|
S T E N O G R A P H Y
of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee
of the Romanian Communist Party's meeting of 25 June 1971
Participants:
Comrades Nicolae Ceausescu, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Emil Bodnaras, Manea
Manescu, Paul Niculescu-Mizil, Gheorghe Pana, Virgil Trofin, Ilie
Verdet, Maxim Berghianu, Florian Danalache, Janos Fazekas, Petre Lupu,
Dumitru Popa, Dumitru Popescu, Leonte Rautu, Gheorghe Stoica, Stefan
Voitec, Iosif Banc, Petre Blajovici, Miron Constantinescu, Mihai Dalea,
Mihai Gere, Ion Iliescu, Ion Ionita, Vasile Patilinet, Ion Stanescu.
Comrade Andrei Stefan, first deputy of the chief of the International
Section of the CC of RCP, was invited to the meeting.
The meeting began at 11.10 and ended at 14.20.
Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu:
We have convened this meeting to inform you about what we did in
these four countries of Asia and to see what the opinion of the Executive
Committee is, especially because next week we will go abroad again
and then it will be too late.
[ . . . ]
In Mongolia the reception was good and the first toasts were good,
there were no problems. The communiqué issued was good. The
meeting was not so good because they inserted in their speeches, although
we had agreed that they should not, a remark that the imperialists
wanted to divide the socialist countries, that for this purpose they
were using the ideological weapon, and that the duty of socialism
was to fight back with all the means available.
During the talks they told us about China, about their historical
relation-ships with China, about the fact that Manchuria had oppressed
them for three hundred years, and that China now wanted to swallow
them, that Mao Zedong himself had said that Mongolia belonged to China.
In fact, in 1924, the Soviet Union signed a secret agreement with
Chang Kai-shi (?), where it was stated that Mongolia belonged to China.
We told them that we had our history, too, that we were under the
Turkish yoke, the tsarist yoke, and the Austro-Hungarian yoke. We
also told them about our gold in Moscow. We told them that as we were
sure they would inform [Moscow] accordingly.
Afterwards they told us about Czechoslovakia, that the imperialists
had wanted to occupy it and that the five countries had saved Czechoslovakia.
Then I asked him [my interlocutor]: where do you know it from? He
told me that he knew it from the Poles. I retorted: I did not come
here to listen to your lecture about Czechoslovakia, for you to give
me lessons, because we know better.
Afterwards, [he spoke] about the fight against imperialism, about
China - the same old story all over again.
I told them a few things about the situation in our country, I spoke
to them about the bilateral relationships. They said they would think
it over and then would see [what to do].
Then the meeting took place. Except for the first part, he kept speaking
about the Soviet Union: when it was born, that it was the bastion
of peace and so on and so forth. I told him: this question of Czechoslovakia
is not in order; either we must say that we do not agree and explain
how things stand to the participants or you take it out for good.
Afterwards, he referred to the fact that the member countries of the
Warsaw Treaty Organization, which was the main guarantee of peace
and security, of the whole socialist system, struggle collec-tively
in support of European security. I told him this was inadmissible.
He also referred to the fight against revisionism and left-wing dogmatism,
against superpower chauvinism and against nationalism. I do not know
what to say: the Chinese say that the Soviets are revisionist, the
Soviets say that the Chinese are revisionists; others say that the
Jugoslavs are revisionists and I do not know any longer who is [revisionist
and who is not]. As regards the nationalists, some say that we are
nationalist. Then I said: there are nationalists in Arabia, too; did
not the Soviet Union conclude a pact with the Arabs, with the nationalists?!
I cannot have an argument with the Arabs over this [issue]. He suggested
that he read only part of the speech and give the remainder in writing.
Then we decided not to make speeches, but say a few words of greeting
only. Very well and that was all there was to it. I think that, from
this point of view, the visit was not of much use because here the
Soviets cut in and required them to put in certain things there and
then we arrived at the situation I told you about.
Ulan Bator has become a modern city, with more than 300,000 inhabit-
ants. They have a population of 1,280,000 inhabitants, but now they
have a very large natality, of 30%. 50% of the population is below
age 15. They have a lot of riches, they have a great many animals.
