The Soviet Union and India: the years of late Stalinism
by Andreas Hilger

Documents and essay published September, 2008

I

The emergence in the 1940s of an independent India (and Pakistan) paralleled the successive intensification of the East-West conflict. Although the Nehru Government was unwilling to commit itself in this confrontation, the rivaling superpowers interpreted Indian foreign policy through a Cold War lens. This was especially true for Stalin, whose reluctance to recognize new international approaches, internal priorities or alternative cultural or ideological mindsets proved a long-time deterrent against Indian – as well as against Pakistani – initiatives for coming to closer terms with the USSR during the late 1940s. So, while the Pakistani background of the intensly discussed, repeatedly postponed, and finally shelved visit of its first prime minister, Liaqat Ali Khan, to Moscow in 1949 remains shrouded in mystery, [1] it seems obvious that the Soviet side never tried to ascertain underlying Pakistani motives or to give an early Soviet-Pakistani rapprochement any chance. Quite the contrary. On 15 October 1949, the Kremlin decreed it would break off ongoing Soviet-Pakistani trade negotiations since Moscow was reluctant to redirect  much-needed goods necessary for rebuilding and strengthening Eastern European, Chinese or Mongolian economies to Karachi. [2]

Generally, the Indian government experienced similar Soviet inhospitality, although Nehru had shown his eagerness for independent relations as early as 1946. [3] Against this background, the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and the USSR in April 1947 did not prelude a new era in Soviet-Indian cooperation, but rather appears as a last echo of a transition period, [4] in which Stalin had to assess post war inter-allied relations, the beginning of decolonization and the Chinese Civil War. [5] By the time India ultimately became independent, ideological orthodoxy and security concerns had long reaffirmed themselves as Stalin’s exclusive obsessions both at home and abroad. “Among the Russians there is a feeling that we have made too much of the recent transfer of power from Britain and that we are permitting ourselves to be lulled into a false sense of security,” the first Indian ambassador to the USSR, V. L. Pandit, summarized the Soviet attitude after the first few weeks of her stay in Moscow. [6] The Soviet leader did not see any real substance in the completed transfer of power, and in spite of repeated pleas of the Indian ambassador for “most cordial relations”, [7] this negative attitude was soon to culminate in shrill exposures of the “oppressive” and “anti-national” character of Nehru’s Government. [8] Consequently, the Kremlin did nothing to substantially underpin the diplomatic recognition, neither in the political, economic nor cultural realms. [9]

To sum up, the Soviet leader’s preoccupation with ideological purity as well as his broad understanding of security prevented him from seeing possible advantages in intensified relations with the newly independent India. His static assessment was reinforced by the very nature of Soviet information policy; the main sources for news from India were a few staunch Stalinists in the shape of TASS-correspondents and diplomatic representatives. Their messages were fuelled less by Indian realities than by traditional Soviet certainties and predispositions. Besides, the Communist Party of India (CPI) served as the auxiliary recruitment pool for local information brokers, who, however, were also not noted for their impartiality; furthermore, the CPI turned out to be an isolated and fraction-driven internal force, vacillating between right and left positions. Nevertheless, thanks to Stalin’s firm ideological reading of the Indian situation and the Indian Communists’ dependence on outside assistance, the Soviet interest in South Asia first manifested itself in its relations with the CPI during the 1950s.

II

Since the CPI’s foundation in the early 1920s, its party life suffered from ideological incoherence and personal aversions. The twisted course of international Communism under the Comintern’s guidance (until 1943), in combination with the dynamics of the Indian national movement (since 1941/1942), had only intensified inner-party struggles. At the same time, those external influences had strengthened the Communist tendency for self-imposed exclusion from a broad Indian national consensus. Generally, the party’s fragility was demonstrated by heated discussions about the party line, resulting in abrupt tactical turns and corresponding radical shake-ups of the party’s top ranks. The unstable relationship with the Indian national movement was expressed in Mahatma Gandhi’s catalogue of probing questions concerning “foreign” influences on the CPI, presented to the then secretary-general of the CPI, P. C. Joshi, in 1944. The last official strings between the CPI and the Indian National Congress (INC) were annulled immediately after the Second World War. [10]

