Submarine Incursions in Swedish Waters, 1980-1992:
Comment on the Research Controversy
by Ola Tunander
22 November 2002
Ambassador Krister Wahlbäck argues that the submarines intruding Swedish waters in the 1980s must have been Soviet submarines because of Soviet interest in the area, even though there is little hard evidence. Ambassador Rolf Ekéus says in his comment that the Soviet Union can "scarcely be excluded as a possible violating state. Nor can the possibility of intrusions of Western submarines be excluded". To Professor Tom Nichols, Ekéus statement about Western submarines is absurd, because why would Western submarines play "cat and mouse with the Swedes? … The Soviets, by contrast, had excellent reasons to test Swedish abilities". In recent years, I have studied Swedish Navy documents from the submarine incidents in Swedish waters and had hundreds of interviews with relevant actors. I contributed as an expert to the Ekéus Investigation, and after having looked into much of the archival material, I find speculations about who had "reasons" for operating in Swedish waters as irrelevant as long as there is no discussion about reported observations and indications. Like Wahlbäck, I am not entirely happy with the Ekéus report, but for different reasons, and this may explain the cautious wording used by Ambassador Ekéus himself. First, some background information. Ambassador Ekéus was appointed to carry out his investigation because of a 15-minute TV-interview with former US defense secretary Caspar Weinberger. Weinberger said that "NATO" or Western submarines operated regularly in Swedish waters in order to test Swedish defences after US-Swedish Navy-to-Navy consultations. "It was part of a routine regular scheduled series of defense testing that NATO did and indeed had to do to be responsible and liable." However, according to Weinberger, "at no time, to my knowledge, did NATO simply send a submarine directly into Swedish waters without consultations and prior discussions that that could be done". This view was confirmed by the British former head of the Defence Intelligence, Sir John Walker, who said that "NATO was allowed a certain amount of intrusions during a given period", and by the former British navy minister, Sir Keith Speed, who said the Royal Navy used Oberon and Porpoise class submarines for these kinds of tests, and he spoke about going deep into the Swedish waters to test: "How far could we get without you being aware of it". Oberon captains have told me that they operated Special Boat Service submarines along the Swedish coast, and these operations were even more secret than the operations in Soviet waters. Former BALTAP Commander, the Danish general Kjeld Hilligsø, said in the same TV programme as Weinberger that NATO was "interested in testing if Sweden firstly was capable and secondly willing to defend its territory", in other words, to find out if the Swedes were willing to use force against "intruding submarines". All this was a risky enterprise, but Paul Beaver at Jane's in London said that there was no problem "as long as somebody in the High Command in Stockholm was aware that there were going to be some intrusions during a given period". All these responsible former officials spoke of or confirmed the existence of Western submarines that on a regular basis tested Swedish defences. In other words, they confirmed that Western submarines on a regular basis masqueraded as an "intruder" deep into Swedish archipelagos where these defences were located. After the interview with Weinberger, Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson wanted to know how such regular operations could have been conducted - after consultations with the Swedish Navy - without the Swedish Prime Minister, Defence Minister or Foreign Minister being aware of it. The Ekéus Investigation was asked to investigate how Swedish authorities, including the armed forces, had dealt with these "established and apparent underwater violations of Swedish territorial waters". But, according to the Swedish naval officers interviewed, there was no such regular presence of Western submarines in Swedish waters. Former prime minister Ingvar Carlsson believed that it might have been some Western activity, and his defence minister Thage G. Peterson implied US submarine operations, but none of them seemed to know. Peterson referred to hints from his US counterparts. Nobody in the Swedish Navy was willing to speak about these activities for the Ekéus Investigation. However, in the documents from these submarine hunts there were substantial indications of Western underwater activity, but the final evidence - the particular pages, the specific photos and the important tapes - were all removed from the military intelligence archive. I believe that Ambassador Ekéus prefers not being put in the same unpleasant category as the 1983 Submarine Defence Commission, which tried to point to a state responsible for the intrusions - using "indications and circumstantial evidence" - without having the final evidence proving his case. In April 1983, the Submarine Defence Commission launched its report on the 1982 anti-submarine operation in the Stockholm archipelago. Chairman of the Commission, former defence and foreign minister Sven Andersson, stated at the press conference that visual sightings (drawings), signal intelligence and acoustic information definitely pointed to the Warsaw Pact, and most likely to the Soviet Union. There was only the Soviet Union that had this capability within the Warsaw Pact. There was no doubt. His wording was almost identical to the words used in a now declassified Defence Staff Report, from Andersson's expert, a week earlier. Today, however, it is clearly established that no such information existed. Already before this report was made, both the signal intelligence agency FRA and a representative from the navy gave briefings to the Commission clearly stating that no relevant information from signal intelligence existed. Details about submarine sails that the Ekéus Investigation found in the internal Swedish Navy report from this anti-submarine operation did not indicate Soviet submarines but rather the opposite. Some information indicated specific western submarines. Even, the acoustic information points to the West. Some evidence points to the USA. In a war, West German submarines would operate against the Soviet Baltic coast and most likely use Swedish waters and bases for the supply of fuel and ammunition. In the 1980s, West Germans submarines were even using their visits to Swedish ports to exercise for such operations. However, it is very difficult to understand why conventional submarines, midgets, and submersibles preparing for wartime contingencies (like the Soviets and the West Germans) would show their periscopes and sails for longer periods of time in densely populated archipelagos, in Swedish naval bases, and even in central Stockholm a hundred metres from a visiting US cruiser and frigate. This was not necessary, and, from an operational point of view, it does not make sense. However, this behaviour is logical if one wants to masquerade as the other to test Swedish capability and will, or if one wants to increase Swedish readiness against a Soviet attack. It is an undeniable fact that the submarines repeatedly violating Swedish waters in the 1980s radically increased the Swedish awareness about the Soviet threat and radically increased Swedish military readiness against a Soviet attack. The opinion polls changed drastically and Swedish military forces were uprooted from their bureaucratic lethargy. Swedish foreign policy changes were an important spin-off of these activities. US and British submarine operations in Swedish waters may have been the most successful covert operations during the Cold War. Most likely, there were also Soviet operations in Swedish waters, but the Soviets would certainly not have operated in the way described above. During the submarine hunt in Karlskrona in February-March 1984, the Soviet Foreign Ministry asked the Swedes: "Why do the Swedes not use more military force against what they believe are submarines?" Finnish President Mauno Koivisto conveyed the following message to the Swedes from the Soviet General Secretary Yuri Andropov: "It will suit us very well if the Swedes use live ammunition against the intruding submarines." After a Whiskey class submarine hit a rock in southern Sweden in 1981, everyone, myself included, believed that the submarine operations in Sweden were conducted by the Soviets. This was also what I wrote at the time. Today, we know that "indications and circumstantial evidence" point in a very different direction. This may be another reason for Ambassador Ekéus cautious attitude.
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