

**ARMED FORCES OF
THE INDIAN UNION**

||
HISTORY OF
||
THE INDO-PAK WAR, 1965

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FOREWORD

Right from October 1947, when it engineered the tribal invasion to capture Kashmir, Pakistan has chosen to follow a path of confrontation with India. The Indo-Pak War 1965 was the outcome of a prolonged and well rehearsed "hate India" campaign launched by the Pakistan Govt. Pakistan sought to achieve by war what it could not achieve through diplomacy. India responded to this act of aggression.

Initially, in August 1965, Pakistan attempted to secure Kashmir valley through infiltration. However, our forces timely encountered this attempt, sealing the infiltration routes. Thereafter, Pakistan launched an attack in the Chhamb Jaurian sector (Op Grand Slam), with a view to capturing Jammu and thereby disrupting the lines of supply for our forces deployed in Jammu & Kashmir. Our Army launched a diversionary attack on the western front and thwarted Pakistan's second attempt to grab the valley.

The essential objective of this history of the Indo-Pak War of 1965 is to place on record an objective account of the events which took place. As such, the present work is not an attempt to glorify or denigrate the Armed Forces locked in battle. A study of this history reveals various shortcomings on both sides. I am sure military experts will draw the emerging lessons, for application to tactical planning for future operations, such as may arise.

[N.N.VOHRA]

DEFENCE SECRETARY

31 December 1992

New Delhi.


PREFACE

In March 1983, while enjoying my retirement in Varanasi, I was recalled to duty to compile the history of Indo-Pak War, 1971, which ended in a decisive victory for India. After completing this task in 1985, the Government asked me to take up the compilation of the histories of the Conflict with China, 1962, and the Indo-Pak War, 1965. These histories were also completed by 1990, and are now being photocopied for limited circulation.

This history of Indo-Pak War, 1965, is as complete and as authentic as we could make it. In this effort we have consulted the available records and documents of the Ministries and departments of the Government. The mass of information culled from the Government files was supplemented by interviewing important participants in the war. Published sources, of course, were also consulted. I hope this history can be published by the Ministry of Defence soon without any reservations, as it has been revised and edited in the light of the comments made by various ministries and departments, and covers a non-controversial subject.

The Government provided to me the assistance of a small team of specialist scholars and service officers to complete the assignment. The book could not have been completed in time without their dedicated and competent efforts, and I am grateful to all of them. I am also grateful to all the concerned Ministries, Intelligence Agencies and Services Headquarters, who vetted the draft history. However, this history does not always reflect their views or commit the Government in any manner. The author and I accept full responsibility for the facts stated and the opinions expressed.

In the end, I would like to acknowledge with gratitude the painstaking and whole hearted contribution of Dr. U.P. Thapliyal, Director, History Division, in preparing the final press copy and in bringing out this work. Shri R.C. Baluja and Shri T.R. Gulati, SROs, also deserve thanks for ably assisting him. My sincere thanks are also due to the secretarial staff and typists involved in the project, specially Shri D.C. Kashyap and Shri D. Tamil Selvan, who worked tirelessly and for long hours to produce a fair copy of the draft. The work could never have been accomplished, of course, without the active support and personal interest of the Defence Ministers and Secretaries (especially Shri S.K. Bhatnagar, Shri Naresh Chandra and Shri N.N. Vohra), to whom I feel deeply indebted.



NEW DELHI
23 September 1992

S.N. PRASAD

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ABBREVIATIONS

AA	- Anti Aircraft
AAR	- After Action Report
ACM	- Air Chief Marshal
ACT	- Air Control Team
AD	- Air Defence
Adm	- Admiral/Administration
AFV	- Armoured Fighting Vehicle
AHQ	- Army Headquarters
Air Cmde	- Air Commodore
AK	- Automat Kalashnikov
Amb	- Ambulance
Amn	- Ammunition
AOC	- Air Officer Commanding/ Army Ordnance Corps
AOP	- Air Observation Post
APC	- Armoured Personnel Carrier
Armd	- Armoured
Arty	- Artillery
ASC	- Army Service Corps
ATC	- Air Traffic Control
AVM	- Air Vice Marshal
AVSM	- Ati Vishisht Seva Medal
Bde	- Brigade
BIO	- Brigade Intelligence Officer
BMG	- Browning Machine Gun
Bn	- Battalion
BPI	- Bulk Petrol Installation
Brig	- Brigadier
BSF	- Border Security Force
Bty	- Battery
CAP	- Combat Air Patrol
Capt	- Captain
Cav	- Cavalry
CAS	- Chief of the Air Staff
Cdr	- Commander
CENTO	- Central Treaty Organisation

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CFL	- Cease Fire Line
C-in-C	- Commander-in-Chief
CIH	- Central India Horse
Cmde	- Commodore
CNS	- Chief of Naval Staff
CO	- Commanding Officer
COAS	- Chief of the Army Staff
Col	- Colonel
Comp Mtn Btys	- Composite Mountain Batteries
Comp Mtn Regts	- Composite Mountain Regiments
COS	- Chief of Staff
Coy	- Company
CQMH	- Company Quarter Master Havildar
CRP	- Central Reserve Police
CZA	- Communication Zone Area
DBN	- Dera Baba Nanak
DIG	- Deputy Inspector General
Div	- Division
DMI	- Director of Military Intelligence
DMO	- Director of Military Operations
DNO	- Directorate of Naval Operations
DSO	- Distinguished Service Order
DZ	- Dropping Zone
EAC	- Eastern Air Command
EC	- Eastern Command
EME	- Electrical & Mechanical Engineers
Engrs	- Engineers
Fd	- Field
Fd Pk Coy	- Field Park Company
Fd Regt	- Field Regiment
Fd Regt (SP)	- Field Regiment (Self-Propelled)
Fd Regt (TA)	- Field Regiment (Territorial Army)
FF (R&S)	- Frontier Force (Reconnaissance & Support)
Fg Offr	- Flying Officer
Flt Lt	- Light Lieutenant
FM	- Field Marshal
FOC	- Flag Officer Commanding
FOCIF	- Flag Officer Commanding Indian Fleet

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FOO	- Forward Observation Officer
FUP	- Forming Up Place
GA	- Ground Attack
Garh Rif	- Garhwal Rifles
Gen	- General
GHQ	- General Headquarters
GNP	- Gross National Product
GOC	- General Officer Commanding
Gp	- Group
GR	- Gorkha Rifles
GSO	- General Staff Officer
HF	- Harassing Fire
HQ/Hqrs	- Headquarters
Hr(s)	- Hour(s)
Hy	- Heavy
IAF	- Indian Air Force
IDSA	- Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis
IN	- Indian Navy
Inf	- Infantry
INS	- Indian Naval Ship
IST	- Indian Standard Time
ITB Force	- Indo-Tibetan Border Force
JAK Militia/Rif	- Jammu & Kashmir Militia/Rifles
JCO	- Junior Commissioned Officer
JCP	- Joint Check Post (of India & Pakistan)
Kg	- Kilogram
Km	- Kilometre
LAA Regt	- Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment
LAD	- Light Aid Detachment
L Hav	- Lance Havildar
LI	- Light Infantry
L Nk	- Lance Naik

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LMG	-	Light Machine Gun
L of C	-	Line or Lines of Communication
Lt/Lieut	-	Lieutenant
Maint	-	Maintenance
Maj	-	Major
M & G Area	-	Maharashtra & Gujarat Area
MC	-	Military Cross
MEA	-	Ministry of External Affairs
Med Regt	-	Medium Regiment
MG	-	Machine Gun
MH	-	Military Hospital
MHA	-	Ministry of Home Affairs
MI	-	Military Intelligence
Mil	-	Military
MM	-	Milimetre
MMG	-	Medium Machine Gun
MO	-	Military Operations
MOP	-	Mobile Observation Post
Mor Regt	-	Mortar Regiment
Mtn	-	Mountain
MU	-	Mobile Unit
MVC	-	Maha Vir Chakra
NATO	-	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
Nb Sub	-	Naib Subedar
NCsE	-	Non-Combatants Enrolled
NCO	-	Non-Commissioned Officer
NEFA	-	North East Frontier Agency
NHQ	-	Naval Headquarters
Nk	-	Naik
OO	-	Operation Order
OP	-	Operation
OR	-	Other Rank
ORBAT	-	Order of Battle
Ord	-	Ordnance
ORP	-	Operational Readiness Platform
PAF	-	Pakistan Air Force

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PAP	- Punjab Armed Police
Para	- Parachute
Pl	- Platoon
PNS	- Pakistan Naval Ship
POK	- Pakistan Occupied Kashmir
POL	- Petrol, Oil and Lubricant
POW	- Prisoner of War
PR	- Photographic Reconnaissance
Pt	- Point
PVC	- Param Vir Chakra
PVSM	- Param Vishisht Seva Medal
RAC	- Rajasthan Armed Constabulary
RADM	- Rear Admiral
Raj Rif	- Rajputana Rifles
RCL	- Recoilless
Recce	- Reconnaissance/Reconnoitre
Regt	- Regiment
Retd	- Retired
Ris	- Risaldar
RT	- Radio Telephone
SA	- Small Arms
SAGW	- Surface to Air Guided Weapons
SC	- Southern Command
SEATO	- South East Asia Treaty Organisati
Sep	- Sepoy
Sig	- Signal
SRP	- State Reserve Police
SU	- Signal Units
Sub	- Subedar
Sqn Ldr	- Squadron Leader
Tac	- Tactical
TAC	- Tactical Air Centre
Tk(s)	- Tank(s)
Tp	- Troop
Tr	- Track
UNFO Team	- United Nations Forward Observer Team

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UNIPOM	- United Nations India Pakistan Observer Mission
UNMOGIP	- United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UP	- Uttar Pradesh
VCAS	- Vice Chief of the Air Staff
VCNS	- Vice Chief of the Naval Staff
VCOAS	- Vice Chief of the Army Staff
VIP	- Very Important Person
Vr C	- Vir Chakra
VSM	- Vishisht Seva Medal
WAC	- Western Air Command
WC	- Western Command
WD	- War Diary
Wg Cdr	- Wing Commander
Wksp	- Workshop
WNC	- Western Naval Command
WPR	- West Pakistan Rangers
WPT	- West Pakistan Time

*** *** ***

LOOKING BACK

Whatever the reasons, the fact stands out that Pakistan and India developed an adversarial relationship right from 1947. Perhaps this relationship was necessary for the very survival of Pakistan. For if Pakistan lived in amity and cordiality with India, the average Pakistani might start questioning the necessity for the partition of the sub-continent, and its continuance, in the face of cultural, economic and military logic. So an anti-India stance was always considered essential by the Pakistani ruling elite. And Pakistan's re-armament with massive US aid from 1954 onwards, though ostensibly against the Communist Powers, was against India in reality. This was known to all, except perhaps the Americans, and Chou En Lai himself once blessed Pakistan's membership of SEATO, since it enabled Pakistan to acquire armaments which China was unable to provide(1).

The valley of Kashmir provided the main bone of contention between India and Pakistan. Indo-Pak antagonism crystallised as the Kashmir issue, and it became a primary objective of Pakistan's foreign policy to obtain possession of Kashmir, by whatever means.

It would appear that Pakistan missed a golden opportunity by not grabbing Kashmir immediately after the Chinese attack on India in 1962. But the developments were too sudden and unexpected and found Pakistan unprepared to take immediate advantage of the situation militarily. Moreover, India had not significantly reduced its forces on the West Pakistan front to fight the Chinese. The USA and UK declared their full sympathy and support to India, making it almost impossible for Pakistan to attack India in collusion with the Chinese. So Pakistan tried to secure its objective in Kashmir by diplomatic pressure.

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1. During a visit to Beijing, "At one time, when Ayub Khan was somewhat apologetic about our continued membership of SEATO, Chou En Lai had assured him that China, did not mind (it) It was just as well, he had said jokingly, for China to have a friend in SEATO. He had also said that since China was not in a position to provide the hardware, it was in Pakistan's interest that it should secure this from the United States". ... Asghar Khan, Air Marshal (Retd), "The First Round: Indo-Pakistan War 1965", p.113, (Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd, Sahibabad, 1979).

Prof Galbraith, the American Ambassador at New Delhi, has recorded in some detail his honest broker act between India and Pakistan, which, however, brought no tangible results(1). The golden opportunity for Pakistan in 1962-63 was thus a mere illusion.

Rudely jolted by the Chinese attack, India launched a major modernisation and expansion programme for her armed forces. It was expected that within five years they would total a million men, armed with modern weapons. When the Indian re-armament was completed, Pakistan would have little chance of any successful military adventure against India. It seemed a matter of now or never for Pakistan.

The fighting in Kutch in the spring of 1965 came before the military balance had tilted decisively against Pakistan. The Kutch imbroglio appears to have been unplanned, and not the result of any diabolical Pakistani design. But the continued inflow of massive American military aid had engendered a mood of belligerence and confidence in the Pakistani armed forces, particularly because the Govt in Pakistan was a military dictatorship under Field Marshal Ayub Khan. So we find Pakistan throwing in its main battle tanks also in what was basically a border skirmish between para-military patrols of India and Pakistan. The result of the fighting in Kutch was hailed as a military victory in Pakistan. India's failure to hit back in full force, at Kutch or elsewhere along the Pakistan border, was taken to be a proof of timidity and lack of confidence. The short statured and unassuming Lal Bahadur Shastri, who had succeeded the great Jawahar Lal Nehru, appeared to be no match for the hefty and imposing Ayub Khan. Pakistan experienced great euphoria. The historic moment seemed to have arrived for Pakistan to solve the Kashmir problem in its own way and to its full satisfaction.

The historic moment appeared to find the historic man already there, and straining at the leash. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, tall, always immaculately dressed, foreign educated Foreign Minister of Pakistan, prevailed upon President Ayub Khan to launch Operation 'Gibraltar', so that Pakistani infiltrators could trigger off an uprising in the Kashmir valley leading to its merger with Pakistan. Operation 'Gibraltar' was undertaken against the advice of Pakistan Army Headquarters, and it is believed widely

1. Galbraith, J.K., "Ambassador's Journal: A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years" (London, 1969).

that Bhutto's real aim was to discredit the military and to come to power in Pakistan, because he knew that Operation 'Gibraltar' would result in Pakistani defeat(1). Many perceptive Pakistanis have admitted openly that it was a disastrous plan, executed disastrously. Air Marshal Asghar Khan (Retd) has attributed the failure of the operation to the fact that "the stepping up of the tempo was not gradual enough to give it the character of an internal up-rising, nor was it controlled sufficiently to keep it within the bounds of Indian political and military acceptability"(2). It was bound to result in failure, and was then followed by Operation 'Grand Slam' against Chhamb. To the consternation of the Pakistan High Command, the meek and unimpressive Indian Prime Minister responded by sanctioning the opening of a second front against Pakistan in the Punjab.

The general war that followed showed up the Pakistani as well as the Indian armed forces in definitely poor light. There was lack of professional competence and good Generalship on either side. The Pakistanis have openly debated in the press and through professional journals the various aspects of their performance in the war(3). There has been no corresponding debate in India, in spite of India being an open society as against dictatorship in Pakistan. But the performance of the Indian Armed Forces was equally if not more unimpressive, as discussed in detail in the last chapter of this history.

In the high realm of politico-military interface, the Indian performance was indeed laudable, due mainly to the unique qualities of Lal Bahadur Shastri. There was complete understanding and trust between the civil Govt. and the military establishment. The Home Front stood solidly behind the armed forces, and the civil population identified itself with the war effort to a degree unexcelled before or since then. International diplomacy was handled competently, as evidenced in dealing with China, the USA and the USSR. However, Inter Services cooperation was far from satisfactory. The institutional framework for it was rudimentary, and the situation on the ground left much to be desired. The Indian Navy was given the minimum role in the war. Army-Air cooperation was primitive and ineffective. Many senior army officers had no experience of modern war and a very inadequate appreciation of the potentialities and limitations of air power.

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1. Remarks of Lt Gen M. Habibullah Khan Khattak (Retd), reproduced in Strategic Digest (IDSA, New Delhi, July 1984), p.727.
 2. Asghar Khan, p.76.
 3. Strategic Digest (IDSA, New Delhi), July 1984 and February 1987.

As regards the Indian Army, problems emerged even at the planning stage. There were deep differences between Gen Chaudhuri, Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh and Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad about the axis of the main attack and its timing. Lt Gen Dhillon, the Commander XI Corps, appears to have had no particular opinion of his own. There were allegations that Maj Gen Rajendra Singh (Sparrow), the General Officer Commanding 1 Armd Div, had direct approach to the Army Chief, the Corps Commander and the Army Commander being ignored. The lack of success of many of the plans was attributed to these major flaws and differences of opinion in planning. But it is clear that the execution of these plans was also over cautious. The main Indian armoured strike force moving into Sialkot area advanced at the pace of the infantry rather than armour(1). On the Lahore front, the troops fell back from the Ichhogil Canal due to PAF air strikes and failure of the supporting echelons to come up quickly. There was the bizarre episode of the order to XI Corps to retreat from Amritsar to the Beas bridge because of the supposed break through of Pakistani armour from Khem-Karan(2). Many officers, including General officers, were sacked in the course of the operations. Many opportunities were lost. It must be recalled, however, that the Field Officers of the Indian Army acquitted themselves gloriously. The new breed Majors and Captains were cool and competent professionals, and the unusually high percentage of casualties they suffered testified to their elan and determination to wipe out the stigma of the 1962 reverses(3).

Performance of the IAF was equally patchy. In planning, there was no definite allocation of air effort for ground support of the Army. The crucially important opportunity to strike first on the morning of 6 September was ignored. The Counter Air strikes against Pakistani air bases were given up too soon, and purely defensive Combat Air Patrols and escort missions took up most of the IAF effort. Missions were not well planned, as witnessed over Chhamb on 1 September, when the old Vampires were sent and four of them were shot down by the PAF Sabres within minutes. Again, the vitally important raid against Sargodha base of the PAF on 7 September, was timed too early, before dawn, and the Indian pilots found it too dark to spot the targets on the ground. Only the gallantry and skill of the individual pilots of the IAF shone brightly in the saga of the air war.

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1. See Chapter VII of this history.
 2. Briefly referred to in Chapter VI.
 3. Refer to Chapter XII for details.

The overall performance of the Pakistani armed forces was equally poor. Pakistani officers, to their great credit, have debated openly and exhaustively the flaws in their performance in the 1965 war(1). They have concluded that the whole adventure presented by Operation 'Gibraltar' was misconceived. Operation 'Grand Slam' fell flat in execution, supposedly after Maj Gen Akhtar Husain Malik was replaced by Maj Gen Yahya Khan as the General Officer Commanding 12 Inf Division in the middle of Chhamb battle. The change was probably the result of internal political conflicts within the Army hierarchy. Pakistan Army Headquarters appears to have been caught totally by surprise when the Indian attack came towards Lahore in the morning of 6 September. Maj Gen Sarfraz is reported to have been sleeping peacefully in his quarters in Lahore Cantonment at that time. The armoured thrust through Khem Karan was not planned or stage-managed competently, apart from the element of luck going against Pakistan. On the Sialkot front, the Pakistan Army proved doughty and fought well, though its performance shone brighter due to the poor Generalship and timid handling of armour on the Indian side. The Pakistan Air Force gave comparatively better performance, for example, at Pathankot on 6 September, at Sargodha and Kalaikunda on 7 September.

By about 20th September, Pakistan had shot her bolt. She was exhausted. Her armoured formations had received heavy battering, and artillery ammunition was almost used up. India would have won a decisive victory if the war had continued much longer. But the Indian Army Chief was over cautious, and 'cease fire' came. Tashkent, therefore, saved Pakistan, although the Pakistanis attribute their deliverance to the 3 'A's - Allah, Air Force and Artillery, in that order!

If Tashkent saved Pakistan, it also destroyed Ayub Khan. Throughout the conflict, the Pakistani public was being fed on stories of bravery, success and victory over the cowardly Indians. The public was, therefore, confused and very angry when President Ayub Khan agreed to a cease fire, and the settlement at Tashkent proved that the contest had been a draw and not a victory for Pakistan. It proved the beginning of the end for Ayub Khan. Here was a classic case of false propoganda coming back like a boomerang.

1. Strategic Digest (IDSA, New Delhi), July 1984 and February 1987.

Although in military terms the contest was a draw, it should be noted that in the overall context it was a clear victory for India. The Indian war aim was to preserve the status-quo in Jammu and Kashmir and to foil Pakistani attempt to grab it. These limited and defensive aims were fully achieved. India deliberately opted for as short and as limited a conflict as possible. East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) was not attacked. The Indian Navy was held back from any offensive action. Even the IAF was not thrown into battle against Pakistan territory till after the PAF had attacked Indian air bases on the evening of 6 September, causing serious loss at Pathankot at least. Cease-fire was accepted when India was still capable of continuing the fight, and when the enemy was showing signs of total exhaustion. So the aggressor was let off lightly. Pakistan would have suffered a crushing defeat if the IAF had launched a full scale pre-emptive attack against the PAF on the morning of 6 September itself, and if the Army had really gone for a kill when the enemy was tottering after 20 September. The Indians, they say, lack, 'the killer instinct', whether it be a battle ground or the play field. In any case, the Indian Government and military leadership accepted a stalemate and refrained from humbling Pakistan, in the belief that this moderation would lead to less bitterness and more friendly relations. But in 1965, as again in 1971, these humane sentiments and noble assessments proved definitely inapplicable in the case of Pakistan. One wonders whether the correct deductions have been made in the quarters concerned.

CHAPTER - I

THE PROLOGUE

Pak Belligerence over Kashmir since 1947:

The Indian National Congress had fought the British for the establishment of a secular democratic polity. The Muslim League, on the other hand, had demanded a division of India on the basis of religion and the two nation theory. The communal game played by Muslim League finally brought about the partition of India. A theocratic state called Pakistan was born on 14 August 1947. This new state continued to play the communal card even after partition. Jinnah, the Governor-General of Pakistan, thought that his Islamic idealism would be incomplete as long as 'Muslim' Kashmir remained separated from Pakistan. Within a month of Pakistan's creation, Jinnah was discussing with Lord Ismay, his military Chief of Staff, the possibility of military operations in Jammu and Kashmir, and stating that there was no alternative but to fight it out.* An immediate military expedition against Jammu and Kashmir at that time was not considered practicable, as Pakistani forces required some time for re-organisation and consolidation. The fear of adverse international repercussions and annoyance of the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir also discouraged Pakistan. However, these factors, it was thought, could be taken care of if a covert attempt was made in Kashmir.

The Indian Independence Act itself had laid down that the princely states of the Indian subcontinent would be free to join either of the two Dominions after the lapse of the British paramountcy. The question whether these states could remain independent was left unanswered in the Act. The Government of India took the stand that it considered the states free to join either India or Pakistan, taking into account the factors of geographical contiguity, and historical, political, economic, social and other ties. Nehru held that the people of these states had the democratic de facto right to decide to join either of the two Dominions and in this the ruling prince had to go by the wishes of the people. Jinnah, on the other hand, stated that the ruling princes alone had the right to decide on the accession, and if desired, they could also opt for independence.

The ruler of Jammu and Kashmir, whose boundary was co-terminus with India, China, Afghanistan and Pakistan, laboured hard to maintain independence, or vacillated and

* Russell Brines, The Indo-Pakistan Conflict, p.54.

did not yield to advice and pressure to join either India or Pakistan.

Pakistan, which had set her eyes on Jammu and Kashmir supported the right of the rulers of the Indian states to remain independent. The intention was to create complications for India as the overwhelming number of princely states existed within her territory. It was also intended to encourage the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir with a view to prevent the State's accession to India. Pakistan entered into a Standstill Agreement with Jammu and Kashmir and, under its provisions obtained the right to supply her with food-grains, petrol, salt, etc., and also to control the post and telegraph system in the State.

This suited well with Pak plan to start a war in Jammu and Kashmir with the help of frontier tribesmen supported by its armed forces in disguise. Her strategy was to fan communal trouble in Jammu and Kashmir, incite the Muslim personnel of the state army to revolt and thus cause a total breakdown of the authority. This was to pave the way for the Pak armed forces to march on to Srinagar in disguise. The whole exercise was to be played up as an uprising of the people.

This clever plan nearly succeeded(1). Communal clashes erupted in the State, and the tribal raiders, controlled and directed by Pakistan, began to attack the State territory from 3 September 1947. The intensity of the attacks increased with each passing day. With the desertions of the Muslim troops of the state army, the collapse of the state authority became a real possibility. The raiders, with full Pak support rapidly advanced towards Srinagar. Simultaneously, it effected economic blockade of the state and withheld the supply of essential commodities such as food-grains, salt, petrol, and kerosene. The shortage of petrol completely crippled the transport system in Jammu and Kashmir. With depleted ranks, disrupted supply system and almost dead communication system, the state forces could not stem the tide of the raiders, led by Pak army personnel in mufti. On the south-western border of the State, "raiders" overran several small towns like Kotli and Mirpur.

This deteriorating situation compelled the Maharaja to appeal to India for help. After the State had formally joined the Indian Union on 26 October 1947, Indian troops were sent in by air and by road. Rajauri and Jhangar were rescued from the raiders. Poonch, surrounded by the enemy from all sides, was supplied and maintained by the IAF (then known as RIAF) for nearly a whole year, till a link-up was

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effected. The raiders advancing along the Jhelum valley road reached the outskirts of Srinagar in early November but were driven back. In Kishenganga valley, Tithwal and Gurais were recaptured by the Indian troops. In the north, the raiders seized Gilgit by a coup, occupied Skardu after a long siege, and took Kargil and Dras by a surprise attack. Leh was also threatened. From the early months of 1948, regular units of the Pakistan Army were seen fighting against the Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian troops, however, broke through the Zoji La by using tanks and reoccupied Dras and Kargil in November 1948.

The hostilities in Jammu and Kashmir ended with a Cease-fire at midnight on 1/2 January 1949. Cease Fire Line left the towns of Mirpur, Kotli and Muzaffarabad under the control of Pakistan, through the so-called "Azad Kashmir Government". The Haji Pir Pass connecting Uri with Poonch also remained with her. On the northern front, the enemy not only retained Gilgit and Skardu, but also some vital positions which dominated the Indian line of communication near Kargil. This left about 13,000 sq km of the State under Pak occupation.

During the Jammu and Kashmir operations the Indian Army suffered 4,255 casualties (1,103 killed and 3,152 wounded). In addition, 32 IAF personnel were killed. State forces lost about 1,990 men killed or missing. Against this, 6,000 Pakistanis were killed and some 14,000 wounded(2).

The UN Resolution, accepted by India and Pakistan, envisaged the withdrawal of Pakistani forces from the entire Jammu and Kashmir State. A plebiscite was to follow to determine whether the people of the State wanted to join Pakistan or India. But Pakistan never withdrew its forces and the UN-supervised plebiscite could not be held. Consequently, the Cease Fire Line (CFL) became, an international border. Hereafter the occupation of the Indian territory of Jammu and Kashmir became the driving obsession with Pakistan.

The CFL, as fixed by the United Nations, did not solve India's problem. The threat to her Jammu and Kashmir border from Pakistani infiltration did not recede. Although negotiations at the UN were going on for a year, the Indian military officers in the field did not get sufficient advance notice that the Government of India intends to accept a Cease-fire. A longer period of warning would have enabled the Indian troops to occupy tactically important positions before the Cease-fire took effect. The sudden declaration of Cease-fire put Pakistanis in an advantageous position.

They stealthily occupied a few vantage points after the Ceasefire. There were no Pakistani troops south of the Burzil Pass on 1 January 1949, but after the snow had melted, they came across the Pass and occupied the ground up to a few kilometres from Gurais. Similarly, they occupied the hill tops, overlooking Kargil town and Kargil-Leh road after the Cease-fire. If the Indian officers had received sufficient advance notice on the date and time of Cease-fire they could have prevented such encroachments.

The Cease-fire alignment left some strategically vital areas along the Cease Fire Line in enemy hand. These included the strategic Haji Pir Pass, the Kargil heights, and some positions near Chhamb. These Pak positions greatly bothered the Indian defenders in subsequent hostilities.

Cultivating USA

After the cease-fire India was all set to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir. Nehru made several attempts to initiate the process, but these were nullified by Pakistan's refusal to withdraw its forces from 'Azad Kashmir', a pre-condition for the plebiscite laid down in UN Resolution. Pakistan had thus made up its mind to grab the valley by the force of arms. To this end it concluded a military alliance with USA, and joined South-East Asia Treaty Organisation and Central Treaty Organisation for the alleged containment of communism. It also agreed to the establishment of American bases in Pakistan and in return received American military aid(3). The motive behind Pak policy was to win American diplomatic and military support against India, and not the containment of communism as made out by it. India on the other hand followed a policy of non-alignment.

India interpreted these moves as a direct threat to its security. On 9 December 1953, Nehru wrote to the Pak Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali: "I do not know what the present position is in regard to the military pact of assistance between Pakistan and the USA. But responsible newspapers state that large-scale military assistance and equipment, arms and training will be given to Pakistan by the US. It is even stated (The New York Times had said so) that an army of a million men may be so trained in Pakistan..... But it is obvious that such an expansion of Pakistan's war resources, with the help of the United States of America, can only be looked upon as an unfriendly act in India and one that is fraught with danger...."(4). India's objections to the pact were spelled out in subsequent correspondence as well.

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President Eisenhower of USA stated that the pact was not directed against India. In a message to Nehru on 24 February 1954, he added "if our aid to any country, including Pakistan, is misused and directed against another in aggression, I will undertake immediately, in accordance with my constitutional authority, appropriate action both within and without the UN to thwart such aggression.... If your Government should conclude that circumstances require military aid of a type contemplated by our mutual security legislation, please be assured that your request would receive my most sympathetic consideration"(5).

India, however, maintained that American military aid to Pakistan had changed the whole complex of the Kashmir issue. Nehru declared that India must "retain full liberty to keep such forces and military equipment in Kashmir as we may consider necessary in view of this new threat to us". But the US went on supplying weapons to Pak army.

In 1954, Washington agreed to arm Pakistan's five and a half divisions with modern weapons. It also agreed to provide squadrons of PAF with modern aircraft(6). By September 1965, Pakistan is estimated to have received from USA 100 F-86 Sabre jets, 18 F-104 Starfighters, 30 B-57 bombers, 4 C-130 transport planes and 200 Patton tanks in addition to other arms and ammunition(7).

China Factor

The ever growing threat from Pakistan forced India to concentrate her limited military resources on Indo-Pak border. Consequently, India's northern frontier with China could not receive adequate attention. Quite naturally when the Chinese launched a massive attack on 20 October 1962, on Ladakh and NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh), the Indian army found itself unprepared to meet the challenge.

USA and UK were quick to appreciate this grave threat to India's security and ordered emergency shipment of some infantry weapons for her immediate need(8). Attempts were also made to soften Pak opposition to US military aid to India by persuading the latter to make concessions in Jammu and Kashmir. But America did not pressurise India considering that she might feel 'that the Chinese are retreating in NEFA while we are trying to take Kashmir for the Pakistanis in the West, and that Kashmir is more valuable than NEFA(9). Strong disapproval of the US coupled with the Indian military preparedness in Jammu

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and Kashmir and the limited nature of Chinese operations appear to have deterred Pak from any military adventure against India just then.

However, Pakistan put pressure on US and UK to force India to make concessions in Jammu and Kashmir in return for Pak assurance not to attack India during this crisis. On persistent US and British attempts India and Pakistan agreed to talk on "Kashmir and related matters"(10). Six meetings took place between 17 December 1962 and 16 May 1963. But the Pak claim on 220,150 sq km of the Jammu and Kashmir territory alongwith the valley, and surrender of some 6475 sq km of occupied territory to Peking as result of a provisional Sino-Pak border agreement, rendered further negotiations futile.

America and England rendered emergency military assistance worth £120 million to India during this national crisis. This included transport aircraft, spare parts, light infantry weapons, ammunition, communication, engineering, medical equipment, etc. India was permitted to purchase American equipment for modernisation and expansion of defence production facilities(11). The US also promised to establish a factory in India for the production of ammunition for small arms.

American assistance between October 1962 and September 1965 totalled about \$47 million. This was much less than what they had pledged(12). But these arms were not sufficient to cater to the defence needs of India to meet the twin threat from China and Pakistan. A five-year re-armament programme was drawn up in 1963 and the defence budget was increased by 12%. It was intended to double the Indian army in the next few years, modernise its air force and establish six new Ordnance factories.

India badly needed supersonic aircraft, but the US and UK could not be of much help in this. The Soviet Union however, agreed to give India "ground-to-ground and ground-to-air missiles and fulfilled its MiG delivery commitments"(13). Subsequently, under a major military agreement concluded in September 1964, the Soviet Union agreed to provide India with MiG fighters, transport aircraft, light tanks, and naval equipment on deferred payment basis. In 1964 itself, India purchased eight AN-12 Soviet transport planes for use in Ladakh area. The Soviet Union had already agreed to build a factory in India for the manufacture of supersonic MiG jets in May 1962. This was completed according to schedule.

Courting the Communists

Side by side with arms build-up, Pakistan launched a diplomatic offensive against India. The military alliances enabled her to get massive arms aid ostensibly against Communist Russia and China, but in reality against India. It also tried to establish firm relations with China and USSR and East European countries to isolate India. Attempts were also made by Pakistan to enlist the support of the Muslim countries. President Ayub even tried to wean away Nepal from India. These Pak efforts had begun much before the Chinese attack on India in 1962.

For support over the Kashmir issue, Pakistan placed great reliance on China. From 1954 to 1961, Pakistan always voted against China's entry into the UN. But privately Pak leaders assured Chou En-Lai that their country was not against China. In Bandung, in April 1955, Chou En-Lai revealed that "the Prime Minister of Pakistan told me that although Pakistan was party to a military treaty, Pakistan was not against China" and that "as a result of that we achieved a mutual understanding although we are still against military treaties"(14). To this end Pak also entered into commercial and cultural agreements with Peking. Two Vice-Premiers of China visited Pakistan in 1956. The same year Pak Prime Minister went to China and Chou En-Lai paid a return visit to Pakistan.

Pakistan began a reappraisal of its foreign policy in 1960. While maintaining military alliance with the US, it started voting in favour of China's entry into UNO, thus demonstrating that it would not compromise its relationship with China for the sake of its alliance with the West. China appreciated this shift. Both the countries concluded a border agreement on 2 March 1963, and Pakistan gave away to China some 6,475 km of Kashmir territory in Hunza, south of the Mintaka Pass. It was believed that this border agreement contained secret military clauses also.

In February 1964, during his visit to Pakistan Chou En-Lai assured full support to Pak stand on the Kashmir issue(15). China and Pakistan came closer during the years 1964 and 1965. Their foreign ministers and high level delegations exchanged visits more frequently. It was during one of these exchanges that the Chinese Foreign Minister Marshall Ch'en Yi hinted at the Chinese military support for Pakistan without pledging it.

Pakistan also made repeated attempts to establish close relations with the USSR and other East

European countries. Relations between Pakistan and Russia grew closer, and on 4 April 1965, President Ayub and Bhutto undertook a six-day state visit to Moscow. In the final analysis, though Pakistan succeeded in establishing close relations with USSR temporarily, it could not turn Moscow against India.