Confronted with profound changes in India, enervated by endless inner-party conflicts, nationally isolated and equipped with a deep-seated distrust against fraternal advice from British comrades (CPGB), [11] the CPI in July 1947 finally asked for Moscow’s “recommendations concerning the most important questions in politics and tactics under new and very difficult conditions.” [12] The request was swiftly granted by the Soviet authorities. Several meetings between CPI politburo member S. A. Dange,  officials from the Soviet Central Committee’s Department for Foreign Affairs (VPK) and the Soviet politburo member Andrei Zhdanov revealed once again Indian susceptibility to ideological distortions of national realities as well as to sugar-coated self-portrayals. On the other side, the Soviet representatives, delving into the niceties of subcontinental foreign affairs, society and economy, at least implicitly admitted spectacular gaps in their knowledge about the current state of India. In the end, concluding Soviet suggestions hardly covered the breadth of the CPI’s  internal debates. Instead, apart from expressing Soviet support for an independent Pakistani Communist Party, Zhdanov at length elaborated on the need to attract Indian peasants to the Communist cause. Surprisingly enough, Stalin’s ideologue found the most promising prototype for the proposed renaming of the CPI (“Workers’ and Peasants’ Party” or “Party of the Working People”) and for separate, unspecified “democratic reforms”  in Northern Korea. In addition, Moscow Bolshevists singled out “archaic” and “reactionary” caste relations as uniquely Indian, which were to be opposed by intensified propaganda and “education”. [13]

Overall, the critical view on Nehru’s accomplishments notwithstanding, Soviet recommendations could not be read as a call to arms and revolution. Consequently, the near legendary Conference of South East Asian Youth Organizations in Calcutta (held in February 1948) was not used by Soviet representatives to convey revolutionary battle orders. [14] Therefore, the CPI’s radical shift to the left that materialized at the end of 1947 might have caught Moscow unprepared; unlike Soviet Communists, the CPI’s new secretary-general, B. T. Ranadive, perceived a revolutionary situation in India and pinned his hopes on violent actions of the – more or less virtual – working class. Regardless of these open contradictions, the archives remain silent with respect to any conceivable reactions to the Indian path in Moscow. Obviously, it took more than disparate, isolated skirmishes to win Moscow’s concentrated attention on the CPI’s party quarrels.

III

It was international developments that led to Stalin’s increasing interest in Asian affairs in general and in Asian Communist affairs in particular. [15] Mao’s victory in China not only meant a rearrangement of the “correlation of forces” between the socialist and capitalist camps, but had, at least in Moscow’s eyes, to be integrated into Stalinist narratives and patterns of the worldwide revolutionary process. To be sure, Stalin had no interest in a build-up of Mao’s China as an equal partner – leader – in world Communism. Therefore, for instance, early Soviet deliberations about an “Eastern Cominform” envisaged only very limited Asian membership – Chinese, North Korean and Japanese Communist parties – selected in tandem with  Soviet strategic considerations in the Far East. [16] Apart from China, Moscow still had to take into account possible reverberations of the Yugoslav heresy in the Asian Communist world: Belgrade’s message had been presented in India and during the above mentioned youth conference as early as 1947/1948. [17] And, finally, the British Communists, in spite of missing Indian enthusiasm for colonial traditions, still showed an eager determination to prove themselves as Moscow’s loyal and indispensable junior partners in Asian affairs.

In this complex situation, in the eyes of Moscow’s professional observers, the Indian Communist party turned out to be a somewhat disillusioning case. In a December 1949 report to Molotov, V. Grigoryan, the chairman of the Central Committee’s Department for Foreign Affairs (VPK), vividly described the ongoing internal conflicts between “right reformist deviations” and “left sectarian failures”. “The leaders of the CPI do not have a clear conception of the new situation [in India], there is no certainty or unity with regard to the definition of the party’s tasks. There is,” continued Grigoryan’s devastating criticism, “no agreement with respect to several important questions of politics and tactics.” From Moscow’s point of view, this depressing picture was compounded by a general disregard for the “colonial situation, the level of development in India.” The experienced Stalinist Grigoryan attributed the defects to “a very low theoretic-ideological level of the majority of party members,” with inadequate party education and with a dangerously high number of “petty bourgeois” elements which contaminated the party’s ranks. [18] Practically, these theoretical shortcomings led to further reshuffles at the top. In May 1950, C. Rajeshwar Rao took over the responsibilities of secretary-general. He implemented South Indian preferences in country-concentrated revolutionary tactics, only to be confronted with fierce opposition by the right wing under the Bombay-based trade unionist S. A. Dange, who publicly repudiated armed struggle against the Government. [19]

