V. Meeting of the PCC, Moscow, 7 June 1962
Editorial Note
The brief meeting of the PCC followed a two-day Comecon summit, at which the main subject of discussion was the division of labor among its member countries - an issue that later fueled Romanian discontent and dissidence. Politically, both meetings were overshadowed by the festering German question that generated tension between East German leader Walter Ulbricht, bitter about Soviet unwillingness to risk conflict with the Western powers by concluding a separate peace treaty with his country, and Khrushchev, indignant at Ulbricht's insistence on economic aid to keep East Germany afloat.
The Soviet-made public declaration issued after the PCC meeting still mentioned the desirability of a peace treaty with Germany and blamed the Western powers for perpetuating the Berlin crisis by their resistance to its conclusion. The tenor of the statement, however, was moderate, emphasizing Soviet willingness to continue negotiating and expressing hope in a peaceful solution of the German question. In reality, Khrushchev had given up concluding the treaty, trying to convince his allies that everything that could have been achieved by signing it had already been achieved.
In Khrushchev's opinion, the peace treaty with Germany would provide the Soviet bloc no more than moral satisfaction. Concluding a separate treaty with East Germany, as Ulbricht badly wanted, would not make the Americans any more willing to negotiate while it would probably provoke economic sanctions damaging to the GDR. The Soviet party secretary informed his audience about the ongoing Soviet-American talks on Germany and, at variance with the subsequently published declaration, told them that the talks were going well. In fact, he defended the need to publish the declaration by saying that otherwise the West "might get the impression that we have lost interest […] or are afraid." He suggested, with unwarranted optimism, that the United States was favorably disposed to the Soviet idea of concluding a non-aggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Rejecting Ulbricht's attempt to at least include the epithet "revanchist" in the communiqué when referring to West Germany, Khrushchev decided that the best option was a declaration that included nothing new.
In the aftermath of the meeting, Khrushchev in a conversation with the Czechoslovak party chef Antonín Novotný vented his anger at the obstreperous Ulbricht. According to Khrushchev, Ulbricht spoke "as if he were doing others a favor by building socialism in the GDR," asking constantly for handouts. "The German fought against us, now they have a higher standard of living than our population, and we always have to give and give," Khrushchev complained. He concluded that, much like in the case of Stalin, Ulbricht's obstinacy was indicative of potentially dangerous senility.
Nothing in the record of the meeting indicated that in the month before the Soviet party presidium had secretly approved Khrushchev's decision to place nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba, thus risking a military confrontation with the United States.
Vojtech Mastny
