After 1968
The New Balance of Forces
Q: Then, when the Central Group [of Soviet Forces] had moved in, [ . . . ] according to the agreement, it was not expected to have more than 75,000 troops. At that time, there was also a long-term reduction of troop levels of the Czechoslovak Army, by 20,000. Actually, it may not have been a reduction, if I consider the number of people who had to leave the army, just like you. As a matter of fact, some units may have been reinforced in a way. What was the reason that was given for having the 70,000 Soviets here in addition our own army, the combat capability of which had been retained, or maybe even improved? [ . . . ]
General Picek: Well, I think the reason was operational use, I would say. I know there were rumors, I do not know the details though, about Soviet ops plans, according to which an army was expected to move here from the Ukraine in about five days or so, which was expected to reinforce first-echelon armies in follow-through operations in the West. So, the 70,000 Soviets here could not mean a reduction of the total strength of the Czechoslovak Army or of Czechoslovak forces assigned to the Unified Command, to the Warsaw Pact. [Picek, 17]
General Franko: However, what mattered most was that Czechs and Slovaks were earmarked as first-echelon units: “OK, you can blame yourself for not having Soviet troops permanently stationed here since the war, so you have to take care yourself – you have to equip your army properly, you have to build the industry, arms industry, and you have to provide armored personnel carriers, tanks, guns and everything else that is needed, because you will be equal to first-echelon Soviet forces on your right flank.” Because the [East] Germans had just one tank division among first-echelon units there, the others being second-echelon units, to be deployed on the second, third or fourth day into the operation, or other similar auxiliary units. The whole group of forces in [East] Germany and the forces constituting the Czechoslovak Front were, from the viewpoint of the ratio of forces, so “crammed” that Czechoslovakia, being a small country, would have paid a high price.
And the arrival of Soviet troops in 1968 improved the position of the Soviet Union. Before that, it had been difficult to imagine moving forces from Lvov to Warsaw or here, a thousand kilometers. It would have taken them at least five days to get here. And setting a foothold here meant the Soviets were a thousand kilometers closer. [ . . . ]
Q: Let’s go back to the Czechoslovak Front. I was a bit surprised to see that, even with the Central Group stationed here, plans still foresaw that the first-echelon Czechoslovak Front would consist exclusively of Czechoslovak units, while the Central Group was supposed to provide second-echelon forces.
General Franko: Yes. Simply as if they had been in Lvov, Belorussia or the Ukraine.
Q: Well, we did not gain much, did we?
General Franko: Well, we did not. They did.
[ . . . ]
Before the Soviets established themselves here, those second-echelon units – I am referring to the Carpathian Front – would have needed at least for to six days to get here. By being stationed here since 1968, the Soviets gained an extra week of combat operations and saved enough equipment to be able to mount yet another front-sized operation. If they had to arrive in trucks, tanks, by rail and I don’t what else from a thousand kilometers away, the tank simply stops and will not move on.
This was also the reason why Czechoslovak units, among others, practiced peacetime movements of tank divisions equipped with T-34 tanks, the “old ones”, [the task being] to move them from that Military Training Area off Topoľčany, what’s its name, Horemláz, under their own power to some distance. This was also why General Tesařík [1] was given an order – and he accomplished it – to move his tank division, which was stationed in and around Milovice, to Doupov in one day or overnight. At that time, he was the greatest geroi [hero] and lauded for his accomplishment. However, he lost almost fifty percent of his vehicles to mechanical failures along the way. Only fifty percent of the tanks got there. But get there they did. [Franko, 34 – 36]
Q: Could you describe circumstances relevant to second-echelon planning? Or what did you expect the second-echelon to consist of?
General Zachariáš: I came across this issue again in the 1980s, when I served first at the army and then at the district levels. Basically, our front consisted mainly of first-echelon units, the Eastern Military District comprised training divisions, the mobilization, use and deployment of which would have required some time. In other words, mobilizing, preparing and moving them, and this was relatively difficult. If there had been a surprise attack – and there were considerations like this at that time – we would not have had any readily usable second echelon. Neither for a defensive operation, nor for an offensive one. And this was one of the reasons – probably – why the Central Group had moved here.