As practiced in preceding years, the CPI’s fractions continued to try to bolster their internal pretensions with recourse to – carefully selected – international Communist positions. While in 1947 and early 1948 exponents of a radical line had referred to their reading of Yugoslav declarations, Rao’s left wing kept invoking the Chinese example – once again in his, Rao’s, interpretation – as support to his claims. So, when in 1949 then Secretary-General Ranadive lashed out against his Indian critics, he chose to present his case as a defense of Soviet orthodox positions, while branding Mao’s “New Democracy” as a “reactionary” and “counter-revolutionary” anomaly. The CPI, Ranadive melodramatically underscored, only “regards the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin as the authoritative fundaments of Marxism.” [20] The lasting, general ideological confusion was intensified by the dismissed (and expelled) former Secretary-General Joshi who led an unprecedented private campaign against his successors. In public letters, Joshi tried to mobilize the Cominform as well as  British, Pakistani and French Communists against the Indian Communist left, which he dubbed “Trotskyist-Titoistic”. His approach was seconded by the CPGB leadership, whose specialist for colonial and post-colonial Communist parties, Palme Dutt, raised the specter of widespread “Titoistic” contaminations of the CPI as well. [21]

This way, internal disputes of the CPI had become inextricably interwoven with open breaks and hidden friction of international Communism. Hereby, the Soviet apparatus would endorse neither British criticism, colored by anti-Maoism, nor Joshi’s “reformatism”. Nonetheless, accumulating reports about Communist disunity, combined with Moscow’s firm belief in hidden influences of Western global conspiracies over Communist “deviations” stimulated a more active role in Indian arguments. [22] In contrast to these ideological deliberations, Nehru’s position on the Korean War, often regarded as an important incentive, was of only secondary importance for the Kremlin’s increasing involvement in Indian affairs. In Stalin’s lectures on the Indian situation, delivered during the secret visit of high-ranking Indian Communists in February 1951, the Soviet leader denounced Nehru’s foreign policy as mere “maneuvering. In fact, the Nehru Government plays between England and America.” [23]

IV

In the summer of 1950, all interested parties produced specific proposals for cutting the Gordian knot of persistent Indian disputes and foreign sensitivities. The CPGB suggested roundtable talks to resolve the most urgent problems of Indian Communism, advocating the participation of British, Chinese, Soviet and Indian representatives. [24] At the same time, the CPI requested a bilateral meeting with the USSR, but asked for Moscow’s support for the establishment of regular contacts between Delhi and Peking Communists as well. With this intra-Asian axis in mind, the VPK pleaded for a trilateral – Chinese-Soviet-Indian – conference in Peking. [25] It is noteworthy that within a few days of receiving the request, Stalin decided in favor of the bilateral variant. [26]

At the end of December 1950, the Soviet politburo ordered the preparation of an illegal visit of four high-ranking CPI members, representing the left and right wings, to Moscow. [27] Soviet representatives in Delhi hectically started to deliver additional CPI documents and resolutions, while the VPK activated British contacts to investigate the alleged “Titoistic” past of one of the presumed visitors, the prominent right-wing S. A. Dange. In addition, background analysis continued to cover up earlier Soviet inactivity by detailed descriptions of the CPI’s general theoretical underdevelopment and sinister warnings against alleged police and Western infiltrations into its ranks. [28]

The Indo-Soviet consultations started on 4 February 1951. Dange and Ajoy Ghosh, both of whom represented the Indian party’s right wing, were accompanied by the leftists Rao and V. Punnaiah. The composition of the hosting Soviet delegation indicated the importance that Moscow attached to this fact- and theory-finding mission: the heavyweight Malenkov presided over two extensive discussions (4 and 6 February 1951) with Suslov, Grigoryan and Pavel F. Yudin present as well. [29]