Pak Military Build-up

Having set her heart on war Pakistan concentrated on the expansion and modernisation of her armed forces. America had already agreed to modernise five and a half divisions of its army with modern weapons(16). The US military aid to Pakistan from 1954 to 1962 amounted to \$100,000,000. In addition to this, Pakistan also set apart a substantial amount of its budget for the military build-up. Its defence budget which was \$207,750,000 in 1961-62 increased to \$210,000,000 in 1962-63 to \$240,000,000 in 1963-64, to \$269,000,000 in 1964-65 and to \$289,000,000 in 1965-66(17).

Similarly, there was a massive increase in her armed forces. In the year 1961, it was estimated to be 182,700, out of which the Army accounted for 160,000, Navy 7,700 and Air Force 15,000. In October 1962, there was a quantum jump in the strength of the Pak army from 160,000 to 230,000, while no significant expansion of the Navy and the Air Force appears to have taken place. The Pak army was organised in 8 Divisions on triangular basis and was equipped with Patton tanks. In addition, there were 250,000 lightly armed militia and about 30,000 'Azad Kashmir' troops. The following years were devoted to provide the army with the latest sophisticated weapons and equipment to increase its striking power manifold.

In October 1964, there was a big increase in the strength of the Pak Air Force. The number of personnel went up from 15,000 to 17,000-25,000 and aircraft to about 200. The aircraft included 30 B-57 Canberras in two squadrons, - one F-104A Starfighter squadron (a second was to be formed) and four F-86 F Sabre squadrons. No role was envisaged for the navy in the invasion of Jammu and Kashmir, and as such its strength remained at 7,700 even in 1964. The Pak navy had 1 Light cruiser (Cadet training ship), 5 destroyers, 2 ASW frigates, 8 Minesweepers and 10 other ships. An examination of the ratio of Pakistan's male labour force in its armed forces reveals that it increased from 7% in 1961 to 10% in 1964, an increase of slightly less than 50%(18). In other words, one out of every hundred male population in the age group 15-64 was in the armed forces. This excluded lightly armed militia, 'Azad Kashmir' troops, etc., whose number exceeded the regular armed forces of Pakistan. The same trend is evident in her defence

expenditure. In the years 1963 and 1964, Pakistan spent 3.2% and 3.1% respectively of her GNP on defence, but in the year 1965, it was doubled to 6% of the GNP.

India's expenditure on defence always remained low. Even after the 1962 Chinese attack the Indian defence allocation was not sufficiently raised to make up for the lost years. It amounted to 3.7%, 3.5% and 3.7% of the GNP in the years 1963, 1964 and 1965 respectively. During the same period, Burma spent 6.5%, 6.6% and 6.7% and China 7.3%, 7.8% and 7.5% of her GNP on defence(19). The urgent need for economic development forced India to cut on defence expenditure.

Fishing in Troubled waters

After the Chinese attack on India in 1962, USA and Britain extended some arms aid to India. This was vehemently opposed by Pakistan. On 8 July 1963, Ayub told the Western nations that their policy of building the armed strength of India "will force smaller Asian nations to seek refuge from India under Chinese shelter"(20). President Ayub, during his visit to China in March 1965, emphasised in several speeches 'friendship' and 'peaceful' aspirations of China. These Pak outbursts against the US and UK were the result of her failure to force them to link the arms assistance to the solution of Kashmir problem, indeed, to the satisfaction of Pakistan. Pakistan viewed Chinese attack on India as a great opportunity to get concessions(21).

Thus Pakistan had waged a political and diplomatic war of nerves against India, and with its inflammable initiative "generally maintained the offensive, seeking to exert pressure on India by every means"(22). On 11 January 1965, Pak Communication Minister, Khan A. Sabur declared that the government would soon "find out all possible avenues to liberate the Muslims of 'occupied Kashmir'". On the same day a tribal leader Malik Spain Gul boasted that he would lead 25,00,000 tribesmen trained in guerilla warfare to Kashmir to "liberate the state from Indian occupation". On 7 March 1965, POK President Abdul Hamid Khan threatened to 'liberate the Indian held territory' of Kashmir. Between 25 March and 31 March 1965, 64 violations were committed by Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir.

India expressed concern over the massive arms supply to Pakistan, especially the heavy armour and supersonic aircraft. The arrival of even relatively slow F-86 Sabre jet fighters in Pakistan had disturbed India. Subsequently, when more advanced F-104A star fighters were supplied to Pakistan the threat became more formidable. These developments forced India to take counter measures. The Soviet arms assistance and

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offer to build a factory to produce MiG fighters was gratefully accepted. India also tapped its own resources to re-organise and modernise its armed forces and to manufacture arms and ammunition within the country. Expansion of the armed forces was also undertaken to meet the dual threat from Pakistan and China.

As a result of rearmament programmes the Comparative Military Strength(Approximate) of India and Pakistan on 1 September 1965 was as follows:

	<u>Pakistan</u>	<u>India</u>
A. Population	98,570,000*	470,000,000*
B. <u>Defence Budget</u> (1964-65)	\$269,000,000*	\$970,000,000*
C. Army Strength	260,000 (including 30,000 "Azad Kashmir" troops manning one Infantry Division)	700,000 (excluding civilians, non- combatants, Nursing personnel & boys(23))

Infantry

7 Inf Divisions. Also 250,000 lightly armed militia.

9 Inf Divisions(of these 4 were on a reduced establishment) and 11 Mtn Divisions (most of them newly raised and some of them understrength and not fully equipped).

Armour

Two Armd Divisions (one of them was allegedly 1/3 of normal strength) manned out of the following:-

9 Regts - Patton
5 Regts - Sherman
3 Regts - Chaffee

Total No. of Tanks = 765

One Armd Div(with only one Armd Bde), one Indep Armd Bde and 5 Indep Armd Sqns(24), comprising the following(25):-

4 Regts - Centurion
8 Regts - Sherman
2 Regts - AMX-13
2 Regts - PT-76

Total No. of Tanks=720

* The Military Balance, 1964-65, IISS, London. The figures pertain to October 1964. Population of Pakistan was 101,000,000 in November 1965.

Artillery(26)

4 Fd Regts (SP)-25 pdr guns (SP) 105 mm How (SP)	25 Mtn Regts - 3.7" How/ 76 mm guns
25 Fd Regts-25 pdr/105 mm guns/ 105 mm How	41 Fd Regts } 25 pdr
10 Med Regts-5.5" guns/155 mm How	2 Para Fd" } 100 mm guns
1 Hy Regt - 155 mm guns/8" How	10 Med Regts - 5.5"/130 mm guns
8 Mor Regts - 120 mm Mors(27)	1 Hy Regt - 7.2" guns
3 LAA Regts(SP) - 32x40 mm Single guns 32x.50" guns in Quads	19 Lt Regts - 120 mm Nitars
	21 AD Regts - L 60 (towed) Bofor guns. A few L 70 guns also(28).

Naval Strength

	<u>Pakistan(29)</u>
Naval Personnel	- 8,000
Submarine	- 1
Light Cruiser	- 1
Destroyers	- 5
ASW Frigates	- 2
Minesweepers	- 8
Other Ships	- 12
Coast Guard Force	- 1,500
Naval aircraft included Albatross and some UH-19 helicopters.	

Naval Strength

	<u>India(30)</u>
Naval Personnel	- 17,000
Aircraft Carrier	- 1
Cruisers	- 2
Destroyers	- 6
ASW Frigates	- 5
AA Frigates	- 3
Minesweepers	- 6
Other Ships	- 25
Coast Guard	- Nil
Naval aircraft included 24 Sea Hawk strike interceptors and 15 Alize ASW aircraft.	

Air Force Strength

	<u>Pakistan</u>		<u>India</u>
Personnel	- 25,000	Personnel	- 63,000
Aircraft	- 260	Aircraft	- about 700
2 Bomber Sqns - B-57		4 Bomber Sqns	- Canberra
9 Fighter Sqns - one F-104 Starfighter Sqn and eight F-86 Sabre Sqns.		26 Fighter Sqns:	
1 Recce Sqn of high flying RB-57		Gnat	- 5 Sqns
2 Training/Tactical recce sqns		MiG-21	- 7 aircraft only
1 Maritime recce and sea air rescue sqn of helicopters and amphibian SA-16 planes		Hunter	- 6 Sqns
2 Transport Sqns - one C-130 Hercules Sqn and one Bristol Sqn		Mystere	- 5 Sqns
		Vampire	- 6 Sqns
		Ouragon	- 3 Sqns
		13 Transport Sqns:	
		Dakota	- 3 Sqns
		Packet	- 3 Sqns
		AN-12	- 2 Sqns
		Caribou	- 1 Sqn
		IL-14	- 1 Sqn
		Otter	- 2 Sqns
		Super Constallation	- 1 Sqn
		5 Helicopter Sqns:	
		Mi-4	- 4 Units
		Alouette	- 1 Unit

The comparative chart shows that Pakistan had a definite edge over India in terms of number and quality of tanks and their equipment, especially in medium tanks. Although the Patton and Centurion each weighed about 45 tons, the American Patton tank was faster and better equipped. The Patton tank had almost a "two-to-one range of gunfire, more manoeuvrability and a capacity, through infra red equipment, to operate at night, which Indian tanks lacked(31). Considered highly suitable for offensive operations, Pattons were much better than the Centurions of older vintage. By 1965, the Indian Sherman and Stuart tanks of World War II vintage had become even more outdated than the Centurions. Of the other tanks held by the Indians, the PT-76 and AMX-13 were light, and hence ineffective in offensive operations against Pattons or Shermans.

While Pakistan's 1 Armoured Division had 3 "combat commands", containing a mix of tank regiments and mechanised battalions, carried in modern tracked amphibious APCs, the lone Indian armoured division had only one armoured brigade and an infantry brigade carried in 3 Ton lorries. Again, while Pakistan had 17 armoured regiments, India had only 16 tank regiments, out of which only 14 were used during the operations in 1965. One was under conversion. Each Pakistani medium armoured regiment carried 44 tanks, and each Reconnaissance Troop 6 RCL guns. Each Pakistani Light Armoured Regiment carried 32 Light Tanks and 28 ACPS (M-113), which served as command vehicles and also as carriers for rifle troops.

India had only 4 regiments of Centurions against 9 regiments of Pak Pattons. Other Indian tanks - Sherman, AMX-13 and PT-76 were much inferior to Pak tanks. While 5 regiments of Sherman, held by India, were too old and mechanically unreliable, one of the two Indian PT-76 regiments was not yet trained on the new equipment, and hence the Indian generals were cautious in using them during 1965 Operations. The Indian armour relied on an out-dated communication system. Whereas Pak side carried an advanced type (ANGRC series) or radio equipment, which enhanced the Pakistani command and control capability. Pak mechanised infantry carried in amphibious M-113 APCs, closely followed their armour in battle and gave close support with the additional fire-power from a 50" machine-gun fitted on each APC(32). Moreover, unlike the Pakistani armoured formations, the Indian Armoured Division had no medium self-propelled artillery or advanced type of anti-aircraft guns, and hence lacked flexibility and adequate hitting power.

Although, India had more artillery pieces, Pakistani artillery was equipped with the latest American weapons, and its anti-tank fire-power was double than that of India. While there was one Medium artillery regiment, mounted on modern self-propelled armoured mountings, in each Pak armoured division, there was none in the lone Indian armoured division. Again, the Indian LAA regiment was towed, but its counterpart in the Pak Army was self-propelled, providing for more mobility and flexibility. The Indian field, medium, heavy and LAA regiments were respectively equipped with 25 pounder, 5.5", 7.2", and 40 mm guns of World War II vintage, whereas the Pak artillery was equipped with much superior and modern American guns - 105 mm guns for field regiments and 155mm howitzers for medium regiments.

Although in numerical strength, the Indian infantry appeared to be larger than Pakistan's,

in effective strength both were more or less equal. While most of the Indian Mountain Divisions were positioned along the northern borders with China on the Pak side, only one of her seven Infantry Divisions was located in East Pakistan. Thus Pak Army strength of 6 infantry divisions and two armoured divisions on West Pakistan border was not inferior to that of India, which had 9 Infantry Divisions (4 under-strength) and about 3 armoured brigades there.

Pak Air Force was smaller in size as compared to that of India. But it was more modern. Moreover, Pakistan had US-built NATO-standard modern air bases, as also a micro-wave communication network linking these bases. Early warning radar sets covering the Indo-Pak border had been installed at Peshawar, Multan, Sargodha and Badin. Pak Starfighters, equipped with Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, were more powerful than newly acquired Indian MiG 21s. All these factors neutralised the numerical superiority of the Indian Air Force.

Both India and Pakistan had limited naval strength. In September 1965 conflict, except an inconsequential Pak bombardment of Dwarka, no naval activity took place.

Thus in several crucial items, Pakistan enjoyed qualitative superiority over India. In numerical strength, the two sides were roughly equal.

It would appear that by joining SEATO and CENTO, Pakistan had acquired superior arms from the USA. She had simultaneously made friends with her former "Communist enemies". Pak rulers always talked that Kashmir would have to be taken by force of arms. India was left weak after the Chinese attack, and its rearmament programme was in an incomplete state. For Pakistan the fateful hour seemed to have arrived.

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3. Lamb, Alastair, p.84.
4. Ibid., p.86.
5. Brines, pp.128-129.
6. Hussain, S.S., and Qureshi, Sqn Ldr, M.T., pp.99-103.
7. Lamb, Alastair, p.124 (Footnote).
8. Brines, p.264.
9. Ibid., p.514. A less charitable but may be more honest, view is that, Pakistan's friends tried to take the opportunity to coerce India to give Kashmir to Pakistan but a gravely weakened India and a victorious China was not conducive to US security in 1962.
10. Galbraith, John Kenneth, pp.501.
11. Ibid., p.581.
12. Brines, p.265.
13. Mohan, Ram, p.154.
14. Strategic Digest, July 1987, published by IDSA, New Delhi, p.1296.
15. Brines, p. 212.
16. Ibid., p.277.
17. The Military Balance 1961-62, 1962-63, 1963-64, 1964-65 published by the Institute of Strategic Studies, London, pp.21,22,25 & 26 respectively.
18. The Military Balance, 1961-62, p.21 and 1964-65, p.26.
19. Raju, p.5. These figures pertain to the calendar years.
20. Asian Recorder, 1963, p.53,61.
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22. Brines, p.252.
23. From Official Records.
24. Singh, B., p.22.
25. From Official Records.
26. One Arty Regiment = 18 guns generally.
27. Singh, B., p.28; Gen Musa, pp.15-16.
28. While there were 64 guns in each Pak LAA regiment, an Indian LAA regiment had only 32 guns. Singh, B., p.28.
29. The Military Balance, IISS, London, 1964-65 and 1965-66.
30. Compiled from Official Records.

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Chapter II

CONFLICT IN KUTCH, 1965

The Terrain

The Rann of Kutch is a salt waste lying between 22°55' and 24°43' North and 68°45' and 71°46' East, covering an area of about 23,310 sq km and stretching along the north and east of Kutch. It separates Kutch from Sind on the north, and from Radhanpur and Kathiawar on the east and south(1). From the head of the Gulf of Kutch stretches the dry bed of the sea that once surrounded Kutch on the south-east, east and north. For the sake of convenience, this area may be divided into two parts, the Great Rann to the north and north-east of Kutch, about 257 km from east to west, and 129 km from north to south, covering an area of about 18,130 km and the Little Rann to the south-east and south of Kutch, about 129 km from east to west, and 16 to 64 km from north to south, encompassing an area of about 4,144 sq km(2).

The Great Rann of Kutch forms the southern boundary of Sind from the south-western border of Rajasthan to the sea. It is generally flooded from June to October by the sea waters pushed into it by the south-west Monsoon, turning it into a salt lake. In other seasons, it is a desert, - flat, firm and quite bare - except for a few islands, sprinkled with scanty herbage. But there appears some evidence that when Alexander the Great was in Sind, it was an inland sea or lake fed by the "lost river", and afterwards by the Puran river. Till recent times, at least the western part of the Rann from Ali Bander to the Kori Creek was fertile, and intercourse between Sind and Kutch was free and frequent, obstructed by no desert barrier(3).

During the south-west Monsoon, the northern Kutch is entirely covered with water, generally salty. When the Monsoon abates, the waters recede, leaving behind a morass which gradually dries up and turns into a good pasture. In Banni area on the border, where agriculture is not possible due to salinity people have, therefore, taken to cattle-rearing. In Northern Rann there are a few villages with a sparse population with little contacts with the rest of the region. Even the area around Bhuj, the main town of Kutch, is barren, with oppressive heat and forbidding dust during most of the year.

As for communications, there runs a road (67 km) from Bhuj to Khavda in Kutch, near the border of the Rann. This road passed through Banni, an obstacle for

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wheels in the wet season. Northward from Khavda a track led to Diplo (in Pakistan) across the Rann. The stretch of track up to Mori Bet, passing over wet, salty Rann, was heavy-going. From Mori Bet onwards the Rann was firm and vehicles could move at some speed, except during the wet period.

The northern portion of the Rann was easily accessible from the side of Sind (Pakistan). There was also a road along the border on the Pakistani side, which was motorable during the dry season. A track linked Luna near the northern end of Kutch with Rahim-Ki-Bazar (in Pakistan) across the Rann, passing through Karim Shahi, Vigokot and Kanjarkot(4). There were two more tracks linking Bela area with Nagar Parkar in Pakistan. One of them started from Bela and the other from Lodrani.

Kutch-Sind Boundary Dispute

The British annexed Sind in 1843. This necessitated determination of boundary between Sind, the British territory and Kutch the Indian state. It was clearly stated that the Rann lying between Sind and the core territory of the Kutch ruler was part of Kutch. As there was no immediate urgency the border remained undemarcated though some effort in this direction had been initiated by planting pillars.

As a result of the partition in 1947, Sind by virtue of its muslim majority was given to Pakistan whereas Kutch with its predominantly Hindu population remained in India.

Even before partition, the Sind authorities had been disputing the rights of the Kutch government over the entire Rann. In 1938 they had laid claim over half of it. On 14 July 1948, Pakistan wrote to India that the Sind-Kutch "boundary was still in dispute and must be settled." On 10 August 1949, India cited evidence to prove that there was no dispute in this regard. In a note of 9 April 1956, Pakistan put forth the argument: "It has been emphasised that the Rann is dead sea. According to the international practice also seas are divided equally between the states situated on either side of it. The same principle appears to have been followed while settling the dispute over the little Rann between the two states of Morvi and Kutch. The Pakistani claim to the northern portion of the Rann upto Dharamsala is, therefore, supported not only by possession and exercise of authority, but also by international practice and precedent."(5) They also cited maps and letters of the British province of Sind to prove that they never ceased to claim rights over portions of the Rann.

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India pointed out that the Survey of India maps issued during the British period mark the entire Rann as part of Kutch.

The exchange of notes notwithstanding Pak intrusions into the Rann and military movements near the border started as early as 1949. To contain this, Indian authorities in Kutch also demanded the strengthening of patrol arrangements. By the end of 1955, Pak had built a motor track leading to Gulmamad Talavadi, a small depression in the Rann, and reports said that contingents of Sind Reserve Police (about 50 in each) had been stationed at Vingī and Baliari or Jat Tarai, opposite Chhad Bet area. Men of SRP were reported to be patrolling Bet area and instigating Pak cattle-owners, not to pay the grazing fees to the Indian authorities. India lodged a protest with the Government of Pakistan on 12 January 1956. But this did not have any effect. On 17 February 1956, an Indian Police patrol found that Pakistani armed personnel had intruded upto Gulmamad Talavadi and taken up position there. They also fired some shots. Pakistan had thus decided on asserting its right over the Chhad Bet area.

At this juncture B Squadron of 7 Grenadiers (camel mounted infantry) was located at Khavda. On 18 February 1956, its Commander sent a routine patrol to Chhad Bet which due to the long distance (72 km) reached there by noontime the next day. The Pakistanis in well dug-in positions allowed the patrol to enter the area and then opened LMG fire, injuring a sepoy. The patrol returned fire and in the resultant exchange of fire, two Indian sepoys were wounded and 3 camels killed. The exchange of protest notes followed without any result.

Subsequently, it was learnt that Pakistanis equipped with MMGs and 2" mortars had occupied the whole of Chhad Bet. On 24 February, India protested that Chhad Bet was indisputably her territory(6). The Indian army took measures to expel the intruders. 112 Infantry Brigade stationed at Dhrangadhra was ordered to move to Bhuj on 22 February. The Brigade (less 5 Raj Rif) concentrated at Khavda on 24 February. On the same day, 7 Grenadiers of the brigade established a firm base in area Bedia Bet. Next day, the Army Commander reconnoitered the area.

Indian Precautions

No major incursions by Pakistani nationals occurred in the area after this. The Indian authorities had however realised the vulnerability of the border to Pak encroachments. Consequently, a

proposal to disband 7 Grenadiers, (a camel battalion) was abandoned and it was reorganised as a normal infantry battalion. One Squadron of 7 Grenadiers with attached troops was stationed at Bhuj, and the rest of the battalion was strung along the L of C between Bhuj and Khavda. The Bhuj airstrip was improved to facilitate the operation of modern fighter aircraft. An all-weather airstrip for landing Auster aircraft was built at Chhad Bet. Fair weather airstrips were also constructed at Khavda and Kotda (16 km north of Khavda), the latter for the emergency landing of Dakotas. A plant for distillation of salt water for the use of men at Chhad Bet was also set up. A bund was also built to keep off the tidal waters from flooding the area.

As a long term measure, it was proposed to construct the following roads of strategic importance in the area:-

- 1) Khavda-Chhad Bet
- 2) Khavda-Lakhpat
- 3) Mavsari-Tharad-Dhanera-Panthwada-Dantiwada
- 4) Varahi-Morwada-Suigan
- 5) Bhabhar-Suigan
- 6) Radhanpur-Morwada
- 7) Dhalavira-Godhada-Lodrani-Mosana-Santalpur

In November 1962, 112 Infantry Brigade Group was replaced by 31 Infantry Brigade Group in the area. However, the border posts continued to be manned by CRPF and State Reserve Police personnel.

Trouble at Kanjarkot

In 1964, trouble started in Kanjarkot area, where Pakistanis were frequently trespassing into Indian territory. On 13 May 1964, three such intruders were arrested and subsequently released by the State Reserve Police. No further incidents took place in that year, but the issue became live again in January-February 1965.

Kanjarkot was a fort in ruins, about 1370 metres south of the Pak border on the north-western fringe of the Rann of Kutch. The area south of Kanjarkot was a flat plain. The area to the north consisted of a series of parallel sand dunes, the southernmost running along the Pak border. The sand dunes dominated the area of the fort and provided Pakistanis an unimpeded view. The area lend itself to operations only during the dry season.

Communications in the area also favoured Pakistanis rather than Indians. The Indian administrative base at Bhuj was about 177 km south of

the border. The advance maintenance area being established at Khavda was about 104 km from the border and about 119 km from Vigokot. The proposed brigade administrative area at Karim Shahi, south-east of Kanjarkot, was 32 km from the border. The Bhuj-Khavda road was liable to breaches during rains. The desert track from Khavda to this area passed through a causeway. No drinking water was available beyond Khavda, except at Vigokot, where it was sufficient for a limited number of troops(7). At this time, for air communication there was a fair weather airstrip at Khavda, and a civil landing ground at Bhuj. Efforts were on to construct a helipad at Vigokot. But a sizeable airstrip for Air Force operations in the area was located only at Jamnagar.

However, the position was quite different on the Pakistani side. Badin a sizeable town, was only 30 km from her border. It had a large airfield with radar, capable of handling all types of fighter and transport aircraft and was well connected with Hyderabad (Sind) and Khairpur. There was also a road running from Badin to Maro and further east to Nagar Parkar. Thus the maintenance of the border-posts was much easier for Pakistanis than Indians.

It appears that Pakistan had started building up in the Kanjarkot area from about the third week of January 1965. On 10 February this was reported by an Indian routine patrol(8). The Commanders of the border police of India and Pakistan met on 15 February to resolve the issue of Kanjarkot. In fact Pakistanis had established a vehicle track, running from Surai to Ding (32 km) which ran through the Indian area, south of Kanjarkot. Thereafter, the Indian police increased night patrols, and in reply the Pakistanis put up a standing patrol there. This aroused the Indians and forced them to take measures to eject the Pakistanis from Kanjarkot.

Pakistan had stationed one Company of Indus Rangers at Kanjarkot, 400 Indus Rangers at Rahim-Ki-Bazar, and one wing of Indus Rangers along the border. Two battalions of Indus Rangers were kept in reserve at Hyderabad (Sind) and Chhor. As on 18 February, the Indus Rangers were deployed in the Kanjarkot area as follows:

- a) Kanjarkot - Possibly one platoon during day and a listening post at night.
- b) Area Sand Dune Hill, north of Kanjarkot - Possibly two platoons, supported by 3" Mortars and MMGs.

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Against this, the Indians had 5 companies of State Reserve Police - two at Vigokot, one at Karim Shahi, and two at Chhad Bet. This force was not, however, adequate to evict the Pak encroachment.

Operation KABADI

On 21 February, the Maharashtra and Gujarat Area Commander, Maj Gen P.C.Gupta, MC, issued his Operation Instruction No 1 (OP KABADI) to Brig S.S.M. Pahalajani, Commander 31 Infantry Bde Group, to capture Kanjarkot. The Brigadier was authorised to cross the border for the completion of his task. Headquarters 31 Inf Bde Gp, 11 Fd Regt, 226 Independent Workshop Company, 373 Field Coy Engineers, 31 Inf Bde Signal Coy, ASC, and 407 Medical Coy reached Bhuj on 27 February. The troops of 17 Raj Rif (less coy) were already in Bhuj. On 26 February, the Army Headquarters arranged for sending 7 companies of police to Ahmedabad. A Parachute Battalion was also placed at 24 hours' notice for move to the area(9).

Pakistan retaliated by ordering its 8 Div Commander, Maj Gen Tikka Khan, to assume operational command of the Indus Rangers and to take measures for effective retaliation. Commander 8 Division, in turn, alerted 51 Brigade Group to move forward, if necessary. The latter moved 8 Frontier Force to Khadan(10) on 6 March, reinforced the posts at Rahim-Ki-Bazar, and Kanjarkot to company strength and deployed mortars and machine guns around Kanjarkot(11).

Maj Gen Tikka Khan visited Headquarters 51 Bde on 9 March and ordered M.Azhar, the Bde Commander to move a little south of Diplo, midway between Vingi and Kanjarkot. 6 Baluch, a Battalion of this Bde stationed at Karachi was asked to move to Hyderabad and act as Bde reserve.

According to a Pak officer, the Indians, in order to hasten their concentration in the Rann, covered up the marshy and sandy portions of the roads and tracks with steel planks and constructed over-head covers over their trenches and dug-outs, particularly in the areas around Vigokot, Gullu Talao, Kanjarkot and Vingi. He further says that in these areas the Indians constructed a number of strong positions which the local Indus Rangers could not recapture due to inadequate weapons and numbers(12).

The Indian authorities knew about the deployment of two tanks(13), four 25 pounder guns, three armoured

vehicles and sufficient troops at Badin by Pakistan. They had also concentrated troops at Pabuhar, (north-west of Diplo) and established a military camp at Ali Bandar. The presence of four tanks, seven armoured cars and some troops was also noticed at Luwari. Intelligence reports indicated the presence of 400 Rangers at Rahim-Ki-Bazar and 100 Rangers each at Kulri, Surai, Vingi, Jattalai, Ving-Jatur and Kanjarkot. It was also reported that the Rangers' headquarters had been moved from Diplo to Rahim-Ki-Bazar and that 12 Pak aircraft had been stationed at Badin air-field.

On 13 March, CRP established Sardar Post, 4600 metres to the south-west of Kanjarkot. This effectively blocked the Pakistani route of ingress. The location was a featureless mud-flat with some scrub-covered area around. Some outposts were established to protect the main Sardar Post. These were located south-west of Ding, south-east of Kanjarkot and south-west of Kanjarkot(14). The 2nd CRP battalion held this area. It is said that the location of Sardar Post which was tactically unsound, was not an Army choice(15).


When the Kanjarkot trouble started, Lt Col K. Sundarji, CO of 1 Mahar (who later rose to become the Chief of Army Staff) was the officiating Brigade Commander. He personally reconnoitred the area in police uniform, and recommended the immediate capture of Kanjarkot(16). But this recommendation was not approved by the government, and it was decided to set up Sardar Post. 4 Coys of Central Reserve Police under Maj Karnail Singh, were brought up to replace the SRP. Maj Karnail Singh deployed one company at Tac Post, and two kilometres behind this, the Adm Post was located. Patrols were placed on two islands to the west of these posts. Maj Sharma of 1 Mahar was ordered to assist the CRPF personnel with 4 JCOs and 15 NCOs of his battalion.

In reaction to the establishment of the Sardar Post the Pakistanis established a platoon post at Ding to the north-east of Sardar Post. In reply the Indians set up a new police post, 1-1/2 km north of Sardar Post in the direction of Ding, on 5 April 1965. This post was necessitated due to Pakistani interference with the Indian Police patrols(18).

Exercise Arrow Head

Meanwhile, during 26-28 March, 1965, Exercise Arrow Head was organised jointly by the Indian Army and the Navy at the sea port of Mandavi on the Gulf of Kutch to familiarise the Indian Infantry with Naval aircraft flown from INS Vikrant(19). This reportedly alarmed the Pakistanis(20).

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HQ Southern Command then appreciated that Pakistan had deployed strong regular forces in the Sand Dunes area in depth, and that an infantry battalion group had been positioned at Pabuhar to protect the flanks and also to act as reserve. It was estimated that four tanks and seven armoured cars and a field regiment had also been positioned in area Pabuhar-Sand Dunes. Even so, the Army Headquarters had assessed the threat against the Kutch border at one infantry battalion group only. On 8 April it was learnt that two F-86 Squadrons had moved from Mauripur to Badin(21). In spite of these military movements, Pak contended that its moves were only a reaction to Indian moves.

Desert Hawk-I

In his book, Maj Ahmad says that Pakistan had apprehended an attack on Kanjarkot by the Indian forces and that to forestall it a preemptive operation by Pak 51 Brigade, code-named "Operation Desert Hawk" was formulated by Pak 8 Inf Division. He says that after the reconnaissance on the morning of 7 April, Brigadier Azhar, Commander of 51 Bde, decided to attack Sardar Post with two Battalions up - 18 Punjab and 8 Frontier Force. The post was garrisoned by a CRP battalion (Bn Hqrs and 3 Coys) with one company forward and two in depth. The fourth company is stated to have been on patrol on an island about 1300 metres north-west, apparently near the post established on 5 April(22). The Pak Bde had identified the three Indian camps in the Sardar Post area and designated the forward eastern camp as 'A' the forward western camp as 'B' and the rear camp as 'C'. The Indians had two smaller posts on the eastern and western flanks of the Sardar Post. These posts were named by Pakistanis as "Jungle Post" and "Clump" respectively. Another small Indian out post was detected between Camp 'A' and the "Clump".

According to the plan of attack two companies each of the two Pak battalions (18 Punjab, 8 FF) were to contact the Indian defenders from east-north-east direction and the remaining troops were to follow close behind(23). 18 Punjab was to lead the attack as the left forward Battalion with the mission to capture camp 'A' at Sardar Post and thus prepare to deal with the enemy counter-attack from south-east. 8 FF as the right forward Battalion was to capture camp 'B' at Sardar Post and then be relieved by 6 Baluch. 6 Baluch was to function as the Brigade Reserve ready to attack the rear of Sardar Post. In the second phase

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of its mission, 6 Baluch, which was to be replaced by 8 FF as the Brigade Reserve, was to capture camp 'C' - area 'Jungle Post' and 'Island' north-east of Sardar Post(24).

Orders were given to the Pak 51 Bde to launch attack on the night of 7/8 April. The attacking Bns could not however be mustered in time and therefore, the attack was launched at 0100 hrs on 9 April 1965. Even on the mid night of 8/9 April there was lack of coordination in 51 Bde.

According to Indian sources, Pak forces in Brigade strength mounted the attack at 0330 hrs on the north and north-west sides of the Sardar Post after heavy shelling. The attack was supported by 14 Field Regiment and 83 Heavy Mortar Battery(25). The two Pak battalions which had left their forming-up place at 0145 hrs on 9 April reached the defence line at 0300 hrs, without being detected. 6 Baluch which had been kept as reserve, also joined the fray and occupied the Shalimar post, which had reportedly been vacated by the Indians. Due to loss of direction, 18 Punjab went for the objective of 8 FF, resulting in general confusion(26). In effect, the coordinated Pak attack, as planned could not be executed. Finally the Pakistanis decided to disengage and withdraw. Though one Pak Company succeedd in reaching the Indian defended position, the Pak attack was repulsed(27). According to Gen Sundarji, due to wrong appreciation of Indian strength at Sardar Post, the Pak attack could neither be aimed correctly nor coordinated profitably. Pak troops pinned down by Indian small arms fire suffered heavy casualties. "Had Pakistan Bde Commander kept up his efforts for some more time, they could have captured the post, but thinking that Indian reinforcements would be coming up soon, he withdrew his forces"(28).

After facing the first Pak attack boldly, many CRP personnel withdrew to Vigokot. At 1600 hrs, the Pak artillery fired shells of coloured smoke which prompted the rest of the CRP personnel to leave Sardar Post. Soon afterwards, Brig Pahalajani took over the command from Lt Col Sundarji and asked 1 Mahar to withdraw from Sardar Post. In this battle, the following casualties were suffered:-

Pakistan - Killed - 4 officers and 30 ORs
 - POW - 4 ORs

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India	- Killed	- 4 CRP Personnel
	Wounded	- 5
	POW/	- One Officer (Major Karnail Singh)
	Missing	- One JCO (Jemadar Baldev Singh), 9 ORs and 8 followers (29).

According to Major Ahmad, 50 Indian dead bodies were counted on the half part of Camp 'B' alone, and subsequent wireless intercepts confirmed 200 Indian casualties, besides 21 (including Major Karnail Singh) captured. The losses of 51 Inf Bde (Pakistan) included 5 killed (including Capt Nazar Hussain of 83 Mortar Battery, 16 wounded and 4 missing (30).

A patrol from 2 Sikh LI, accompanied by Lt Col Sundarji, went to Sardar Post, to see if the Pakistanis had occupied that post. According to Sundarji, he found dead bodies of Pakistanis strewn all over. He captured some Pak arms, ammunition and equipment and also recovered a considerable quantity of arms, ammunition and equipment, left behind by the CRP personnel.

The Indian Bde Cdr also visited the post. The DIG of Police reportedly declined to accompany him. The DIG feared a possible attack on the Vigokot post, held by two of his companies, and ordered vacation. On 9 April itself, 'C' Coy 17 Raj Rif arrived at the Vigokot post at 1915 hrs. Soon after, 2 Sikh LI positioned itself on the post. In the meanwhile, 11 Fd Regt had also moved to Dharamsala and by 0800 hrs on 11 April, a Battery of the Regt had been deployed at Vigokot. On 11 April, a standing patrol (coy strength) of 2 Sikh LI was sent to Sardar Post, and simultaneously 1 Mahar at Khavda was also ordered to move to Sardar Post. 1 Mahar reached there at 0800 hrs on 12 April. Coy 2 Sikh LI returned to its unit at Vigokot on 14 April. A platoon patrol was sent to Kanjarkot to verify if it was still occupied by the Pakistanis. The patrol reported that Kanjarkot was occupied by approximately 2 companies of Pak troops. One RCL gun was also seen there.