We came back and stopped at Moscow. We have required that, when we
come back, we inform them - if they wish - about where we were and
what we did where we were. We were met by Kosygin, Suslov and others
from the Section; they invited us to have a meal at the airport. We
succinctly informed them about this concept/spirit of the Chinese
to develop the relationships with the socialist countries. After we
talked about China, he wanted to say something and then I told him:
hold it, I have another three [countries], I was not only to China,
and I told him about the other [countries].
It was Kosygin who began, saying that the visit was public, that people
discussed, interpreted, saying that from this viewpoint they would
tell us their opinion. He thinks that the fact that in China there
was no discussion about the community of socialist countries damaged
the community of socialist countries; that there, in Comrade Ceausescu's
speech, an appeal was made for the unity of small and medium countries
and what kind of unity can exist with Saudi Arabia, where there are
slaves. Afterwards, in Comrade Ceausescu's speech, refer-ences were
made to superpowers and superpower chauvinism. In fact, Chou En-lai
said this, not me. But did the Soviet Union threaten somebody, did
the Soviet Union threaten you, after all, 70% of the Soviet Union's
trade is with the socialist countries. That there nothing was said
about helping the COMECON countries, only China's 200-million help
was mentioned; in fact, what means 200 million for the Soviet Union
and Romania!. Then, he said, you talked about the superpowers; after
all, Romania borders only with the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary,
and Yougoslavia; that means, therefore, that only the Soviet Union
threatens Romania. Maybe the United States of America threatens you,
but not the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which is an umbrella [organization]
a.s.o. Maybe China threatens you, but this thing should have been
said. Afterwards, you talked about the cultural revolution. The cultural
revolution has its international part, too, and he took a booklet
out of his pocket: look, by accepting the cultural revolution you
accepted the anti-Soviet position, anti-so-and-so, anti- so-and-so.
Look, while you were there they issued a poster - and he takes a poster
out of his pocket. But we have always striven to improve our relationships
with Romania, we are in the COMECON a.s.o.
Suslov also cut in and resumed this idea that the visit had the effect
of worsening the divergences and it was directed against the socialist
countries.
After they were finished, I started: I am amazed at the way comrades
Kosygin and Suslov have approached the issues and we reject such an
interpre-tation. If the Soviet comrades have some issues to discuss,
they must discuss them with us because we did not discuss the issue
of big and small countries in China, but set it forth several times,
including on the aniversary of 50 years from the foundation of the
party; it is a reality that there are small countries, middle countries,
powers, and superpowers. And in connection with the superpowers, was
it not comrade Brezhnev who said - at the 24th Congress [of the CPSU]
- that the Soviet Union was a superpower? But China is a superpower,
too. The Chinese did not say that they were a superpower; Chou En-lai
says that he will never conduct a superpower policy. Consequently,
there are superpowers, big, middle, and small countries. Then Kosygin
says: about Romania I do not even say that it is a middle country,
for fear of hurting you. Then I told him that Romania was a small
country and as regards Saudi Arabia - that there was slavery there,
but there was exploitation in other countries as well. Marx and Engels
spoke a lot about the exploitation of labor force. Then, if we decided
not to collaborate with the countries where there was exploitation,
we should not collaborate with a lot of countries. It is all the same
to me if there labor force is sold for life, and elsewhere it is sold
by the day, it still remains exploitation. If you wanted to discuss
this problem with us, you could discuss it with us not wait to connect
it with our visit to China. Then I told him that we did not go there
to discuss about others. He said: we negotiate directly with China,
not through go-betweens; I do not mean Romania. Then I told him: rest
assured that we spoke about you only a little; we were busy dealing
with our relationships, not yours. You said that this poster had been
published, but why did articles directed against China appear in "Izvestija"
and "Krasnaja Zvezda" ? Why did you publish this brochure
and made a review of it? Why did the Romanian-speaking and Chinese-speaking
radio stations transmit two anti-Chinese conferences? We told you
and the Chinese comrades that an end must be put to your swearing
at each other. Then he says: look what the Chinese say - that capitalism
is being restored in our country! Start talking to the Chinese for
a change.