The first round of discussions once again revealed deep frictions within the Indian party. The debates focused on current revolutionary potentials, the CPI’s (non)participation in forthcoming elections and on the assessment of Nehru’s policy towards the Korean problem. In principle, the corresponding left or right approaches to these issues reflected fundamental differences of opinion about the general applicability of Chinese experiences in India. Besides, Dange’s insistence on an authoritative ban on death sentences against unloved party members underlined the bitterness of Indian struggles; incidentally, Stalin, keenly differentiating between Communist parties in power or opposition, supported Dange’s view. In general, however, Soviet subjects of conversation mirrored the tremendous significance attached to inner-Communist frontlines; following the Soviet initiative, the participants once again discussed – and finally shelved – accusations regarding Dange’s pro-Tito leanings. Information about the real composition of armed forces in India constituted the second topic. The emerging picture belied any dreams of revolutionary change. Even in the strongholds of Telangana and Andhra, the CPI counted no more than approximately 500 fighters; furthermore, it had not established any resilient connection with army circles. [30]

Two days after the second meeting, Malenkov and his colleagues sent Stalin their condensed summary of the talks. The extent to which Stalin worked on those papers testifies to his commitment to ideological debates, and they demonstrate his ideological understanding of and approach to the Indian situation. Furthermore, his response shows that Stalin still regarded himself as  the authority in problems of party theory and practice worldwide, and therefore personally resolved the most relevant questions. Finally, Stalin took his time to explain his recommendations in a three hour talk on 9 February, where he appeared as undisputed leader and scholar. [31]

Stalin’s understanding of the Indian situation was guided by his appreciation of classical Marxist-Leninist doctrine as well as by his reading of Russian revolutionary experiences. Therefore, Mao’s struggle was to be integrated into superordinated processes, and the Chinese upheavals, in comparison to East European “people’s democratic revolutions”, appeared as an Asian latecomer. In Stalin’s eyes, the “Chinese path” corresponded to nothing more than the first revolutionary stage, an “anti-feudal”, “bourgeois” revolution. Unlike China, the East European countries already had advanced towards the second, “socialist” stage of revolution. Underlining the (arguable) importance of Soviet support for Mao’s conduct of war, Stalin rejected the idea that China’s development could serve as an all-Asian inspiration or model. “The Chinese path was good for China. For India, it is inadequate”, Stalin explained to his Indian guests.” Finally, Stalin’s realistic assessment of the CPI’s weakness and Nehru’s sound position in India led him to stress the necessity of patient, long-term preparations before resorting to more radical steps. Taken together, Stalin’s guidelines appear to be the Asian variant of traditional Soviet “minimal” and “maximal” programs, as explicitly formulated several months later. [32]

In all, Stalin’s advice reads as self-confident application of Stalinist ideological fundamentals to India. The new party program as well as the so-called “tactical line” of the CPI, both drafted in close Indo-Soviet joint production in Moscow, followed the same leitmotivs. Additionally, the installation of the comparatively moderate Ajoy Ghosh as new secretary-general of the CPI and the intensity of following contacts between Delhi and Moscow signaled the durability of revived party relations. Since February 1951, the Indian comrades could count on substantial financial aid from Moscow, channeled through the so-called “International aid fund for left workers’ organizations.” [33] What was more, the intensive exchanges of early 1951 had established the future pattern, with the CPI’s headquarters turning to Moscow for advice, and with the Kremlin at least trying to pacify Indian struggles for the sake of long-term revolutionary prospects or Soviet requirements. [34] Soviet calculations and Indian hopes notwithstanding, the CPI continued to be an intricate instrument prone to ideology determined along regional lines, [35] foreshadowing the party splits of the 1960s. [36]