The Pakistanis did not launch another Infantry attack at Sardar Post. However, they directed intense

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artillery and mortar fire on Sardar Post and Vigokot for many days, resulting in exchange of fire. According to Sundarji, his troops raided Pak territory several times, but when Brig Pahalajani heard about it, he stopped raids. It would appear that Commander of Pak 51 Bde handled the operations as ineptly as Brig Pahalajani of 31 Indian Inf Bde(31).

At 11.40 A.M., on 14 April, Air Marshal Asghar Khan, C-in-C Pakistan Air Force, rang up his Indian counterpart, Air Marshal Arjan Singh, to suggest that the aircraft of both the countries should not fly over the 'disputed' Kanjarkot area, as it might escalate fighting. He added that no PAF aircraft was stationed at Badin and that there was no plan to do so. He also suggested that the fighter and bomber aircraft of both the Air Forces should not fly within 16 km of the border. The Indian Air Chief accepted the proposal but added that Indian helicopters and transport aircraft would be used right up to the Army position for supply purposes. He also told Air Marshal Asghar Khan that two Pak Air OP type aircraft had flown over the Kanjarkot area. The Pak Air Chief explained that those aircraft were under the control of the Pak Army, and he would talk to the Pak Army about that(32). According to S. Ahmad, the very next day IAF plans flew several sorties over Kanjarkot and other Ranger posts along the border, and two days later the two Air Chiefs again discussed the subject inconclusively. This was followed by a PAF air defence exercise in the southern region on 15 April. Anti-aircraft guns were deployed to take part in the exercise(33).

Indian Forces Reorganised

In the meanwhile, the Indian Army set-up responsible for the defence of Kutch was reorganised. On 10 April, Maj Gen PO Dunn was appointed Army Headquarters Liaison Officer in Gujarat. On 17 April, the Indian Force operating in the Kutch sector was designated as Kilo Force and Maj Gen Dunn became its General Officer Commanding. On 20 April, HQ Kilo Force became HQ Kilo Sector. 50 Independent Parachute Brigade less one battalion, which came under Southern Command Headquarters on 17 April, joined Kilo Sector on 20 April.

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The Pakistani disposition at the time was as follows:-

<u>HQ 8 Division</u>	- Hyderabad (Sind)
Tac HQ	- Badin (April 22)
<u>HQ 51 Bde</u>	- Rahim-Ki-Bazar
18 Punjab 8FF	
6 Baluch	
One Platoon 15 FF (R&S)	- Opposite Sardar Post
14 Field Regiment	
83 Mortar Battery	
81/25 Field Battery	
<u>HQ 6 Brigade Group</u>	
	- 8 km south of Diplo (area opposite Chhad Bet)
6 Punjab less 2 Coys, 25 Field Regt, less battery	- area Jatrai
15 Punjab less one coy; Battery 25 Field Regiment; one troop 88 Mortar Battery	- area Vingri
2FF	- Sirey Jo Got (21/22 April Jatrai (23 April))
<u>Brigade Reserve Force</u> (one company from each battalion, but less platoon of coy 15 FF (R&S)	- Sirey Jo Got
Element 12 Cavalry, Squadron 24 Cavalry	- formed into a composite Regiment
Army Aviation units, four 20-mm Orlikan guns	
One platoon 3 Engineers battalion, Light workshop 63 EME battalion, ADS battalion, Section 11 Military Police Unit, and Special Services Group platoon were also there in the area(34).	

The Indian dispositions before the organisation of Kilo Force were as follows:-

<u>HQ 31 Inf Bde Gp</u>	Bhing
1 Mahar	Sardar Post
2 Sikh LI	Vigokot
17 Raj Rif less 2 coys	Dharamsala
Coy 17 Raj Rif	Chhad Bet
Coy 17 Raj Rif	Bela
Coy SRP	Pt 84 (Sera Bet)
Coy SRP	Hanuman Talai

Under M&G Area

2 Grenadiers	Suigam-Nagar Parkar axis
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11 Field Regiment and battery 1673 Field Regiment provided the artillery support - the former supporting the troops in Sardar Post - Vigokot area, and latter the 2 Grenadiers.

Following the creation of the Kilo Sector additional troops were inducted into the area. Their dispositions were as follows:-

<u>HQ 50 Para Bde</u>	- Khavda
<u>2 Para HQ</u>	- near Dharamsala
B Coy 2 para Platoon 'A' Coy	- Screen position in the area of Pt 84 (6 km north of Dharamsala)
<u>3 Para HQ</u>	- Dharamsala
B Coy	- Pt 84
C Coy	- Biar Bet
<u>4 Para</u>	- Pt 183 (Dharamsala and south of cause-way)

Anti-tank mine-laying was completed at Vigokot on 17 April, and in Sardar Post area on 23 April. 106 mm RCL guns and 3.5" Bazookas were brought to fight the tanks.

Desert Hawk-II

After the attempt on Sardar Post, the Pakistanis brought more reinforcements into the area. The task allotted to Pak 8 Division was to maintain status quo and an offensive capability against the Indians in the disputed territory. "Moreover, if the Indians did not abstain from their frequent aggressive actions against the Rangers' posts and patrols, then 8 Division, as a counter-measure, was to advance, capture and secure maximum possible of the disputed territory, particularly those areas which were still not occupied by the Indians e.g. the area between Vigokot and Gullu Talao"(35).

Between 10-19 April, both sides engaged in patrolling and exchange of artillery fire, directed by Air Observation Posts. On 12 April, a Pak patrol, north of Sardar Post, was engaged by the Indian artillery and suffered at least six casualties. There was another patrol clash on 15 April, south of Kanjarkot, in which the fleeing Pakistanis suffered casualties. It is significant that these activities were confined to the Vigokot-Sardar Post area up till 19 April. However, on 20 April, while continuing the shelling of the Sardar Post, the Pakistanis started shelling Pt 84 (Sera Bet) in the Chhad Bet area with field guns. The shelling from 0730 to 0930 hrs was so heavy that the State Reserve Police occupying the post abandoned it, as also the post at Biar Bet. It is said that under "Operation Desert Hawk-II", the Pak troops launched a deliberate attack on Pt 84, which was a screen for the main Indian defensive position at Dharamsala, during the night of 20/21 April.

Brig Eftikhar of 6 Bde (Pak) had already made plans for raiding the Indian out-posts at Sera Bet and Gullu Talao on 20/21 April, before launching the main offensive against Biar Bet and Chhad Bet on 23/24 April. Accordingly, a raiding party of 6 Punjab (Pak) consisting of Lt Nadir Pervaiz and 20 men of his Commando Platoon, accompanied by Capt Mohd. Yaqub as the artillery FOO, equipped with 2 LMGs, 2 Rocket Launchers, 8 Sten Guns, 6 Rifles, hand-grenades, and also M-30 grenades, attacked an Indian post at Pt 84. The defenders were taken by surprise, and before they could take up position, the raiding party had killed 8 Indians, blown up their tents, destroyed the water tanks, and set fire to the ammunition dump(37). The FOO brought down artillery fire on the Indian camp and kept it engaged until the raiding party withdrew. The Pakistanis brought back one LMG and 6 rifles from the Indian camp. This successful raid raised the morale of the Pak battalion. Lt Pervaiz was awarded 'Sitara-i-Jurat', and his deputy 'Imtiaz Sanad'.

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A similar raid was organised by 15 Punjab (Pak) at Gullu Talao on 21 April. But before the raiding party could reach the objective, the SRP withdrew in confusion after suffering some casualties in shelling(38).

Immediately, Kilo Sector Headquarters ordered 3 Para to occupy Sera Bet with a company('B'). This was done after a patrol had cleared it. On 20 April, one battery of Indian 71 Medium Regiment and 70 and 78 Field Companies reported arrival. The battery was moved to south-west of Vigokot on 23 April. Though there were many reports of Pakistani armour moving into the area, India deployed no armour in Kutch(39). Between 21 and 23 April, the Pakistanis moved their armour and did some reconnoitring, while keeping up the shelling. Gen Sundarji has stated that although the existence of Pakistani tanks was detected in the area through tank noise and otherwise, according to higher Indian Intelligence Organisations, there was no Pakistani tank in the area. He further says that some of the Pakistani tanks got bogged down in the wet sands.

Desert Hawk-III

Maj Gen Tikka Khan carried out a complete reappraisal of the situation in the Rann of Kutch. Major portion of his 8 Division was concentrated in Diplo area, regarded vital for both defence and offence. For offensive south of Diplo, he conceived 'Plan Alpha', to destroy Indian forces in area Chhad Bet-Dharamsala-Vigokot-Karim Shahi. PAF was alerted to strike the Indian concentrations in this area. On 23 April, Tikka Khan received the following order from the C-in-C Pakistan Army:-

"6 Brigade Group will be established in area south of Jatrai upto Biar Bet not later than 1800 hours today. Enemy post at Biar Bet will be dislodged at the earliest opportunity. Position will be dug and mined and prepared for all round defence. Enemy will be enticed to attack this position and maximum casualties inflicted on him. There will be no withdrawal from this position without permission from GHQ. No attack on Chhad Bet"(41).

One Squadron of 24 Cavalry and 12 Medium Regiment less two Batteries from 51 Brigade sector were allotted to 6 Brigade at 8 p.m. on 23 April to become available by first light on 24 April to support the attack(42).

However, the Indian assessment was that the Pakistani build-up was only defensive. It was felt that the experience at Sardar Post must have chastened Pak to be wary of undertaking any fresh venture. It was also estimated that the Pakistanis should be aware that after 15 May, due to climatic conditions, the Indians would have to withdraw the bulk of their forces to the south of the Rann. It was also assessed that the Kilo Sector had resources just for defensive tasks, aggressive patrolling and harassing artillery fire against Pakistani posts, and hence the Kilo Sector was not in a position to undertake offensive tasks. But things developed differently.

Sera Bet (Pt 84) was held by B Coy 3 Para, (about 70 men), under the Command of Major PP Singh. It was supported by a troop of 17 Para Field Regt and a section each of MMG and RCL. On 23 April, at 1800 hrs, Major Singh sent a reconnaissance patrol under 2/Lt Sharma to Jat Talai to ascertain the enemy strength. The patrol did not return. That night the noise of the movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles opposite the company position could be heard. There was shelling for about an hour from 0300 hrs on 24 April. The Pakistanis, about a battalion in strength, were seen advancing in assault formation from approximately 1090 metres north-west of the position at 0600 hrs. When engaged by artillery, MMG and 3 inch mortars, the attackers seemed to have stopped. However, at 0715 hrs, Pak armour (Sqn plus) followed by APCs could be seen forming up about 1400 to 1800 metres in the north-north-west direction. They were engaged by the artillery and RCL guns. Three of the Pakistani tanks appeared to have been knocked out. But tank shells kept falling into the trenches and the temporary gun position, ahead of the company locality. Later, the Pak tanks, adopting fire-and-move tactics, advanced to within 700-800 metres of Company position. Realising the weight of the assault, Maj P.P. Singh ordered his troops to withdraw under the cover of Artillery, 3 inch mortars and RCL guns. In this encounter Pakistanis suffered heavy casualties estimated to be 100 killed/wounded. The Indians suffered one OR killed, two wounded, and nine including one Officer missing. Pt 84 was occupied by the Pakistanis.

According to Major S. Ahmad, this Pak attack by 6 Brigade was code-named Operation Desert Hawk III, and was executed by Brig Eftikhar Khan. The plan of

attack of 6 Punjab was as follows:-

- (a) Attack was to be launched with two Companies up: 'A' and 'B' Companies leading and 'C' and 'D' Companies following at a distance of 275 metres. The Battalion Headquarters was to move in between the two leading Companies behind a Battalion navigation party.
- (b) 'A' Company was to capture the left half of the objective and 'B' Company the right half.
- (c) The attack was to be a silent one with Artillery Support Fire on call. Objective to be indicated for an artillery concentration on the Battalion Commander's order(43).

During the advance on Sera Bet, 6 Punjab ambushed and captured an Indian patrol, consisting of Lt Sharma of a Para Bn and 3 ORs, without firing a shot. With the help of B Coy of 15 FF (R&S), they attacked the Indian position at Sera Bet (Pt 84) and forced the Indians to withdraw, leaving behind some equipment. 6 Punjab occupied Sera Bet by 0730 hrs, on 24 April 1965. During the Pak attack on Sera Bet, 15 Punjab carried out a feint attack on Chhad Bet from Vingi to mislead the Indians.

However, when 3 Pak tanks tried to probe south-west of Pt 84 under cover of smoke-screen at 1500 hrs on 25 April, their efforts were foiled.

Loss of Biar Bet

Pakistanis then turned attention to Biar Bet, the other screen position, about 13 km to the south-west of Pt 84. On 25 April, at 1630 hrs, a Pakistani patrol, mounted on 3 APCs, approached the 'A' Coy position at Biar Bet. The Coy led by Major Kumar had in support a sub-unit of 17 Para, and a section each of 106 mm RCL gun, MMG and 3 inch mortar. These were brought to bear on the patrol, and it withdrew to Pt 84. Pakistani infantry in APCs, supported by 12 tanks made another futile attempt to bypass the position at 1750 hrs. Apprehending another Pak attempt to occupy the position two additional RCL guns, a section of MMG and sufficient number of jeeps to lift a platoon were sent to Biar Bet on the night 25/26 April.

On 26 April, the Pakistanis fired intermittently on the position with artillery and mortars for an hour from 0500 hrs. Then, forming up about 1800 metres to the north-north-east, the Pak infantry mounted on APCs

and supported by 13 tanks, launched attack on Biar Bet. A smokescreen was also laid by the enemy at about 730 metres to the front. Some tanks and infantry were also seen about 1300 metres to the north-north-west, probably kept as a reserve.

The Indian guns went into action. But due to clouds of dust enveloping the Pak tanks on the move, and dust raised by the blast of RCL guns, visibility was affected. In spite of this, the Indian guns set ablaze 3 Patton tanks and knocked out three others(44). But the number of Pak tanks, now estimated to have grown to about two squadrons, kept advancing and shelling the Indian Coy position. Probably to prevent a 2 Para detachment nearby (at Arjun Tree) from coming to the aid of the 2 Para Coy at Biar Bet, it was also shelled heavily from about 0720 by the Pakistanis. Seeing the unmanageable Pak strength, the Indian troops began withdrawing from Biar Bet in stages. With the guns slowing down the Pak advance, the 3 Para Coy returned to Dharamsala. Only one disabled jeep of RCL gun could not be withdrawn. In this action about 140 Pakistani casualties were estimated as against Indian casualties of one killed, six wounded and five missing(45).

According to S. Ahmad, Brig Eftikhar carried out a detailed reconnaissance of the Biar Bet area to get maximum information about the terrain on 24 and 25 April. Maj A. Shakoor Jan, Commander B Coy 15 FF (R&S) was ordered to lead a mobile patrol towards Biar Bet. Wireless communications with him was to be maintained from Sera Bet. An Army Aviation aircraft was to keep airborne for surveillance and guiding the artillery fire. As per the Brigade plan, the assaulting force was to advance from Sera Bet due west on a compass bearing of 270 degree and, after covering a distance of 8 km, was to turn due south on 180 degree for a distance of 5 km. The column was to be led by the Commander of B Company 15 FF (R&S), followed by the squadron of 24 Cavalry, Heavy Mortars of 15 FF (R&S), 2 FF mounted on vehicles, and two Companies of 15 Punjab. Two companies of 2 FF were to be left behind at Sera Bet so that the firm base established there was not upset. In their place two companies of 15 Punjab were to join 2 FF in the attack(46).

"The column advanced practically head to tail and cleared the first leg at 0500 hrs. While turning in the soft bed on the Rann, the 2 leading tanks got completely bogged down, leaving only 8 tanks to make the assault"(47). During the assault each Company was supported by a troop of tanks and a section of the Battalion Assault Pioneer Platoon and Artillery Forward Observers. Before the column could reach the

forming up place, still 1829 metres away, the Indian troops on Biar Bet opened up with all weapons at 0530 hours, thus disclosing their own disposition and thereby helping the Pakistanis. If the Indians had held their fire for a little while, the Pak column would have suffered heavily. However, 2 FF suffered 8 killed and 2 wounded due to Indian artillery fire. As the Pak tanks inched forward, the Indians fired heavily with Recoilless Rifles. But once the Pakistani tanks came closer, the Indian defenders withdrew to avoid disaster. One Indian gun detachment which unsuccessfully tried to engage the Pakistani Commander's tank subsequently deserted the gun. It was captured by the Pakistanis intact. The Pakistanis also captured a huge quantity of arms and equipment, abandoned by the Indians. Besides 4 prisoners of war, 50 Para Bde suffered over 40 casualties(48). By 0800 hours, Biar Bet was occupied by the Pakistanis.

The action at Biar Bet was followed by a stalemate, activities being restricted to shelling and patrolling. One notable event was the straying of seven Indian 3-ton lorries carrying defence stores into the Pakistani held area at Biar Bet during the night of 27/28 April. Only the JCO in charge of the convoy escaped to tell the story(49).

After the capture of Biar Bet, the Pakistanis strengthened their defences in the area. Maj Gen Tikka Khan ordered 24 Cav, less the Sqn with 6 Bde, to concentrate in Jitrai area in order to frustrate Indian counter-attack on Biar Bet. 'B' Coy 15 FF (R&S) was deployed about three miles beyond Biar Bet to gain early warning about the Indian troop movement. The main defences at Biar Bet were held by 2 FF and 15 Punjab, each short of two coys. 6 Bde Headquarters was also established in the area along with 25 Fd Regt and two batteries of 12 Medium Regt, brought from Jitrai and Rahim-Ki-Bazar. Besides, one battery of 38 Fd Regt and 88 Mortar Battery were deployed to cover Indian approaches to Biar Bet. During 27-29 April, the Pakistani troops fired 220 rounds from Medium guns and 2,000 rounds from Fd guns, besides 325 mortar shells. Most of the Pak shooting was directed by officers of the Army Aviation Flight who maintained daylong vigil over Biar Bet. In an artillery duel, 88 Mortar battery of Pakistan suffered 2 killed and 3 wounded(50).

Meanwhile, the Defence Minister of India, Y.B. Chavan, announced in Parliament on 26 April that the armed forces had been put on the alert following general mobilization in Pakistan. This "necessitated certain moves plus stoppage of leave and recall of personnel on leave." Thus the armed forces were put

in a state of readiness to face any Pakistani challenge not only on the Kutch border but all along the Indo-Pak frontier.

As the Indian forces moved into battle positions along the West Pakistan border, Gen Mohd Musa, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, placed all his army formations at twelve hours' notice to move into their battle positions(51). Pakistan railways were also instructed to accord top priority to all military moves, and the Pakistan Air Force and Navy were also alerted to meet the war threat. 52 Bde Gp and 21 Bde Gp were ordered to move from Quetta to Hyderabad (Sind) area to reinforce 8 Div in the Rann(52). Maj Gen Tikka Khan also created a small mobile counter-attack force, called "Changez Force", consisting of a Sqn of 12 Cav and some infantry, and deployed it at Vingoor to foil any Indian threat to 8 Division's positions in the Rann(53).

Meanwhile, cease-fire negotiations had begun. On 28 April 1965, Harold Wilson, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, wrote to the Indian Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, and President Ayub Khan of Pakistan, expressing great concern over the Kutch conflict. He suggested a cease-fire to be followed by withdrawal of troops, restoration of the status quo as on 1 January 1965, and talks between the two Governments. Both India and Pakistan accepted these proposals. The Pak President appeared to be satisfied with this turn of events, as they supported the Pak position that the Sind-Kutch border was in dispute. However, the Indian Prime Minister warned: "If Pakistan continues to discard reason and persists in its aggressive activities, our Army will defend the country and it will decide its own strategy and employment of its manpower and equipment in a manner which it deems best"(54).

On 1 May 1965, HQ Kilo Sector issued instructions to its formations not to undertake any offensive action(55). However, patrolling by both sides continued. On 23 June 1965, the responsibility of the Kutch border was taken over by 11 Infantry Division, commanded by Maj Gen N.C. Rawley, MC, from the Kilo Sector.

The Cease-fire Agreement

Negotiations on the terms for a cease-fire agreement continued in May and June 1965. Finally the effort of the British Prime Minister bore fruit and a cease-fire agreement was signed by India and Pakistan on 30 June 1965. The cease-fire was to take effect from 0600 hrs IST on 1 July 1965. The main features


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of the agreement were:-

1. Restoration of the status quo as on 1 January 1965 in the area of the Gujarat-West Pakistan border.
2. All troops on both sides to withdraw; the process to be completed within seven days.
3. Indian police could reoccupy the post at Chhad Bet in the same strength as on 31 December 1964.
4. India and Pakistan police could patrol on the tracks on which they were patrolling prior to 1 January 1965, the intensity being restricted to that of the period prior to 1 January 1965.
5. The ministers of the two Governments should meet, not later than one month after the cease-fire, in order to agree on the determination of the border in the light of their respective claims and make arrangements for its demarcation.
6. In the event of no agreement between the ministers of the two Governments within two months of the cease-fire, the two governments as contemplated in the joint communique of 24 October 1959, would have recourse to a tribunal, to be constituted within four months of the cease-fire(56).
7. The tribunal would consist of three persons, other than nationals of the two states, India and Pakistan - two to be nominated by each of the two governments of India and Pakistan, and the third, the Chairman, to be selected jointly by the two governments or failing an agreement on the selection, to be nominated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
8. The decision of the tribunal would be binding on both governments and could not be questioned on any ground whatsoever.

As per agreement, the Indian troops were pulled back south of the "Cause Way"(57) by 0600 hrs on 8 July 1965. A total of 417 mines (13 anti-tank and 404 anti-personnel) mainly in the Sardar Post area, could not be removed but the fields were suitably marked and cordoned off. Two CRP battalions were placed under the operational control of Southern Command to establish posts at Suigam, Bela, Lodhrani, Navsari and

KUTCH DISPUTE RIVAL CLAIMS & FINAL AWARD



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Chhad Bet. A post at Karim Shahi was also to be established depending upon the feasibility of its maintenance during the monsoon. Patrolling was to be carried out from Chhad Bet to Kanjarkot broadly following the line passing near Biar Bet and Pt 84 and through Karim Shahi and Vigokot. Patrols might be sent east of Chhad Bet to visit Narbet and Pt 5. Patrolling was to be done once in a week.

As per the agreement, a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan was arranged from 20 August 1965, but it was subsequently cancelled. On 7 October, it was decided to refer the matter straightaway to a tribunal. The Pakistan Government nominated Nasrollah Entezam, a former Iranian Foreign Minister and President of the UN General Assembly. The Indian Government nominated Ales Bebler, an eminent Yugoslav jurist and Judge of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia. On 15 December 1965, the UN Secretary General nominated Gunnar Lagergren, President of the Court of Appeal for Western Sweden, as the Chairman of the Kutch Tribunal.

The Tribunal held its first meeting in Geneva on 19 February 1966. It held sittings in camera to hear the arguments of both the countries and to consider the documents. It announced the award on 19 February 1968, which was accepted by both the Governments. India won her basic claim, that the border was along the northern rim, leaving the whole of the Rann in India. Pakistan's basic claim - that the border ran through the middle of the Rann - was rejected by the Tribunal. It however, awarded to Pakistan an area of about 828 Sq kms, which included the Kanjarkot and Chhad Bet areas. This amounted to roughly 1/10th of the area, originally claimed by Pakistan. Biar Bet, Pt 84 and Sardar Post areas remained with India. The Kutch affair thus ended on a note of peace.

Conclusion:

The nature of the terrain made the conduct of military operations in Kutch difficult for India. While Pakistan operated from an elevated region linked by good communication, Indian defenders were placed in a terrain with almost no water and no communication lines. It was difficult to conduct operations in the heat of the desert during daytime, but easy to lose direction and the way, especially at night.

It is said that Pakistan deliberately created trouble in Kutch to test Indian military capability and political will, so that in the event of success she could follow it up in Kashmir also. Surprisingly,

no Pakistani source has hinted at this. Gen J.N. Chaudhuri remarked in 1971 : "Could it have been foreseen then that these moves were the first stage of a grand plan which was designed to culminate with the so-called freeing of Jammu & Kashmir by equally so-called Azad Kashmir raiders?"(59)

But the inept way the Pak Army planned its offensive in Kutch goes to prove that there was no plan to test the Indian Army's capability in the Rann. Nor was there any Pak strategy to draw out Indian forces from Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir into the distant, unfavourable terrain of Kutch, with a view to capturing the Kashmir valley. Perhaps the Kutch flare-up was accidental, but the Pak sense of victory in the Rann might have encouraged her rulers to undertake Operation Gibraltar in August 1965(60).

In 1965, there was a clamour in India over the alleged failure of Indian intelligence to supply adequate information about the terrain and Pak intentions in Kutch. It was subsequently realised that Indian intelligence did provide information about the movement of Pak troops and armour into the Rann. However, the local commanders were not happy with the intelligence that was provided to them(61). Gen J.N.Chaudhuri admitted in 1971, that he had "adequate information regarding the southward move towards the Sind-Kutch border of some Pakistani military units, though the official Pakistani story was of movement by Rangers or Armed Police only(63). Perhaps a better assessment of the collected intelligence would have been helpful(63).

There was no higher plan to meet the Pak attack, nor any prior preparation for the operations in the Rann. Local commanders chose their own objectives(64). In April 1965 Indian forces were not at all prepared to take on Pakistan(65).

About the performance of Indian forces, divergent views have been expressed. It is said that 50 Para Brigade which was inducted into Kutch in April 1965, did not push forward with sufficient determination(66). The withdrawal from certain positions in the face of Pak attacks was also not wise (67). However, it was not possible to defend every place with a limited number of troops(68). Moreover, Indian troops had withdrawn from delaying positions only, but not from the main defended positions(69).

It is said that the leadership of the Pak forces was good, their artillery was accurate; and if they had deployed their armour properly against the Indian

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units, the latter could have easily been cut off(70). There is no doubt that the induction of Pak armour made all the difference in the fighting in April 1965. "As the area to be guarded was too wide, it was not possible to hold every point in strength, and in the absence of Indian armour, it was difficult to fight against the Pak armour"(72). Still the number of casualties suffered by Pakistan was more than that of India as shown below:-(73)

	<u>INDIA</u>	<u>PAKISTAN</u>
(a) Killed	15	34 (at Sardar Post)
(b) Wounded	40 (2 Officers)	150 (at Biar Bet) 6 tks destroyed
(c) Missing/POW	2 (Officers)	5 PsOW (1 Officer)

In sum, for India the Kutch Operation was a wrong war with the right enemy, at a wrong place(74). For Pakistan, it was a victorious war, out of which it learnt a wrong lesson that it could win a cake-walk victory in Kashmir. This fake sense of victory whetted Pakistani appetite for Kashmir. This led to the September War ultimately.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. XI, New Edition, Oxford (1908), pp. 84-85
2. Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, Vol.VIII (Kathiawar), Bombay, 1884, p.69
3. Aitken, E.H., Gazetteer of the Province of Sind, Karachi, 1907, pp. 4-5.
4. From Official Records.
5. Justice Abler of the Kutch Tribunal, while submitting his note, repudiated that there were any internationally accepted rules on this subject (Award, p.726).
6. Lt Gen Moti Sagar (Retd), who was CGS at Army Headquarters, New Delhi, in April 1965, has observed: "Peculiarity of terrain makes the area into a low water level swamp, with sufficient water to stop vehicular or major manpower movement, but insufficient to permit amphibious equipment. Chhad Bet was a raised ground that had plenty of grass and was being used as grazing ground by both the sides. This was, indeed, the bone of contention." - Report of interview with Lt Gen Moti Sagar, held on 22 May, 1987.
7. Lt Col Ram Singh Yadav, who commanded 2 Para Bn during the Kutch Conflict of 1965 says that "When we were deployed north of Khavda we used to get our water supply from that place only, as supply of drinking water was not locally available north of that place."
8. According to L.P. Singh, ICS (Retd), then Home Secretary, Govt of India, in 1965, the first information about the Pak intruders in the Chhad Bet area in February 1965 was provided by Imdad Ali, Inspector General of Police, Gujarat, and on that basis a CRPF Battalion, which was specially trained in the use of MMG, was airlifted to Kutch from Madras. - Report of Interview with L.P. Singh in New Delhi on 29 December 1987.
9. From Official Records.
10. Apparently, this was the same as Kadhan, found on the maps, midway on the road from Badin to Rahim-Ki-Bazar.
11. Ahmad, Major S., p. 29.
12. Ibid., pp. 29-30.
13. According to L.P. Singh, in April 1965, the Pakistani tanks were detected in the Kutch area by the Police, but when this information was passed on to the Army Hqrs, the Army Officer receiving this information simply refused to believe and thought that the original informant might have been misled by the desert mirage. - Report of Interview, 29 December 1987.

14. Ahmad, Major S., recounts how the last post was dominated by Mara ridge, manned by the Pakistanis. - p.44
15. Report of interview with Gen P.P.Kumaramangalam, DSO (Retd), held in Pune on 29 September 1986.
16. Gen Sundarji observed, "I do not think that our SRP Units patrolled the border regularly. The Indus Rangers started patrolling the track between Ding and Surai, cutting short through the Indian territory near Kanjarkot, and once by chance our SRP patrol noticed this and raised objections, but the Indus Rangers replied that they were patrolling in their own territory and Kanjarkot was within their border. Thus the trouble started." - Report of interview with Gen K.Sundarji, 14 August 1987.
17. Ibid.
18. From Official Records.
19. Ahmad Major S., has said: "The land and carrier based aircrafts carried out extensive reconnaissance and simulated air attacks over the Rann, frequently violating Pakistan's air space. The main purpose of the exercise, so close to Pakistan, was probably to confound and provoke Pakistan's armed forces, particularly the Pakistan Navy and the Air Force, or, perhaps to intimidate Pakistan by a show of formidable force. The Indian Naval Task Force worked its way up the Rann and carried out firing practices. Later it was learnt that immense difficulties were being experienced by the Indian troops in the Rann. Due to absolute lack of potable water locally, the ship's boilers were being used to distil sea water and to supply it to the troops by landing crafts. But, probably, this was found to be impracticable and the Naval Task Force withdrew from the Rann by the end of March". - pp. 34-35. Also From Official Records.
20. According to one Pakistani source, India's aircraft carrier Vikrant along with 7 Destroyers, some Frigates and the Fleet Tanker supported the Army during this exercise. "The Indian Navy was used for transporting men and material to the disputed area. Before landing the troops and equipment the naval guns were allowed to practice gunnery.... These moves by India forced Pakistan to order 8 Infantry Division to move one of its brigades to the affected area." - Ahmad, Brig Gulzar (Retd), p.66.

President Ayub Khan reportedly remarked: "We cannot take these unilateral actions lying down. We must be ready to take them on as and when they indulge in such flagrant violations of existing agreements." - Ibid. p.67.

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21. From Official Records.
 22. From Official Records.
 23. The sketch given by Major Ahmad in his book (p.59) shows the attack as having proceeded from east-north-east direction.
 24. Ahmad, Major S., pp.45-46.
 25. From Official Records.
 26. According to Saeed Ahmad, this was Camp 'B' which was vacated by the Indians after a hand-to-hand fight with 'A' Coy of 18 Punjab. It was here that Major Karnail Singh and 16 ORs were taken prisoner by Pakistan.
 27. From Official Records.
 28. Report of interview with Gen Sundarji, held on 14 August 1987.
 29. From Official Records.
 30. Ahmad, Major S., p.60.
 31. Report of interview with Gen Sundarji, held on 14 August 1987.
 32. From Official Records.
According to S. Ahmad, the telephonic conversation between the two Air Chiefs took place on 12 April. p.65.
 33. Ibid.
 34. Based on Major S. Ahmad's book.
 35. Ahmad, Major S., p.66.
 36. Ahmad, Major S., pp. 78-81.
 37. The Indians left behind not only 3 dead bodies, but also large quantities of arms and equipment, petrol and rations. Ahmad, Brig Gulzar, p.68.
 38. Perhaps, Gullu Talao has been mentioned as Hanuman Talai (in Chhad Bet area) by the Indian sources. Ahmad, Major S., p.80.
 39. The reluctance of the Indian authorities to move tanks into the area might have been dictated by the certainty of several areas in the Rann getting flooded at the start of the Monsoon which was imminent. On the Pakistani side there was no such problem. However, Saeed Ahmad tells about a regiment of light tanks of Indian 1 Armd Div having been spotted moving north of Khavda (p.62), and of 6 tanks having been knocked out, while they were probing towards Kanjarkot (p.65). However, later he refers only to reports that the Indians had concentrated an AMX Armoured Regt at Dharamsala-Karankaur Bet (p.76). (This appears to be wrong.)
- Pakistan decided to despatch to 8 Division, a composite armoured regiment, consisting of one Squadron of Medium tanks and one Squadron of M-24 light tanks in response to the alleged Indian moves(p.66).
40. Report of interview with Gen Sundarji, 14 August 1987.

41. Ahmad, Major S., pp. 82-83.
42. Ibid., p. 83.
43. Ibid., p.86.
44. From Official Records.
45. From Official Records.
46. Ahmad, Major S., p.86.
47. Ibid., p.92.
48. Ibid., p.97.
49. From Official Records.
According to S. Ahmad (p.102), a little before midnight of 27/28 April, seven Indian vehicles carrying defence stores, having lost their way and being still unaware that Biar Bet had changed hands the previous night, strayed from south-east towards the outposts of 2 FF. On being engaged, the vehicles halted about 150 yards from the Pak position. They were kept under intermittent fire throughout the night, before they along with their drivers were rounded up the next morning.
50. Ahmad, Major S., pp. 99-100.
51. Ibid., p.101; AR, 21-27 May 1965.
52. Ahmad, Major S., p.104.
53. Ibid., p.106
54. Lal Bahadur Shastri's speech in the Lok Sabha on 28 April 1965.
55. From Official Records.
56. AR, 1959, p.3000.
57. Possibly, it means the one, north of Khavda, as referred to in the Indian records.
58. Report of interview with Brig Nambiar (Retd), 22 November 1986.
59. Chaudhuri, General J.N., p.57.
60. Report of Interview with Gen Sundarji, 14 August 1987.
61. Brig Nambiar (Retd), who commanded 50 Para Bde in the Rann in 1965, observed: "We were provided with no intelligence about the enemy. We only vaguely knew that one Pak Division was facing us." - Report of interview, 22 November 1986.
62. Chaudhuri, Gen J.N., p.56.
63. Ibid., p.60.
64. Report of interview with Brig Nambiar, 22 November 1986.
65. Report of interview with Lt Gen Moti Sagar (Retd), 22 May 1987.
Report of interview with L.P.Singh, 29 December 1987.
66. Report of interview with Lt Gen Moti Sagar (Retd), 22 May 1987.
67. Ibid.
68. Report of interview with Lt Col Ram Singh Yadav (Retd), 28 October 1987.
69. Report of interview with General Sundarji, 14 August 1987.
70. Report of interview with Lt Col Ram Singh Yadav

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- (Retd), 28 October 1987.
71. Report of interview with Brig Nambiar (Retd), 22 November 1986.
 72. Report of interview with Lt Col Ram Singh Yadav (Retd), 28 October 1987.
 73. From Official Records.
 74. Report of interview with Gen P.P.Kumaramangalam (Retd), 29 September 1986.

