XII. Meeting of the PCC, Berlin, 2 December 1970
Editorial Note
Convened less than four months after the previous PCC meeting, the Berlin gathering continued the process of mutual consultation started after the conclusion of the Soviet-West German treaty, and since then made more topical by the negotiation, though not yet conclusion, of the Polish-German treaty. This treaty was crucial not only because it involved the acceptance by West Germany of its territorial losses east of the Oder-Neisse line, whose final recognition the Bonn government maintained was up to the four power responsible for the peace treaty with reunified Germany. The resolution of the border issue was also for the Warsaw Pact precondition for the establishment by its members of normal diplomatic relations with West Germany.
Gomułka expressed satisfaction at the manner in which the West Germans in effect accepted his country's western border. He further emphasized that Poland did not make any substantive concessions in return, having particularly made no concession in regard to the remaining German minority in Poland beyond agreement to the reunification of families. Taking a longer view, however, the Polish leader rightly pointed out that "we have started a process," and it may eventually turn to our advantage or to our disadvantage.
While generally welcoming the process, different Warsaw Pact members emphasized different achievements and priorities regarding what was yet to be accomplished. Husák pointed out that negotiations about the invalidation of the 1938 Munich agreement ab initio, desired by the Prague government, had not even started. Ulbricht noted that Bonn's acquiescence in the territorial changes resulting from World War II did not preclude its trying to link the ratification of the Soviet-West German agreement with an agreement on Berlin that would entail infringement by the three Western powers on what he considered "vital functions of the GDR."
Kádár maintained that the Brandt government was the best the Warsaw Pact could wish and Ceauşescu tried to claim credit for pioneering the impending normalization of its members' relations with West Germany since Romania had been the first to normalize those relations, against their opposition, long time ago.
Attempting to draw a balance, Brezhnev regarded the two treaties as a watershed in shaping relations with the West to the East's advantage but admitted that it was too early to tell how negotiations on West Berlin would turn out. He noted that the Brandt government was still weak and needed support, warning that ups and down is relations with West Germany should be expected. He singled out the project for a European Security Conference as the next top priority.
The Soviet Union wanted the PCC to issue statements about Vietnam, the Middle East, and Africa as part of its appeal for the security conference, but because of Romanian opposition the statements, directed against the United States, were issued separately from the appeal to a conference that required American cooperation.
Vojtech Mastny