We think that, generally speaking, such vituperation must stop. You
surely have your bilateral problems, but what we are concerned with
here is the fact that there must exist unity between the socialist
countries, and what is detrimental to the unity is just this continual
swearing. When I spoke about doing away with differences, they said:
but we have good relations with all the socialist countries. As if
the whole world did not know. I told to myself, if you only knew what
the Koreans said! I told them, we did not go there to tell them about
COMECON when nobody wants to hear about COMECON. We spoke there and
said words of good appreciation about the Soviet Union. Says he: only
two passages! Practically, they had nothing to tell us.
I told him that the fact surprises me that he links this issue with
the economic relationships. I told him, I have more experience in
politics, but how can others interpret the fact that, in connection
with this visit, you question the economic relationships, the commercial
relationships a.s.o. I understand, I cannot make interpretations,
but others may understand something else. After all, we wanted to
inform you in a comradely manner, for we could have informed you through
the agency of our ambassadors. Either he understood or he did not,
but suddenly he jumped up and said: what did you say, what issues
did you want to raise through the embassy?! I told him, we cannot
accept the kind of discussion and affirmations you made here; on the
contrary, we think that the visit served the unity of the socialist
countries. This is our position and, of course, we will inform the
Executive Committee and the Central Committee about your position.
And, in connection with this, he said: what, you will inform both
the Central Committee and via the embassy?! We said just as between
friends; we told you all this just because between us there are good,
friendly relationships; we told you so that you may know our opinions,
too. Why we thanked the Chinese, well, because 200 million means something
for us; for the Soviet Union it is little, true; but they gave us
a credit, gave us help and we thanked them. If tomorrow you also give
us a credit, we will thank you as well.
Such was the spirit of the discussions. To wind up, we said that we
wanted to develop the relationships. Kosygin took the floor again,
saying that - in his opinion - the discussions had been useful. I
also told him that we, too, thought the discussions had been useful.
In addition, we said that the discussions have to be held in a different
spirit, starting from trust, mutual respect and then it will possible
to draw good conclusions, that we appreciate the discussions as being
useful and that we wish to develop the relationships. Of course, the
discussions are useful, but they would have been more useful if they
had been held in a different spirit. With that we concluded, stood
up, and left.
The ambassadors of the countries we had visited were also present,
we said goodbye to them, and left.
[ . . . ]
They realized that our good appreciations about China would exert
a good influence. They have this position and that is why they tried
to raise the issues in the way they raised them. They prepared Tsedenbal
as well, maybe some others, too. It seems, however, that things in
their country have also evolved gradually because four days before
they had let us know that they would have us stay and we would go
to the villa, but in the end Kosygin and the others came to the airport.
Maybe they also have diferent discussions and opinions and they had
reached the conclusion that it was better to go on this way, to test
their force. This means that they are still prisoners of the old policy,
that they are more willing to try to reach an understanding with the
United States and with others than with China. They are not afraid
that the Chinese will attack them - in fact the Chinese told us that
they did not have such intentions - but they fear that the Chinese
influence in the world will increase.
[ . . . ]
I think, therefore, that the visit took place in good conditions
- except for these minuses in Mongolia and the discussions with the
Soviets - but our main objective was the visit to China, Korea, and
Vietnam. I feel that [the visit] had better results than we had initially
expected. We now have our own impressions and are aware of what is
going on there.
[ . . . ]
Now a few impressions about our embassies. Except for the ambassador
in Beijing, the other ambassadors are weak, incapable, people who
disinform about the situation in the relevant country, beginning with
the preparations here. They kept sending one telegram after another
complaining that they had nothing to eat, that they had to bring everything
from home. They insisted on meat being brought to Beijing; to Korea,
too. But this is another issue. An end must be put to this state of
affairs, there must be order and discipline as regards our Party Economy.
Both in China and in Korea. The staff of the embassy called [George]
Macovescu in and told him that there was nothing there. I did not
go there, but Lenutza [Elena] and the other comrades went to the shop
and found that there was everything there. Korea's production of eggs
is two billion per year and in 1975 it will amount to three billion.
Only in 1975 will we be able to produce two billion eggs. [The Koreans]
eat 80 kg of fish per inhabitant and per year, therefore there is
no point in complaining that one has nothing to eat in such a country.
Even in Mongolia, the land of meat, they brought meat from Beijing.
In Hanoi there was the same situation. There was food there, food
products were provided. The persons belonging to the embassy staff
do not know the real situation, neither the ones in Hanoi nor the
ones in Korea and the ones in Mongolia. Let us change them and send
them to work in production. They should not stay abroad more than
eight years and then they should work in production, otherwise they
will become detached from reality.