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CHAPTER - III

PAK PLANS AND MOVES AGAINST KASHMIR

General

Pakistan evidently concluded from the brief successful military encounter with India in April 1965 over the Rann of Kutch that a similar solution of the Kashmir problem, favourable to Pakistan, was possible through a limited military adventure. The annexation of Kashmir was Pakistan's single, definite political aim and she would do everything possible to attain that objective. The methods by which she could hope to do so were either negotiations, or resort to sabotage and subversion, or the application of force. While outwardly professing the desire for peaceful negotiations, the Pakistanis were secretly preparing to strike in Kashmir in August 1965. Therefore, hardly had the ink dried on the document of the Kutch agreement, when Pakistan embarked upon a new military venture on the Jammu and Kashmir front.

Pakistan lulled India into a false sense of security by outwardly lying low after the truce in Kutch. However, there was no material change in the extent of the military threat from Pakistan. Although since the cease-fire agreement on Kutch, the regular formations and units of the Pakistan Army had been withdrawn from their battle positions along the Indo-Pak border, they had not all returned to their permanent peace-time locations(1). This was obviously due to Pakistan's pre-planned decision to increase guerrilla and sabotage activities in Jammu and Kashmir and to retain a position of strength so as to be able to cope with any reaction from India.

The evident Pakistani plan was to set off a 'People's War' in the Valley and to create a situation permitting active Pakistani intervention to aid the rebels. In the past also, Pakistan had indulged in campaigns which inflamed tension, and conspired to create disturbances in the Valley. She had fully exploited the turmoil, precipitated by the Hazaratbal (hair of the Prophet) incident in Kashmir in December 1964, and later the situation arising out of the internment of Sheikh Abdullah in May 1965.

Holy Relic Incident

The alleged theft or mysterious disappearance of the Holy Relic (a strand of hair believed to be of the Prophet, called Moe-e-Muqaddas), on 27 December 1964, from the Hazaratbal shrine in Srinagar had deeply hurt the sentiments of the devout Muslims of the Valley.

Large crowds thronged the streets protesting against the theft, and a hartal was observed in Srinagar and many other parts of the Valley. The incident gave Pakistan a God-sent opportunity to indulge in anti-India propaganda. It accused the Government of India of having engineered the theft of the Holy Relic in order to humiliate and suppress the Muslims of the Kashmir Valley. Muslim feeling was sought to be roused against the "Hindu" rulers of India who had supposedly outraged Islam, and a Jihad was called. The Kashmiris were exhorted to rise and "throw away the chains of slavery for ever". They were assured of full support of Pakistan and the entire Muslim World. The entire Valley was in a state of turmoil, and people's anger had been fully roused. But to the regret of Pakistan, peace returned to the Valley when the Holy Relic was recovered on 4 January 1965, and restored honourably to the Hazaratbal shrine.

Though the quick recovery of the Holy Relic had foiled the Pakistani plan of bringing about a mass upheaval in Kashmir, Pakistan was not going to be outplayed so easily, as she was determined to take over Kashmir. Pak official media started propagating that the Holy Relic, which had been recovered, was not the real one and accused India of perpetrating a fraud on the people of Kashmir. It incited the Kashmiris to renew their agitation. The pro-Pakistan elements, who were crest-fallen on the recovery of the Holy Relic, saw an opportunity to stage a comeback. The Pak agents in the Valley came out openly and again began to build up public opinion against the authorities. By mid January 1965, the adverse propaganda started taking a violent form in Srinagar and other parts of the Valley. A demand for a special 'Deedar' (exposition) by the Action Committee was made to establish the true identity of the relic. The demand was clearly inspired by Pakistan. But fortunately, the religious leaders, who conducted the identification at the 'Deedar' on 3 February, certified the Holy Relic as the genuine one and the Pak designs came to naught(2).

Internment of Sheikh Abdullah

The internment of Sheikh Abdullah in May 1965 provided a fresh opportunity to Pakistan to malign India and mislead world opinion to the effect that a state of revolt existed in Kashmir. Under the inspiration of the Pakistan Government, the Pakistan Radio, Press and political leaders raised a big hue and cry. Protest meetings and demonstrations were organised in Pakistan condemning the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah. The Pakistanis immediately built up Abdullah into a martyr and thereafter repeatedly

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invoked his image to serve their cause. Pak agents instigated acts of hooliganism and provocations in Srinagar. Pro-Pak and pro-China slogans were shouted at some of the demonstrations in the Valley(3). Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, described the internment as a ruthless and unlawful step towards 'the point of no return' in Kashmir(4). The Pak Press widely published exaggerated reports about the internal situation in Jammu and Kashmir getting out of hand and a wave of suppression sweeping over the entire land. A memorandum was also presented to the Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-Lai, in Rawalpindi, on 2 June 1965, by the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, requesting him to raise the issue at the Afro-Asian Conference.

Stepping up of Cease-Fire Violations

Thus having failed to instigate the people of the Valley to rise in rebellion, Pakistan now started building up pressure by intensifying its aggressive activities along the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir under the illusion that it was militarily superior to India and that Indian Armed Forces were demoralised. Pakistan concluded that the time was now ripe to take military action. The inactivity and years of defensive posture by the Indian army encouraged the Pak troops to step up offensive operations, which mainly comprised raids on bridges, firing on convoys and systematic encroachment on Indian territory. Pakistani troops and "Razakars" (irregulars) were active in Keran, Tithwal, Kargil, Punch and Chhamb areas. They were constructing new bunkers, bringing reinforcements and improving their positions in Tithwal and Keran sectors(5). There had been a steep rise in the number of firing incidents, intrusions, border raids and other provocative activities by Pakistani forces. The documents seized from the captured Pak infiltrators revealed that plans for the attack on Kashmir had been finalised as early as May 1965. The C-in-C of the Pakistan army, General Mohammad Musa, visited his troops along the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir in May 1965 and told them: "All steps have been completed to deal with any eventuality"(6).

A large number of men of Pakistan's Frontier Corps (comprising Khyber Rifles, Kurram Militia, Zhob Militia, Tochi Scouts, South Waziristan Scouts and Bajaur Scouts), which guarded the North-West frontier along Afghanistan, were moved to the Pak-occupied Kashmir. During the same period, the "Azad Kashmir" administration ordered universal military training for its citizens between the age of 16 and 45. A resolution, adopted by the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim

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Conference on 27 May 1965, called upon Kashmiris to join the "Razakar" movement in large numbers, and reiterated that the time had come to undo the cease-fire line in Kashmir, which divided their homeland into two artificial and unnatural parts.

In fact, the firing and shelling across the cease-fire line were stepped up as early as January 1965. As the year progressed, the spiral of cease-fire violations shot up alarmingly. There had been as many as 1,347 cease-fire violations from the Pakistan side between January and May 1965(7), compared to 522 in the previous year(8). The intensification of the hostile activities along the cease-fire line was intermixed with a series of subversive activities inland. It soon became clear that this sudden spurt in hostile activities was part of a calculated plan to increase tension along the border and create a law and order problem in the State. The ground was being prepared with elaborate care for Pak military aggression which was to follow soon.

Kargil Operations

As a result of the intensification of cease-fire violations by Pakistan, the Indian military authorities in Jammu and Kashmir decided in May 1965 not to remain passive any longer, but to inflict maximum casualties on the enemy as and when the attack came(9).

There were Pakistani posts on the heights in Kargil area, commanding the vital Srinagar-Leh road, which constituted the main supply route, for the Indian troops guarding the Sino-Indian border in Ladakh. The Kargil region is strategically located between the Ladakh Range in the north-east and the great Himalayan Range in the south-west. The Pak defences on Pt 13620 dominated the Indian positions at Kargil, including the Brigade HQ. The Pakistanis harassed the movement of supplies with gun-fire, and attempted to cut the road by armed assault across the CFL. On 16 May, the Pakistanis attacked one of the Indian posts in strength. The attack was repulsed but the danger persisted.

The two reconce patrols sent by 4 Rajput to area Pt 13620 and Black Rocks discovered for the first time that the enemy in strength (coy supported by MMGs and 3-inch mortars) occupying Pt 13620, Saddle, Black Rocks, Peak 1 and Peak 2, had committed encroachment into Indian territory. 121 Brigade with three battalions 4 Rajput, 1 Jammu and Kashmir Militia and 17 Punjab, plus 1 Guards (ex 3 Inf Div) held this

area. Two Coys of 12 Jammu and Kashmir Militia and 85 Lt Regt were in support.

Brig V.K. Ghai, Commander 121 (I) Inf Bde Group, thereupon decided to launch a two-pronged attack with 4 Rajput, commanded by Lt Col Sudarshan Singh and supported by 85 Lt Regt less bty. The Pak posts were on dizzy heights, with steep gullies and razor-thin ridges radiating from them. It was decided to use the southern approach for attack on Pt 13620, as it was an extremely difficult and hazardous route and the enemy defences were not very strong on this unlikely route of approach. In fact, the enemy expected an attack through the central approach where he had his defences strengthened with mine strips.

Two coys of 4 Rajput were to capture Pt 13620 and Saddle from the south and the third coy was to capture Black Rocks, Peak 1 and Peak 2 from the north-east. Strict security measures were adopted during the preparatory stage. Villages in the area were sealed and ammunition was dumped and forward moves undertaken only in the hours of darkness. No civilian labour or ponies were employed. The approach march had to be in single file. The FUP was barely 90 metres from enemy bunkers, and there was just about sufficient room to deploy one platoon. Hence, the attacking company had to be deployed one platoon behind the other.

The silent attack went in at 0200 hours on 17 May. The Indian troops were able to get within 90 metres at pt 13620, without losing surprise. Thereafter the coy came under heavy mortar, LMG and small arms fire, and hand-to-hand fighting broke out. Major B.S. Randhawa, the Coy Commander, was killed in the fighting. Lt Col Sudarshan Singh, who was following, immediately rallied the men and the momentum of the attack was maintained. On the north-east side, progress was a bit slow as surprise had been lost. The FOO, Capt N. Darkunde, accompanying Major Nayyar's company, brought down arty fire on Saddle, Black Rocks, Peak 1 and Peak 2. Indian MMGs and 3-inch mortars also opened up in full fury on the enemy positions. Pt 13620 was captured by 0330 hours. Major Nayyar's coy was in possession of Peak 1 and Peak 2 by 0430 hours. The Black Rocks and Saddle fell by 1030 hours.

The enemy opposition was stiff, but the fierce onslaught of Indian troops forced the enemy to withdraw leaving behind their dead, large quantities of arms, ammunition and rations. Pakistan suffered casualties of two officers and fourteen ORs killed, as against 1 Officer, 2 JCOs and 9 ORs killed, and 1 JCO

and 50 ORs wounded on the Indian side(10). It was a difficult military operation, for the troops had to scramble through a huge rocky wasteland, commanded by Pakistani guns, but it succeeded brilliantly.

After the loss of the area around Pt 13620, the Pak troops intensified their hostile activities. They also made several attempts to reoccupy their lost picquets. Pak troops attacked an Indian position in the vicinity of Kargil twice, first on the night of 18 May and again in the early hours of 19 May. Both attacks were repulsed as a result of heavy and accurate firing from Indian positions(11). Smarting under their defeat, the Pakistani aggressive activities continued. Incidents were reported from various sectors of the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir. On the night on 18-19 May, there were 20 violations of the CFL by Pak troops from Chhamb to Punch. They fired about 2,700 rounds from Browning medium and light machine guns, besides 300 mortar shells. A full battalion of Pakistani troops, which attacked an Indian picquet, south-west of Mendhar, in the early hours of 19 May, was repulsed by Indian troops. Forty Pakistanis were killed and many injured. Another concentrated attack by Pakistani troops on an Indian forward post, Dalla, south-west of Chhamb, on the night of 18 May was repulsed by Indian patrols. The Pak troops which crossed the cease-fire line south of the Tithwal sector, also suffered heavy casualties at the hands of the Indians.

Capture of Kala Pahar

Meanwhile, the enemy had grabbed an unoccupied 2700 metre long feature Kala Pahar, about 10 km west of Kargil, dominating the road. This was discovered by a patrol of 1 Jammu and Kashmir Militia on 29 May. A complaint was lodged, and Pak troops were asked to vacate the area by the UN. When all efforts by the UN to get the aggression vacated failed India decided to evict the enemy from her territory and make the road Srinagar-Leh safe for traffic by 9 June 1965. 1 Guards was entrusted with the task of capturing Kala Pahar. Recce patrols carried out by 1 Jammu and Kashmir Militia found that the enemy strength on Kala Pahar was about 200 men, and that the terrain was steep and not easily negotiable by men, even by day, and that Pak troops had obtained reinforcements.

It was decided to capture Kala Pahar from the north and attack it from the Right Ridge. Accordingly, Major M.C.S. Menon, Offg OC 1 Guards, was ordered to establish a firm base with one coy in area Right Ridge on 1 June and move the entire battalion on the feature by 3 June and secure a suitable FUP.

Gunners were to carry out registration/harassing fire(HF) tasks over 2/3 days. 'H' hour was fixed at 0230 hours on 5 June 1965.

Right Ridge, located at a height of over 3,600 metres, involved a steep and hazardous climb for approximately 1,200 metres from Harka Bahadur Bridge. A coy 1 Guards succeeded in establishing the firm base at Right Ridge by 0800 hours on 2 June after a brief encounter with an enemy protective patrol. The enemy started shelling the area and made a move to occupy an area known as Three Bumps which dominated the proposed FUP. Capt R.S. Saharawat led a section through the shelling and secured the area Three Bumps before the enemy could do so.

For two days and nights prior to D day, the enemy was subjected to HF by 85 Lt Regt. 1 Guards' 57 mm RCL guns, which had been manhandled to the firm base, were successfully employed in destroying enemy 'sangars' before last light on 4 June. The battalion moved to the FUP at 0130 hours on 5 June. The troops encountered heavy SA fire, and the enemy put up stiff resistance and fought from bunker to bunker. But Kala Pahar peak was captured by 0500 hours on 5 June. Indian troops continued the momentum of attack and succeeded in the capture of the OP Ridge also by 1030 hours, inflicting heavy casualties. 1 Guards suffered 7 Killed and 44 wounded as against the Pak casualties of about 64 killed and 3 PsOW(12). Casualty evacuation and movement of replenishment posed a major problem, as local porters and ponies were reluctant to come for fear of getting hurt. Therefore, troop labour had to be used extensively.

It was appreciated that the enemy after having been evicted from Kala Pahar would try and occupy another peak, called Snow Peak, to dominate the Srinagar-Leh road. So, 1 Jammu and Kashmir Militia sent a strong probing patrol with a FOO towards the Snow Peak. There was six feet of snow on the objective. As expected, on 7 June 1965, this patrol contacted the enemy, and heavy fire was exchanged. The FOO, 114 Lt Bty, brought down concentrated and accurate fire and in broad day light, the patrol supported by one bty 85 Lt Regt launched a quick attack forcing the enemy to withdraw from the area.

Outstanding Features of the Operation:

This was the first counter-offensive undertaken by Indian troops in many years. Its success had a good effect on the morale of the troops in Jammu and Kashmir and the Army as a whole. Politically it bolstered the image of the country.

This operation was unique in many respects. The attack was launched over extremely rugged terrain on heights above 4,000 metres. It was launched at night in sub-zero temperature. Men had to go through snow over 45 cm deep near Black Rocks, Peak 1 and Peak 2. 4 Rajput showed remarkable courage and determination(13). Major B.S. Randhawa of 4 Rajput was awarded Maha Vir Chakra, posthumously. Capt Ranbir Singh and Sepoy Budh Singh, both of 4 Rajput, won Vir Chakra. Brig V.K. Ghai who commanded Indian troops in the Kargil Sector was awarded the Vishisht Seva Medal (VSM) Class I for outstanding service during the operations.

The Guards did equally well in their attack on Kala Pahar. The enemy was well-organised, alert and prepared for an attack. Men of the South Waziristan, Northern and Karakoram Scouts of Pakistan were doughty fighters, and fully at home in those high mountains. But they could not stand the determined assault. Good tactical planning and bold execution brought success to Indians.

During the Kargil operations, 85 Lt Regt gave effective fire support to attacks by 4 Rajput, 1 Guards and 1 Jammu and Kashmir Militia. During the attack on Pt 13620 and Black Rocks, 600 rounds and equipment of 853 Lt Bty were lifted by manpack, about 1000 metres up on a hill side to the gun area. All ranks including officers carried loads. For the first time in the history of the Regt, 853 Lt Bty took part in action and executed fire plan in support of 4 Rajput's attack on Pt 13620 and Black Rocks. No registration or proper survey of targets was possible. Targets were fixed by graph paper survey, and fire plan was on call. Fire was adjusted with the help of fixed points on the sky line, but it was so accurate that the enemy packed up quickly. Later, when the enemy reacted and attacked other picquets, they were beaten back by effective artillery fire.

During the attack on Kala Pahar by 1 Guards, the regiment again came in with its telling fire power. For this attack 114 Lt Bty from 32 Lt Regt (3 Div), placed under command 121 Inf Bde Group, was grouped with 85 Lt Regt. Between 2 June and 4 June 1965, when 1 Guards was preparing to attack Kala Pahar, the Regt fired HF tasks on the enemy location intermittently. On 5 June 1965, the Regt fired its first fire plan as a regiment in support of 1 Guards in the capture of Kala Pahar and adjoining features. The fire plan was well coordinated to suit the progress of advance, and the objective was swept with accurate fire, causing heavy casualties on the enemy.

It was estimated, and later confirmed from the prisoners captured, that the enemy suffered over 100 casualties. Immediately after the capture of Kala Pahar, the OP sighted the enemy gun position, and it was silenced for good.

On 7 June, 853 Lt Bty provided accurate and timely artillery support to the patrol of 1 Jammu and Kashmir Militia. This heavy volume of fire with troops advancing towards Snow Ridge gave the impression of an attack in great strength, and the objective was quickly captured.

The credit for the success in the Kargil operations goes not only to the infantry and artillery but also to the Pioneers and the Border Road personnel. No.9 Border Road Task Force was of great help in providing manpower for carrying ammunition, rations and stores to forward picquets. No.9 Task Force also launched a 100-Ft span Bailey Bridge near Harka Bahadur Bridge on 21 May 1965, when the later was in danger of being knocked out by enemy artillery.

This Task Force was mainly responsible for the maintenance of the L of C. The bridges damaged by the enemy were repaired with speed, and the men exhibited a high sense of discipline.

Hard Won Gains Given up

The steps taken in the Kargil sector by the Indian troops were purely in self-defence, and intended to protect the line of communication of Leh. However, on 30 June 1965, the Indian troops, vacated these posts falling in the Pak-occupied Kashmir along the cease-fire line in the Kargil sector. The Indian troops withdrew in deference to an appeal made by the UN Secretary General with a solemn assurance to India about the safety of the Srinagar-Leh road which passed through Kargil. The UN also agreed to post military observers to prevent violation of the cease-fire line in this area by Pakistani forces(14).

However, the scale and frequency of firing incidents during June and July touched a new high. In June, the Pakistan Government reportedly made it compulsory for employers to release all military reservists, and thus a Mujahid force was set up under the Pakistani Army(15). Indian posts in Tithwal, Uri, Mendhar, Naushahra, Punch and Chhamb were fired at frequently. India still hoped that Pakistan would not resort to a direct attack in Kashmir. These hopes were belied when large numbers of Pakistani infiltrators invaded Jammu and Kashmir in August 1965.

Who Planned Operation Gibraltar?

Though Pakistan loudly and vigorously denied its complicity in the attack on Jammu and Kashmir by Pak infiltrators and made all efforts to propagate it as a local uprising, some recent Pakistani publications, including books authored by senior retired army officers, have provided fresh evidence to prove beyond doubt that the armed raiders, who crossed the cease-fire line and committed acts of sabotage, arson and loot in Jammu and Kashmir in August 1965, were Pakistani nationals, and they were raised, trained and equipped by the Pakistan Government. These publication have not only exposed the fact of Pakistani aggression, but also nailed the Pakistani lies about the "spontaneous upsurge" of the people of Kashmir, and the "great revolution launched by the freedom fighters" in the state.

According to Gen Mohammad Musa (Retd)(16), Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff in 1965, the plan for Operation Gibraltar was prepared by Maj Gen Akhtar Husain Malik, General Officer Commanding No.12 Infantry Division, in consultation with the GHQ. The operation was authorised by the Supreme Commander of Pakistan, President Ayub Khan, at a briefing in Murree, where Gen Malik discussed the final plan with the help of a sand model, before it was put into effect in August 1965 under the overall control of the GHQ. Gen Musa further stated that the Gibraltar force consisted of approximately 7,000 Mujahids from Azad Kashmir.

The General has also explained the circumstances under which the entire Operation Gibraltar was initially conceived and planned. "The then Foreign Minister Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and Foreign Secretary, Aziz Ahmed, spurred on by Major-General Akhtar Husain Malik, who was commander of our troops in Azad Kashmir, pressed the Government to take advantage of the disturbed situation in the valley and direct the Army to send raiders into the Indian-held Kashmir for conducting guerrilla activities there a movement with a view to eventually starting an uprising against the occupying power...."(17). Gen Musa was given a concrete proposal for enlarged operation in Kashmir with which, he says, he did not agree, and after its examination recommended that the raids be postponed so that the time thus gained could be utilised for making proper arrangements for not only guerrilla activities in Kashmir but also for building up the army's capacity for an open war(18).

But, surprisingly, one of his own divisional commanders and the foreign office experts proceeded

with the planning and actual launching of Gibraltar, contrary to the Army Chief's professional judgement. In a remarkably candid and forthright statement Gen Musa says: "The policy-makers thwarted the professional assessment and advice on a matter having grave military implications because of their miscalculation of the politico-strategic situation and the over-ambitiousness of a few individuals involved in the decision-making who were prompted by their desire to achieve some quick and spectacular results in Kashmir by clandestine operations"(19).

It is stated that the GHQ briefing, based on Special Service Group (SSG) Commander Col Mehdi's assessment, was against sending commandos into Kashmir due to time, space, logistic and follow-up support factors, and it clearly impressed upon the C-in-C that this operation was a non-starter. However, the army Commander-in-Chief failed to advise the President that on military grounds the General Staff, were opposed to Operation Gibraltar, under the impression that the President was in favour of sending the raiders. It is believed by some independent observers in Pakistan that it was this absence of a clear-cut opposition from his C-in-C to the operational soundness of Gibraltar that led President Ayub Khan to give the go-ahead signal(20).

Air Marshal Asghar Khan (Retd), former C-in-C Pakistan Air Force, says that Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, had convinced the Government "that Pakistani's incursion into Kashmir would not provoke the Indians to extend the area of hostilities along the Indo-Pakistan border"(21). He says that the decision to launch the operation was made on three assumptions: (1) Widespread support would be available within Indian-held Kashmir; (2) India would restrict its offensive to the Azad Kashmir territory; and (3) there was no possibility of India crossing the international border. All the three assumptions proved wrong. Asghar Khan observes:"I found it difficult to believe that the President, who had always been cautious in his approach to international relations, particularly as they affected out contacts with India, should have agreed to a policy that had the germs of a conflict on a major scale....As these incursions began to increase in intensity it became obvious that a major shift had occurred in our policy towards Kashmir"(22).

An eminent Indian journalist met Gen Ayub in Islamabad in 1972, and asked him why he provoked India by sending infiltrators into Kashmir. Ayub's reply was cryptic: "Don't ask me, ask Bhutto". Bhutto was

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Foreign Minister in 1965 and President of Pakistan in 1972. When the journalist met Bhutto and told him that Gen Ayub seemed to blame him for the 1965 War, Bhutto did not deny the responsibility and argued that Pakistan had to act then because the ordnance factories which India had established had not yet gone into full production and once they did, India would have been too strong to be beaten. "There was a time when militarily, in terms of the big push, in terms of armour, we were getting and that was the position up to 1965. Now, the Kashmir dispute was not being resolved peacefully and we had this military advantage, we were getting blamed for it. So it would, as a patriotic prudence, be better to say, all right, let us finish this problem and come to terms, and come to a settlement. It has been an unfortunate thing", Bhutto added. Bhutto said he had no regrets about having persuaded Ayub to send in the infiltrators(23).

This leaves hardly any doubt about the direct involvement of the Government of Pakistan in planning, organising and executing the Operation Gibraltar, which led inexorably to the full scale war of 1965.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. From Official Records.
2. Mullik, B.N., (pp.140-41 and p.151) has accused Pakistan of conspiring to remove the Holy Relic through its agents in the Valley with a view to bringing about an upheaval in Kashmir.
3. From Official Records.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Kaul, Lt Gen. B.M., p.23.
7. AR, 1965, p.6708.
8. From Official Records.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. AR, 1965, p.6500.
12. From Official Records.
13. Ibid.
14. The UN Secretary-General's Report says:

"Among the most serious of the violations was one that occurred in May of this year when Indian troops in battalion strength attacked and captured Pakistan positions in the Kargil area of Kashmir and remained in occupation of them. In the interest of preserving the CFL, I appealed to the Government of India to withdraw its troops from the Pakistan side of the line. On assurance from me that UN Observers would henceforth be stationed on both sides of the Line in that area, which India considered strategically vital to the security of the Srinagar-Leh Road, the Government of India agreed to do so and in due course the Indian troops were withdrawn, thus closing the matter and making unnecessary any further consideration of a report on it to the Security Council. Subsequently, there were some military attacks on the road by armed elements from the Pakistan side".

- Report of the Secretary-General, dated 3 September 1965, on the current situation in Kashmir, with particular reference to the cease-fire agreement, the cease-fire line and the functioning of UNMOGIP.

15. Kaul, Lt Gen B.M., p.23.
16. Mohammad, Gen (Retd), Musa, My Version: India-Pakistan War 1965.
17. Ibid., p.2.
18. Ibid., p.4.
19. Ibid., p.4.
20. Khattak, Lt Gen M. Habibullah Khan, A General's Version: Rejoinder to My Version, reproduced in Strategic Digest, IDSA, July 1984, p.726.
21. Khan, Air Marshal Asghar, pp.75-76.

22. Ibid., p.73. An interesting story about the operation and the setting up of the so-called Sada-i-Kashmir radio is narrated by the then Information Secretary of Pakistan, Altaf Gauhar, in the Foreword written by him for Air Marshal Asghar Khan's book "The First Round: Indo-Pakistan War 1965". He says: "The first time I heard about the operation was on the 25th of July 1965, when Brigadier Irshad (then Director, Military Intelligence) requested me to depute a Kashmiri-speaking officer for a broadcasting station which was to operate from Muzaffarabad. He told me that the Army had the necessary equipment, and they could go on the air at a moment's notice. I placed the services of the late Mr. Yusuf Zafar, a dedicated and experienced Radio Pakistan official, at the disposal of the Army. A few days later Brigadier Irshad gave me some more information about "Operation Gibraltar", and told me that I would be given at least 24 hours notice before the D-Day. After that I heard nothing more until the morning of 8th August when Brigadier Irshad came to see me at a rest house in Murree. He looked a little excited. He informed me that the operation had already begun, and he was sorry that he had not been able to give me the promised 24 hour notice. What, however, brought him to the rest house was the discovery that the radio equipment, which the Army had installed in Muzaffarabad, had failed to work: I drove down to Rawalpindi and made alternative arrangements to get the Sada-i-Kashmir radio off the ground. A few days later there was a meeting in the Defence Secretary's office where Agha Shahi and Nur Khan were also present. Shahi was worried that the Foreign Office had not been able to establish a revolutionary council in Occupied Kashmir, and Nur Khan was urging me to publicise the fact that he proposed personally to drop food supplies for the volunteers trapped in Rajauri". pp.xiv-xv.
23. Nayar, Kuldip. Also reproduced in Strategic Digest, IDSA, July 1984, p.745.

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CHAPTER - IV

OP GIBRALTAR

THE INFILTRATORS

Pakistan had for some considerable time been raising a substantial irregular force trained in guerilla operations for launching aggression into Jammu and Kashmir through large-scale infiltration(1). The Pakistani leaders and press had been talking of starting an "Algerian type" of struggle in Kashmir(2). Gen Md. Musa, the then C-in-C of the Pak Army, has described it as a 'Clandestine War'. The infiltration was planned to be employed on a wide front with a view to forcing dispersal of the Indian forces and undermining the morale of the local population. The primary objective behind the infiltration operation was to create disruption and chaos in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and to incite the people of the State to revolt against the Government. This, in turn, would have facilitated the entry of further waves of infiltrators, followed by regular Pakistani forces for the annexation of the State. A flood of malicious propaganda was let loose to condition the minds of the locals for the coming momentous events. Acts of sabotage and subversion, a familiar feature of Pak intrigues in the Valley, touched a new high during July 1965 and reached its peak in the first week of August. Specially trained agents and saboteurs were infiltrated into Jammu and Kashmir for mass-scale subversive activities, in order to generate amongst the populace an atmosphere of despair and fear, with a view to eroding the authority of the civil administration.

The whole operation was planned in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) under the overall command of Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, General Officer Commanding 12 Infantry Division of the Pakistan Army. The four sector commanders in POK under 12 Infantry Division were made responsible for organising, training and launching of the various infiltration forces from their respective areas(3). The whole force of infiltrators composed of some 30,000 men was named Gibraltar Force(4). Though the training of the Pakistani armed forces personnel in guerilla warfare had been in progress in POK for a long time, the main preparations for the launching of the Gibraltar Force in Jammu and Kashmir started in May 1965.

Basic Organisation

Infiltrators were organised into various task forces and each of these forces was stiffened by inducting officers and some trained troops from the POK battalions for command and control. The remainder of the personnel came from the Razakars and Mujahids. The Razakars formed the bulk, constituting about 70 per cent of this force. This government-sponsored organisation was formed in POK in August 1962(5). Under this, all able-bodied civilians living near the border were recruited and trained. The Mujahid force was organised in POK much later, and they were used primarily as porters. From the interrogation of the captured prisoners it appeared that the Mujahids and the Razakars were not volunteers, and most of them had been recruited forcibly under the orders of the local civil authorities.

The infiltrators comprised eight to ten 'Forces', each having six units of five companies(6). Each force was commanded by a Pak Army Major and had been given a code name. Each company was commanded by a Pak Army officer of the rank of Captain and below and was known by the name of the Commander. A company was made up of one officer, one to three JCOs, half a dozen NCOs and about 35 key personnel from the POK battalions or units of Northern Scouts, 3 to 4 Other Ranks from the Special Service Group, and about 70 Razakars/Mujahids, making a total strength of approximately 120 all ranks. The POK soldiers formed the hard core of the companies and the Special Service Group men handled the explosives for carrying out demolitions and sabotage. The hard core personnel had been carefully selected, and the majority of them came from the commando platoons of the POK battalions. The above organisation, though generally adopted, varied at times. In certain cases the entire company consisted of personnel of regular forces, and in other cases the ratio of regulars and irregulars varied from company to company(7).

Training

The Razakars were given training in POK at Nikial, Khuiratta, Darman, Kalargala, Tarkundi, Bohri Mahal, Pir Kalanjar, Hajira, Kotli and Bher by the POK battalions(8). They were subsequently given intensive training alongwith the regular troops at various centres. Marrying up between the regular troops and the Razakars was carried out during further six weeks' intensive training at the Guerilla Warfare Schools located at Shinkiari, Mang Bajri, Dungi and Sakesar in POK. Training was imparted on the following

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subjects:-

- (a) Laying of ambushes.
- (b) Destruction of bridges and disruption of lines of communication.
- (c) Raids on military formation headquarters and supply dumps.
- (d) Toughening exercises.
- (e) Unarmed combat.

Arms and Equipment

Infiltrators were equipped, in addition to the small arms, with the following:-

- (a) Wireless Set ANGR-9 1 per Force HQ
- (b) Blendicide 83mm rocket 1 per company
- (c) Plastic explosive 100 lbs per company
- (d) Light Machine gun 1 per section
- (e) Transistor 1 per platoon
- (f) Verey light 1 per company
- (g) 12 Bore Shot gun 3 per company

These arms and ammunition, equipment and clothing were supplied by the Pak Government, although in most cases Pakistani markings were erased from the weapons and equipment. Each individual, in addition to the personal weapons and connected ammunition, carried 4 grenades. Ammunition issued was on a lavish scale, 200 rounds per rifle, 200-500 rounds per Sten gun and 750 rounds per light machine gun. In addition to the above, certain forces also had some 2-inch and 3-inch mortars(9). Before launching the infiltrators into Jammu and Kashmir, their uniforms had been withdrawn and civilian clothing - green and Mazari shirts and Salwar - alongwith jungle boots were issued.

Administration

At the time of infiltration, the infiltrators were given seven day's cooked/uncooked rations. The cooked rations were in the form of 'chapati' (a kind of coarse bread made of wheat, maize, etc), 'gur' (molasses) and 'Shakarpara' (dry sweets). They were

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also issued with false identity cards to facilitate local purchase of rations. Adequate money in Indian currency was also provided to enable purchase of supplies from the locals in Jammu and Kashmir. Each company commander was given about 9,000 to 10,000 rupees. This enabled the infiltrators to subsist themselves on local food supplies for a long period. In some cases, when rations and ammunition could not be carried by the infiltrators, mules and porters (mainly Mujahids) were used. Sometimes, even the local labour was commandeered. Major groups of infiltrators were replenished with supplies and ammunition, etc., by mule convoys across the cease-fire line, and by air drops. The mule convoys were better organised in the Budhil and Kandi areas. The air drops were resorted to primarily at night in Budhil and Kandi and the Northern areas (Kel, Keran, Bandipur, etc)(10). During the early days of the operations, the infiltrators paid for all their requirements which were procured from local shops through the pro-Pakistan elements. During the later part, however, they resorted to loot, arson and murder.

Besides replenishment of ammunition for the infiltrators on man-pack basis or by mule convoys and air drops, referred to above, it appears that the planners were also alive to the possibility of creating small dumps of ammunition in some selected places through smuggling over a period, before the launching of the infiltration operation. In fact, at least in one case, a dump of ammunition was discovered in a mosque in Srinagar during the operations against the infiltrators.

For medical cover, the infiltrators were supplied with only a first aid kit. No definite information is available regarding the method adopted for evacuation and medical treatment of the seriously wounded/sick personnel. The wounded were reported to have been either carried away, or left in the houses of sympathisers. It is possible that the returning mule convoys were used for their evacuation. The dead were either left behind or buried in jungles. On the whole, it seems clear that satisfactory medical arrangements were lacking, and this may have been one of the reasons for the low morale of the infiltrators. However, during the course of the operations, they were able to establish some channels for reinforcements and reliefs.

Command and control of the operations was exercised by the HQ Gibraltar Force in POK. For this purpose an ANGR-9 wireless set was provided to each Force for long-range communications. A transistor set

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was also provided down to the Platoon level. Instructions and orders to the infiltrators were also transmitted from the 'Azad Kashmir' Radio in previously arranged codes at fixed times.