V

Although Nehru’s position with regard to the recognition of Mao’s China, the Korean War and the Japanese peace treaty had clearly sharpened India’s non-aligned profile, Stalin remained tied to his conception of internal class struggle with its international translation into two hostile world camps, leaving no room for alternative models of international relations.   Stalin’s categorizations only allowed for certain adjustments in light of Indian flexibility in foreign affairs and class analyses of Indian domestic policy. Since the end of 1951, Moscow experts tended to accentuate that only the “very top” of the Indian bourgeoisie, which “constitutes only a part, what is more, only a very small part of the national bourgeoisie,” was allied with the “imperialists”, [37] while Stalin in his concluding remarks at the 19th Party Congress lumped together all bourgeois sections. [38]

Obviously, this approach did not place Indo-Soviet relations on a new, all-embracing footing. So, for example, in the field of economics, careful extension of Soviet relations with the non-socialist world remained designed to play off assumed inner-capitalist contradictions with the aim of  expanding the socialist camp’s economic and strategic positions, as aptly demonstrated by an International Economic Conference in Moscow in April 1952. [39] In the diplomatic realm, Soviet representatives in the United Nations – with almost religious devotion – demolished Indian attempts to mediate a ceasefire in Korea, representing them as Indo-American machinations “not to end, but to prolong and extend the war.” [40] And, finally, in the context of New China’s policy with regard to Tibet, Stalin once more spelled out his favorite theme of alleged Western-Indian, anti-Communist complicity. [41]

Consequently, the USSR applied its bipolar conception to South Asian regional conflicts that had their origins outside the immediate bloc-confrontation. The Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir is a case in point. Without burying himself in the complex interconnection of post-colonial nation-building and regional power politics, Stalin clearly judged the subcontinental war in context of  the “present” usefulness of Indian/Pakistani ruling circles in the East-West conflict. [42]

Thus, as the Stalinist era was inexorably drawing to an end, the Kremlin’s main decision-maker had not developed a particular affinity for the Nehru Government. In the bilateral setting, the Indian government was simply ranked as a lesser evil than its Pakistani counterpart in Karachi. [43] Therefore, although general Soviet designs had to reckon with the given Indian leadership, in the long term they expected little from a bourgeois representative in Delhi and they continued to prepare for a radical change of Indian power structures.

In the arena of international relations, while South Asian dynamics compelled the USSR somehow to widen its spectrum, Moscow still managed to subordinate non-bloc developments to its own ideologically informed perceptions, interests and  security concerns. In this context, Kashmir deserved Moscow’s attention as an assumed Western ideological and strategic gateway to the subcontinent as well as to strategic weak spots of the USSR. With this specific interpretation shaping the Soviet approach to the Kashmir problem, the USSR was unable to do justice to underlying regional positions, or to contribute to constructive solutions of the South Asian deadlock. It remained to be seen whether the strange mix of tactical pragmatism, ideological certainties and strategic considerations that constituted the legacy of Stalinism in Indo-Soviet relations could serve as a reliable basis for post-Stalinist development. [44]

Dr. Andreas Hilger, University of Hamburg

[1] Western sources regarded Karachi’s move as a reaction either to Nehru’s visit in Washington or to the Western-dominated Security Council’s stand on the Kashmir issue; the semi-official Karachi Dawn (3 October 1949, p. 1; 31 October 1949, p. 5; 6 November 1949, Sunday Magazine, p. 1) likewise indicated a certain unhappiness in Karachi about perceived Western priorities in South Asia. The chronology of the corresponding protracted exchanges between Karachi and Moscow is documented in Hasan Zaheer, The Times and Trial of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy 1951: The First Coup Attempt in Pakistan (Oxford: OUP, 1998), 227-233.

[2] Politburo Decision, 15 October 1949, Russian State Archive for Socio-Political History (RGASPI), F. 17/Op. 3/D. 1078, Moscow.

[3] Bachitov to Molotov, 29 June 1951, RGASPI, F. 82/Op. 2/ D. 1196/Ll. 90f, Moscow.

[4] Exchange of Notes Between Nehru and Moltov, 21 September and 2 October 1946,  and Exchange of Notes Between the Indian and Soviet Ambassadors in China, 2 and 9 April 1947, Russian Archive of Foreign Affairs (AVP),  F. 90/Op. 21a/P. 34a/D. 1, Moscow.