And as the Central Group was under my command, because I was the District Commander and would have been the Front Commander [in wartime], I had much better conditions and prerequisites for planning and accomplishing tasks that were handed out to me. I had a readily available second echelon, a relatively strong one, capable of mounting defensive operations, counterstrikes and the like. And, in the event of an offensive operation, the first echelon would have consisted of our forces, and once they had crossed the border and found themselves in an area favorable for expanding the operation, we had at our disposal a well-trained and –armed second echelon. So, it was – from the military viewpoint – a tremendous reinforcement for our front.
[ . . . ]
General Zachariáš: The Soviets were in command there [in East Germany], and main forces were provided by the Soviet Army, and East Germans were subordinated to them. And, to my knowledge, the first echelon consisted of Soviet units only. And the East German Army comprised the second echelon and was subordinated to the Soviets. It was the other way round here. The Central Group was subordinated to our front, we had all the documentation, and they only had that part which was relevant for them, that is the one describing the use of the Central Group and their second-echelon divisions. We were in charge of command and control. [Zachariáš, 6]
The Neutron Weapon
General Franko: You know what neutron weapons are?
Q: Yes.
General Franko: At least the name. They are simply nuclear weapons, but their principal effect is a flow of neutrons, which does not destroy equipment ...
Q: ... but personnel.
General Franko: ... but personnel. I had first learned about them from the Military Information Service, then I took care to monitor the situation on my own initiative, I got to some reports. [ . . . ] I even laid my hands on some US military regulations, which stipulated the percentage of neutron rounds in the basic load of an artillery piece. It was supposed to be 25 percent. Given that the basic load was twelve or sixty, then one could get an idea. And I also put together a map with the 20th (Karlovy Vary) Division, 19th (Plzen) Division, and so on, standing on the opposite side, along some 200 kilometers, simply a map showing our forces and those of the opponent, all of which were known, every schoolboy knew that, as assessments of enemy forces were routinely prepared.
So, if every artillery piece, mortar or Honest John [2] and God knows what, simply any weapon capable of delivering nuclear rounds, had fired just two shots – and every weapon like this can loose off two rounds in thirty seconds – from their gun emplacements in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany to a distance matching or consistent with its effective range – of course, a gun cannot be positioned on the border, it doesn’t make sense, does it, it must be in the rear, just like missiles, Pershing,[3] twenty kilometers, there must be sixty, eighty kilometers – simply a distance consistent with its range. Mathematically, it is the area of the circle, quite a simple equation, and all the forces in the area, except personnel hidden in deep trenches or large and deep shelters, to give you an example, from Aš to České Budějovice, can be disposed of by 150 to 250 shots.
And this was how I handed it over to Valo, [4] to have a look at it. And he, pretending it was his idea, went and showed it to the Minister, and he in turn showed it to Soviet advisors. Two days later, Valo tells me: “I have been tasked to submit a draft document on the theory of neutron weapons to the Advisory Board of the Minister. It should be prepared in a way allowing it to be disseminated down to and including the regimental level. And he also asks for two copies in Russian.” And the Soviets suddenly wanted yet another copy and sent it to Milovice [5], to the Central Group, in Russian, and they also organized a training course there. And people started thinking about it and looking for some protection. And I always laughed that the best protection against neutron weapons was simple: “As soon as you see an explosion, jump into a barrel full of water, so that you’re underwater. [laughter] Or drop into a hole. But how do you want to attack, if you are in the hole? You either are in a hole, or you attack.” [Franko, 12 – 13]
General Franko: Neutron weapons – it’s about high radiation. They wanted to destroy personnel and retain tanks unscathed. Then there were some developments, new types of nuclear weapons, small, man-portable or transportable in some small trailers or carriages. They pre-positioned – and so did we - nuclear … nuclear “depositories” in the battlefield along every route that could have been used, for example, by forces advancing from Czechoslovakia, via Rozvadov or other border crossing points. And if any of the opponents had been losing the border fight, they would have let them explode and thus render the area impassable. And there was a problem of civilian population living in the area. And, unfortunately, the bad thing for the East was that winds always blow from the west to the east. [Franko, 50]
Toward a Conventional Option
Q: This plan [dating back to 1964] basically assumes – if I am reading it right – that nuclear weapons will be used from the very beginning, which means that any war conflict would immediately turned nuclear. Could you compare it to the 1980s, what was the situation then? What was the position of the conventional option and its nuclearization sometimes during the conflict …?