In addition, I would mention that our apparatus is undisciplined.
I am discontented with the behavior of our comrades in the delegation;
they were refractory and did not help the delegation. In fact, I told
them that, but they put their hands in their pockets or locked themselves
in their rooms, they did not act, they did not make any effort. It
is true that comrade [Ion Gheorghe] Maurer was ill; but, frankly speaking,
he exaggerated, too, because he practically did not go anywhere and
this made a bad impression. It is true that he was ill and this was
not easy. But to stay locked in your room, not to go out anywhere,
is also bad. I am referring to the other comrades, who are young and
should have been preoccupied as there were a lot of problems there;
everyone entered his room and waited to be woken up, to be invited.
As regards the preparation of materials, I had [only] the two counselors
since [Ion] Iliescu practically did not work as he should have. I
had the two counselors - Dobrescu and Mitea. Only [Stefan] Andrei
and [George] Macovescu worked to draw up the communiqué.
I am saying all this only to keep in mind the fact that we must learn
our lesson [from all that had happened].
By and large, a situation was created as if everybody was going on
a trip; in addition, there was this attitude towards Asia; since we
left home, we were repeatedly told that we must guard against/be wary
of everything. Hence this attitude of staying indoors, in one's room,
because it is warm or for some reason or other. That is why they [the
embassy staff] brought even water from Bucharest, they took water
from Beijing for Mongolia, where there is a mountainous region and
the water is clean. Hence/Accordingly, we discussed this when we still
were in Beijing because they [the embassy staff] wanted to send one
more plane; however, they went shopping to Beijing. But this belongs
to another group of problems, related to the Party Economy, the Party
Chancellor's Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the International
Section [of the CC of the RCP].
We found this kind of disinformation elsewhere as well, but here [in
China] ignoring the realities in the country in which they conducted
their activity was more pregnant and [moreover] there were no contacts
whatsoever with the leadership and the apparatus in the country in
question/point and that is why the results were bad. Beside Beijing,
where [ambassador] Duma performed well - he was known everywhere,
in point of fact he was the only ambassador who maintained contacts
in the period of the cultural revolution and Chou En-lai mentioned
this fact several times; he was also known by officials in Shanghai
and Nankin.
Lack of discipline as regards security, including in the case of pilots.
Although I had established with them not to make stopovers anywhere
any longer, to fly directly from Ulan Bator to Moscow, and to make
up a list so that in the presidential plane only the strictly required
number of persons may travel, in Ulan Bator it was found out that
in fact people and baggage were taken out of the plane and in their
place baggage for 14 people, among which items of furniture as well,
and including baggage [belonging to ambassador] Duma were loaded.
I asked Stoica what was happening, but he did not know. I give you
an order not take either people or baggage [in the plane] any more,
but - in spite of all this - you load the plane with two tons. This
is also valid for the security people, as if they were rich men; they
do not work industriously, they do not do their duty, there is a lack
of discipline. We discussed about that in the plane, too, but here
I wanted to say only that.
We will have to think about it in this respect, too. This means that
people went there to buy furniture; this means that we give [them]
too much hard currency. Now it is my wish that we decide to forbid
bringing things from abroad. This has already become a problem; everybody
struggles to stay as long as possible [abroad] to buy the devil knows
what incredible things there. We must issue a decision or a decree
regarding bringing things from abroad, just like the Yougoslavs did
five years ago. You do not find such a situation either in the Soviet
Union or in China or anywhere else for that matter. In addition, [the
staff of] all the embassies in the countries around China go shopping
to Beijing. I have learned that even the staff of our embassy in Moscow
go shopping to Beijing. Maybe the same thing happens elsewhere. This
is disorder. I do not want to inform [you] further on this [issue]
any longer as we will discuss it in more detail and decide what steps
should be taken.
I have eventually learned that [our staff in] Ulan Bator brought meat
from Pekin. Why ever for?
Comrade Ion Florescu:
For Ulan Bator we brought only 60 kg of lamb and chicken [intended]
for the plane.
Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu:
We will discuss about it because you do not disgrace yourself, you
disgrace the homeland, the people.
[Translation provided by the Romanian Institute
for Recent History]
|