VIII. Meeting of the PCC, Bucharest, 4-6 July 1966
Editorial Note

The meeting followed a series of conferences called in response to a Soviet campaign for reform of the Warsaw Pact, initiated at the beginning of 1966. At issue in the attempted reform was enhancing the powers of the supreme commander and creating new institutions, particularly a military council as the PCC's subsidiary in charge of military matters and a committee on technology to supervise research and development.

The proposed reform prompted a genuine discussion among the Warsaw Pact's members and a large number of amendments, thus disappointing Moscow's hopes for an expeditious implementation of the changes it wanted. The attempt at consolidation prompted the Romanians to question the fundamental premises of the alliance, particularly the subordination of the national armed forces to the will and whim of the Soviet supreme commander.

Striving to inhibit the use by the Soviet Union of its nuclear weaponry in the event of war permeated different responses to the reform program. The Czechoslovaks wanted the proposed military council to function as a subcommittee of the PCC that would ensure common strategy and appropriate military planning. Without illusions that this could work, the Romanians sought instead a committee capable of tying the hands of the Soviet supreme commander by giving each of its members the right of veto. They were rightly accused of trying "to paralyze the alliance and transform its organs into noncommittal discussion clubs." [1]

In May 1966, the conference of Warsaw Pact defense ministers in Moscow nevertheless agreed to the texts of statutes for the joint command and committee on technology, and forwarded them to the PCC for final approval. The approval, however, hinged on the reservations attached by Romania to the first, though not the second document. Moreover, Bucharest leaked rumors about being opposed to the reform plan in principle and went public pleading for the abolition of both military groupings, the dismantling in Europe of all foreign bases, and the withdrawal from there of all foreign troops - demands more disruptive of the Warsaw Pact than of NATO. Considering that the Romanian challenge to the integrity of the Soviet alliance was more fundamental than any NATO ever faced, Moscow's forbearance of the mischief was remarkable.

Rather than pressing for the acceptance of the reform plans, the Soviet Union tried to rally its allies on other divisive issues - the relations with West Germany, the conflict with China, the Vietnam War. At the PCC meeting, the most acrimonious debate took place about a declaration on the Vietnam War, of which the Soviet Union and Romania had prepared two different drafts. The Romanians took a pro-Chinese position by championing North Vietnam against what they described as a "capitulationist" attitude taken by Poland. Reflecting Soviet preferences at the time, the Poles favored a negotiated end of the war trough mediation in which it would play a prominent role.

At one point during the heated debate, the new Romanian party chief Nicolae Ceauşescu threatened to publish separately the Romanian version of the statement on Vietnam. The Soviet Union defended the Poles while trying to appease the Romanians. "One must be patient," Brezhnev later explained to Ulbricht, for "comrade Ceauşescu is still young and inexperienced." [2] In the end, an agreement was reached on the Vietnam declaration, which was subsequently published. "This is the first time at such a high-level meeting that divergent points of view were discussed [...] and [...] accepted in the agenda," Romanian politburo member Emil Bondăraş commented later.[3]

At Bucharest, the Soviet Union struck an informal deal with its allies by shelving the Warsaw Pact's reorganization in return for their support of a conference on European security - an idea advanced by Poland at the previous PCC meeting now adapted by Moscow to its own purposes. Rather than striving to mitigate conflict between the superpowers through rapprochement between their junior partners, as the Poles were hoping to do, the Soviet Union sought to foment division within NATO by isolating West Germany. As preconditions of the conference, the declaration demanded recognition by the West of both German states, abandonment by FRG of its legal claim to territories east of the Oder-Neisse line, eastern German territories, and its claim for exclusive representation. The Romanians particularly welcomed the declaration because of its calls for the eventual dissolution of both military blocs, withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of European states, and liquidation of military bases abroad in foreign countries.

Expressing his satisfaction with the outcome of the Bucharest meeting, Brezhnev commented prematurely that, "with less lecturing and shouting about friendship," relations within the communist bloc had turned for the better.[4]

Vojtech Mastny

Notes

[1] Vojtech Mastny, "Learning from the Enemy: NATO as a Model for the Warsaw Pact," Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung, no. 58 (Zurich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse, 2001), p. 22; also published in A History of NATO - The First Fifty Years, ed. Gustav Schmidt, vol. 2 (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 157-77, 393-401.

[2] Record of Brezhnev-Ulbricht conversation, 9 October 1966, ZPA J IV 2/202/344 Bd 10, SAPMO-BA.

[3] Minutes of Romanian politburo meeting, 12 July 1966, in Romania and the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1989, ed. Mircea Munteanu, vol. 1 (Washington: Cold War International History Project, 2002), p. 307.

[4] See note 2, above.