Stalin and His Legacy: Offensive Plan in 1950?

Gen. Drzewiecki: About our operational plan, the use of the Polish Armed Forces in a potential future conflict. The briefing by Stalin allegedly took place (in January ’51). It took place already after the so-called May exercises. So those May exercises in ’50 defined the responsibilities of the Polish armed forces in a potential conflict.

The then Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Army, Marshal Vasilevskii, directed the exercise. It was a staff command exercise. All operational and tactical units of the Western Theater of Operations took part in it. For the first time in the history of the Polish Army in the postwar era, the notion appeared of a Maritime Front, a self-directed operational-strategic unit. Before, the units of the Polish Army had a different operational-strategic assignment. Two armies were stationed with bases in the Pomeranian and Silesian Military Districts, and these armies were supposed to join respectively the fronts created by the Northern Army Group and the Central Army Group. According to the pattern – more or less – of the Second World War.

Q: The First Belorussian and the First Ukrainian Front?

Gen. Drzewiecki: Yes. The Northern Army Group created the Northern Front and the Central Army Group, the Central Front, and that was where these armies were to go. In contrast, in that May exercise in ’50, for the first time the Maritime Front appeared, which the central institutions of the Ministry of National Defense were supposed to set up. Acting then as commander of the Front was General Popławski. He was not prepared. But he was surrounded by Soviet advisers, who were helping him extricate himself from such problems that making decisions at the front level created for him. In this exercise, I was in that group that was to discuss the exercises. The May exercises represented for us the basis for working out operational plans.

In this exercise, as I said, the outline of an operational-strategic plan for the Polish armed forces was laid out. It foresaw the stationing of two first-echelon armies and one second-echelon army in the composition of this Maritime Front. The stationing of suitable forces for the defense of the Coast. Of course, some attention was devoted to the defense of the Coast. The basic assumption was the implementation of an offensive along the entire Western front. The capture of the line including Hamburg and the Kiel Canal was our first responsibility. A landing operation was to be carried out at Bornholm, the occupation of Bornholm. And as a further assignment for that Maritime Front was the opening of an offensive against the Jutland Peninsula. The occupation of the Danish straits and the closure of the Baltic.

This was practiced in general during those very May exercises. Of course, the state of the military forces at the time would not have permitted the realization of such an operation. But later the armed forces were systematically adapted to realize an operation of this very type. That is, the corps structure was abandoned, [and] the armies had a direct, divisional composition; the first-echelon armies consisted of mechanized tank divisions; an airlift division was created – that was in a later period – with the assignment, of course, among others, of occupying Bornholm. The main points of contention in this direction, or even for the preparation of an operation to conquer Bornholm, would have been the use of nuclear weapons at a certain stage. Landing units were created in the Navy. Stalin was clearly inspired by his staff.

With regard to the defense of the Coast, Rokossovskii took a so-called field trip along the Coast after the May exercises. That is, the Coast was probably divided into three sections. I received the middle section. We conducted thorough reconnaissance of the defense of the Coast. And after that, Rokossovskii went by train along the Coast, and it was successively reported to him, and he was driven to the more interesting sections along the Coast. And then the decision was made to organize a brigade to defend the Coast. Well, and these brigades for the defense of the Coast were to be the first line of defense, while in the second line was to be a Corps created from two divisions of infantry, based in the Warsaw Military District.

And in the main theater, military maneuvers were not conducted. There might have been somewhere during the operation — for example, I know that during the turn towards the Jutland Peninsula, a part of the defense forces was placed here to cover the flank from the West, along the Elbe. But there was not yet any practicing of the defensive army operations [during the exercises].

Q: A defensive operation, General, was not planned in principle?

Gen. Drzewiecki: It was not planned.

Q: Because if a defensive operation was not being planned, then it was an offensive operation — that is, in principle the intention was unmistakable.

Gen. Drzewiecki: Well, yes. I did not come across any words of criticism regarding the doctrine at that time in any quarters. Only the possession of adequate forces and means awakened doubts. [Drzewiecki, pp. 2-3, 8, 12-14]

Attempted Reform

Gen. Drzewiecki: One should be aware of the situation in which the memorandum came into being. Of course, there were no miracles. I was not the exclusive author; I put it down on paper. It was the result of the thoughts of many colleagues — officers, generals — with whom I cooperated at the time. The document could only have come into being against the backdrop of the changes of the time, adopted after October [1956]. It could be that we were naive. We believed that that Plenum really initiated some period of change in the history of People’s Poland. The results were unpleasant [although] the document is relatively cautious. It is true that it contains theses, which sound — sounded at that time — let’s say, revolutionary. But certain postulates were considered cautious because the Hungarians were planning to leave the Warsaw Pact. And how did things end up for them? We were also aware of this at the time. Someone could link it with the developments that occurred after ‘89. The authors and I personally at the time did not go so far in our views. It also had as its goal reform of the system, but under the limits, in the framework, in which we earlier found ourselves. That is, all the theses, although they had as a goal many reforms, they did not come out against the basic strategic assumption — that is, against the participation of the armed forces in the Warsaw Pact.