[5] Dmitrov and Panyushkin to Molotov, 28 July 1945, RGASPI, F. 82/Op.2/D. 1196/Ll. 8-10, Moscow.

[6] Letter to Nehru, 31 August 1947, Private Papers of V. L. Pandit Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), I. Instalment/No. 472/Subject File 53, New Delhi.

[7] Record of Conversation V. L. Pandit–Molotov, 27 February 1948, AVP, F. 7/Op. 21/P. 1/D. 3, Moscow  and Summary of Conversation V. L. Pandit–Molotov, 10 February 1949, National Archives of India (NAI), 1 (33)-Eur. II, New Delhi.

[8] The Soviet propaganda is discussed in detail in Surendra K. Gupta, Stalin’s Policy Towards India. 1946-1953 (Colorado Springs: International Academic Publishers, 2000).

[9] See footnote 7.

[10] John Callaghan, Rajani Palme Dutt: A Study in British Stalinism (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1993). Sobhanlal Datta Gupta, Comintern and the Destiny of Communism in India, 1919-1943: Dialectics of Real and a Possible History (Calcutta: Seribaan, 2006). Samaren Roy, M. N. Roy: A Political Biography (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1997). Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, Communism in India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959).

[11] Record of Conversation S. A. Dange–Members of the Department for Foreign Affairs of the Central Committee of the VKP (b), 24 July 1947, RGASPI, F. 17/Op. 128/D. 1127, Moscow.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Purabi Roy et al., eds., Indo-Russian Relations: 1917-1947 (Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1997).

[14] Protocol of the Session of the Soviet Politburo, 12 February 1948,  RGASPI, F. 17/Op. 128/D. 427, Moscow and Account of Conference N. Mikhailov–Zhdanov, 22 March 1948, RGASPI, F. 17/Op. 162/D. 39, Moscow.

[15] For the simultaneously renewed Soviet interest in Indonesian party politics see Larisa M. Efimova, “Stalin and the Revival of the Communist Party of Indonesia,” in Cold War History  5 (2005): 107-120 and Ragna Boden, Die Grenzen der Weltmacht. Sowjetische Indonesienpolitik von Stalin bis Breznev (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2006), 84-92.

[16] Record of Conversation Mikoyan–Mao, 3 February 1949 and Telegram from Stalin to Kovalev, 26 May 1949, in Russko-kitajskie otnošenija 2 (1949/1950) 62, 136-138. Dieter Heinzig, Die Sowjetunion und das kommunistische China. Der beschwerliche Weg zum Bündnis (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesselschaft 1998), 331-341.

[17] Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, Communism in India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), 195, 231, 243, 265.

[18] Grigoryan to Molotov, 29 December 1949, RGASPI, F. 17/Op. 137/D. 1208, Moscow.

[19] Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, Communism in India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), 297.

[20] Editorial, Communist (India), June/July 1949.

[21] John Callaghan, Rajani Palme Dutt: A Study in British Stalinism (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1993), 248-252. Joshi’s Letter to the Editorial Office of the Cominform’s Journal, 9 August 1950, RGASPI, F. 17/Op. 137/D. 442, Moscow. Grigoryan to Stalin, 3 February 1951,  RGASPI, F. 82/Op. 2/D. 1210, Moscow.

[22] Grigoryan to Molotov, 23 November 1950 and Grigoryan to Stalin, 5 July 1950, RGASPI, F. 82/Op. 2/D. 1208, Moscow.

[23] Record of meeting between Stalin and CPI delegation, 9 February 1951, RGASPI, F. 558/Op. 11/D. 310/Ll. 71-86, Moscow. In addition, see Indian documentation about Radhakrishnan’s, [Indian ambassador in Moscow] interview with Stalin, 22 July 1950, National Archives, Kew, FO 371/86746, Kew.

[24] Pollitt to VKP (b), 25 August 1950, RGASPI, F. 82/Op. 2/D. 1208, Moscow.

[25] Grigoryan to Stalin, Molotov et al., 21 October 1950, RGASPI, F. 82/Op. 2/D. 1208, Moscow.

[26] Draft telegram to Soviet embassy New Delhi, 23 October 1950, RGASPI, F. 82/Op. 2/D. 1208, Moscow. Final version, 24 October 1950, RGASPI,  F. 558/Op. 11/D. 308, Moscow.