General Zachariáš: The comparison is purely theoretical and very complex, but if nuclear weapons are used, the principal objective of each of the opponents is to destroy nuclear weapons of the other side. This is the task number one. Next come assets that are crucial for mounting and conducting operations – command posts, aviation, guidance facilities etc. … And troops basically come last. However, no account is generally taken of the tremendous difficulties caused by explosions, contamination and destruction of areas that would be rendered absolutely impassable. And if this had happened early into the war, troops probably could not have attacked at all. There wouldn’t have been any way. There wouldn’t have been any place to attack. [ . . . ] Our whole territory would have become a contaminated zone. Bohemia, Moravia, then on to Poland and Slovakia, depending on prevailing winds. And the beginning could also have meant the end of the operation. [Zachariáš, 4]
Q: The things you said indicate that, in the event of a war conflict, operations in the European theater would have dispensed with the use of nuclear weapons. At least, this was the intention of the Warsaw Pact, wasn’t it?
General Štorek: Yes, yes.
Q: This is a serious statement.
General Štorek: Based on all experience at our disposal, information from nuclear tests etc., it was becoming obvious that the use of nuclear weapons by any side, which would ultimately have resulted in both sides using them, would have brought about the extinction of mankind, or tremendous problems, there simply wouldn’t have been any winners in the nuclear war. I think this is the leading idea of subsequent developments, of the withdrawal from the concept of waging war with nuclear weapons. [....]
Q: This here [the 1964 War Plan] says that, in the event of a conflict, the 57th Air Army would have been deployed in the Czechoslovak territory or at least made subordinate to the Czechoslovak Front command. I gather the 57th Air Army was a Soviet formation.
General Štorek: I cannot comment on that period of time, I don’t know, probably yes in the event of a war conflict, if this was provided for in ops plans. Before 1968, there had been no Soviet troops in our territory, and I can hardly imagine something like this happening in peacetime. But it was probably provided for in ops plans.
Q: And later, in the 1980s, which is of course another story, 20 years later, i.e. quite a gap, is there also a Soviet Air Army operating as a part of the Order of Battle of the Czechoslovak Front in the event of a “hot” conflict?
General Štorek: No, as Soviet air forces were expected to operate in the second, i.e. main thrust, echelon. We were earmarked for the beginning of the war, our basic mission was to provide defense. The exercises we were conducting then – simply holding the borderline using all forces available. And then a second echelon would have come from the east to further exploit the outcome of the operation. I cannot image any other way. Although, as I said, we simply did not have any ops plans at this level; any exercise we conducted at that time was designed to match reality to the maximum extent possible. We only knew that there would have been a “D” day of sorts, let’s say D+15 or D+30, when reinforcements from the east would arrive to exploit the initial phase of the operation. [Štorek, 6 – 7]
Slowing Down Advance
Q: You told me that you had never had the entire Ops Plan, but that you had only known the part pertaining to your duties and responsibilities attached to your post. However, as the Commander of the Western Military District, you were basically earmarked as the Commander of the Czechoslovak Front.
General Zachariáš: Yes. When I took part in the planning – I think it was once – we used more realistic ratios of forces; in any case, it was not just the quantity, but also the quality, which were taken into account. Tasks were also set more realistically in terms of depth and direction of advance. Even at the time when we had much better equipment, more efficient equipment, much more assets, our mission did not require us to advance to such a depth. And the key planning assumption – I am referring to the instance I took part in – was that we would first conduct a defensive operation when attacked, that we would succeed in destroying or substantially weakening enemy forces in a battle along the border, and only then mount an offensive operation. I did not work on a purely offensive operation, which is one of the reasons why I believe the plans at that time were more realistic, based on a much more realistic situation.
Q: Could you make a comparison – we are now talking about the purely defensive option and the offensive operation – could you make a comparison of the rates of advance in the 1980s and those stipulated in the 1964 War Plan? How many kilometers per day?
