor at the International Peace Research Institute Oslo.
[1] Most references to this article are also to be found in my main article for PHP: ‘Some Remarks on the US/UK Submarine Deception in Swedish Waters in the 1980s’; and in my book: Ola Tunander, The Secret War Against Sweden: US and British Submarine Deception in the 1980s (London & New York: Frank Cass, 2004).
[2] Ola Tunander, Norden och USAs maritima strategi: En studie av Nordens förändrade strategiska läge [The Nordic Countries and US Maritime Strategy: A Study of the Changed Strategic Position of the Nordic Countries]. Försvarets Forskningsanstalt (Swedish Defence Research Establishment), FOA Rapport C 10295-1.4 September (1987).
[3] Ola Tunander, Cold Water Politics: The Maritime Strategy and Geopolitics of the Northern Front (London: Sage, 1989).
[4] SOU 1983:13. Att möta ubåtshotet – Ubåtskränkningar och svensk säkerhetspolitik. Betänkande av ubåtsskyddskommissionen [To Counter the Submarine Threat. Report from the Submarine Defence Commission] (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 1983).
[5] Tunnader (1989), see for example page 114.
[6] SOU 1995:135. Ubåtsfrågan 1981-1994: Rapport från ubåtskommissionen [Report from the Submarine Commission] (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 1995).
[7] Lennart Ljung, Dagbok [Utskriven], March 8, 1983 (The Typed Diary of the Commander-in-Chief, General Lennart Ljung), Krigsarkivet, Stockholm (The Stockholm War Archive), 1978-1986.
[8] Interview with Caspar Weinberger, ‘Striptease’, Swedish TV2, (7 March 2000).
[9] Interview with Keith Speed, ‘Striptease’, Swedish TV2, (11 April 2000).
[10] A transcript of the interview is published in my book, Tunander (2004), pp 325-29.
[11] See also Tunander (2004), pp. 244-45.
[12] Interview with Sir John Walker, Associated Press, 08.38 pm (7 March 2000).
[13] See Tunander (2004), pp. 259-64.
[14] Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew with Annette Lawrence Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff: The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage (New York: HarperCollins, 1999).
[15] See for example SAP VU meeting (1983). Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party meeting 17 May 1983, Arbeterrörelsens arkiv (Labour Movement Archive). See also Lennart Ljung, Dagbok (Utskriven), March 8, 1983 (The Typed Diary of the Commander-in-Chief, General Lennart Ljung), Krigsarkivet, Stockholm (The Stockholm War Archive), 1978-1986.
[16] See for example interview with Paul Beaver, 'Striptease', Swedish TV2, (7 March [+11 April] 2000).
[17] Interview with Sven-Olof Kviman, ‘Aktuellt’, Swedish TV1, (7 March 2000).
[18] Tunander (2004).
[19] (CM/Grandin, 1982) ‘Granskning av ubåtsjaktverksamheten mot bakgrund av händelserna i Stockholms skärgård’, av Gunnar Grandin (ordförande) och Sven-Åke Adler (vise ordförande) för Chefen för Marinen 3 december 1982 (Swedish Navy internal investigation on the Hårsfjärden submarine hunt by Rear Admiral Gunnar Grandin (Chairman) and Sven-Åke Adler (Vice Chairman) for the Chief of Navy 3 December 1982), P. 25.
[20] Göran Wallén has argued that the yellow-green sea marker dye or visual distress signal (VDS) from 11 October could have been green paint from, for example, a box of paint destroyed by the mine explosion. The yellow-green VDS appeared on the surface one hour after a mine was detonated against a submarine on 11 October 1982. The VDS surfaced about 100-150 meters south-southeast of the place of the explosion. It’s almost impossible that a box of paint would have been destroyed one hour after the explosion, and it is unlikely that it would have surfaced at the very place where a damaged submarine most likely would have bottomed. The yellow-green patch was almost certainly a VDS from a damaged US submarine (see my ‘Some Remarks on the US/UK Submarine Deception in Swedish Waters in the 1980s’). Göran Wallén was debating this issue with the main secretary Mathias Mossberg, who was closer to my position (Ekéus Investigation Files, Riksarkivet, Stockholm). Göran was not willing to give up his position and Ambassador Ekéus accepted the absurd wording, which the insider would interpret as humorous. See SOU 2001:85. Perspectiv på ubåtsfrågan: Hanteringen av ubåtsfrågan politiskt och militärt (Stockholm: Statens Offentliga Utredningar, Försvarsdepartementet, 2001), p. 124. See also Göran Wallén, ‘Hårsfjärden 1982: Fakta i målet’, Tidskrift i Sjöväsendet, no. 1 (2002), pp. 33-50.
[21] SOU (1995), pp. 267-68.
[22] SOU (1983); see also SOU (1995).
[23] SOU (1995), pp. 201-210.
[24] CÖrlBO Krigsdagbok [Chief Naval Base East, Rear Admiral Christer Kierkegaard, War Diary], September 27 - October 15 1982; CMS Krigsdagbok (War Diary of Chief of the Mine Troops and the Chief of Mälsten Coastal Defence Base [Chief MS under Stockholm Coastal Defence] Lieutenant Colonel Sven-Olof Kviman), October 6-15, 1982.
[25] Protocol for the speaker channel on the tapes recorded at Mälsten between 11-28 October (The tapes had one channel for each of the five hydrophones plus one speaker channel for comments from the sonar operator). The tapes were sent to FOA and were called ‘FOA 0’ – ‘FOA 11’ (Protocol made by Chef MUSAC Peter Gnipping June 2001 for Ambassador Rolf Ekéus Submarine Investigation, The Ekéus Investigation Files, Riksarkivet, Stockholm).
[26] Marinens Analysgrupp Rapport från Hårsfjärdsincidenten (Attachment 61). [The Naval Analysis Group Report for the Hårsfjärden incident under Captain Emil Svensson]. The report cover the period September 27 - October 15, 1982.
[27] Marinens Analysgrupp (Attachment 38).
[28] Tunander (2004), pp. 135-148.
[29] SOU (1995), pp. 201-210.
[30] Marinens Analysgrupp Rapport (Attachment 38, Subattachment 2). FOA's rapport om bandinspelningar vid Mälsten: Ananlysresultat sammanfattning. 20 October 1982 (FOA report on the tape-recorded sounds at Mälsten 11-14 October).
[31] Lennart Ljung, Dagbok (Utskriven), 12 October 1982 (The Typed Diary of the Commander-in-Chief, General Lennart Ljung), Krigsarkivet, Stockholm (The Stockholm War Archive), 1978-1986.
[32] Tunander (2004), p. 139.
[33] Wallén (2002), p. 45.
[34] SOU (2001), p. 286.
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