Gomułka took the memorandum [1] with him when he went to Moscow for the first time after October ‘56, a sort of triumphant journey. At the railway stations the train was stopped, crowds of people came; they raised the banner cry to Gomułka that he should not yield in Moscow. And when he returned, similar demonstration took place. He took the document to Moscow and left it there. And for the longest time there was no response. After that, some cosmetic changes ensued. Basic changes occurred, however, only after the reorganization of the Polish armed forces. That is, then we finally gave up on a corps structure. The armies had a divisional structure; the operative and strategic tasks of the Polish armed forces were brought up to date.

These activities had a formal character. The Committee of Ministers of Defense was established as the organ deciding not only about political cooperation, but it also had the adjective “consultative.” Formally, the powers of the representatives of the individual countries were increased in the Unified Staff. The number of advisors was decreased. The basic character of the command of the Unified Armed Forces was not changed. For a certain period it was even the so-called XI Administration of the General Staff of the Soviet Army. The representatives [of other countries] did not generally have access to it. The rooms in which they were located had cars, but they could not interfere in many things. And already with regard to operations, it was completely ruled out. [Drzewiecki, pp. 1-2]

Gen. Drzewiecki: At the time when the Plenum gathered in Warsaw,[2] I was at the Drawsk base, and was carrying out inspections of the twelfth division. With me at the base was Huszcza, and I took General Kuropieska. I picked him up in the car, and the three of us sat that evening, I remember, and some carafe of vodka was sitting on the table. And we found out that there was a Plenum in Warsaw. We turned on the radio, listened to Gomułka’s famous speech, and immediately after it, there was a telephone call that we should report to Warsaw in the morning. We traveled to Warsaw in the night in two cars. Along the way, we saw the Tank Division, which was from Czarny, in the area of Szczecinek.

Q: The 20th Tank Division was stationed there.

Gen. Drzewiecki: Not ours. A Russian division. The road was littered with broken-down tanks. But the front ranks of the division made it more or less to Sochaczów. I returned to Warsaw, and of course, in the Operational Administration, I ordered a report on the situation. No one gave any orders for the movement of Polish divisions. The Polish units were all in their garrisons.

Q: With the exception of the KBW [Internal Security Corps] — right?

Gen. Drzewiecki: Preparations were intensified, but nobody moved.

Q: But battle readiness was raised. Three tactical units had such orders. Just as that tank division was stationed the whole time, up to the very end, in Borne-Sulinowo. The Soviet Tank Division.

Gen. Drzewiecki: Yes, it was. Up to the withdrawal of the Soviet armies. [Drzewiecki, p. 11]

Alliance without Structure

Q: When the Warsaw Pact was created, did we have operational or strategic tasks?

Gen. Drzewiecki: I can only answer for the period up to the end of ‘62. In our operational plan, there was the achievement of the offensive operation by Polish forces. The operational plan that I recounted basically did not change; the assignments of that front remained the very same, but the development of armaments, especially the introduction at that time of weapons of mass destruction — concretely, nuclear weapons — also had to be reflected in our plans. Both with regard to the defense of our own armies, and also for use in an offensive operation. We of course did not possess these weapons or the means to deliver these weapons, but in coordination with the Staff of the Unified Armed Forces — that is with the XI Administration of the General Staff of the Soviet Army — we planned — I must admit that we planned the use of [these] weapons — of course, not in the initial phase of the operation, but during the implementation of the later assignment. In principle the use of atomic weapons was planned in response to the use of atomic weapons by the enemy. Such was the general principle. I do not know how it looked in the Soviet Army, it is difficult for me to answer such a question. There is such an old military principle that generals always prepare the armies for the previous war. So in Poland, too, it was also deeply instilled. And therefore one should have fought against those schemes that did not take into account the use of nuclear weapons, that did not take into account the use of relatively modern means on the battlefield. Discussions of such a type had a great enough significance. [Drzewiecki, pp. 3-6]

Gen. Szklarski: From 1955 to 1968 inclusive there was practically no structure to the Warsaw Pact. Neither a command nor a staff. A supreme commander was appointed, and a Chief of Staff of the Unified Armed Forces. And in the General Staff of the Soviet Army, in the so-called X Administration, there were representatives from the individual armies that composed the Warsaw Pact. Still, they functioned there only as individuals. At that time, they filled a sort of role as liaisons, directing officers between the general staffs and the Main Staff in the GDR and the General Staff of the Soviet Army. And there was no structure. All functions that the Soviet Army, or the Soviet leadership associated with the structures of the Warsaw Pact were decided in the General Staff of the Soviet Army, and there were no consultations. [Szklarski, p. 3]

Gen. Tuczapski: Until ‘60 there was no operational plan. After the adoption of a decision about the Warsaw Pact (it was a political decision), questions only then began to develop: economic questions, questions of our relations also along military lines. Until the moment that I entered the General Staff in the capacity as chief of the Operations Department, there was practically no planning, despite the exercises that were taking place, to which the Soviets from the X Administration also came — there was a Lieutenant General Gusev. All of this was in accordance with such principles that [if] something should be done, we will help, and we will do it.