Tasks/Objectives

Main objectives behind the launching of the infiltration operations, which were in furtherance of the political aim of annexing Jammu and Kashmir, were:-

- (a) to establish infiltrator bases for operations at various points within the State of Jammu and Kashmir with the help and support of anti-Indian elements;
- (b) to fan out from the bases as and when possible in order to commit acts of sabotage and violence, to terrorise peaceful and loyal citizens and to provide support to pro-Pakistan elements;
- (c) to attack civil and military personnel and government institutions in different parts of the Jammu and Kashmir State so as to disperse the Indian army and the police forces as much as possible;
- (d) to create tension and unrest in Jammu and Kashmir and instigate lawless activities with a view to paralysing the administration and projecting picture of internal revolt in the State; and
- (e) to facilitate the induction of increased numbers of armed forces from Pakistan.

In furtherance of the above objectives, the tasks assigned to the infiltrators were: destruction of bridges and disruption of lines of communication, raids on ammunition dumps and supply dumps, raids on Indian formations and unit headquarters, and ambushing of convoys and patrols. Having carried out these, they were to merge with the local population and await further orders.

Grouping and Induction(11)

The infiltrators were organised into various forces and they operated as follows:-

- (a) Tariq Force - Sonamarg, Dras and Kargil areas.
- (b) Qasim Force - Kupwara, Gurez and Bandipur areas.

- (c) Khalid Force - Trehgaon, Chowkibal, Nangaon and Tithwal areas.
- (d) Salauddin Force - Uri Sector and Srinagar Valley.
- (e) Ghaznavi Force - Mendhar, Rajauri and Naushahra areas.
- (f) Babar Force - Kalidhar Range and Chhamb areas.
- (g) Murtaza Force - Kel area.
- (h) Jacob Force - Minimarg area.
- (i) Nusrat Force - Tithwal area.

In addition to the above, Sikandar Force and some other unidentified groups were also noticed in different areas. Another group of infiltrators from bases in Pakistani territory around Shakargarh indulged in raids in the area south-west of Samba, with a view to disrupting the communications between Pathankot and Jammu.

Sector commanders and Force commanders were assembled in Murree during the second week of July 1965 and addressed by Field Marshal Ayub Khan. Maj Gen Akhtar Hussain Malik, who controlled the operations of the forces from Murree, addressed the Force commanders on 1 August 1965 and impressed upon them the importance of the mission, stating that it was their last chance to liberate Kashmir. Extensive infiltration of the above Forces took place at various points across the cease-fire line and the international border between Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir, starting in August 1965.

Routes of Infiltration

In the hilly terrain between the Jammu and Kashmir and the Pak-Occupied Kashmir there were numerous routes that could be taken. Given below are the major routes, some of which were known to have

been used by the infiltrators:-

INFILTRATION ROUTES INTO JAMMU AND KASHMIR(12)

<u>Route</u>	<u>Important Places on Route</u>	<u>Highest Point on route</u>
Gultari-Drass	Through Gultari, Marpola, Goson, Moradbag on to Dras.	4760 mtrs
Buniyal-Dras	Buniyal, Shandorila, Bhimbet, Dras.	5290 mtrs
Matiyal-Kharbu	Matiyal, Chehumudo, Palawar, Kakshar, Kharbu	5090 mtrs
Dusnail-Chunagund	Dusnail, Kirkitchu, Chunagund	2740 mtrs
Brielman-Kargil	Brielman, Yourbal Tak, Simul, Kargil	5380 mtrs
Natsara-Kargil	Natsara, Olthing Thang, Musbar, Chuli Chang, Batalik, Simul and Kargil.	2440 mtrs

Infiltration Plan


The plan of infiltration was brilliant in conception. The raiders were to infiltrate in small groups between 1 and 5 August 1965, concentrate at selected points and then converge into the Valley from various directions. In the Valley, the raiders hoped to mingle unnoticed with thousands of people congregating to celebrate the festival of Pir Dastagir Sahib on 8 August 1965. On the next day, which coincided with the anniversary of the first arrest of Sheikh Abdullah, the Action Committee had scheduled a processional demonstration in Srinagar. The raiders proposed to sneak into the procession, fully armed, stage an armed revolt and in the process capture the Radio Station, Airfield and other vital centres. Meanwhile, other columns further south, and in the north-east of the Valley were to cut roads Srinagar-Jammu and Srinagar-Kargil to isolate Srinagar. Having this done, it was planned to constitute a 'Revolutionary Council', proclaim it as the lawful government, and broadcast an appeal for recognition and assistance from all countries, especially Pakistan(13). This was to be the signal for the Pakistan Army to move in for the kill. However, the quick reaction of the Indian forces combined with the spontaneous assistance of the loyal locals frustrated this diabolical plan.

ACTIVITIES OF GIBRALTAR FORCE


Extensive infiltration of the Gibraltar Force at various points across the 750-km long cease-fire line and the international border between Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir, began on 5 August 1965. The activities of the armed infiltrators covered areas from the south-western tip of Jammu and Punch and Uri in the west, Tithwal in the north-west, Guraiz in the north, and Kargil in the north-east. Initially, about 1,500 of them crossed the Indian border in Jammu and Kashmir surreptitiously in small batches, and concentrated at selected points inside Kashmir to organise themselves into larger groups(14). This force was equipped with light, automatic weapons, and its aim, apart from sabotage, was to indoctrinate the Kashmiris so that they could rise in a rebellion against India. Infiltration was mainly directed towards Kanzalwan, Keran, Tithwal, Kargil, Uri, Gulmarg, Mendhar, Punch, Rajauri, Naushahra and Jammu areas.

The second wave of infiltrators was inducted into Jammu and Kashmir in the third week of August. At this time, which was the period of their peak strength, their number was estimated between 5,000 and 6,000. Taking into account the replacements for those who "exfiltrated", it is estimated that on the whole, a total strength of about 8,000 took part in these operations(15). By about the first week of September 1965 when the open hostilities started between India and Pakistan, a third wave of infiltrators, approximately 5,500 strong, was ready in Pak-Occupied Kashmir for induction(16). But this could not be sent across the Indian border due to the operational pressures in West Punjab.

The infiltrators initially worked independently in small groups. Subsequently, as worthwhile success was not achieved, they changed their tactics and attempted to concentrate themselves in selected areas and operate in larger groups. Some of the infiltrators from various columns managed to exfiltrate without participating in any operations, while others kept drifting and operating indifferently till they ran into another group and merged with it. Towards the later part of their operations they were able to establish their bases and consolidate themselves into strongholds in certain areas. Most of these were in remote, isolated mountainous regions which were not frequented and were not easily accessible.



PAKISTANI INFILTRATION INTO J&K



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Activities of some of the columns are given below area-wise:-

The Valley: Saluaddin Force operated in the valley. It consisted of six companies. This force had crossed the cease-fire line on 30 July 1965 and reached Chor Panjal on 1 August. At Chor Panjal, the force was split into two columns: one consisting of two companies headed towards Gulmarg, and the remainder towards Khag. On 8 August, it blew up Bimna bridge and killed the police guard(17). It was this group that was responsible for the many incidents of sabotage, arson and violence that took place in Baramula, Badgam, Yusmarg and Srinagar itself. Elements of the group penetrated into four key suburbs of Srinagar, in the vicinity of the cantonment, the military depots, the radio station and the Government secretariat. However, except sniping the police lines, it could not achieve anything substantial. The column failed to get any support or welcome from the locals. In rage and sheer despair, the raiders resorted to arson and set fire to the congested Batamallu locality, burning about 300 houses(18).

Elements of this group operated in the Anantnag-Achibal-Kazigund area. They had turned Khag forest into a stronghold, leading to major encounters with the Indian security forces. As a result, they completely disintegrated, and trekked back to Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, via Sonat Nala, by 15 August. With the expulsion of this force, the worse was over in Kashmir valley.

Kargil Sector: Tariq Force in this sector was given the task to strike towards Dras and Kargil. It was approximately 400 strong, consisting largely of the Karakorum Scouts, Mujahids and Razakars. It also had a complement of some Baluchis of the Pakistan regular army(19). The force infiltrated through Gultari, Marpo La and Kaobal Gali. One of these groups headed for Zoji La and Sonamarg. It attempted to blow up the Hamilton bridge on the Srinagar-Sonamarg road and a cement bridge near Zoji La. Except for minor damage to the bridges, its attempts were foiled by the Indian security forces, which had a head-on clash near Sumbal bridge on 29 August. In this encounter 20 raiders were killed, and the rest fled across the cease-fire line(20). On 15 August, the Indian troops reoccupied the picquets including height 13620 which had been returned to Pakistan on 30 June 1965. After this, the infiltrators quarrelled amongst themselves, mutinied twice, and ultimately on 9 September, this force was reported to have been disbanded.

Kishanganga Sector: This sector can be divided into two parts:

- (a) Area Nausam-Sopore-Bandipur
- (b) Kishanganga Valley.

They were very active in Nausam-Sopore-Bandipur area. In this sector, the Qasim and Khalid forces of the infiltrators operated. The Qasim Force, composed of 500 men, started from Taobat and, reached Bandipur via Razdan Pass. Its principal base was established in the forest area of the Pass itself. This force tried to set fire to the Bandipur police station. However, the attempt was foiled. It also attempted to burn down a bridge near Kanzalwan on 11 August, and again on 15 August. One band made its stronghold at Malud Behak and operated in the area of Woyil bridge. In this area, the Indian security forces used helicopters to mop up the saboteurs and, it is believed, practically every soldier of the Qasim Force was liquidated.

The Khalid Force started from Keran and encircled Handwara from the west. This force attacked the Naugam and Lingyat bridges on 12 and 21 August respectively(21). But the attacks failed miserably. It destroyed the Kazilpur bridge also and attacked Chowkibal. By the end of August, this force was also disbanded.

Tithwal-Tangdhar Sector: The heights in this sector dominated the Muzaffarabad-Kel road, which was the life-line of Pakistani troops stationed in the Kishanganga Valley. Rations, ammunition and reinforcements were despatched by this road to Kel, Guraiz, Minimarg and Kargil. Owing to this, the road had special significance for Pakistan and had enhanced the tactical importance of Tithwal-Tangdhar sector. From 5 August to the end of December 1965, the sector remained under continuous firing. In this sector, the Nusrat force operated nominally, because all along it was supported by regular Pakistani troops and their MMGs and field guns, the bases of which were located near Mirpur. From 13 to 18 August, the Pakistanis raided some Indian posts and indulged in intensive firing(22).

The Indian troops reacted quickly, crossed the cease-fire line on 24 August and occupied three Pakistani posts. It was during this action that a Pakistani Divisional order signed by Maj Gen Akhtar Hussain Malik was captured, and the document conclusively proved that it was Pakistan that had sent the infiltrators into Jammu and Kashmir(23). The

Indian security forces later advanced right up to the line of the Kishanganga and secured the southern bank. Pakistan now feared that the Indian army might cross the river and dominate the northern bank also. To prevent this, on 11 September they blew up all the bridges over this river. The Pakistanis continued their attempts to regain the lost ground throughout November and December 1965, but always failed. These posts were given back to them on 25 February 1966, as a result of the Tashkent Agreement.

Mendhar-Rajauri-Chingas-Jhangar Sector: The Ghaznavi Force entered Jammu from Kotli during the first week of August. It initially consisted of six companies, but later on swelled in to nearly 2,000 men (24). It was perhaps the largest of the guerilla bands. This group operated in Mendhar-Rajauri-Chingas-Jhangar area. They attacked an ammunition depot at Narian but were beaten back by the Indian troops. By 18 August, they got virtual control of Budhil and established their Headquarters in Dudaruni. They were supplied by air and on one occasion got approximately 500 rifles dropped at Dana. The men of this group were sighted as deep as Ramban and Riasi. Timely action saved the bridge over the Chenab at Ramban and other bridges on road Udhampur-Srinagar. They inflicted a considerable number of casualties on the Indian troops in Punch and Mandi. This force had an advantage over the rest of the guerilla army: most of its men belonged to the same ethnic group as the majority of the locals. An all-out drive against the raiders was launched only after the cease-fire. Most of the raiders in this region managed to escape back into Pakistan.

Kalidhar-Samba Sector: The Babar Force, 400-strong, entered the State of Jammu and Kashmir through Bhimber, Sadabad and Penga into Kalidhar, with a view to spreading out in the Naushahra-Sunderbani area. On 9 August, 150 infiltrators were sighted at Banjaro, north of Chhamb, and by 12 August, 300 of them had established a camp in Narijira and Panapura. Some 200 of them penetrated Kalidhar where they were engaged by the Indian security forces and suffered heavy casualties. By the middle of August, they were all forced to retreat into Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir under cover of heavy artillery barrage, provided by the Pak Army.

In addition, another group of infiltrators from bases in Pakistan territory in Shakargarh raided the Samba area in Jammu with a view to disrupting the communications between Pathankot and Jammu, and even ambushed some convoys during August and September.

By about 10 October, after the cease-fire, only about 500 to 600 infiltrators were left behind. Approximately, 1,000 men of Gibraltar Force were liquidated over the whole period since 5 August, with the remainder having exfiltrated into POK, in spite of blockades by the Indian security forces(25).

Though the infiltration operation succeeded in tying down a large number of the Indian security forces, it failed in its overall aim. Despite the fact that the Gibraltar Force failed to rouse a revolt, it did succeed in committing many acts of sabotage and violence, though it did not have as much of success as expected in blowing up bridges, assassination of political leaders, disrupting economic, political and social order, as also cutting the Indian lines of communication.

It was surprising that such a large number of men had managed to slip across the Indian borders, supposed to be so vigilantly guarded. It must at the same time be conceded that this guerilla invasion was one of the best kept secrets in Pakistan. The organisation of the Gibraltar Force, its number, aims and objectives were pieced together later from prisoners' statements and captured documents. The Indian authorities had anticipated a certain amount of activity by infiltrators, but no one visualised a well-coordinated operation on such a massive scale. Even on 2 August 1965, when a high-level conference was held at Srinagar to review the security arrangements on the cease-fire line, there was no inkling of the impending guerilla invasion within 72 hours.

INFILTRATION HIGHLIGHTS

The major incidents that took place during the infiltration operation until the Indian security forces launched the counter-offensive across the cease-fire line on 25 August 1965 are given below in chronological order:

At about mid-day on 5 August 1965, information was received from a local Bakarwal (Shepherd) that a large number of armed strangers had infiltrated into Gulmarg sector. They were reported to be concentrated in area Buna Danwas. Two patrols of approximately one company strength each from 7 Field Regiment and 7 Bihar were sent out on night 5/6 August 1965 to encircle the area and deal with these infiltrators. In the ensuing action the group of infiltrators disintegrated and withdrew into jungles south of Buna Danwas. On searching the area, the patrols recovered four rifles, three sten guns, nine LMG barrels and 26 Grenades(26).

A few hours later, at approximately 1800 hours, a report was received that a few POK troops were seen moving in area Dhabrot near Galuthi in the Mendhar sector. An ad hoc patrol of a platoon strength ex 120 Inf Bde HQ was despatched to intercept the infiltrators. It encountered strong opposition. In the skirmish that followed, the patrol leader, Captain Chander Narain Singh, and three ORs lost their lives during a gallant charge on the enemy. The raiders after the brief but sharp encounter fled back across the cease-fire line, leaving behind a number of arms, and large quantities of ammunition and equipment. Six infiltrators were killed and a number of them wounded(27).

An infiltrator, caught during the clash in area Buna Danwas on 5 August, revealed the startling information that a large number of intruders had moved in from Bugina to Domari Gali in the Tithwal sector. A large influx of infiltrators through Atham Gali, a pass situated directly north of Kupwara, was also reported by a civilian source. On 6 August, strong patrols were despatched to intercept these intruders whose target appeared to be the Road Kupwara-Tithwal, preliminary to penetrating the Valley. Infiltrators also fired at the Rear HQ of 3 JAK Rifles in area Bandipur and attacked a 6 Guards post at Kalaruch. Meanwhile, HQ 68 Inf Bde, with 6 Dogra, was moved to Tangmarg, and was made responsible for the operations in this sector. Towards the evening of 6 August, a number of infiltrator concentrations were reported to HQ 25 Inf Div. The estimated strength of the largest of these was 100 raiders in area Tatta Pani near Kalakot. Comparatively smaller batches were seen in areas Dharamsal and Nagun. A concentration reported in area Dunga Gali, approximately 16 km north-east of Rajauri, caused serious alarm, for it indicated that the enemy had managed to lodge itself well into the interior without detection. Further south, in the Chhamb sector, the presence of infiltrators was detected for the first time when approximately 60 of them, accompanied by porters, were seen about 2 km north of Dewa.

On 7 August 1965, information was received that approximately 200 infiltrators were seen in area Magam, on its way to Srinagar. One coy 6 Dogra and one platoon PAP intercepted the group, killed one and arrested five. An Indian OR was killed in the encounter. Later in the night, the raiders attacked Kralapur and Sonarwain bridges, and damaged them. In the action at Kralapur bridge, 4 Kumaon lost 10 ORs(28). Further west, an ammunition depot near point Trahagam fired upon incessantly was engaged

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throughout the night, an Indian patrol combed the surrounding area and captured three infiltrators. In 25 Inf Div sector, a column of approximately 500 POK troops in mufti was reported to be infiltrating through Kopra forest in the Haji Pir Bulge. They appeared to be heading towards Nawan and Jamianwali Gali, obviously en route to Srinagar via Badgam. A number of clashes took place during that night, the most serious one being at the Gali Picquet (602) - the gateway into the Mandi Valley. Here the Pakistanis launched four vicious attacks in a determined effort to overrun the post. But 7 Sikh, who were in occupation of this picquet, repulsed all these assaults, inflicting severe casualties. Posts 603 and 604 (Doda) in the Punch Sector, were also attacked repeatedly, but in all cases the infiltrators were beaten back with heavy losses. There was yet another encounter with approximately 100 infiltrators south of Balnoi, during which the Indians recovered two rifles and four grenades. Yet another engagement took place in the Bhimber Gali area where the Indian troops clashed with about 200 infiltrators and successfully liquidated the gang.

The same night, in 191 Inf Bde sector, approximately 40 infiltrators launched a raid on 369 Field Company at Jaurian Camp, using 3-inch mortars, MMGs, LMGs and rockets. The Indian troops appeared to have been caught off-guard and in consequence suffered 5 killed and 5 wounded (29). A few vehicles were also damaged. Casualties inflicted on the infiltrators could not be assessed.

In the evening of 8 August, reports trickled in of a large number of infiltrators in the suburbs of Srinagar. A sizeable batch was reported in village Qasba Biru, moving towards the Srinagar airfield - the most sensitive target in the Valley. A company of 8 Jammu and Kashmir Militia, two tank troops of Central India Horse and some infantry were, therefore, immediately deployed for the protection of the airfield. Later in the night, approximately 400 infiltrators, who were seen in area Bimna bridge and Tangpur village, fired on the patrols protecting the bridge. Two companies from Jammu and Kashmir Militia and three platoons of Punjab Armed Police were sent to engage these infiltrators. This force was later reinforced by a company from 2/9 Gorkha Rifles which had just arrived from Jammu. It soon became obvious that the infiltrators were closing in their ring around Srinagar in a determined bid to enter the city.

In 25 Infantry Division sector, the infiltrators fired on petroleum, oil and lubricants dump Narian, but could cause no damage. Patrols sent to search the

surrounding area captured Captain Ghulam Hussain of 8 AK Battalion and Captain Mohammad Sajjad of 18 AK Battalion. These Officers were the first to give a definite insight into the elaborate preparations that had been made for launching the infiltration campaign(30). The infiltrators made a daring raid on Headquarters 120 Infantry Brigade on 8th night. There were, however, no casualties. The same night, for the first time, the whole cease-fire line in 25 Infantry Division sector erupted into life with intensive and continuous fire from across the border. In the Punch area, the enemy introduced a new element in the infiltration campaign by shelling selected targets with 25 pounder guns(31). Meanwhile Pakistan, through Press and Radio, was at great pains to explain away the happenings in Jammu and Kashmir as spontaneous local insurrection in which she had no hand! As the situation in 25 Infantry Division sector was deteriorating rapidly, it was decided to move 52 Mountain Brigade from 26 Infantry Division to Rajauri.

On 9 August, a band of raiders was reported in area Bedori in the Haji Pir bulge. Another strong batch was seen moving forward from Sallar towards Gulmarg, and a third group heading in the direction of Zurahom. Counter-measures were initiated. A sizeable batch of the intruders had trickled into the Mandi Valley in the early hours of 9th morning, and at 0930 hours raided the Mandi Police Station, and occupied the main heights along the track linking the town to Punch. Simultaneously, reports came in of bands of infiltrators concentrating to the east of Mandi at Molsar, Loran and Markot. Mandi town fell to the infiltrators. Telephone lines to Indian picquets 601, 602, 603 and 604 were cut and wireless traffic was heavily jammed by powerful transmitters from across the cease-fire line. Further south, in 191 Infantry Brigade area, approximately 120 infiltrators were reported in the vicinity of Kalit.

During night 9/10 August 1965, some infiltrators were engaged near the cease-fire line by Indian picquets 497 and 499 as they were trying to slip back to the safety of their own territory. This was the first indication of a flow of infiltrator traffic in the reverse direction.

However, in 121 Infantry Brigade sector, the infiltrators were most active during this night. They damaged the bridges at Pashkyum (south-east of Kargil) and Shamsah (19 km north-east of Dras on road Srinagar-Leh)(32). The Suru River Valley, dominated by Point 13620, appeared to be the obvious line of ingress. 163 Infantry Brigade en route to the Valley had to be halted at Kargil until these bridges were

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repaired. During the halt, the Brigade was continuously sniped by Pak posts at Point 13620, Saddle and Black Rocks. The presence of these posts overlooking Kargil continued to pose serious threat to the Indian line of communication in this sector.

On 10 August, in a vigorous counter-drive, the area of Tangpur, on the outskirts of Srinagar, was cleared of the infiltrators, and a large quantity of ammunition and equipment recovered. Meanwhile, four ad hoc companies, organised from 19 Infantry Division, had been concentrated on the Tattoo Ground. At about mid-day the advance party of 163 Infantry Brigade arrived from Leh by road and two companies of 4 Sikh Light Infantry completed their landing at Srinagar airfield(33). With the arrival of these troops, the immediate threat to Srinagar had been foiled, and hence 8 Jammu and Kashmir Militia was ordered to move to Pir Panjal with Bn HQ at Shupiyau.

While the Indian post 635 opposite Daruchhian was engaged with 81 mm mortars, further south, at Jhangar, the administrative base of 4/8 Gorkha Rifles was subjected to heavy firing. But there were no casualties. One Pak Captain and three raiders were captured by 80 Infantry Brigade, and near Jaurian one Pak officer and seven raiders were wounded and three others captured. In the Chhamb sector, infiltrators were reported in Kalidhar-Dewa area, where two infiltrators along with rifles were captured, while they were sneaking back across the cease-fire line. During night 10/11 August, sporadic firing was reported in various parts of Srinagar, and Magam village was reportedly burnt and the police station at Qasba Biru ransacked. Also the Indian posts along the cease-fire line and international border in the 191 Infantry Brigade sector were continuously engaged throughout the night.

On 11 August, one of the Indian ambush patrols was attacked by 300 infiltrators in area Mahadev and the Indian post at Pathreki Gali was subjected to light machine gun and mortar fire. In an encounter near Jaurian, four infiltrators were killed and fourteen captured. A large quantity of arms and ammunition was also recovered(34). In the afternoon of that day, 8 Grenadiers with a company of 7 Sikh under command launched an attack on Mandi under the overall direction of HQ 52 Mountain Brigade. By the evening, the heights guarding the approach to Mandi were secured, and all was set for an assault on this important town next day.

During the night 11/12 August, there was a comparative lull all over Jammu and Kashmir, with the

exception of the Punch and Chhamb sectors. In the Punch sector, Indian picquets 421, 427, 428 and 429 and HQ 93 Inf Bde were shelled continuously. There was also intermittent firing in area Dubey bridge and Bhimber Gali. In 191 Infantry Brigade sector, there was an enemy attack in force, approximately one battalion, on an ambush party positioned between posts 704 and 705. The action developed into a major engagement, and under overwhelming pressure the ambush party was forced to withdraw(35). On 12 August, about 50 infiltrators, seen in area Tosh Maidan, were engaged by the Indian artillery, but casualties could not be assessed. In the Punch sector, 1 Madras cleared Point 4007, killing 12, wounding 4 and capturing 16 infiltrators. This was followed by the capture of Mandi by 52 Mountain Brigade(36). And with that the first ray of light shot into the prevailing dismal situation in the Punch sector.

During night 12/13 August 1965, the enemy continued to harass Srinagar with intermittent firing. The cease-fire line was kept ablaze by Pakistan in 19 Infantry Division sector with incessant firing, which included shelling with 25 pounder guns. In the Punch sector, Khanetar and the Kalai bridge came under heavy small arms fire. At one stage, the threat became so serious that its capture appeared imminent. Indian artillery, however, stepped into the breach and blasted away the infiltrators.

8 Kumaon base at Naugam was attacked at 0600 hrs on 13 August. The attack lasted for two hours during which the unit lost its commanding officer, Lt Col M.V. Gore, and the second-in-command of the battalion was wounded(37). Subsequently, the convoy evacuating casualties was ambushed, and in the confused fighting that followed five Indian ORs were killed and five others wounded. The enemy lost 12 killed in the action. 4 Sikh Light Infantry, which had landed at Srinagar airfield on 11 August 1965, was moved to Baramula. The same day, the infiltrators made an all out bid to capture the Gali picquet. The picquet's garrison, marooned since 7 August refused to yield ground and repulsed the assaults with heavy casualties to the attackers.

Again, from 191 Infantry Brigade sector ominous reports came in of the presence of one squadron Pak tanks in area Mattewala and heavy vehicular movement all along the international border opposite the Chhamb area. A concentration of Pak troops was also reported in area Moel. This was the first indication of the movement of Pak regular troops opposite the Chhamb sector(38).

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It had been under consideration for some time to form a separate Headquarter for dealing with the Pak infiltration in the Kashmir Valley, thus giving 19 Infantry Division a free hand to plan and execute the counter-infiltration operations. On 14 August 1965, this Headquarter came into being and was designated Headquarter SRI Force with Maj Gen Umrao Singh in command. With the formation of this Headquarter, 19 Infantry Division Tactical Headquarter moved back to Baramula. At this stage the enemy went a step further in escalating the aggression; for the first time medium guns were used to shell Uri(39). A request was made to the UNFO Team Baramula for intervention to stop this firing. The UN Observers, although fully posted with the actual state of affairs, expressed their inability to do anything in the matter. The Indian forces, therefore, retaliated with medium guns and engaged Chakothi.

In 191 Infantry Brigade Group, a raid on police station Palanwala was successfully repulsed, and two companies 3 Mahar were despatched to chase the raiders. On 14 August, first reports were received of regular troop movements in the Sialkot sector(40).

On 15 August 1965, a major tragedy struck the Chhamb sector when the enemy artillery directed by an Air Observation Post, shelled the Indian post at Dewa where an Artillery Ammunition dump was located. A stray shell blew up this dump and inflicted heavy casualties which included personnel from the Brigade Headquarter Group. Brigadier B.F. Masters, Commander 191 Infantry Brigade Group, was killed and along with him died Maj Balram of 8 Jammu and Kashmir Rifles, 2/Lieut Narinder Singh of 14 Field Regiment, Captain R.K. Chahar, one JCO and four Other Ranks. Two Officers and 38 Other Ranks were wounded and, six guns of 14 Field Regiment were rendered out of action. Palanwala post was abandoned and the lines of communication to all the forward units were disrupted(41).

Headquarters SRI Sector reported that a fire had broken out in area Batamallu in Srinagar. It appeared that the infiltrators having failed in their task at Srinagar were indulging in acts of arson. When approximately 100 infiltrators were seen in area village Khag, the village was shelled and fifteen infiltrators were killed. Meanwhile, in the Punch area, the gallant defenders of the Gali picquet, now severely depleted in strength and administratively isolated for over a week, abandoned the post in the early hours of 15 August. Further south, in 26 Inf Div sector, the Pakistanis extended the hostilities across the international border by ransacking village

Bajpur near Samba(42). Fifteen villagers were slaughtered in this rampage. In the Udhampur sector also infiltrators were reported in various places. 3 Kumaon searched area Bhaj Masta and recovered some ammunition and explosives. On 16 August 1965, the concentration of infiltrators at Pharkian Di Gali was engaged by the Indian troops, and three of them were killed. Information was also received that a company of Pak regular troops had intruded into the Indian territory 3 km west-south-west of Rangwar Gali. Although there was unmistakable evidence of Pakistan's involvement in the infiltration campaign, this was first time that Pak troops had openly crossed the cease-fire line(43).

In the 25 Infantry Division sector, enemy activity was limited to the shelling of some Indian posts, but further south, from the Chhamb area came the depressing news that with the exception of the Indian posts between Moel and Burejal, the remaining Indian picquets guarding the approaches to Dewa had been abandoned. On 17 August 1965 a patrol from 6 Dogra, en route to Chor Panjal, clashed with a strong body of infiltrators and killed seven of them. The next day in the Uri sector, the Indian guns engaged Nauseri, hitting an officers' Mess and a few bunkers. Further east, in the SRI Force area, approximately 200 infiltrators were engaged by the Indian patrols in area Nahom and Hayatpur. As a result two infiltrators were killed. When the Beri Pattan bridge was shelled and damaged by the Pak medium artillery, the Indian troops retaliated with counter-bombardment on a suspected medium gun position. Meanwhile, 2 Sikh secured a firm base west of Dewa. Although they were subjected to artillery fire throughout the night 18/19 August 1965, they held their ground. On 19 August 1965, an enemy patrol was intercepted at Jamianwali Gali, and the infiltrators lost one officer and three raiders, and a Junior Commissioned Officer and 2 raiders were captured. The same day at about 1000 hours, the enemy shelled the Punch Landing Ground, damaging one Otter aircraft and rendering the airfield temporarily unfit for use(44). However, the Landing Ground was repaired by the evening.

On 20 August 1965, while the enemy fired on Field Ammunition Depot Khruah and Field Petroleum Depot Khunmuh, the two major Indian installations in the Chhamb sector, 2 Sikh captured Green Ridge and Red Hill, and 6/5 Gorkha Rifles secured Point 3779.

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On 21 August 1965, GOC XV Corps thus appreciated the prevailing situation:-

(a) 25 Infantry Division Sector

The maximum success gained by the infiltrators was in the Mandi area where they had secured local support. The situation had, however, stabilised, although a small corridor was still in their hands. Punch area still continued to cause anxiety, as the Pakistanis had brought in some 81mm mortars and two medium guns. Although Mendhar area was still infested by a large number of infiltrators, they presented no serious problem.

(b) Chhamb Sector

The second area causing concern was between Kalidhar range and River Chenab. In this area reverses had been suffered primarily due to preponderance of the Pak artillery, the unfortunate death of the Brigade Commander (Brig B.F. Masters) and the blowing up of Dewa Camp. The Indian commanders did not react quickly enough, in contrast with the speedy enemy reactions. But the situation was then under control.

The same day, an attack on an Indian post in the Tithwal sector was repulsed with heavy casualties. On 22 August 1965, in the Northern sector, air violations were reported in areas Bandipur-Sopor and Kupwara. The Indian base at Chowkibal was fired upon by the infiltrators, wounding two other ranks. In the SRI sector, the High Altitude Warfare School came into the picture for the first time when its patrol clashed with a group of raiders in an area near Handwara. The Indians suffered no casualties, and the enemy casualties could not be ascertained. On 23 August 1965, the enemy attempted to blow up a bridge on road Galuthi-Rajauri. The bridge was slightly damaged(45). In the Valley, SRI Force Headquarter reported a concentration of 200 infiltrators in village Malud. Counter-action was promptly taken and the infiltrators were dispersed. The next day, an Indian post in 10 Infantry Division sector was engaged by the Pak artillery and mortar fire, and considerable movement of enemy vehicles was observed by the post in this area.

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COUNTER-INFILTRATION OPERATIONS

The Indian authorities soon realised that the guerilla groups were a serious threat to the security of Jammu and Kashmir and that the only effective way of eliminating them was to go on the offensive and cross the cease-fire line to plug their entry routes and destroy their sanctuaries in the Pak-Occupied Kashmir. Debate in the Indian Parliament clearly showed the unanimity of opinion that India should retaliate against Pakistan and take the bases from where the raiders were operating. Once the decision was taken, action was swift. One of the steps in this direction was the recapture of three Pakistani posts on the Kargil heights. That removed a constant danger to the Indian life line between Srinagar and Leh. Some days later, Indian troops struck in the Tithwal sector, and occupied several strategic Pakistani posts, capture of the vital Haji Pir Pass was the brightest achievement of these operations.

Recapture of Kargil Heights

It may be recalled that the Kargil heights, which were captured in May 1965, were returned in end June in response to a UN appeal. In August, two companies of 17 Punjab were manning the Indian picquets and two companies with the battalion HQ were in the helipad area in Kargil. The picquets reported occasional enemy movements on Pt 13620 complex. It appeared that the Pakistanis were only patrolling it by day, but not manning it at night. On 14 August, CO 17 Punjab was ordered to capture Pt 13620 complex at the earliest. The battalion immediately carried out certain regrouping to ensure that its defences remained intact, but a balanced striking force with adequate reserves was created. The regrouping commenced at 1400 hrs and was completed by sun-set. Maj Balwant Singh, OC D Coy, was appointed the task force commander of 2 Rifle Platoons and supporting elements. With these he was ordered to capture Pt 13620, Saddle and Black Rocks by 0500 hrs on 15 August 1965. Three platoons were to assault three different objectives from three different directions. Troops were to climb the slopes through mine-field gaps to be created by engineers that night. Each assaulting group had a Forward Observation Officer(FOO), Mobile Fire Controller(MFC), one section MMG, and detachment of Engineers for breaching and laying of the mines. Operation commenced at 0001 hrs, as planned. It was a silent attack with Radio silence. Complete surprise was achieved, and all the three objectives were captured by the morning of 15 August, without suffering any casualty(46).

Tithwal Sector

The first limited offensive by the Indian security forces, launched in the Tithwal sector, was aimed at securing a series of tactically important features, which was essential to dominate the area in question.

At 2340 hours on 23 August 1965, a combined patrol composed of 2 Rajput and 3/8 Gorkha Rifles secured the Ring Contour Area across the cease-fire line. Although no opposition was encountered on the objective, the enemy shelled the position throughout the night, but the Rajputs and Gorkhas held their ground.

On 24 August 1965, at 2130 hours, 1 Sikh less two companies, supported by 138 Mountain Battery and 17 Field Battery from 7 Field Regiment, attacked the Pak post on Richhmar Ridge, held by a platoon plus of the enemy. The attack was ably led by Maj S. Kapur (subsequently decorated with the Vir Chakra). Taken completely by surprise, the enemy fled in confusion. The assaulting companies pressed on to the PT Ground, occupied by a company less platoon of 16 AK Battalion and elements of 5 Punjab. By 2250 hours, Richhmar Ridge was in the hands of the Indian troops. Casualties suffered by the enemy were eight killed and five captured. The Indian forces incurred casualties of one killed and seven wounded. A large quantity of arms, ammunition and rations was also captured. These included 4x.30 machine guns, 1x.50 machine gun and 4x81mm mortars. These weapons were usefully employed by the battalion in subsequent operations against the enemy(47).