General Zachariáš: I don’t remember exactly, but in any case, our depths of advance were much lower than in the plan I have seen. To my knowledge, the plan was to advance about thirty kilometers on the first day, the rest of the operation was to take some eight to ten days – this was the maximum, which roughly corresponds to the depth of the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. This speaks for itself – the rates of advance were lower, and the tasks assigned to us were thus more realistic, although we had better, more powerful equipment. Not to speak of the fact that we had much better river-crossing assets that they had had [in 1964], equipment capable of bridging a stream or a river in a few minutes, allowing non-amphibious vehicles to cross it. Also, we had much better supply and logistic support systems for all types of weapons and other equipment. [Zachariáš, 3 – 4]
General Slimák: [ . . . ] In that Ops Plan [ . . . ], I participated in its preparation, which took place in Czechoslovakia in the 1970s, our advance was supposed to stop [showing on the map] on the French border. For the Czechoslovak Front.
Q: And did you think, or perceive the plan as suggesting, that the front would no longer be combat-capable, or be replaced by another formation?
General Slimák: The reasons may have been political. Look – another subsequent front-size operation was assumed. The first frontal operation was planned to the depth of the southern part of the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. The ops planning process did not deal with the next step. But this was the plan of the front.
Q: Could you indicate the rates of advance considered in the 1980s?
General Slimák: Well, for what is planned here as the front’s mission, I guess it was expected take twice as long.
Q: OK, so ...
General Slimák: Thirty, forty [kilometers per day] close to border, and naturally fifty to sixty as the operation unfolded, exploiting the initial success. But thirty to forty early into the operation, that was at the army level and for objectives situated closer [to our border]. My job was a bit different, but I know that exercises were basically the same. Thirty, forty kilometers per day for closer objectives at the army level. More than fifty – it was in the unfolding and exploitation phase of the operation. [Slimák, 7]
NATO’s Growing Edge
Q: In the 1960s, internal analyses prepared in Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union tend to emphasize weaknesses of the NATO Alliance. Perhaps this is the reason why the envisaged rates of advance were so high. On the other hand, Warsaw Pact analyses and assessments dating to the 1970s tend to emphasize NATO’s growing strength. Do you think there were any political reasons for it, or do you think the analyses were a true reflection of the real situation?
General Zachariáš: I would rather think that the analyses were more realistic. And probably better work of the intelligence service, which had to provide information for familiarization with their equipment, for making comparisons with ours. And a more realistic assessment of the opponent’s equipment leads to a more realistic overall assessment in other respects as well. A more realistic assessment. I don’t think it had anything in common with politics.
Q: In the reports I have, there often appears information to the effect that armies of the Warsaw Pact respond to some innovations, introduction of new military technologies and equipment in the NATO Alliance. During the 1970s and 1980s, what do you think played the key role in the strengthening of NATO? [ . . . ]
General Zachariáš: Hard to say. But I think it was the use of space, intelligence-gathering satellites which had a great impact on the development of technologies and opinions on operational arts. Because the satellites could see and determine the deployment, types of equipment, movements, everything, including communications, to the tiniest detail. And there were times we knew – we have a satellite overhead, no movements. So, special weapons, such as missiles, were allocated windows during which they were allowed to move from one place to another. Also, the development of new weapons played a role; if the enemy fields a new piece of equipment, e.g. a new tank, you immediately start looking for a counter-weapon, a new anti-tank weapon, for example. And when I commanded a division and later on, at the army command, we knew we could not attack at night. Because at that time we did not stand a chance – they had much better night vision and night fire control equipment. And in that case, we would have attacked blind, and they could have seen us long before we could see them, we would not have stood a chance. [ . . . ]
The ranges of [Western and Eastern] weapons, such as anti-tank guided missiles or surface-to-air missiles, differed. They launched their helicopter-borne ATGMs from six to eight kilometers away, we launched ours from, for example, three kilometers away. And you have to take this into account in simply everything, tactics, command, control, use of combat assets, simply look for ways and means to succeed. [....]
You mentioned the air force; I don’t know whether General Štorek admitted that NATO airplanes had been able to launch their air-to-air guided missiles from a distance which was twice to three times that of the range of our missiles. If they had flown against each other, both could have seen each other on the radar, but Štorek [’s boys] wouldn’t have been able to launch, while the American could have launched from a distance of, say, 140 kilometers and been gone before our pilot could get within range.
So, it was the quality of equipment and weapons that was crucial. This is what I have been talking about, no qualitative ratios of forces were prepared, and this was the reason why tasks were far from realistic. [Zachariáš, 7 – 8]
Problematic Intelligence
General Slimák: When I became the Chief of the Intelligence Directorate, I was facing many problems. I wanted to change everything.