The first person who began to demonstrate that it could not continue to be like this was Spychalski,[3] especially after the experiences of Cuba and Berlin. This was an experience that gave them a great deal to think about, and they simply attacked us, that you should say what you actually wanted. Please remember that at the moment when the problem of Berlin arose, they stood before the fact that they would most likely have to transfer the eastern [military] districts to the GDR. Because a war might take place.

I remember that I then went to Minsk, and there the whole fuss began. Because of which roads? And how would they anticipate fuel issues? Replacement parts? After all, they were supposed to cross in those tanks, all of that through all of Poland — that was 700, 800 km. And also the depth of those districts: the Baltic, the Minsk, and the Carpathian — that is also several hundred kilometers. Such that they would have come to the western border and stood in place, because there was no fuel. Then, we began urgently — based on their request — to prepare certain fuel depots here.

Q: You said, sir, that it was a fuss. That is, the fuss was based on the fact that they claimed it was not ready?

Gen. Tuczapski: Yes! While I was there in Minsk, along with a group of my officers, a whole group of people from Moscow came. Do you know what it was like? “We want, not done, do not have, you do not know!” Then I told them: “Gentlemen, comrades, after all, there is no planning. We do not know anything about what we are supposed to do, which roads you want to take, over which bridges you want to cross?”

And only then did they come to the conclusion that an enlargement of the Theater of Military Operations was simply necessary; that is, they should present their requests and recommendations for what should be done in our Polish country, and furthermore, that they should involve themselves in it because we would not prepare the fuel for them, we would not prepare spare parts for them, because that was not our problem. We would prepare the roads and bridges wherever it was necessary. Later, we thought in such categories, that upon crossing over the Vistula and over the Oder, special Units for Territorial Defense should be created that would insure the possibility of transit, but not just for them [the Soviets]. Also for the transit of our forces. And also for the normal functioning of the state, because the Vistula divides us, Poland, into two parts, and we would not be able to transit.

Only at the beginning of the sixties did we first sit down to some sort of concrete planning, to some sort of operational plan. Only then did we see how they positioned our Front. Then they assented to the Front because from the beginning they had not wanted to hear that we would create a Front as a higher operational unit. They thought that just armies would suffice. They consented and only then did a normal operational practice follow. And only then did their relationship to us similarly begin to change completely. Because from the beginning they had considered us in the same way, let’s say, as an owner, as a tradesman (when he was the commander of a regiment) — “What are you little Poles doing there?” [Tuczapski, pp. 4-5]

Gen. Jaruzelski: All of us in some sense were relieved of a certain corset that was characteristic of that period in the first half of the fifties. The Soviet Union was no longer considered to be an inviolable taboo. Of course, there was still the feeling that the alliance was the main thing, and it should not be harmed. All of us had been deported at the point of a machine-gun and in cattle cars, but we wrote that we found ourselves during the war in the Soviet Union, that was the formula.

Władysław Gomułka, who was in this regard a person mindful of our independence, had the awareness that we had to pay for this independence in more important matters so that it would not call forth irritating plots, irritating subjects having to do with history but that were not important today; what should we achieve, what should we gain, what should we ensure ourselves. I never heard him ever speak contemptuously about our allies. Moreover, over the years, a relationship, I would say, of far-reaching friendship grew in him. Where did this come from?

It resulted first of all from what power always brings—that the person becomes petrified within certain arrangements, certain structures. I cannot find a better term. That’s the way things were. Because it went on internally – if not a battle, then debates and conflicts of various kinds – there was an environment that gave a feeling of certainty, that gave a feeling that there would not be some sort of blow from one side, that the older brother could cause without difficulty or with difficulty, having some possibilities or the other here. In this regard there was still always the open problem of the western border, which was exceptionally acute for us until ’70. And I saw to some extent through Gomułka’s eyes his relations with Khrushchev, which later assumed such a very outright, friendly character. [Jaruzelski, pp. 24-5]

 

Notes

[1] Władysław Gomułka, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party (the ruling communist party).

[2] The plenary session of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party in October 1956.

[3] Marian Spychalski, Polish Minister of National Defense.