The Sikhs next proceeded to attack the formidable Pir Sahiba feature on night 25/26 August. 138 Mountain Battery was in support. The enemy opposition was estimated as one company. Indian troops stealthily crept up the treacherous slopes of this mountain and, when within assaulting distance, made a bold dash for the post. The enemy fought bravely but could not stand up to the grim determination of the Sikhs. From the new positions, the Indian troops could now overlook an extensive area, and, in particular, could watch important routes which the Pakistani saboteurs had been using to enter Kashmir. In the first week of September, Indian troops improved their position by a slight northward move and captured new mountain heights.

Next, 3/8 Gorkha Rifles, supported by field, mountain and light artillery, attacked the massive

Sunjoi feature on night 3/4 September. The post was held by one company of AK troops and a company plus of Kurram Militia. After a brave charge across the minefield, followed by bitter hand-to-hand fighting, during which the Khukri was freely used, the Pakistanis were evicted from the objective. The enemy casualties were twenty-eight killed, as compared to sixteen on the Indian side. A large quantity of enemy arms and ammunition was also captured(48).

The adversary reacted sharply to the capture of Sunjoi and launched two furious counter-attacks on night 4/5 September and 6/7 September to regain this important feature. However, both these assaults were repulsed. Enemy casualties were one Officer and seven Other Ranks killed, and the Indian troops lost an Officer and one Other Rank. In this action the Indian troops captured an operation order issued by General Officer Comanding 12 Infantry Division of Pakistan(49). The operation order revealed that the enemy in brigade strength, under Brigadier Fazle Rahim Khilji, MC, was to infiltrate from different directions to cut off the lines of communication of the Indian Brigade in the area, and thereafter mount attacks on the HQ, its gun area and administrative bases.

With the capture of Sunjoi, the Indian troops reached the outskirts of Mirpur, a few kilometres north-east of Muzaffarabad. Now they dominated the whole area east of the Kishanganga river.

After their success at Sunjoi feature, 3/8 Gorkha Rifles, supported by a mountain and a field battery, were next detailed to capture the enemy post at the Ring Contour overlooking the Mirpur Bridge. Night 10/11 September was selected for launching this action. Although the feature fell after a fierce hand-to-hand fighting, the withdrawing enemy destroyed the Mirpur Bridge - a task which was to have been carried out by the Indian troops. The enemy casualties were eight Other Ranks killed and forty wounded(50). Large quantities of ammunition and rations were again captured. On 12 September, patrols from the battalions found the post at Parni deserted and Mirpur clear of the enemy.

Next was the turn of Point 9013, held by two companies plus of 23 AK Battalion. The approaches to the position were heavily mined. On night 20/21 September, 4 Kumaon attacked the post and after three hours of intensive fighting secured the feature. Indian artillery was used to great effect, and heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy - 55 dead bodies, including one of an Officer, were counted at

the scene of action. Indian casualties were 5 killed and 2 Officers and 31 Other Ranks wounded(51). The capture of Point 9013 gave Indian troops complete domination of the Mirpur area up to Jura Bridge on the river Kishanganga.

Capture of Haji Pir Pass

The next main objective of Indian troops was to capture the Haji Pir Pass. In the scheme of Pakistani infiltration into Kashmir, Haji Pir was a vital link. All communication between the infiltrators in Uri-Punch area passed through it, and it was in a way the life-line for the saboteurs. The Pass was dominated by three neighbouring hill features - on the east by Bedori (3760 metres high), on the west by Sank (2895 metres) and Ledwali Gali (3140 metres) to the south-west. It was considered essential to seize these posts before proceeding to the Haji Pir Pass (2637 metres). Bedori is situated 14 km south-east of Uri and 4 km south of the cease-fire line. Haji Pir Pass is about 10 km south-west of Bedori.

The Haji Pir Operation involved the launching of a large scale pincer movement consisting of an offensive along the general axis Uri-Haji Pir Pass, in combination with a thrust from the south via the Punch-Kahuta approach. It was appreciated that the link-up between these forces would cut off all routes of approach into the crucial area of the bulge. 19 Infantry Division was made responsible for the thrust from the north, with Haji Pir Pass as the objective. 68 Infantry Brigade was placed under command of the formation for this task, and the operation was given the code name "OP BAKSHI". The following troops were placed under command 68 Infantry Brigade for this action:

- (a) 1 Para
- (b) 19 Punjab
- (c) 4 Rajput
- (d) 6 Jammu and Kashmir Rifles
- (e) 4 Sikh Light Infantry
- (f) 164 Field Regiment less one battery.
- (g) 144 Mountain Battery.
- (h) B Troop 39 Medium Regiment.
- (i) 18 Field Battery.
- (j) One section 4.2-inch mortars.

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The link-up action from the south was to be undertaken by 93 Infantry Brigade of the 25 Infantry Division, using a minimum of two battalions and was designated "OP FAULAD".

Estimated enemy dispositions facing the 68 Infantry Brigade advance were some 14 rifle companies or three and a half battalions, including 20 Punjab Battalion. Out of these, approximately one battalion was holding the area opposite the Indian picquet on Point 8370. Enemy defences were known to be well-prepared and properly coordinated. It was also known that the enemy had a large number of LMGs and MMGs in his defence positions.

The two-pronged pincer was to advance on the Haji Pir Pass in the following manner:-

- (1) Right Arm: Uri - Sank - Ledwali Gali - Haji Pir Pass.
- (2) Left Arm : Uri - Bedori - Kuthnar Di Gali - Kiran - Haji Pir.

The whole operation was planned in 3 Phases:

Phase I

- (a) Capture of Ring Counter and Pathra by 19 Punjab by 0100 hrs on 25 August.
- (b) Capture of Sank Ridge upto Ledwali Gali and Sawan Pathri by 1 Para by 0500 hrs on 25 August.

Phase II

- (a) Capture of Bedori and Kuthnar Di Gali by 19 Punjab by 0600 hrs on 25 August.
- (b) Securing the ring counters and capturing Haji Pir Pass by 4 Rajput by 1200 hrs on 25 August.

Phase III

Mopping up by 19 Punjab less company with under command one Coy 4 Rajput.

4 Sikh LI and 6 Jammu and Kashmir Rif were to provide troops for the firm bases.

H Hour - Not before 2000 hrs on 24 August 1965(52).


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The operations of the right and the left pincers were thus entrusted to 1 Para (Punjab) and 19 Punjab respectively. These battalions holding position in the Uri sector were to be relieved by 4 Sikh LI and 6 Jammu and Kashmir Rif on 23/24 and 22/23 night respectively for the initial attack to begin at 2150 hours on 24 August 1965. The 19 Punjab was relieved by 6 Jammu and Kashmir on 23rd night as per plan but owing to heavy rains the 4 Sikh LI could not relieve 1 Para in time to concentrate for the impending operation(53). This necessitated the postponement of operation by 24 hours. Further, 4 Rajput, which was to follow the 4 Sikh LI on its way to Uri, had to pass through village Lagma. Unfortunately, heavy rains flooded Uri nullah and made it impassable on foot. The Brigade Commander, realising that the news of advance of 4 Rajput towards Sank must have been communicated to the enemy by his agents in the Lagma village, changed his plan slightly. The Rajputs instead of being moved behind 1 Para in Sank area, were shifted to the area behind 19 Punjab.

Operation Bakshi

The Operation commenced at 2150 hours on 25 August 1965 after a delay of 24 hours. On the right wing, the attack was preceded by shelling of suspected enemy positions at Point 9591, Sawan Pathri and Agiwas in the vicinity of Sank. 1 Para launched the pre-dawn attack on Sank ridge in two-coy strength. 'A' coy followed by 'C' coy reached the base of Sank. The enemy held fire till the leading troops reached within 45 metres of the perimeter fencing and then opened up with all his weapons. No.3 Pl 'A' coy hit the alert enemy position head-on and suffered heavily. The battle continued within 45 metres of the fenced trenches of the enemy till 0930 hours when the effort was called off owing to heavy casualties, to be renewed again in the night. Thus, in spite of heavy artillery support, 1 Para could not reach the objective. The approach to the ridge was very difficult and the heavy rains of the previous night had made it very slippery.

Contact was broken on 26th morning with the enemy so as to prepare for the night attack again. The second attack was put at 2230 hours the same night. 'B' coy followed by 'D' coy moved forward towards Pt 9591. The enemy troops rushed from their trenches and opened up with MMG, LMG and other small arms. The Indians also opened up effective firing, forcing the enemy to fall back upon his trenches. By 0430 hours 27 August, 'B' coy had reached within 450 metres of the enemy positions, formed up in front



of the enemy positions on Sank, and charged frontally. In a daring platoon attack, enemy MMGs and LMGs were silenced. Thus beaten, the enemy withdrew to Sar feature leaving 16 dead behind, but managed to evacuate about 100 wounded(54).

Though the enemy had been eliminated from Sank, the position could not be secured owing to menacing fire from Sar. 'D' coy was, therefore, asked to clear the enemy from this feature. The coy soon captured Sar and advanced upon Ledwali Gali, where the enemy made the last stand to facilitate the withdrawal of his troops from the surrounding area by 1100 hours. 'B' coy on the other hand secured Sawan Pathri and Agiwas against minor opposition from the defending troops by 1400 hours. 'C' coy which had in the meantime reached Sank was ordered to clear area south of Sank, and it did it by last light.

At this stage, a small, self-contained, mixed column from 'A' and 'D' coys was formed under the determined leadership of Maj Ranjit Singh Dayal to advance to the Haji Pir Pass. The approach involved a climb of over 1220 metres, and it had to be done during the hours of darkness. The force starting from Ledwali Gali was to infiltrate through Hyderabad nullah on night of 27/28 August and capture ring contours 1194 and 1094 one after another. The column started descending, at 1530 hours on 27 August, from Ledwali Gali into the Hyderabad nullah along the spur, running south-west before climbing to the Pass. Soon, the enemy started MMG fire from the western shoulder of the Pass. Small arms fire from area east of Ledwali Gali was also met. The coy commander thereupon ordered the FOO to register the post proper and its eastern and western shoulders. The small arms menace was eliminated in a quick action by a platoon of the column. After silencing the enemy fire with heavy shelling, the column moved along the left bank of the Hyderabad nullah, alongside the hill, before crossing over to the pass side. About 1730 hours, it started raining heavily making the going very difficult(55). By 1900 hours the coy reached Hyderabad nullah. It was now completely dark. The commander decided to climb the pass. On the way, the Coy surrounded a house and captured one LMG and 9 rifles with 10 personnel of Azad Kashmir militia. At 0430 hours, the coy hit the old Uri-Punch road, about 10 km below the pass. Here the troops were given a much needed rest for two hours in a very cold and bitter morning before the final assault.

At 0700 hours, the column was again on the march. Moving alongside the road, it reached 700 metres short of the pass by 0900 hours. The enemy,

who had lost touch with the advancing coy the earlier evening following heavy rains and approaching night, appeared surprised to see the Indians right on the pass. They, however, opened up with MMG from the western shoulder of the pass and with LMG and rifle shots from the pass area itself. In the meantime fire was directed on the enemy targets and the coy commander ordered the two platoons to climb up on to the spur and assault enemy from the western side of the pass and then roll down to eliminate the LMGs on the pass. The enemy could not stand this daring day-light attack and withdrew in confusion to a feature to the west of the pass. Soon the LMG on the pass was silenced, and by 1000 hours on 28 August, the formidable pass fell to the column, and 1 Para was in complete control of the objective.

The enemy mounted a furious counter-attack on 29 August in a desperate bid to recapture it. However, the attack was repulsed. To consolidate its position, the battalion captured Ring Contour on 30 August and Point 8786 a day later. Maj R.S. Dayal, who had so ably led his troops in a series of brilliant actions culminating in the capture of the Pass, was awarded the MVC.

The advance on the left flank of the pass, however, did not go so well. At 'H' Hour, i.e. 2150 hours on 25 August, 19 Punjab started its advance to capture Bedori. In Phase I of its operation, which started in inclement weather conditions, no enemy resistance was met, and Point 10944, north of Pathra, and Pathra were secured by midnight. By 0430 hours of 26 August, 'C' and 'D' coys of the battalion were poised for attack on the massive Bedori hill to begin Phase II of the operation. But when just at the base, the battalion encountered heavy enemy MMG fire. Further, it was realised that approach to the objective, i.e. the ridge along which the troops were advancing, was extremely narrow with sheer drops on either side. Thus any advance from the north-west direction was considered almost impossible.

This failure of 19 Punjab led to the conclusion that the only way to reach Bedori lay through the Bedori springs in the north-east. But the employment of 19 Punjab in this newly discovered approach would have delayed the capture of Bedori by 36 hours, thus giving enemy enough time to reinforce Bedori and Haji Pir. With a view to securing the Bedori ridge quickly, 7 Bihar was called up to attack the post. 7 Bihar which had only one Coy to spare for the attack failed to achieve the target(56). An attempt by 4 Rajput from the north on 27 August was also foiled.

Finally, OC 19 Punjab volunteered to make another try to capture Bedori from the north-east approach through Kunrali, Gagarhill, Tilpatra, Jabar, Bedori Spring, and Bedori Pass. The battalion less 'A' coy started at 0500 hours on 28 August and reached Heman Buniyar by 0715 hours in transport. Thence it moved to Bedori springs, already secured by 7 Bihar, and concentrated there for the assault.

At 0330 hours on 29 August, the troops crossed the FUP for assault on Bedori, 3,760 metres above the sea level and 610 metres higher than the FUP. The dominating feature of Bedori was finally captured by 'B' and 'C' coys of 19 Punjab by 0600 hours. In this assault on Bedori, a 3.7 mountain gun played a significant part. On the 28th when the Punjabis planned to attack the Bedori Pass, they found that the enemy had built up stone 'sangars' at Bedori, taking advantage of the rocky nature of the feature. They, therefore, requested for a mountain gun which could destroy the sangars by direct shooting. This gun, which had arrived 30 minutes before the last light on 28 August, not only destroyed the enemy sangars, but also shattered his morale completely(57). By 29 August, 19 Punjab was again on the move to Kuthnar Di Gali and further on to Kiran. A link-up with 1 Para was effected on 1 September.

The battle for Haji Pir was a prestigious operation, and the Indian troops spared no effort to make it a great success. It was well planned and skilfully executed. The courage and determination of the commanders as well as the high morale of the troops ensured its success.

Operation Faulad

Between Punch and Kahuta there were many hill features which dominated the Punch-Haji Pir track. The enemy picquets on these features had cement emplacements for MMGs and shell proof bunkers. All the approaches to these posts were covered by MMGs, guns and mortars. 93 Infantry Brigade planned to achieve the Punch-Haji Pir link-up by capturing these picquets en route to Kahuta. Of these the most important were the Raja and Chand Tekri picquets, both formidable bastions of enemy defences, encircled with wire and mine obstacles.

93 Infantry Brigade, after an initial setback, launched its final assault northwards to establish the link-up. The main characteristics of 'OP Faulad' were the gallant actions that were fought for the capture of the Raja and Chand Tekri picquets, both of which were considered to be virtually impregnable. The massive features of Raja and Chand Tekri dominated

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most of the area, east of the Betar Nullah, along which ran a track that linked Punch with Haji Pir Pass. The enemy posts located on these features served as the main pivots and staging camps for all infiltrator activities in the Punch sector. The capture of these picquets was necessary, not only to seal off the Haji Pir area but also for the destruction of the two major bases of enemy operations.

On account of their vital importance both the posts were held in strength. The total opposition was estimated at a battalion less company, supported by 2x3.7-inch howitzers and 2x81 mm mortars. The Pakistanis were entrenched in shell-proof shelters, bristling with automatic weapons. The picquets were ringed with barbed wires and mines. In short, they were miniature of fortresses that challenged the best in any unit.

On night 5/6 September 1965, a simultaneous attack was launched on Raja and Chand Tekri by 2 Sikh and 3 Dogra respectively. The battle opened with an intense artillery bombardment, but it had little effect on the build-up positions. The approach to the objectives also lay along steep and slippery slopes, and very often the assaulting troops had to crawl on all fours. As they approached the posts they were met by heavy automatic fire. The assaulting troops wavered momentarily, bewildered by the intensity of enemy fire. However, inspired by bold leadership, the leading troops quickly recovered to dash through the mines and wires and were soon locked in a grim hand-to-hand battle for over two hours before the picquets fell. The defenders fought with determination. The garrison at Raja picquet fought to the last man. The casualties on the Indian side were heavy too. Amongst the dead were Major G.C. Verma and Captain G.S. Bawa, of the Dogras, who fell while personally leading the assaulting wave. The intrepid commanding officer of 2 Sikh, Lt Col N.N. Khanna, was also fatally wounded as he led his battalion into the attack. For this act of bravery Lt Col N.N. Khanna was awarded MVC(58).

With the fall of Raja and Chand Tekri, Gibraltar Force's back in this sector was completely broken and thereafter Indian troops had no difficulty in mopping up and liquidating the remaining pockets of resistance in the area. However, the enemy fought desperate rearguard actions to extricate his troops locked up in "the Bulge". The final link-up was completed with the capture of Kahuta on 10 September 1965. And with that the Indian security forces closed the mouth of the Bulge and sealed the Haji Pir sector. All enemy resistance east of the Betar Nullah ceased.

Helicopter Support

During the dark days of Operation Gibraltar, a helicopter task force, initially consisting of two Squadrons, but later raised to three, was formed to assist in fighting against the Pak armed infiltrators who had entered Jammu and Kashmir in August 1965. This task force was mainly based in Srinagar, and it carried out 79 offensive sorties against the infiltrators from 20 August 1965, till the end of the hostilities. These IAF helicopters, suitably modified, bombed and strafed the positions of infiltrators in many areas, especially Haji Pir Pass, Tangdhar, Badgam, Mandi, Budil, and the hills around Gurais. Although these offensive sorties could not inflict much damage on the enemy, they certainly exerted a great demoralising effect on the Pakistani guerillas. The helicopters also played an important logistical role by dropping approximately 92,000 kg of essential stores and urgently needed ammunition to army columns operating in difficult areas, lacking suitable ground communication. They also performed a useful task by speedily evacuating critical casualties from inaccessible areas, flying a total of 198 trips, each loaded to maximum capacity. Some of these helicopters, including three Alouettes, were used by senior army officers to get a good view of the areas of operations, so that quick decisions could be taken to plan and execute counter-offensives against the infiltrators(59). Thus, the Indian Air Force contributed its air effort, limited to helicopter sorties only, till 1 September 1965, when its other aircraft also joined the fray.

THE UN ROLE

Pakistan consistently disowned any connection with OP Gibraltar, and Z.A. Bhutto, the then Foreign Minister, blandly denied Pakistani participation or direction of the guerilla invasion of Kashmir. His protestation that the raiders were not Pakistanis, but local "freedom fighters" was, however, exposed by the UN disclosures. The official reports of General R.H. Nimmo, Chief of UN Military Observer Group in Kashmir indicted Pakistan for committing aggression in Kashmir by sending across the cease-fire line thousands of armed infiltrators. The UN Secretary-General, U. Thant, in his report to the Security Council pointed his finger at Pakistan as the party responsible for the flare-up. In his report, dated 3 September 1965, to the Security Council, he said: "General Nimmo has indicated to me that the series of violations that began on 5 August were to a considerable extent in subsequent days in the form of

armed men, generally not in uniform, crossing the CFL from the Pakistan side for the purpose of armed action on the Indian side. This is a conclusion reached by General Nimmo on the basis of investigations by the United Nations Observers, in the light of the extensiveness and character of the raiding activities and their proximity to the CFL, even though in most cases the actual identity of those engaging in the armed attacks on the Indian side of the Line and their actual crossing of it could not be verified by direct observation or evidence"(60).

U. Thant added: "As regards violations by artillery, there was heavy and prolonged artillery fire across the Line from the Pakistan side in the Chhamb-Bhimber area on 15-16 August, and on 19 and 26 August the town of Punch was shelled from the Pakistan side, some of these shells hitting the building occupied by UN Military Observers"(61).

According to the Chief Military Observer's report to the UN Secretary-General, dated 30 August 1965, between 5 August (the date on which the infiltrators began to pour into Jammu and Kashmir) and 30 August, there were 23 cases of violations. Of these, no less than 19 were committed by the Pakistanis on the Indian side of the cease-fire line in which the raiders attacked the Indian army positions and patrols. Only four out of the total 23 incidents were attributed to Indians, and occurred during August 12-24 by way of retaliation, and this was openly acknowledged before the UN Observers(62).

In discussing those incidents occurring during the initial phases of the guerilla invasion between 5 August and 10 August, General Nimmo established several basic facts. He demonstrated, for example, that a number of attacks were made, that they occurred over 400 miles apart along the CFL, and that, in at least one incident, a soldier of the regular Azad Kashmir infantry was involved. One of the most serious attacks, on the night of 7/8 August, resulted in the raiders' capture of the town of Mandi, near Punch, in the west-central area and its occupation for four days. General Nimmo's report further said: "The number of raiders was estimated to exceed 1,000. The available evidence indicated that some of the raiders must have come from across the CFL. As of August 24, the raiders were still holding some Indian picquets (outposts) north of Mandi...."(63). Another attack in the Kargil sector, on the northern stretch of the CFL, was verified and the dress of one dead raider, as per the report, "was similar to the uniform of Pakistan frontier corps of scouts", a unit controlled by the Pakistan Army. At another point

near Baramula, on the road to Srinagar, attacks on the night of August 7/8 were confirmed. "The observers interviewed one of the captured raiders, who stated that he was a soldier of the 16 Azad Kashmir Infantry battalion and that the raiding party was composed of about 300 soldiers of his battalion and 100 'Mujahids' (armed civilians trained in guerilla tactics). United Nations Observers noted that some of the materials said to have been abandoned by the raiders were manufactured in Pakistan"(64).

The Secretary-General noted in his report to the Security Council on 3 September, that the UN group preferred to report its conclusions in secret, and consequently, the majority of investigated incidents during the Indo-Pakistan conflict were not disclosed publicly. He further said that he sounded out both governments in August on the advisability of publishing the reports available up to that time. India voiced no objection, but "The Government of Pakistan was strongly negative"(65). Hence, U. Thant decided to withhold publication of reports temporarily, and they did not become public until September 1965. The Secretary-General said he concluded "that a public statement by the Secretary-General at that time would serve no constructive purpose and might well do more harm than good. My first and primary objective has to be to see the fighting end rather than indicating or denouncing any party for starting and continuing it. I thought it might be helpful to make another quiet effort toward achieving observance of the cease-fire through a new approach to the two Governments"(66). However, Russell Brines, in his book, The Indo-Pakistan Conflict, has pointed out that "prompt publication of the UN findings obviously would have helped to clarify the situation at a particularly critical period. The result might have been an entirely different global picture of the conflict and less criticism of India for her share in extending it. In this respect, the UN failed again to serve as an impartial fact-finding body at a time when these services were urgently needed. Another consequence was further encouragement for disguised warfare. India was unsuccessful in subsequent attempts to induce the United Nations to brand Pakistan as an aggressor"(67).

The publication or the disclosure of UN findings in mid-August would have resulted in the loss of face for Pakistan for its disguised aggression, and might have prevented the large-scale hostilities that followed. Opinion in India contended that suppression of the reports encouraged Pakistan to embark on intensifying and extending the Pak aggression.

WHY "GIBRALTAR" FAILED

Although the infiltrators did succeed in tying down a large number of India's security forces and created a situation of great concern, they, by and large, did not succeed in their mission. Possible reasons are:

The political atmosphere inside Jammu and Kashmir was misjudged by Pakistan. Pakistan had expected substantial help from the Kashmiri Muslims. The infiltrators got minimal support and sympathy from locals and hardly any open support as was expected, except in some outlying areas, particularly near the cease-fire line. The people of Kashmir refused to be taken in by communal propaganda, launched in full force, by the infiltrators and Pakistan and the so-called 'Azad Kashmir' Radio. Pakistan's anti-India propaganda made little impact on the majority of the Kashmiris. Even the pro-Pakistani political parties at that time kept themselves on the fence and did not come out in open support of the infiltrators.

Pakistan Army Officers have openly debated these points now, and pointed out that no Kashmiri leader had been taken into confidence, to preserve secrecy of Operation Gibraltar. So they were taken by surprise and gave no help to the infiltrators. On the other hand, if they had been informed in advance, Pakistan feared that the Kashmiri leaders would inform the Indian authorities(68). So, in effect, the Kashmiris were to be 'liberated' even if they did not want it.

Morale of the Mujahids and Razakars, who formed about 70 per cent of the Force, seemed to have been affected by their involuntary role or forced conscription. There were a large number of desertions amongst them, particularly in the Northern area, and the Indian forces sealed the cease-fire line, making their return difficult. The infiltrators lost contact with their central base camp and found themselves lost in a hostile land.

Pakistan had overestimated the capacity of the guerillas and underestimated the force and capacity of the Indian security personnel. Inadequate administrative cover to the infiltrators might also be responsible for their low morale and desertions. Even during the period of their peak strength, their efforts were inadequate both in numbers and determination.

Induction of the second wave of infiltrators was delayed, to await results of the first wave. Induction of waves of infiltrators at shorter

intervals would have caused more strain on the already stretched resources of the Indian security forces and the results could have been better from Pakistan's point of view.

Guerilla warfare needs an adequate cadre of highly motivated leaders and men. Possibly, in this case these were not available either in requisite number or quality. A basic fault in the plan was that the guerillas were outsiders. A guerilla movement can succeed only if the local people support it. In this case, the locals had no affinity with most of the infiltrators from Pakistan. Most of the Pakistani guerillas did not know the Kashmiri language. While they used to eat bread, the Kashmiris' staple food was rice. Again, the Mujahids were not aware that the metric system of weights and measures had been introduced in Jammu and Kashmir long ago. So, when they went to any shop in Jammu and Kashmir, their lack of knowledge of the metric system would at once prove that they were Pakistanis. In many cases, the Kashmiris gave away the guerillas to the authorities.

Although the infiltration operations were backed by a cry for Jehad, enough motivation did not seem to have been provided to the infiltrators. Majority of them, apparently, were misled regarding the nature of their job. But most important, the Indian security forces dealt with the infiltrators effectively.

However, the Pakistani guerillas had achieved at least one indirect success: They tied down about 4 Indian Divisions in Jammu and Kashmir in mopping up the Pak infiltrators during the whole of September 1965. Otherwise, had these Indian Divisions been available to fight the Pakistanis in the Punjab Theatre, the fate of the Pak army would have been really dismal. In the final analysis, Operation Gibraltar led to the Indo-Pak War of September 1965, upsetting all Pak calculations that India would not violate the International Boundary and start a war on the Punjab front.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. From Official Records.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Brines, p.301.

It is interesting to learn from a Pakistani why the infiltrators were given the name of Gibraltar Force. "Most muslims know about the famed Arab General Abdur Rahman Tariq whose forces landed on the Jablul Tariq (Gibraltar) and the Commander asked his men to burn the boats. When his men asked him how could they return to Arabia, their homeland after the boats were burnt, he told that now Spain and Gibraltar were their homeland and there was no question of their returning to former homeland" - Mir Abdul Aziz writing in "The Muslim" (Islamabad) of 9 September 1986, reproduced in February 1987 issue of "Strategic Digest" published by Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi.

The name "Gibraltar Force" reveals the intention of Pakistani Maj Gen Akhtar Malik and his men to take over Kashmir, just as Gen Tariq had taken over Spain and crushed the local population.

5. From Official Records.
6. Brines, p.302.
7. From Official Records.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Appendix 'A' - Text of proposed proclamation.
14. From Official Records.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Mankekar, D.R., p.64.
19. From Official Records.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. In this relief operation 4 Sikh LI had to follow a circuitous route to avoid Lagma village on the actual route. This village was supposed to be infested with enemy agents and there was a genuine fear that any move made through the village would become known to the enemy. Further, the move was to be made at night to keep utmost secrecy.
54. From Official Records.
55. This in a way proved to be a blessing in disguise. It firstly helped in concealing the direction of the approach of the column and secondly per force broke contact with the enemy. As a result of this an element of surprise was introduced in Indian assault on Haji Pir.
56. From Official Records.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Report of the UN Secretary-General, dated 3 September 1965, to the Security Council.
61. Ibid.
62. Mankekar, D.R., pp.82-83.
63. Second Report of the UN Secretary-General, dated 6 September 1965, to the Security Council; Brines, p.305.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Brines, p.314.
68. For details, please see the most interesting debate in "The Muslim" of Islamabad in Sep-Oct 1986 and pages 36-37 of "My Version" by Gen Musa, who was the C-in-C of the Pakistan Army in 1965, reproduced in Strategic Digest of Feb 1987, published by the IDSA, New Delhi.

CHAPTER - V

"GRAND SLAM" AND XV CORPS RESPONSE

Operation Gibraltar, having failed, Pakistan put in her regular forces to the battle. Pakistan had already prepared itself for such an eventuality, after very careful planning.

OPERATION ABLAZE

But before we discuss the Indian reaction, military planning and deployment of forces in August 1965, something should be said about Operation Ablaze of May-June 1965. This code-name was given to the retaliatory measures taken by the Indian Army along the Indo-West Pakistan border after the Pak attacks against Indian posts in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965(1). Under Operation Ablaze, all formations earmarked for Punjab were put on 'red alert'.

Under XI Corps, 15 Inf Div was concentrated at Amritsar, and its units were moved to their battle locations, while 4 and 7 Inf Divs were given other sectors, with HQs at Fazilka and Bhikhiwind respectively. On 6 May, these divisions were ordered to complete all defence preparations including laying of defensive and tactical mine-fields. This was an extreme step as laying of such extensive mine-fields in Indian territory especially in the intensely cultivated Punjab, was something that had not been thought of before. The Divisional Commanders were not informed officially, but from civilian sources it was learnt that on 29 April, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri had given his approval for military action against Pakistan at a time and place to be chosen by the Army, and that General Chaudhuri had indicated that offensive operations could start by 10 May(2).

A conference of the Divisional Commanders was held at the Corps HQ without notice. There, no information about the intentions and strength of the enemy was given, except that one of the Pak Armoured Divisions was located in the Raiwind area. The Corps Commander, Lt Gen J.S. Dhillon, did not indicate his or any higher plan in detail. However, the Ichhogil Canal from Malakapur to Ganda Singhwala was divided into three parts, and each of the three Divisions was given a stretch of it to be secured. 15 Inf Div was given the tasks to secure the east bank of Ichhogil Canal from Malakapur to Dahuri and to open the Grand Trunk road axis from Wagah to Dograi. Additional tasks given were to secure intact, if possible, the road bridge over the Ichhogil Canal on the GT road, the railway bridge across the canal and the Jallo link

bridge. Major General Niranjan Prasad, GOC 15 Inf Div, carried out several ground and one air reconnaissance of the area to have a clear idea of the terrain.

During OP Ablaze, XI Corps had an excellent opportunity to play war games to evolve the plan of advancing to the Ichhogil Canal. The working drawings of the Canal were made available to the Corps Commander. Being trained in irrigation engineering in Roorkee, the Corps Commander could visualise the various works on the Canal and assess their military implications. However, Lt Gen J.S. Dhillon did not disclose the details of the Canal to his formation commanders. He instructed all Commanders down to the level of Lt Cols about the essentials of their roles, so that they could have the opportunity to rehearse them(3). But by the middle of May, it became clear that the Indian Army would not be required to take any offensive action against Pakistan, as talks had started for a cease-fire in the Rann of Kutch. The Army Chief visited Amritsar in mid-June 1965, and held a conference at the 15 Div HQs where the Chief of Staff, Western Command, and the Corps Cdr were present. After the conference, General Chaudhuri remarked: "All my experience teaches me never to start an operation with the crossing of an opposed water obstacle; as far as I am concerned, I have ruled out Lahore or a crossing at Dera Baba Nanak". On 30 June 1965, there was an agreement that the Kutch dispute was to be referred for arbitration. Under this, both sides agreed to carry out certain troop withdrawals. Thus, "OP Ablaze", which had "taken off to an excellent start, ended up as a damp squib"(4). The Indian troops dismantled their defences and lifted the mines - a most unpleasant task - in which a number of casualties were suffered by Indian troops and civilians due to mine explosions. In July 1965, the armies of both sides stood down, and formations returned to their peace stations, except 1 Armd Div, which withdrew to an interim location in the Jalandhar area. Pakistan also kept her two Armd Divs within striking distance inside Pak Punjab.

Pak Plans

Gradually, appreciations and operational plans and orbats were evolved on both sides, leading to September 1965 operations (OP Riddle). According to information then available with Pakistan, the strength of the Indian Army was estimated as equivalent of four infantry divisions and strong civil armed forces in Kashmir, reinforced by additional brigades and battalions; one armoured division, one independent armoured brigade, nine infantry divisions, and three

independent infantry brigades against West Pakistan; about one infantry division and one independent infantry brigade poised against East Pakistan; and about two infantry divisions from the two Corps facing the Chinese in NEFA and Siliguri areas(5).

The overall Pak plan of action envisaged infiltration of irregulars into Jammu and Kashmir on a wide front, use of the Special Service Group personnel against pre-determined objectives in that state, and also employment of her regular forces to support the irregulars, when necessary, to fight a conventional military action. Pakistan specifically planned the disruption of the Indian lines of communication from Srinagar to Leh and the isolation of Kargil for its subsequent elimination by Northern Scouts and Karakoram Scouts in conjunction with trained SSG commandos; diversionary thrusts via the Nastachun Pass and Tutmari Gali towards the Valley combined with infiltration raids through the Northern Gallies to sever communication to Tithwal; an offensive against Akhnur-Naushahra sector for snapping Indian lines of communication towards Rajauri and Punch; and disruption of the primary Indian lines of communication from Pathankot, to isolate Jammu and Kashmir theatre.

In Punjab and Rajasthan, Pakistan had adopted an aggressive defensive posture by moving the major elements of 1 Armd Div (approximately two Patton regiments and one Chaffee regiment) into Lahore area, and most of 7 Inf Div from Peshawar to the Lyallpur-Sheikhupura area, with one of its Brigades stationed near the Marala Headworks. Two armoured regiments (11 Cavalry and 13 Lancers) from 6 Armd Div were at Shakargarh Salient and the remainder of the Division was concentrated in general area Sialkot-Gujranwala(6). Lt General Harbakhsh Singh had appreciated that these Pakistani tactical moves were undertaken to deny access via Dera Baba Nanak Bridge by effectively sealing this approach; to ensure security of the Lahore sector by holding in strength the Ichhogil Canal and the Upper Bari Doab Canal; and to mount an offensive in Khem Karan sector where the alignment of the various canals and distributaries permitted a thrust in Punjab from the direction of Kasur(7).

Gen Musa, the Pak Army Chief, made his own appreciation. He thought that in the event of war, India would try swift move to destroy the fighting power of Pakistan and capture territory in West Pakistan as well. For this, he thought, India would seek a break-through in the Chenab-Ravi corridor by attacking Sialkot with an Infantry Division plus

supporting arms from the direction of Jammu; cut the Grand Trunk Road between Wazirabad and Gujranwala and attack Lahore along the two main approaches - Amritsar-Wagah and Harike-Lahore, with the intention of capturing Lahore and the Ravi bridge, or failing that, at least to contain Lahore. Simultaneously, India was expected to break-through between Bedian and Kasur to outflank Lahore from the south, attack Kasur from Ferozepur across the headworks to divert Pak attention, threaten Sulaimanke and the headworks, and launch diversionary moves in Sind to extend the frontage, disperse Pak troops and prevent Pakistan from diverting resources to other areas(8).