Q: What specifically did you want to change?
General Slimák: Well, the focus of intelligence activities in the first place. Basically, there was no concept, everything was routine. Ironically enough, when we had at last worked our way toward something tangible, I submitted the resulting document as a medium-term plan to the Chief of the General Staff on November 20, 1989.
[ . . . ]
Q: Were there – and I don’t want you to mention specific cases – any results that were talked about, given as examples, cases when you really came across something important?
General Slimák: Not in my time. Not even at the time when I was the Deputy Chief of the Intelligence Directorate, there wasn’t any essential, breakthrough information. It was more or less about exploiting various informers, and coming across something of interest was chancy. [ . . . ]
Q: Can you estimate how many people the Intelligence Directorate had at that time?
General Slimák: [ . . . ] It had several hundreds of people.
Q: Was there any specific area or specialty assigned to the Czechoslovak military intelligence service in the framework of coordination within the Warsaw Pact? For example, a specific region or segment of West Germany or France?
General Slimák: Shortly before my arrival, we were tasked with France and Spain. But nothing was done about it prior to my appointment.
Q: Was this a decision of a meeting of intelligence chiefs?
General Slimák: Yes. There were annual conferences of chiefs of intelligence directorates. Their agendas were approved during the conference. Attending these conferences were the Chief of the Intelligence Directorate and the Chief of the Information Section. I have to admit that our Information Section, namely its analytical segment, was at least able to exploit, process and “sell” what little information it was able to lay its hands on. [Slimák, 17 – 18]
Q: Do you think that military intelligence reports reduced the nuclear war threat? Or any war threat, not just nuclear?
General Slimák: I think they put things into a proper realistic perspective. [ . . . ] The information that we were submitting and that was available was focused on issues related to the development of armed forces, improving their quality, modernization and upgrading. In short, information focused more on technological advancements and achievements rather than on arms rattling, or threats. [ . . . ]
I think the Intelligence Directorate worked well in that it was providing enough intelligence and some focus. I believe it also made a significant contribution to the introduction or implementation of new technologies and innovations, from the viewpoint of taking necessary measures, imports of materials and some technologies. But all in all, quantity prevailed – and I will not mention why it was so - as it was simpler. You know, Soviets were secretive even to each other. For them, everything was classified and they did not divulge anything even to each other. When studying at the General Staff Academy, I talked to many people and I know that, for example, there were enterprises and factories developing something that the army had already developed.
[ . . . ]
Q: To what extent was the intelligence cooperation with the Soviets one-sided? For example, did you have access to specific Soviet information in exchange for our information? For example, satellite imagery or something else?
General Slimák: Not specific documents [or raw intelligence]. Just outputs. For example, on the composition and nature of armed forces. Whenever we had accurate information on armed forces of the United States, United Kingdom, Spain, it was only from their sources. We were taking it over from them automatically. Secondly, there were assessments of, say, qualitative parameters. We were not very advanced in this respect, we were just taking this over. [ . . . ] At that time, our research institute was lagging behind very much. [Slimák, 20 – 21]
[Translated by Jiří Mareš, Prague]
Notes:
[1] Major General Richard Tesařík fought in the Czechoslovak Army Corps, was wounded twice and decorated with the Hero of the Soviet Union medal. Since 1954, he commanded the 13th Division in Mladá; between 1956 and 1958, he was Deputy Commander of the 1st Military District, and Deputy Commander of the 4th Army from 1958 to 1959. In April 1960, he was ousted from the Communist party, demoted and released from the army.
[2] The unguided tactical missile MGR-1A (1B) Honest John was put into operational service with US armed forces in 1955.
[3] The operational tactical missile MGM-31A Pershing was put into service with US armed forces in Europe and the Bundeswehr in 1964. In 1967, the production of an upgraded version, Pershing 1A, started. In the 1980s, the US forces in Europe received the Pershing 2 missile, with a substantially extended range and a smaller Circular Error Probable.
[4] Colonel General Vasil Valo, Commander of the Central Military District from 1967 to 1969, First Deputy Minister of Defense from 1971 to 1979.
[5] Milovice was the seat of the Central Group Headquarters since the early 1970s.