[27] Record of meeting between Soviet politburo members and CPI delegation, 8 February 1951, RGASPI, F. 558/Op. 11/D. 310/Ll. 1-11, Moscow and Protocol No. 371 of Soviet Politburo Session, 20 December 1950, RGASPI, F. 17/Op. 162/D. 45, Moscow.

[28] For instance, Deputy MID, Zorin, to Grigoryan, 20 November 1950 and 29 January 1951 RGASPI, F. 17/Op. 137/D. 428, Moscow; British involvment documented in Grigoryan to Stalin et al., 3 February 1951, RGASPI, F. 82/Op. 2/D. 1210, Moscow; and the VPK’s analysis in Grigoryan to Stalin, 31 February 1951, ibid.

[29] Records of Conversation, 4 and 6 February 1951, RGASPI, F. 558/Op. 11/D. 310/Ll. 12, Moscow.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Record of meeting between Soviet politburo members and CPI delegation, 8 February 1951, RGASPI, F. 558/Op. 11/D. 310/Ll. 1-11, Moscow and Record of meeting between Stalin and CPI delegation, 9 February 1951, RGASPI, F. 558/Op. 11/D. 310/Ll. 71-86, Moscow. The records of a second Stalin-CPI-conversation at the beginning of March 1951, are not included in the corresponding RGASPI’s collection and remain inaccessible (RGASPI, F. 558/Op. 11/D. 311, “Zapis’ besedy, 1.-8.3.1951”).

[32] Central Committee CPSU, VKP (b) to CPI General Secretary Ghosh, 20 September 1951, RGASPI, F. 558/Op. 11/D. 312/Ll. 40-44, Moscow.

[33] Record of meeting between Soviet politburo members and CPI delegation, 21 February 1951, RGASPI, F. 558/Op. 11/D. 310/Ll. 114-118, Moscow and Central Committee CPSU, VKP (b) and the TsK Presidium, Russian Government Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), F. 89/Op. 38/D. 26, 33, decisions of the VPK and the TsK-Presidium.

[34] Grigoryan to Stalin, 14 September 1951, RGASPI, F. 558/Op. 11/D. 312, Moscow and Grigoryan to Stalin, 21 October 1952, RGASPI, F. 82/Op. 2/D. 1211, Moscow.

[35] Memorandum Rao/Punnaiah about guerrilla war in India, 27 February 1951, RGASPI, F. 82/Op. 2/D. 1205, Moscow and Letter from Ghosh to VKP (b), 21 April 1952, ibid. D. 1206.

[36] Indira Rothermund, Die Spaltung der Kommunistischen Partei Indiens. Ursachen und Folgen: Wiesbaden 1969.

[37] Draft letter to Ghosh, 13 December 1951, RGASPI, F. 82/Op. 2/D. 1211, Moscow and Letter Grigoryan to Molotov, 7 April 1952, ibid., D. 1210.

[38] Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953 (New Have: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 28.

[39] Resolution Politbureau VKP (b), 11 February 1952, RGASPI, F. 17/Op. 163/D. 1612, Moscow.

[40] Vyshinskii in General Assembly of the UN, 7th session, plenary meetings. Verbatim records of meetings, 14 October 1952–28 August 1953, p. 399. session, 3.12.1952.

[41] Minutes of Conversation Stalin–Enlai, 3 September 1952, CWIHP Virtual Archive: The Cold War in Asia.

[42] Central Committee CPSU, VKP (b) to CPI delegation, 17 October 1951, RGASPI, F. 558/Op. 11/D. 312/Ll. 40-44, Moscow. In January 1952, the Soviet representative for the first time took part in the Security Council’s deliberations on the Kashmir conflict. Malik Speech Malik, in: UN Security Council, Official Records, 7th year 570th session, 1952.

[43] Ibid.

[44] For a discussion of continuities and changes of direction see Andreas Hilger, “Revolutionsideologie, Systemkonkurrenz oder Entwicklungspolitik? Sowjetisch-indische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen in Chruschtschows Kaltem Krieg,” Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, Bonn 2008.