As far as Pak-Occupied Kashmir was concerned, Pakistan concluded that India would plan to launch the main attack against Muzaffarabad through Uri and Tithwal; advance from Punch towards Hajira and then fan out in the direction of Rawalakot or Palandari; and protect the Chenab bridge by strongly holding the Chhamb-Jaurian-Akhnur approach(9).

After carefully considering the likely Indian moves, Pakistan decided to deploy the bulk of the army (two Armoured Divisions, three Infantry Divisions, including 11 ad hoc Division, and three Independent Infantry Brigades) in Punjab, where the main battle was expected to be fought. It would hold the Indian Army opposite Lahore and Kasur along the BRB Canal, south of Ravi river, and mount a counter-offensive from an area further south, for which the force had been concentrated at a suitable place. Sialkot and Lahore were to be held at all costs; and Pak army would hold POK and to operate from there in the Valley, mainly with the AKRF Division located there, and plan the defence of East Pakistan. Based on this strategy, the operational plan of Pakistan was to hold Sialkot-Pasrur sector and Jassar with one Infantry Division and one Infantry Brigade respectively; move 6 Armd Div to Pasrur from its forward concentration area near Gujranwala; defend Lahore with one Infantry Division, basing its defences on the BRB Canal; deploy the ad hoc 11 Div in the Bedian-Kasur sector to repel the Indian attack and prevent it from securing canal crossings; engage the Indian army operating in the Fazilka area and protect Sulaimanke headworks with one Infantry Brigade; launch the main counter-offensive force, consisting of 1 Armd Div and 7 Inf Div, from its concentration area; and check Indian advance in Sind(10).

This plan was expected to enable Pakistan to keep the Indian Army heavily engaged in West Pakistan so that adequate force could not be spared by India against East Pakistan. By defending at least four

RESTRICTED

vi.	HQ NO.3 Sector	Six AK Bns (1,8,11,18,19,21)	Kotli
vii.	HQ No.4 Sector	102 Inf Bde (Three Inf Bns)	Bhimber
		Three AK Bns (2,5,14)	
b)	Chhamb-Sialkot- Shakargarh Sector	HQ IV Corps	Sialkot
		6 Armd Div	Sialkot
		7 Inf Div	Sialkot
		15 Inf Div	Sialkot
		IV Corps Arty	Road Wazirabad - Sialkot
c)	Lahore-Kasur- Sulaimanke Sector	HQ 1 Corps	Sheikhupura
		1 Armd Div	Lahore - Sheikhupura- Raiwind
		HQ 10 Inf Div	Lahore
		114 Inf Bde	Wagah
		103 Inf Bde	Lahore - Khaira axis
		22 Inf Bde	Kasur
		105 Inf Bde Gp	Sulaimanke
		106 (Indep) Inf Bde	Harbanspura (Lahore)
		1 Corps Arty	Lahore
		11 Inf Div	Bedian area
d)	Sind:		
	i. Opposite Rajasthan	52 Inf Bde	Naya Chor
	ii. Opposite Kutch	HQ 8 Inf Div	Badin
		6 Inf Bde	Vingoor
		51 Inf Bde	Rahim Ki Bazar(12)

Indian Preparations

So far, the Indian plans, in case of hostilities with Pakistan, were mainly defensive. But in view of Pak intentions the urgent need was felt for undertaking some offensive action aimed at both the destruction of Pakistani forces and the acquisition of territory, so that India would be in a better bargaining position. Any attack by Pakistan in collusion with China was unlikely. But China could help Pakistan during the war against India in some way. The Indian forces were built up with this view. Accordingly, Western Command was allotted the general tasks of -

- (a) defending Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Rajasthan against Pakistan's regular or irregular forces;
- (b) defending Ladakh and Sugar Sector (Himachal Pradesh area bordering China) against aggression from China; and
- (c) launching an offensive into Pakistan.

The tasks in particular allotted to it in Jammu and Kashmir were to ensure the security of Srinagar and the Valley, inflict the maximum attrition on infiltrators between Akhnur and Punch, and to protect the line of communication Pathankot-Udhampur-Srinagar-Leh. In Punjab, Western Command was to hold ground suitable for a defensive position as close to the International Border as possible, while in Rajasthan the task was to deny the enemy the Hyderabad(Sind) - Jodhpur Railway east of Jasai and to undertake limited raids across the border.

The limited offensive action, to be taken on instructions from the Army Headquarters, included a raid from Sulaimanke towards Montgomery, an advance from Ferozepur-Khem Karan to the line of Upper Bari Doab Canal, and an advance to the Ichhogil Canal along the Grand Trunk road from Amritsar and along Khalra-Lahore road. In addition, it could establish a bridgehead across the Ravi in area Dera Baba Nanak-Pathankot and secure the line Dhallewali-Wuhilam-Daska-Mandhali. There was no possibility of getting a long notice of any major aggression by Pakistan, but as the enemy's logistical preparations for a major offensive were difficult to conceal, a ten days' notice was expected. Taking note of Pakistan's aggression in the Kutch and large scale infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir in August 1965, the Indian Army reviewed its plan against Pakistan and issued Operation Instruction No.36 on 9 August 1965, which laid down that on orders

from the Army Headquarters, the Western Command was to take simultaneous action to -

- i. secure the line of Ichhogil Canal from north of Grand Trunk Road to Bedian;
- ii. establish a bridgehead across river Ravi in area between Mumka to Gil;
- iii. carry out a limited advance towards Sialkot, and establish a brigade less a battalion across the border in area north of Zafarwal and Shakargarh, and
- iv. capture Tanda.

On completion of the above tasks, preparations were to be made for one of the following:

- (a) securing the line Dhallewali-Wuhilam-Daska-Mandhali;
- (b) continuing the advance on Lahore(13).

There was no change in the tasks allotted in Jammu and Kashmir or Rajasthan Sector. But it was clarified that the Western Command could count on a notice of only five days (instead of 10 days envisaged earlier) as far as Pakistan was concerned, that it be prepared to take offensive action within 48 hrs, and that there was to be no concentration of formations nor any defensive phase to cover such concentration. The forces allotted to Western Command for these tasks were(14):-

- | | |
|-----------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. <u>HQ 1 Corps</u> | Lt Gen P.O. Dunn |
| 14 Inf Div | Maj Gen R.K. Ranjit Singh |
| 2. <u>HQ XI Corps</u> | Lt Gen J.S. Dhillon |
| 4 Mtn Div | Maj Gen Gurbaksh Singh, MVC |
| 7 Inf Div | Maj Gen H.K. Sibal, MVC |
| 15 Inf Div | Maj Gen Niranjana Prasad |
| 2 Indep Armd Bde | Brig T.K. Theogaraj |
| 3. <u>HQ XV Corps</u> | Lt Gen Kashmir Singh Katoch, MC |
| 3 Inf Div | Maj Gen G.B.S. Singh, MC |
| 19 Inf Div | Maj Gen S.S. Kalaan, MVC, MC |

25 Inf Div	Maj Gen Amreek Singh
26 Inf Div (4 bdes)	Maj Gen M.L. Thapan
68 Inf Bde Gp	Brig S.C. Bakshi, MVC, Vr C
121 Inf Bde Gp	Brig V.K. Ghai
191 Inf Bde Gp	Brig Manmohan Singh
4. 1 Armd Div	Maj Gen Rajinder Singh Sparrow, MVC
5. 28 Inf Bde	Brig Pritpal Singh
6. 41 Mtn Bde	Brig M.R. Rajwade
7. 67 Inf Bde	Brig Bant Singh

XV Corps Tasks and Orbat

When in the last week of August, reports were coming on Pakistani build-up opposite Chhamb, Lt Gen K.S. Katoch, MC, GOC XV Corps, allotted the following tasks to the various formations under its command:-

Tasks in general

- (a) To hold defensive positions on the Indian side of CFL and International Border for the defence of Jammu and Kashmir State.
- (b) To destroy all Pak/POK infiltrators and inflict maximum attrition on any further Pak infiltration.

Tasks in particular

121 Inf Bde Gp

To defend Dras and Kargil.

19 Inf Div

(a) To defend the following:-

- i. Gulmarg.
- ii. Uri Heights.
- iii. Tutmari Gali.
- iv. Tangdhar - Nastachun Pass.

- v. Northern Gallies.
 - vi. Razdhainangan Pass.
- (b) To deny Northern and Western approaches into the Valley.

SRI Force

- (a) To ensure the safety of Srinagar town and its suburbs by both close defence and vigorous aggressive action against parties operating in its area of responsibility.
- (b) To be responsible for the ground defence of Srinagar air-field.
- (c) To be prepared to deny Coji La.

25 Inf Div

(a) To defend the following:-

- i. Punch.
- ii. Mendhar.
- iii. Bhimber Gali.
- iv. Jhangar.
- v. Naushera.

(b) To prevent the enemy from enlarging the corridor Sialkot-Mandi.

191 Inf Bde Gp

(a) To hold the following:-

- i. Kalidhar Ridge.
- ii. Area Laleali.

(b) To defend Akhnur. Akhnur Bridge was vital.

26 Inf Div

(a) To defend Jammu and Samba.

(b) Provide ground defence to 43 SU and 628 SU at Jammu.

Offensive tasks

Following offensive tasks would be carried out:-

(a) 19 Inf Div

To capture Badori and Haji Pir Pass.

(b) 25 Inf Div

To advance towards Haji Pir Pass along Ridge and link up with 19 Inf Div.

(a) 26 Inf Div would be prepared to carry out tasks allotted by HQ 1 Corps.

(b) 121 Inf Bde Gp would be prepared to carry out raid in area Marol along axis Gurgurdu-Marol.

(c) 191 Inf Bde Gp would be prepared to capture area Batala Ridge(15).

Detailed instructions for offensive tasks were to be issued personally to GOCs/Comdrs depending on how the situation developed. However, plans to capture suitable ground opposite CFL to improve defences was to be borne in mind.

To accomplish these tasks, XV Corps was allotted the following teeth arm units:-

19 Inf Div

(a) HQ 19 Inf Div Maj Gen S.S. Kalaan

(b) HQ 68 Inf Bde Brig S.C. Bakshi

1 Para

19 Punjab

4 Rajput

6 JAK Rif

(c) HQ 104 Inf Bde Brig B.C. Chauhan

1 Sikh

2 Rajput

4 Kumaon

8 Kumaon

3/8 GR

(d) HQ 161 Inf Bde Brig M.K. Balachandran
7 Maratha
20 Maratha
6 Dogra
4 Sikh LI
6 Bihar
7 Bihar

(e) HQ 268 Inf Bde Brig S.N. Antia
6 Guards
3 Sikh
3 JAK Rif
2 J&K Militia
13 J&K Militia
ITB Force (on arr)

Armr

One tp CIH

Arty

7 Fd Regt
164 Fd Regt
37 Lt Regt
Two Comp Mtn Btys
one Med Bty

25 Inf Div

(a) HQ 25 Inf Div Maj Gen Amreek Singh
(b) HQ 62 Mtn Bde Brig H.C. Gahlaut
2 Dogra
14 Kumaon
4/5 GR
3/11 GR
11 J&K Militia

(c) HQ 80 Inf Bde Brig U.B.S. Verma

1 Madras

5 Sikh LI

2 Bihar

4/3 GR

4/8 GR

9 J&K Militia less one coy

(d) HQ 93 Inf Bde Brig Zora Singh

i. 7 Madras

8 Grenadiers

3 Raj Rif

3 Rajput

7 Sikh

3 Dogra

ii. 2 Sikh - Temp allotted for special task.

(e) HQ 120 Inf Bde Brig Bharat Singh

22 Maratha

14 Jat

2 Garh Rif

10 Mahar

Arty

(a) 23 Comp Mtn Regt

52 Comp Mtn Regt less two btys

42 Fd Regt

169 Fd Regt

31 Lt Regt

one sec 39 Med Regt

(b) 163 Fd Regt. Temp allotted, at 6 hrs notice to move back to 26 Inf Div.

26 Inf Div

(a) HQ 26 Inf Div Maj Gen M.L. Thapan

(b) HQ 19 Inf Bde Brig Aban Naidu

14 Dogra

8 JAK Rif

2/1 GR

(c) HQ 162 Inf Bde Brig R.S. Sheoran

6 Jat

7 Jat

1 Sikh LI

(d) HQ 168 Inf Bde Brig A.K. Luthra, MC

9 Mahar

5/4 GR

Armr

18 CAV

62 CAV

Arty

13 Fd Regt

168 Fd Regt

38 Med Regt

126 Div Loc Bty

SRI Force

(a) HQ SRI Force Maj Gen Umrao Singh

(b) HQ 163 Inf Bde Brig G.S. Kale

1 Maratha

2/9 GR

(c) HQ 31 Comn
Z Sub Area Brig A.J.R. Dyer

8 J&K Militia less one coy

(d) HQ J&K Militia Brig Hardit Singh

12 J&K Militia less two coys

Armr

One Sqn CIH less tp

Arty

25 LAA Regt less one bty.

HQ 121 Inf Bde Gp Brig V.K. Ghai

1 Guards

17 Punjab

1 J&K Militia

Two coys 12 J&K Militia

Arty

85 Lt Regt less bty.

HQ 191 Inf Bde Gp Brig Manmohan Singh

(a) 9 Punjab

6 Rajput

6 Sikh LI

3 Mahar

3 J&K Militia

(b) 15 Kumaon - Available for 26 Inf Div at 6 Hrs notice.

Armr

B Sqn 20 L

Arty

14 Fd Regt

39 Med Regt less bty and one sec

85 Lt Bty

HQ XV Corps Arty Bde

Brig Surat Singh

27 LAA Regt

No.2 Air OP Flt

Sta HQ Udhampur

One coy 8 J&K Militia

One coy 9 J&K Militia

Four coys PAP

Corps res

HQ 41 Mtn Bde

Brig M.R. Rajwade

3 Kumaon

6/5 GR

1/8 GR(16)

Pak Offensive Against Chhamb

With the failure of the Operation Gibraltar, the first phase of Pak aggression in Jammu and Kashmir had ended. But the guerilla threat continued. Large number of infiltrators were still present in the Valley and their comrades were operating on the northern front and in Jammu. In an effort to seal the bases from where the infiltrators sneaked into Jammu and Kashmir territory, Indian forces were advancing on Haji Pir Pass to effect a link up between those advancing from Uri and those advancing from Punch. Pakistan feared that after this link-up the Indian army would push westward, threatening the whole of Pak-Occupied Kashmir. This limited military operation also threatened the road communications channelling infiltration into northern Kashmir.

Pakistan then decided to undertake the second phase of the operation to sever Kashmir from India. This was given the name - 'Operation Grand Slam'. According to Brig Gulzar Ahmed (Retd), "As a result of Indian offensive in Kashmir, the President of Pakistan in consultation with the C-in-C, Pakistan Army, decided to undertake offensive operations and to attack the enemy in Chhamb and Jaurian"(17). This major attack was intended to capture or destroy the Akhnur bridge, lying 40 km from the CFL. This would have cut off Naushahra, Rajauri and Punch from Jammu and Pathankot, as the Jammu-Rajauri road passed over

this bridge. Consequently, the Indian forces, stationed in the north-western sectors of the front, would have been isolated. After this a second tank thrust would have been made towards Jammu which was only about 30 km from Akhnur. Had Jammu also fallen to the invading forces, the land communication with the Indian forces stationed in Jammu and Kashmir would have been snapped, and these forces isolated. With Jammu in his hands Ayub could have dictated terms.

This was a grand plan. It was meticulously planned and well executed to some extent. The Chhamb-Jaurian sector, chosen by Pakistan for launching the massive offensive with a powerful armour-cum-infantry force, was bounded in the West by the CFL and in the south by mostly flat fields upto the international border. The Kalidhar range formed its northern bound, and the river Manawar Tawi was the only water-obstacle in this sector. However, this river was only a partial tank obstacle and was fordable during dry weather. India had no anti-tank defences there, and the lay of the land also restricted her use of tanks, whereas Pak armour had freedom of Manoeuvre in its approach to Indian defences. It was the most suitable sector in Jammu and Kashmir for the application of Pakistan's heavy striking power. The terrain favoured the thrust and it had short lines of communication with Pakistan's bases - Sialkot and Kharian. "From the Indian side, the terrain was unfavourable. The 180-kilometre line of communication consisted of a single road from Pathankot. Running close to the Indo-Pak border at some places, it was vulnerable. The bridge over the Chenab at Akhnur could not take heavy tanks"(18). Further, river Chenab provided an effective right flank security to the Pak offensive, but imposed a serious logistic handicap on Indian Operations. "While Pakistan could assemble a striking force without legal complications in its own nearby territory, the battle area was in Kashmir, where the disposition of Indian troops was curtailed by the Cease Fire Agreement"(19).

The preparations made by Pakistan for this thrust could not be concealed, and the United Nations observers had warned the Indian authorities of the impending Pak attack in this sector. The warning was probably not taken seriously, and no efforts were made to take adequate counter-measures. The Indian armed strength in the sector remained at about 1,000 men, mainly lightly armed police. Some concrete bunkers, inter-linked by covered communication trenches, were built as a defensive measure. "They had a top storey for observation, the ground storey, with MMG, LMG and RR emplacements for fighting and the basement for

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living"(20). The area was under the operational command of 191 Infantry Brigade Group which was responsible for its security. The Brigade had made the following disposition of forces under its command:

- (a) HQ 191 Inf Bde Group - At Mandiala crossing
- (b) 6 Sikh Light Infantry - Along CFL from Burejal to Pir Jamal
- (c) 15 Kumaon - Area Mandiala
- (d) 3 Mahar with elements of 3 J&K Militia - Area north of Pir Jamal
- (e) 6/5 Gorkha Rifles - General area Kalidhar
- (f) 'C' Sqn 20 Lancers - West of Mandiala
- (g) 14 Fd Regt - Regiment less one battery in area Chhamb and one battery at Dhak Baniyar
- (h) Troop Medium Battery - Area east of Chhamb(21)
- (i) 6 Rajput(22) - Concentrated at Akhnur at 0700 hrs on 30 August 1965.

According to the information then available to India, the CFL was held by Pakistan with only two Azad Kashmir battalions and about 600 para-military personnel. A squadron of armour and a Baluch battalion were kept in depth. Across the international border in the south, one infantry battalion, a regiment of armour (less two squadrons) and a mechanized battalion were stationed. Pakistan had kept its reserve around Bhimber and the Marala headworks. It consisted of two infantry battalions, a regiment of armour and 14 Para Brigade (less a battalion). The artillery force included two field regiments, one medium battery (155 mm howitzer) and two heavy mortar batteries(23).

With this force, India thought, Pakistan posed no major threat in the immediate future. The maximum it would do was to indulge in shelling, raids and infiltration by guerillas. During a meeting on 31 August 1965 at Srinagar, between the Chief of the Army Staff, General Officer Commanding XV Corps and the Director, Military Operations, the Army Chief opined that "Pak had not so far officially associated herself with infiltrators, but if she decided to do so

she was likely to attack in Chhamb or in Jhangar-Nowshera, simultaneously stepping up infiltrators"(24). He further remarked: "It was difficult to say whether Pak dispositions were purely defensive or were for offensive purposes but in any case an offensive by Pak was unlikely to get very far"(25). Lt Gen Katoch, however, thought that "Pak was bound to react to our taking of Haji Pir and would either go for Jhangar, Nowshera or attack in Chhamb Area"(26). But he was of the opinion that Pakistan would not be able to take the Akhnur bridge. These observations reveal some misreading of Pakistan's intentions and capabilities by Indian army Generals.

Contrary to Indian assessment, Pakistan had already decided to launch a big attack in Chhamb-Jaurian sector with more than two regiments of armour (Sherman and Patton tanks mixed - 80% Pattons) two Field Regiments, two Medium Regiments, one Heavy Mortar Battery, and 7th Infantry Division, consisting of eight infantry battalions(27). The tasks allotted to this force were:

- (a) To secure the west bank of Manawar Wali Tawi and effect crossings in Chhamb-Mandiala areas on D Day.
- (b) To capture Akhnur Bridge at the earliest.
- (c) To use the Hill Section between Kalidhar Ridge and Kalit for sending infiltrators and columns of regular infantry to establish road blocks between Sunderbani and Akhnur in the general area Tanda(28).

On the Indian side the tasks allotted to XV Corps on 31 August 1965 were:

- (a) to hunt out infiltrators;
- (b) to complete Uri-Punch link-up; and
- (c) to be prepared for an offensive by Pakistan.

The Corps Commander accepted these tasks and hoped to complete the Uri-Punch link-up by 3 September. He felt confident to repulse the Pak attack on Jhangar, expected to be a minor one. He, however, realised that his major weakness was in artillery, and sought permission to call on a medium regiment and field regiment from 26 Inf Div, if required. Subsequently, during the course of discussions he amplified that Pakistan's likely area of offensive would include a thrust towards Naushahra

or into the Chhamb sector. But he assured that Pakistan would not be able to capture Akhnur bridge, although he expressed concern about the linear defences in the Jhangar sector. These discussions continued even on 1 September 1965, which show that India was guessing regarding the timing and area of Pak offensive even up to the eleventh hour.

Brig Manmohan Singh, had taken over the command of 191 Inf Bde Gp on 15 August 1965, following the death of Brig Masters killed by Pak shelling, and was new to the job. Prior to this, he was commanding 162 Inf Bde under 26 Inf Div with HQ in Jammu. 191 Inf Bde Gp was an independent formation, directly under XV Corps, and its area of responsibility was very large, covering approximately 83 km of the international border and 32 km of the CFL, containing 66 border posts. While the Indian border posts on the international border were manned by the Punjab Armed Police (PAP), the Indian posts on the CFL were held by the Indian Army. Chicken's Neck also fell in this Bde Sector. By 16 August 1965, 3 J&K Militia had lost 8 pickets. The Bde Commander had only two battalions- 9 Punjab and 3 Mahar - at that time. Now, 2 Sikh joined him, and by 24 August all the eight lost pickets were recovered by him. Brig Manmohan Singh had a plan to deploy the infantry battalions on Troiti heights, but he did not have sufficient troops to do that. To make things worse, the Corps Commander took away 2 Sikh, two regiments of medium artillery and some more infantry from 191 Inf Bde in order to reinforce Punch.

Brig Manmohan Singh asked for anti-tank mines but they never reached him. He sent his tank commanders along with infantry patrols to detect Pak tanks through tank noise or by observing armour tracks on the ground. The latter confirmed reports about Pak armour concentrations in the area, but the Corps HQ would not believe(29). The Brigadier concentrated all his RCL guns on road Dewa, and his armour (out of one Squadron, three tanks were already disabled) in the south.

Exploiting to the maximum India's ignorance of the impending danger, Pakistan launched a three-pronged attack with a force, estimated to be a division of Infantry and two regiments of armour. The attack began at about 0400 hrs on 1 September with an intense artillery and mortar bombardment on all the Indian posts along the Cease-Fire Line in the Chhamb sector. Pakistan had deployed IV Corps Artillery to support the attack on Chhamb. Pak IV Corps, commanded by Lt Gen Bakhtiar Md. Rana, had the following

artillery units under its command:

- 2 Field Regiment
- 39 Field Regiment
- 81 Azad Kashmir Field Battery
- 8 Medium Regiment
- 28 Medium Regiment
- 32 Battery, 10 Medium Regiment
- 124 Battery, 33 Heavy Regiment (155 mm guns)
- 127 Battery, 34 Heavy Regiment (8 inch howitzer)
- 111 Battery, 29 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment
- 17 Corps Locating Regiment(30).

Chhamb-Mandiala Battle

The Pak artillery units selected for the assault assembled near Padhar, where IV Corps Artillery Command post and 17 Corps Locating Regiment Command post were established. The guns shelled all the forward posts occupied by the Indian soldiers from Red Hill to Burejal. Heavy artillery fire was also directed towards Mandiala and Chhamb villages and on Mandiala crossing and gun areas(31). The shelling was so heavy that even the buildings in Jammu felt its tremors(32). Under the cover of this massive fire-support, Pakistani forces surged forward. Simultaneously, Pakistan launched an attack on Jhangar, about 56 km north-west of Chhamb, also at 0400 hrs. The place was heavily bombarded for about two hours to keep the Indian army guessing about Pakistan's intentions.

Around 0600 hrs, Pakistan attacked the post of Burejal, south of Chhamb, where the CFL and the international boundary met. The assault was repulsed, but the post was again attacked by a column that came across the international border. Both the assault columns had armour support of about a squadron each. Meanwhile, a third column, with a squadron of Pattons, had advanced through the gap between Moel and Paur at about 0030 hrs. Indian squadron of 20 Lancers boldly faced the enemy and knocked out about ten enemy tanks. These attacks were, however, only probes, and while the above battle was raging furiously, the main assault came from the direction of Pir Maungawali along general line Green Ridge - Bramia - Dewa on the road to Mandiala. It was a Brigade attack with a regiment of Pattons and one motorised battalion.


With the meagre armour at its disposal, 191 Brigade was in no position to stem the three-pronged assault for long. By about 1000 hrs, Pakistan was able to cut off 3 Mahar from other Indian troops, south of Dewa. One AMX troop, rushed from area Chhamb, was also caught on the run and destroyed by

CHHAMB-JAURIAN BATTLE

1-10 SEPT. 1965



- INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY: - - - - -
- CEASE FIRE LINE: - . - . - .
- ROADS: - - - - -
- RIVERS: ~~~~~
- INDIAN THRUST: - - - - -
- PAK THRUST: - - - - -



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Pak armour. Other Indian posts - Moel, Paur and Burejal were also overrun by Pak armour. Advancing further, it attacked 15 Kumaon's forward defence line and almost overran its two forward companies. This brought Pak tanks within 450 metres of the Brigade Headquarters. At this moment, in a remarkable performance, a 15 Kumaoni RCL destroyed the leading Pak tank and knocked out the barrel of the following tank. Apprehending more RCLs and tanks in Mandiala area, the Pak tanks turned towards the south. But, by now most of the Indian posts had either been overrun or surrounded by Pak tanks and the defenders were either killed or taken prisoner.

In this grim situation, at noon the Brigade Commander made an urgent request for immediate air strikes by the IAF. But the IAF sorties came at 1700 hrs when the situation had vastly changed. The IAF ground attack might have acted as deterrent to Pakistan's tank advance, but unfortunately it also hit Indian gun positions and armour, causing considerable damage(33). All artillery ammunition lorries, three AMX tanks, one Armoured Recovery Vehicle and one ammunition lorry with tank ammunition, were destroyed in the IAF strikes.

Pak advance continued, and by 1800 hrs it succeeded in driving a wedge between Mandiala and Chhamb. By 2200 hrs, about 10 Pakistani tanks crossed over to the eastern bank of river Manawar Tawi. Simultaneously with this attack, Pakistan also made a thrust in the hilly section of Chhamb sector, and captured Red Hill and Green Hill picquets, held by 3 Jammu and Kashmir Militia. 191 Inf Bde Headquarters was thus put in great danger. Orders for its withdrawal were, therefore, issued at 2100 hrs on 1 September, and 191 Inf Bde Gp HQ, 6 Sikh LI, 15 Kumaon, 14 Field Regiment, including medium troop, and the surviving elements of C squadron withdrew to Jaurian, leaving behind heavy equipment(34). However, 3 Mahar, 6/5 Gorkha Rifles and remnants of 3 Jammu and Kashmir Militia were to continue holding their defence in area Kalidhar.

Now, 191 Inf Bde was made responsible for the defence of Akhnur, including the Akhnur Bridge, and 6 Rajput, already deployed for the defence of the bridge, was placed under command 191 Inf Bde. At about 0630 hrs on 2 September, Pakistani Sabre jets strafed, rocketed and bombed the Jaurian area, inflicting considerable damage to Indian forces, especially 3 Punjab Armed Police. 191 Inf Bde Gp less 9 Punjab and 3 Mahar concentrated at Akhnur and redeployed for its defence. Elements of C Squadron 20 Lancers were deployed as covering troops under 41 Mtn

Bde for the defence of the Jaurian heights.

Meanwhile, Headquarters XV Corps had been watching with growing concern the rapidly deteriorating situation. Earlier in the afternoon of 1 September, it had ordered 10 Inf Div to take charge of the situation. The task allotted to it was to stem the Pak offensive and defend Akhnur Bridge and Kalidhar complex. Frantic efforts were also made to rush troops to reinforce the sector. Orders were issued on 1 September 1965, for the move of the following:-

- (a) 6 Rajput from 163 Mtn Bde for defence of Akhnur Bridge. (The battalion arrived at its destination after first light on 2 September 1965).
- (b) 20 Lancers less two squadrons from Pathankot. (On arrival this armour element was placed under command 41 Mtn Bde which was already in the process of occupying an intermediate position in Jaurian).
- (c) 28 Inf Bde (consisting of 2 Grenadiers, 5/8 Gorkha Rifles and 1/1 Gorkha Rifles) from Pathankot to Damana. The formation reached Damana at 0800 hrs on 2 September 1965 and was designed as Corps reserve. 161 Fd Regt and its affiliated artillery complement were sent forward to Jaurian to support 41 Mtn Bde. 1/1 GR were ordered to move to area Chauki Chaura for the protection of line of communication Akhnur-Sunderbani.

Pakistan had based the success of its offensive on surprise, speed and slow reaction on India's part on account of time-consuming process of decision-making in a democracy. 'Grand Slam' did achieve surprise, and Chhamb fell on the first day. But, thereafter Pakistani offensive lost its momentum. Instead of pushing on to Jaurian, the Pakistanis were inactive till 3 September, which gave 41 Brigade time to prepare its defences. According to Gen Musa, the first stage of the offensive operations ended with the capture of Chhamb and the advance of the Pak army to their side of Manawar Tawi river. In the second phase, Maj Gen Akhtar Husain Malik was replaced by Maj Gen Yahya Khan as commander of the Pak forces. The change of commanders took place on 2 September at 1100 hrs. This, Gen Musa claims, was pre-planned and not an after-thought. Whether this change was pre-planned or not, the stubborn resistance put up by the defenders certainly forced Pakistan to delay its advance and move cautiously.

But the sudden collapse of 191 Inf Bde had created a critical situation. The feasibility of making a firm stand on Jaurian-Kalit line with both 41 Mtn Bde and 28 Inf Bde was considered, but it was decided to contest the Jaurian position with 41 Mtn Bde only, keeping 28 Inf Bde in hand as Corps reserve for the final defence of Akhnur. Orders were accordingly issued to 41 Mtn Bde (which had only two battalions under it at the time), to occupy the Jaurian-Troti position as quickly as possible(35).

41 Mtn Bde acted quickly, and reported in the morning of 3 September 1965 that the intermediate position at Jaurian was reasonably well prepared to oppose the enemy. The armour support to this position comprised 20 Lancers less two squadrons, plus the remnants of 'C' squadron which had so far been battling with the enemy single-handed. 161 Fd Regt, commanded by Lt Col V.N. Swami, and a battery of 38 Medium Regt, provided the artillery support.

Meanwhile Pak Infantry had also consolidated their positions along river Manawar Tawi. By 1930 hrs on 2 September, they had crossed the river unopposed and established a bridgehead. They renewed the offensive at about 1200 hrs on 3 September, and at about 1800 hrs the same day, the enemy mounted a major attack on Jaurian with approximately thirty tanks, supported by infantry and heavy concentration of artillery from the north. The attacks was repulsed with losses on both sides, but it was clear that 41 Mtn Bde would not be able to hold this attack for long. Indian forces fought stubbornly, but had to withdraw(36). 191 Infantry Brigade was still in the process of preparing its defences in Akhnur area and was not in a position to withstand the Pak onslaught. 28 Inf Bde, consisting of 2 Grenadiers and 5/8 Gorkha Rifles, was, therefore, rushed in at this critical juncture. It was placed under command 10 Inf Div at last light 3 September 1965, and was allotted the task of holding a delaying position on the general line of Fatwal Ridge, approximately 10 km West of Akhnur by first light 4 September 1965.

During 2-5 September 1965, the order of battle of 10 Inf Div was(37):-

1. 191 Inf Bde Group

(a) At Akhnur:

6 Rajput (new arrival)

6 Sikh LI

15 Kumaon

} After fighting the
} initial thrust on
} 1 September

6/5 GR

3 PAP (remnants)

14 Field Regiment (elements)

(b) Area Kalidhar/Sunderbani:

3 Mahar

9 Punjab

3 J and K Militia

One tp 123 Med Regt

2. 41 Mtn Bde (Jaurian)

9 Mahar

1/8 GR

161 Fd Regt

123 Med Bty less one bty and one tp (tp det to Sunderbani)

3. 28 Inf Bde (Damana/Fatwal)

2 Grenadiers

1/1 GR (det to Chauki Chaura 2 September)

5/8 GR

The disposition of the Indian forces in the Divisional sector on 4 September was:-

- (a) Jaurian-Troti 41 Mtn Bde was under heavy enemy pressure but was expected to hold out until night 4/5 September 1965.
- (b) Fatwal Ridge 28 Inf Bde (two battalions) was in the process of preparing a hasty delaying position.
- (c) Akhnur 191 Inf Bde was strengthening its sector around Akhnur with mines.

(d) Kalidhar Ridge Post No.707 had fallen during the night 3/4 September 1965. 3 Mahar, 9 Punjab and elements of 3 Jammu and Kashmir Militia were, however, in occupation of the Main Hill feature (9 Punjab had relieved 6/5 Gorkha Rifles on night 1/2 September 1965).

The Pak forces renewed the attack on Jaurian position at about 1100 hrs on 4 September and also attempted to outflank the position with armour from the south. The assault was a determined attempt on Jaurian from the north with a force of one armoured regiment and two infantry battalions, supported by one regiment each of field and medium guns and a heavy mortar battery. The battle raged till 1400 hrs, when, in spite of repeated armour and infantry attacks and three forward company positions having been overrun, the situation was stabilised through counter-attacks. Later in the evening, considerable enemy movement forward was reported across Manawar Tawi towards Jaurian and Kalit, as also armour and infantry concentration north and south of the Indian positions. The situation of 41 Mtn Bde had become desperate and the formation itself was in danger of being overrun. Accordingly, 41 Mtn Bde was withdrawn during night 4/5 September 1965 to area Akhnur, passing through Fatwal Ridge position which had been occupied by 28 Inf Bde on the previous night. During this critical battle 161 Field Regiment had abandoned their guns the previous day. Strict orders were issued making it obligatory on the formation to retrieve the guns at all costs. But, it appears, that its attempts could not succeed due to intensive Pak shelling.

Pakistani troops followed the withdrawing Indians, and leaned on Indian defences on both Jaurian and Kalit axes in the afternoon of 5 September. They maintained pressure by armour and artillery all along the front, and patrols and probing elements made contact with the delaying position of 28 Inf Bde (2 Grenadiers and 5/8 GR) by 1530 hrs on 5 September(38). Then it made a determined attack on 2 Grenadiers by the southern flank of the brigade on 6 September, making extensive use of artillery and tank fire and MMGs mounted on Jeeps. The attack was, however, effectively repulsed. An attack was also made from the north but it was also repulsed.

Meanwhile, frantic efforts were being made by the UNO since 2 September to arrange a cease-fire between India and Pakistan. Pakistan was, however, not in a mood to listen and paid no heed to UNO

pleadings. The Security Council called for an immediate cease-fire on 4 September. Pakistan, as if to show her disdain for such calls, carried out an air-raid on Amritsar the next day(39). By now the crisis in the Chhamb sector was rapidly slipping into disaster. To relieve Pakistan's pressure in this sector it became inevitable to mount a full-fledged offensive in the Lahore and Sialkot sectors by XI and 1 Corps respectively on 6 September. Within a few hours of opening of the Indian offensive, the major portion of Pak medium armour, artillery and a brigade of infantry were ordered to pull out of the Chhamb sector. Pakistan's ambitious thrust towards the Akhnur Bridge was thus stumped just in the nick of time.

However, Patton regiments were quickly replaced by a tank destroyer unit; also there was no appreciable let up in artillery fire. Pakistan was thus able to maintain pressure all through, only changing her tactics to increased employment of infantry. But Pak advance was effectively halted, and India decided to launch counter-offensive in this sector against the remaining Pak forces. Plans were, therefore, made for an offensive in this sector on night 6/7 September 1965:

- (a) 28 Inf Bde, with 20 Lancers less one Squadron and one troop, 6/5 Gorkha Rifles and 5/8 Gorkha Rifles were to advance on the main axis, secure Jaurian heights and be prepared to seize the Chhamb crossing.
- (b) 191 Inf Bde Gp, with two troops 20 Lancers, 6 Rajput and 15 Kumaon, were to advance along axis Akhnur-Kalit, secure Kalit and then seize Mandiala crossing.
- (c) After the capture of Jaurian by 28 Inf Bde, 41 Mtn Bde, with 1/1 Gorkha Rifles and 1/8 Gorkha Rifles, was to pass through and seize Chhamb, if not already secured by the former.

However, the offensive did not make much headway, because the Indians did not have adequate superiority in armour and artillery. The advancing columns were halted by intense artillery and tank fire on 7 September. 28 Inf Bde just struggled up to short of Chak Karpal. On 7 September, 191 Infantry Brigade Group with 15 Kumaon and two troops of 20 Lancers moved to area Kaink. Then 15 Kumaon advanced along axis Akhnur-Kalit with under command two troops of armour at 0730 hrs. Pakistanis were found in good strength here and their tanks, RCL and MMG fire

engaged Indian forces at Thinder Wali Khad and knocked out one AMX tank, dispersed the infantry and separated it from the armour. In addition, one Company 15 Kumaon was ambushed in area Jad. Although, the Indian armour and infantry were pulled back, they suffered heavy casualties - over 120, including approximately 30 killed, and 2 AMX tanks lost. On 8 September 1965, the above plan was revised, and regrouping and allotment of tasks were ordered as under:-

- (a) 28 Infantry Brigade, with 6/5 Gorkha Rifles, 2 Grenadiers and one squadron 20 Lancers, were to be in defence astride road Akhnur-Jaurian.
- (b) 191 Inf Bde, with 5/8 Gorkha Rifles, 6 Rajput, 15 Kumaon and two troops 20 Lancers were to deploy along road Akhnur-Kaink-Kalit.
- (c) 41 Mtn Bde, with 6 Sikh Light Infantry, 1/1 Gorkha Rifles and 1/8 Gorkha Rifles, was to be responsible for the close defence of Akhnur. It was also to be prepared to advance to Jaurian.

On night 8/9 September, the two forward brigades improved their positions. Intensive patrolling was carried out on their respective fronts, despite intermittent shelling by Pak artillery, leading to a number of patrol clashes. The situation stabilised on 9 September 1965, and a fresh offensive was planned to advance along the main axis. General Officer Commanding 10 Inf Div issued his verbal orders at 1600 hrs on 9 September 1965. The three-phased plan in outline was:-

(a) Phase I

Attack on Chak Karpal by 2 Grenadiers, under 28 Inf Bde, during night 9/10 September 1965.

(b) Phase II

One company 15 Kumaon, with two troops tanks, to advance at first light 10 September 1965 to threaten Chak Karpal from the north and rear. Responsibility for this was of 191 Infantry Brigade Group.

(c) Phase III

Thereafter 41 Mtn Brigade was to advance to Jaurian.

On 10 September, 2 Grenadiers made another attempt to capture Chak Karpal, supported by a squadron of tanks astride the Jaurian axis. But under the intense artillery and medium machine gun fire, the battalion disintegrated before it had even left the forming up place, and had to be extricated with difficulty. The unit suffered heavy casualties during this disastrous action - fourteen killed, forty-six wounded and twelve missing. The company of the Kumaonis, with two troops of tanks coming in from the North, ran into stiff opposition, consisting of two troops Shermans, and a company plus of infantry, with four recoilless guns, supported by heavy artillery. This group, too, failed in its mission, and after a fight, lasting six hours, returned to the base. Pak casualties were three Shermans and one RCL gun destroyed or damaged. India lost three AMX tanks(40).

The same day, 41 Mtn Bde was moved to the XI Corps Zone of operations. This took away the striking potential of 10 Inf Div, and the Indian position at Fatwal took a permanent shape. But the enemy continued to exert pressure against Indian defences along the Fatwal Ridge and infiltrated in force in the hilly area to the North, i.e. between Fatwal Ridge and Kalidhar. Accordingly, fresh grouping became essential, and was effected as under:-

- (a) 28 Inf Bde, with 6 Rajput, 6/5 Gorkha Rifles, 5/8 Gorkha Rifles, one company 1/1 Gorkha Rifles, and one squadron 20 Lancers, was to be responsible for operations in area Fatwal Ridge, with the task of sealing both the axes.
- (b) 191 Inf Bde Gp, with under command 1/1 Gorkha Rifles less one company, 3 Kumaon and 2 Grenadiers, was to operate in the hilly area to the North. The troops already deployed in Kalidhar area, (9 Punjab, 3 Mahar and elements of 3 Jammu and Kashmir Militia) were to come under command 191 Inf Bde Gp. Headquarters 191 Inf Bde Gp was to be located at Tanda(41).

After the initial reverses on 1-2 and 3-4 September, 3 Mahar and 9 Punjab had taken up resolute defences on Kalidhar Ridge. While the operations in Chhamb-Jaurian were going on, Pakistan had made repeated attempts to dislodge the Indian troops from the Kalidhar Ridge. Pakistan now pushed through approximately two infantry battalions with a force of irregulars into the hills, north of Garh. On 14 September 1965, Indian patrols reported that the enemy

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had infiltrated a sizeable force of regular troops and Mujahids in general area Manani-Gulaba Chappar. For clearing this intrusion, two battalions, 1/1 Gorkha Rifles and 3 Kumaon, were employed. 1/1 Gorkha Rifles attacked and captured Point 2357 on 14 September 1965, after inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. On 18 September, they captured Manani after a well-fought action, again inflicting heavy casualties on Pak forces. Similarly, 3 Kumaon attacked the Pak position at Gulaba Chappar on 17 September and captured it at 1530, after inflicting approximately sixty-three casualties, including thirty-three killed. Large quantities of arms, ammunitions and stores were also captured. The Pak column in area Dager was also effectively stopped, and the enemy fell back towards Gopiwala in area Keri. Next, 3 Kumaon attacked Keri at 0300 hrs on 18 September, but the enemy artillery and counter-attack by approximately three companies foiled this attempt(42). In spite of the initial success, Gulaba Chappar could not be retained for long, and 3 Kumaon had to firm in at Jalara.

On 19 September 1965, 10 Inf Div received fresh instructions from Headquarters XV Corps based on the information that one Pak medium armoured regiment was likely to be employed in the Akhnur sector. The tasks allotted to 10 Inf Div at this stage were:

- i. Hold present positions forward of Akhnur.
- ii. Defend Akhnur at all costs.
- iii. Hold Kalidhar Ridge.
- iv. Be prepared to resume offensive to regain Troti-Kalit position and exploit forward to Manawar Wali Tawi.
- v. Protect line of communication Akhnur-Sunderbani.
- vi. At suitable opportunity, capture area Dager.

For offensive tasks, one infantry battalion and one squadron of AMX tanks were to be made available. 2 Grenadiers was earmarked as Corps reserve at six hours notice.

Increased activity of enemy was reported in area Gulaba Chappar on 20 September 1965. Encounter with Pak patrols also took place, in which both sides suffered casualties. Consequently, 28 Inf Bde was warned for a likely offensive task in Dager area. 6 Sikh Light Infantry less one company, and 2 Grenadiers less one company were placed under

command for this operation. This task was changed the next day when 28 Inf Bde was alerted for an offensive along road Akhnur-Jaurian on night 22/23 September 1965. The following additional troops were made available to the formation for the operation:-

- (a) 11 Kumaon
- (b) 1/1 Gorkha Rifles
- (c) 2 Grenadiers
- (d) One squadron 20 Lancers

However, the offensive was called off due to the coming of the Cease-fire on night 23 September 1965.

Meghdoot Force

It is appropriate to describe here the exploits of the Meghdoot Force, which operated unconventionally like Wingate's Chindits, although on a smaller scale, behind the enemy lines in the Uri-Punch and Chhamb sectors. Major Megh Singh, who had experience of clandestine operations in Burma during the Second World War and was on the verge of retirement from the Army, offered his services to Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh, GOC-in-C, Western Command, to head a special group to operate behind the enemy lines in Jammu and Kashmir. The Army Commander readily agreed to this. Major Megh Singh raised a batch of young and hardy men from 3 Rajput(43). After a short but intensive training, he prepared his Force by 1 September 1965, for operations "in the guts of the enemy".

During the night of 1/2 September 1965, this Force blew up an important culvert on road Dwarandi-Bandigopalpur 10 km deep in enemy territory. During 6/7 September, Maj Megh Singh's men captured 2 formidable enemy pickets - Neza Pir and Ari Dhok - in actions complementary to the main attack on Raja and Chand Tekri pickets. When 3 Dogra, after the capture of Chand Tekri, faced difficulties near the Kahuta Bridge, the Meghdoot Force came to the rescue. By a well-planned and bold manoeuvre, this Force drove away the enemy from this vital bridge area. Credit goes to Maj Megh Singh for the establishment of the link-up with 68 Inf Bde, south of Haji Pir, on 10 September 1965.

The Meghdoot Force demonstrated that great success could be achieved by small groups of specially trained and resolute troops, operating in the rear of the enemy. Maj Megh Singh made a creditable contribution of his Force, besides leading it to successful exploits. For this, he was awarded Vir Chakra and promoted as a Lt Col on 16 September 1965.

As the Haji Pir area grew quiet, the Meghdoot Force was shifted to the Chhamb area, where a full-fledged War started in early September 1965. In the Chhamb area, the Force carried out harrassing raids, spreading chaos and confusion behind the enemy lines. On 18 September, the Force captured an enemy stronghold at Thil, in the Kalidhar sector, about 4000 metres deep in the enemy held territory after killing 50 persons and wounding 70. Only two men of the Meghdoot Force were wounded in this attack. Next, the Force raided an enemy administrative base in area Nathal, about 12 km behind the enemy lines, at 0200 hrs. Approximately one company of enemy troops, guarding the base, was completely surprised, and fled after suffering casualties. After destroying the supply dump, the Force moved back and encountered another enemy post in Thuggi area at 0600 hrs. There ensued a fierce hand-to-hand fight in which 22 Pak troops were killed and another 40 wounded as against one OR killed and 3 ORs wounded on the Indian side. Lt Col Megh Singh was also wounded in this action. Operations of the Meghdoot Force ended on Cease-Fire on 23 September 1965.

Operations after Cease-Fire

Even after the declaration of the Cease-Fire, Pakistan with the characteristic frustration of a bad loser, continued to bolster the remnants of the infiltration groups. In the hills, Pakistanis infiltrated in large numbers, occupying Malla and Point 3776. These encroachments posed a serious threat to Sunderbani Road, and so, major attacks were launched to wrest the places back from Pakistan. It was on the night of 30 September/1 October that 1 Madras advanced over a difficult route in the face of the heavy artillery and MG fire. With the help of its artillery support and simultaneous attack by 6 Sikh Light Infantry on the target, 1 Madras captured Malla after a bitter struggle, by 0645 hrs on 1 October. Pakistan heavily shelled Malla area after its occupation by 1 Madras, and most of the casualties suffered by 1 Madras were due to enemy artillery air bursts.

The eviction of Pak forces who had occupied Point 3776 proved more difficult. The task was entrusted to 6 Sikh LI. As a prelude to assault on the main height, it was found essential to occupy two near-by ring contours. These were captured on 28 September through the enthusiasm and grit of the battalion, though it was a very difficult and steep climb. But soon, the Pak artillery heavily shelled the place and more than two Pak companies, supported by MMGs and mortars, inflicted heavy casualties and

forced the Sikhs to withdraw. Plans were then taken in hand to re-occupy the area. On 3 October, 163 Field Regiment (less battery) arrived from 25 Inf Div. A troop of medium guns also moved from Akhnur, and in addition, 100 Field Bty ex 14 Field Regiment was made available as artillery support for the assault.

On 4 October, 52 Mtn Bde, commanded by Brig R.D. Hira, came under command 10 Inf Div, and was located at Chauki Chaura. The new order of Battle of 191 Inf Bde on this day was:-

- (a) 9 Punjab
- (b) 1 Madras
- (c) 6 Sikh LI
- (d) 3 Mahar
- (e) 11 Mahar
- (f) Company ex 2 Grenadiers
- (g) Company ex 3 J and K Militia

With this battle order, 191 Bde was allotted the following tasks:-

- (a) Hold feature north of Jhang
- (b) Secure and hold Point 3776
- (c) Hold Kalidhar ridge
- (d) Defend Sunderbani

The immediate task was to secure and hold Point 3776, for which a three-pronged attack was planned. Accordingly, the Indian artillery commenced heavy firing on Pak forces around Point 3776 at 0450 hrs on 4 October. The Pak strength in the area was about a company plus, supported by Mortars, MMGs and Machine Guns. 6 Sikh LI attacked and captured area Twin Pimples at about 0600 hrs after a stiff fight. But, 11 Mahar, which was to launch the main thrust from the south, disintegrated due to heavy enemy shelling, and the company 3 Mahar, which was to attack from the west, could also not make any progress. The whole burden thus fell upon 6 Sikh LI, which was still able to reach the objective. Pak forces counter-attacked immediately after, but were thrown back. Once again the enemy made a determined attack, but it was again repulsed. 6 Sikh LI continued its advance and, despite the heavy shelling by Pak forces and the

casualties already suffered, it was able to secure Ring Contour by 1430 hrs on 4 October after a hand-to-hand fight(44).

6 Sikh LI was then re-inforced by releasing one 6 Sikh LI platoon from the gun area, and then ordered to advance further. Simultaneously, one company 2 Grenadiers moved to Point 2317 from Jhang to occupy it as firm base for 6 Sikh LI. It was on 5 October morning that 6 Sikh LI attacked Point 3776 with tremendous dash and determination, and after one of the heaviest fightings encountered in the entire sector, occupied it by 0700 hrs. In the process, it killed 44 Pakistanis (counted on the ground) and wounded about 50 others. Besides congratulating Lt Col Nand Gopal CO 6 Sikh LI, for this excellent achievement, the Brigade Commander recommended immediate award of four Maha Vir Chakras (two of them posthumous) and three Vir Chakras to 6 Sikh LI.

In 25 Inf Div sector also, Pakistanis infiltrated into many areas, and consequently large-scale combing operations had to be mounted to flush out the infiltrators from their hideouts. By 16 October 1965, the last of the invaders was swept out of Jammu and Kashmir.

In addition, to the above counter-infiltration actions, two major operations were undertaken in the Mendhar and the Kishanganga sectors. These actions are described in the succeeding paragraphs.

Mendhar Sector - The Battle of OP Hill

Apart from the infiltration activities already described, the only action of any significance in the Mendhar sector was the battle of OP Hill, which took place after the Cease-fire had come into effect on 23 September 1965. Located on the south-west of the road Mendhar-Balnoi, Chuni-Nar feature with a height of 1524 metres provided a dominating view over Indian defences and road Mendhar - Balnoi. The feature comprised a complex of hills, and was mentioned in official correspondence as 'OP HILL'. It was sometime in early August 1965 that Pakistan had occupied this feature and gradually developed it into a battalion-defended position, when the Indian troops were busy dealing with the infiltrators and defending the CFL. The first time Pakistan is fired from 'OP HILL' on 2 Dogra Picket 636 was at 2300 hrs on 13 August. Pak troops used MGs and also sent a jitter party which used 2 inch mortars. The jitter party was effectively engaged by 2 Dogra and chased away. Again on 22 August, Pakistan shelled Picket 636 intermittently throughout the night and attacked in

strength at 0445 hrs the next morning. The attack was repulsed after a hard fighting. No action was, however, taken to evict the enemy forthwith which gave them an opportunity to develop and strengthen the defences on OP Hill. But OP Hill was not a lodgement area tactically large enough to act as a base for future operations, although it was an ideal location for artillery observers.

Having failed in their efforts to capture Pt 636 by a direct attack, the Pak troops infiltrated in the area on 18 September in a bid to isolate and "strangle" the picket. This intrusion was flushed out by a coy attack on night 20/21 September. Pakistan then concentrated on the development of OP Hill into a stronghold. The position was developed along three spurs emanating from a central position, called OP Hill. From 27 September the Pakistanis started using explosives to improve defence works. They also resorted to shelling of 2 Dogra base at Balnoi and Picket 636. The movement of vehicle convoys and large bodies of troops by day on road Mendhar-Balnoi was made impossible.

To dislodge the enemy from OP Hill, an attack by 2 Garhwal Rifles was mounted on night 6/7 October 1965. But by now the enemy had prepared shell-proof bunkers and wired the strongly built defences. It also counter-attacked repeatedly with overwhelming strength. The attack was repulsed with heavy losses(45). Subsequently, it was found that India had under-estimated the defence potentialities of the position and at least a Brigade attack was needed to evict the enemy from OP Hill. Before undertaking further operations for the recovery of OP Hill, it was considered expedient to appeal to the UN Observers. But on the failure of the UN Observers to get the area vacated by Pak forces, a decision was taken on 15 October to mount a Brigade attack on the feature.

The operation was planned and executed by Brig B.S. Ahluwalia, Commander 120 Inf Bde, who assumed the command of the Brigade only on 16 October 1965. According to the plan of operation, a three-phased Brigade attack was to be mounted. In phase one, 2 Dogra was given the task of capturing Twin Pimples and Black Rocks, and 5 Sikh LI was to capture White Rocks on D Day. In phase two, 7 Sikh was to capture Jungle and OP Hill by 0500 hrs on D+1. The battalion plan of 2 Dogra was to launch the attack with two companies. D company was to capture Black Rocks, whereas C company with a platoon of A company was to capture Twin Pimples. B company was to remain as reserve for D company, and A company less platoon was to be the reserve for C company.

Assaulting companies crossed the Cease-Fire Line at 2200 hrs on 2 November and formed up for the final assault below their respective objectives at 2245 hrs, under heavy enemy artillery and automatic fire. C company and a platoon of A company suffered about 50 per cent casualties due to enemy shelling and automatic fire. Yet the determined soldiers pushed on through the minefield and wire obstacles and finally captured Twin Pimples and the feature south-west of it by 2345 hrs after a hand-to-hand fight. There remained only 20 gallant survivors from C company to hold Twin Pimples. The rest were either killed or wounded. The platoon of A company also suffered heavy casualties. However, the Pak soldiers fled, leaving behind 11 dead and a large quantity of arms, ammunition and equipment.

D company also suffered heavy casualties due to enemy shelling and automatic fire, but continued to advance and reached within 45 metres of its objective. Here, it met with extensive minefield, wire obstacles and devastating enemy automatic fire, as a result of which the four assaulting sections of the two leading platoons were practically written off. But the remnants pushed through the minefield on a narrow frontage and created a breach through the obstacles and established a foothold. During the two-hour long severe battle, the company was badly mauled. B company was rushed to reinforce D company, but by then the enemy opposition had also stiffened, and he was bringing down effective fire on B and D companies. The progress upto 0030 hrs was very little, and B company had suffered about one-third of its strength as casualties. The battle continued for two hours more, and Black Rock was finally captured by 0430 hrs on 3 November.

Now, 5 Sikh LI was given the limited task of capturing White Rocks. All ranks were imbued with the spirit of capturing OP Hill, and, if possible, Jungle, Hill and Twin Trees. Accordingly, the operation plan of the battalion was:-

- Phase I - B company was to capture White Rocks, C company was to capture area between White Rocks and OP Hill.
- Phase II - Capture of OP Hill by D company.
- Phase III - Capture of Jungle Hill by A company.
- Phase IV - Capture of Twin Trees by D company.

It was decided that the attack would be mounted during moon-light through the southern approach, which was least expected, because it was steep, providing no room for deployment. Move to forming up place began at 1830 hrs on 2 November. The move was along the tracing tape which amounted to tight rope-walking. After reaching the forming up place, B and C coys reached dangerously close to artillery concentration undetected. B company had reached as close as 23 metres, closely followed by D company in platoon waves, when it charged the enemy with speed and determination. "Officers JCOs, NCOs and Jawans were suffering heavy casualties due to extensive minefields, heavy concentration of enemy air burst shells, well co-ordinated fire of a large number of automatic weapons and showers of grenades, but all eyes were glued on the objective; no body hesitated, no body uttered a word of pain, Jawans with severed limbs, those who had only a few minutes to live and those seriously wounded refused to be attended to but instead exhorted their comrades to move on, to annihilate the enemy, to complete the tasks"(46). Severe hand-to-hand fighting ensued and the crucial objective was captured. The weight and speed of the attack overwhelmed the enemy. C and D coys rushed forward, charged and captured OP Hill well ahead of time. After quick reorganisation, D company attacked Twin Trees and occupied this also. With this the entire Chun-i-Nar was captured and secured. During the operation the battalion lost 40 ORs killed, and 142 all ranks wounded.

The task originally allotted to 7 Sikh was to capture Jungle, OP Hill, Twin Trees and Lone Tree by 0600 hrs on D+1. The battalion reached forming up place at 2130 hrs on 2 November and the operation began at 2200 hrs. A company which was moving towards Jungle Hill had to encounter very heavy enemy fire. B company which was following A company also came under heavy artillery fire, but the advance continued and a fierce hand-to-hand fight took place after which these companies evicted the enemy from Jungle Hill and occupied it on 3 November(47). The rest of the task allotted to 7 Sikh had already been accomplished by 5 Sikh LI by this time. The following Indian heroes were decorated with gallantry awards:-

Maha Vir Chakra

1. Lt Col Sant Singh - CO, 5 Sikh LI
2. Capt Gautam Mubai - 2 Dogra
3. Naik Darshan Singh - 5 Sikh LI

Vir Chakra

1. Capt Sansar Singh - 7 Sikh
2. Sub Piara Singh - 5 Sikh LI (Posthumous)

Thus it could be seen that the Brigade plan of action involved an enveloping attack from three sides, combined with company strength of troops in the rear to prevent enemy reinforcement or ambush. The plan was brilliantly conceived and executed with courage and determination.

Kishanganga Sector - The Straightening of the Bulge

When Cease-fire was declared, Indians were in control of the area, east of River Kishanganga. But the task still remained to clear the enemy from the area between Point 9013 and Bugiana and to straighten the Kishanganga Bulge. This task was given to 4 Kumaon and 3 Sikh. The battalions had to operate in very rough terrain, made more difficult by the presence of snow. The Kumaonis and the Sikhs, however, set about their mission with dogged determination. 3 Sikh was tasked to destroy the Shahkot bridge. By 0330 hrs on 26 September, D company less platoon 3 Sikh had occupied the area which dominated the road across the Kishanganga river and the Shahkot bridge over it. The bridge was made of concrete and steel rope suspension and was heavily guarded by Pakistani troops, entrenched in concrete bunkers. From here fire was directed against the Indian troops. Initially, attempt was made by 3 Sikh to destroy this bridge by Medium artillery fire. But this could not be accomplished even after firing the whole day on 26 September. Then a party was despatched at about 1830 hrs to raid the bridge. This party was subjected to heavy enemy fire from along and across the Kishanganga. The Pakistanis probably had 81 mm mortars which outranged the Indian mortars. But even then the party succeeded in partially damaging the bridge on 27 September. The Pak troops continued to shell effectively with their mortars from the dominating position for the rest of the month, inflicting some casualties. Another attempt made by 3 Sikh to raid the bridge on 5 October was also foiled by the enemy, who subjected the raiding party to heavy mortar and automatic fire. Efforts to achieve the objective continued in October also, and finally at about 1800 hrs on 12 October, D company was able to blow off the bridge on river Kishanganga.

The task allotted to 4 Kumaon on 2 October was to destroy the Jura Bridge. ~~This involved a move over~~ an approximate distance of 40 km at a height upto

4,000 metres above sea level. The battalion concentrated on 3rd at Bhatija at a height of 3080 metres. The assault force was divided into groups and it reached Bimla Pass (height 4780 metres) on 5 October. Further advance to the objective commenced on 6 October. D Company stormed the objective and captured a Ring Contour by 1730 hrs. Advancing further, it attacked and captured the central position of the Ridge of Point 9020 at 2330 hrs. Twin Pimples were also occupied by the advancing troops at 1700 hrs on 7 October. On 8 October, Point 8667 was occupied after a severe hand-to-hand fight, lasting for over an hour. On 9 October another hill top was assaulted and captured.

For assault on Jura bridge, C and D companies concentrated by the night of 10 October. The enemy was probably aware of these movements and it counter-attacked on 11 October. During the night 10/11 October, it succeeded in infiltrating three companies across the river Kishanganga over the Jura bridge and assaulted the Indian positions repeatedly during the morning. But the Kumaonees beat back all the attacks. Fierce fighting, attacks and counter-attacks continued upto 1230 hrs.

Till now 4 Kumaon had lost 2 Officers, 2 JCOs, 24 ORs and 7 porters killed and 2 Officers, 3 JCOs, 72 ORs and 14 porters wounded. The enemy left behind 111 dead. It was now realised that a direct assault on the Jura bridge was not possible, and that the bridge should be destroyed by RCL guns. These reached Chejua at 1800 hrs on 14 October. Preparation for the destruction of the bridge commenced on 15 October. A fire plan was prepared to engage the enemy 3.7 howitzer and the two known mortar locations. The RCLs were directed against the target, and in the 7th round the bridge was destroyed at about 1215 hrs on 15 October.

Now, the Mirpur-Bugiana Bulge was cleared of the enemy, and the Cease-Fire Line was realigned to follow the course of the Kishanganga. With that, the Indian troops were in complete domination of the Muzaffarabad-Kel Road, and the infiltration routes into Kargil and Gurais had been effectively sealed.

Conclusion

XV Corps operations were neither too successful, nor too disappointing. The Corps' success lay in the counter-infiltration operations, especially in cutting off the sources and routes of Pak intrusion by capturing Kargil heights, Haji Pir Pass, OP Hill and the Kishanganga Bridge. But it met a debacle in the

Chhamb-Jaurian area due to lack of proper military appreciation, purposeful planning, and energetic preparation. No defence works were constructed to stop the Pak advance, nor sufficient armour and artillery were assembled for defending this sector. Even, the need for more ammunition was felt during the operations. Mines did not reach 191 Inf Bde, and although a large number of tanks (20 Lancers Regiment less two Squadrons) were there at Pathankot, unfortunately they were not sent to Chhamb in time(48).

The Pakistanis had expected the crossing of the Manawar Tawi to be strongly opposed by the Indians, but the latter did not dig in on its east bank, nor did they bring armour and artillery in sufficient strength to stop the Pak advance towards Akhnur. It was the last minute, ad hoc regrouping and reinforcement of the Indian forces in the area, and the Indian attack on the Punjab front, that really stemmed the tide of Pak thrust.

The late arrival of the IAF aircraft for ground support resulted in utter confusion. By mistake the IAF Vampires and Mysteres knocked out some of the Indian tanks, and also attacked own ammunition depots and troops. Perhaps it was all due to the lack of proper wireless network for calling up close air support at short notice, and indicating the shifting bomb line on the ground. Not only did 163 Fd Regt fall back leaving their guns undestroyed, at some places even the Indian infantry showed lack of determined will to fight. It is a fact that a large number of Indian troops were newly recruited, as a result of the rapid expansion of the Army. Inter-communication by wireless was not satisfactory, and 3 Mahar remained out of touch with 191 Inf Bde almost throughout the war(49). Only C Sqn 20 Lancers (AMX tanks), under the command of Maj Bhaskar Roy, although out-numbered 1:6 by Pak armour, stood its ground well, thus delaying the Pak advance for enough time to enable the Indian Army to launch its major counter-offensive in the Punjab Sector.

However, the safety of the Akhnur bridge was not the result of Indian generalship, but due to Pak hamhandedness in crossing the Manawar Tawi and changing horses in mid stream, i.e. replacing 12 Inf Div Commander Maj Gen Akhtar Malik with 7 Inf Div Commander Maj Gen Yahya Khan in this area. However, Gen Musa claimed that the change of command in the Chhamb valley was part of his plan, as it was not possible for Maj Gen Akhtar H. Malik to conduct the operations efficiently in Chhamb and also in other parts of far flung Kashmir which was his main

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responsibility. Gen Musa thought it unsound to allow Akhtar Malik to be embroiled in the fighting opposite Akhnur on the extreme right flank of his extensive command, stretching over hundreds of miles of hilly areas. According to him, the inability of Malik to exercise effective personal control over his forward troops caused the initial delay in crossing the Manawar Tawi. In fact, his troops were awaiting on the west bank of the Tawi for the code-word for crossing that river, whereas Gen Malik did not seem to be aware of this development. Gen Musa has also blamed Maj Gen Yahya Khan for slow advance after the fall of Jaurian(50):

Unlike in the other Sectors, in the XV Corps Sector, stray operations continued even after the cease-fire till mid November 1965, in which the Corps attained undoubted successes.

In the Indo-Pak War of 1965, from 1 September to 10 October 1965, 10 Inf Div of the Indian Army suffered sizeable casualties (about 2,006) as under(51):-

	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Missing</u>
Officers	11	47	13
JCOs	15	36	13
ORs	358	800	713
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	384	883	739
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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Personal Account of Lt Col D.N. Singh of 9 Mahar. From Official Records.
2. From Official Records.
3. Ibid. Lt Gen Dhillon (Retd) has described the Canal thus:

"The Canal could be divided into three distinct parts from its starting point. The first part did not command the land - which is an irrigation term for stating that the water level in the Canal was lower than the surrounding country and no irrigation was possible without pumping. This part was about eighty feet wide, was the deepest of the three parts, with steep banks and its channel was bricklined. The GT axis ran approximately through the middle of this part. It was clear that this part was designed as a military obstacle to make an assault crossing difficult and was bound to be covered by Arty fire. Indeed we pin-pointed the location of the main Pakistan Arty concentration by drawing gun range arcs from the two ends of the brick-lined portion of the Canal and where these crossed was the general area of the enemy Arty concentration.

The second part commanded the land. Here the channel widened and the depth decreased. The Khalra axis ran approx through the middle of this part. The enemy could resort to flooding by cutting the banks. The third part was after Bedian to the end. Here the Canal crossed the natural drainage of the country-side in aquaducts.

Visualising the Canal with all its works and design, it was clear that it was a good defensive obstacle. Any advance on the GT axis would be resisted by concentrated Arty fire on an assault crossing of the Canal and an advance on the Khalra axis by flooding on one or both sides of the Canal. A counter attack by Pakistan could be launched without resorting to bridging through the third part. Our plans took all these factors into consideration".

It has, however been alleged by various Commanders under 11 Corps that detailed information about the Ichhogil Canal was not passed on to them by the Corps Commander.

4. From Official Records.
5. Musa, Gen Mohammad (Retd), pp.15-16.
6. From Official Records.
7. Ibid.

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8. Musa, Gen Mohammad (Retd), pp.17-19.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid, pp.21-22.
11. Ibid, pp.22-23.
12. There were also about 10,000 Mujahids/Razakars in support of the above formations. From Official Records.
13. From Official Records.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ahmed, Brig Gulzar (Retd), p.87.
18. Praval, Maj K.C., p.348.
19. Brines, p.320.
20. Ahmed, Maj Gulzar, p.87.
21. From Official Records.
22. Ibid.
23. Praval, Maj K.C., p.350.
24. From Official Records.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid. According to Brig Gulzar Ahmed (p.88), the expeditionary force under 12 Inf Div comprised of 10 Inf Bde (2 Battalions), 102 Inf Bde (2 Battalions), 4 AK Brigade, two companies of 12 FF (R and S), 11 Cavalry 13 Lancers and Divisional Artillery and other services.
28. From Official Records. This information is based on Indian assessment and captured documents. According to Brig Gulzar Ahmed (p.88), the task allotted was to destroy Indian forces in area Lalial, Dewa, Sakrana and Chhamb and then to threaten Akhnur.
29. Interview with Brig Manmohan Singh dated 26 October 1988.
30. Shaukat Riza, Maj Gen (Retd), pp.172-73.
31. Ibid, p.176. In this massive bombardment for field guns, forty medium guns and eighty heavy guns took part.
32. Manmohan Singh, Brig (Retd)'s interview dated 28 October 1988.
33. Ibid.
34. According to Brig Manmohan Singh, Pakistan had lost 11 out of her 40 tanks, and consequently was too scared to attack Indian tanks crossing Manawar Tawi within sight.
35. The distance between Jammu and Akhnur was 32 km, and that between Akhnur and Chhamb was about the same. It was only about 1500 metres from Jaurian to Troti.
36. According to Maj Gen Rajwade, Commander 41 Inf Bde, the reasons for India's failure in Jaurian were: (a) Frequent shifting of commanders from one place to another every few days, (b) shifting of units frequently, (c) no time was given to settle down and prepare defences, (d) 161 Fd Regt ran away, leaving their guns undestroyed.

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37. From Official Records.
38. According to Brig A.A. Khan Chaudhry, the Pak C-in-C had told Div Commander on 5 September to abandon the plan to capture Akhnur. p.734.
39. Praval, Maj K.C., p.353.
40. From Official Records.
41. Ibid.
42. From Official Records. The attack took place on 19/20 September.
43. Official Records says, 20 civilians were also organised under Maj Megh Singh to go behind the enemy and raid his rear areas.
44. In this action, 6 Sikh LI lost 1 Officer, 2 JCOs and 31 ORs killed, and 4 Officers, 1 JCO and 24 ORs wounded, in addition to 7 ORs missing. The losses suffered by 11 Mahar included 30 ORs killed, 33 wounded and 55 missing. Besides, 5 Officers and one JCO were wounded, and 1 Officer was missing.
45. 2 Garhwal Rif casualties were 2 Officers, one JCO and 18 ORs killed and 4 Officers 3 JCOs and 68 ORs wounded.
46. From Official Records.
47. During this encounter the battalion lost 21 killed and 60 wounded.
48. Bhupinder Singh, Dr., 1965 War, Patiala 1982.
49. Ibid, p.64.
50. Musa, Gen Mohammad (Retd), pp.40-42. According to Lt Col Irshad Rashid, MC, after the War when he asked Gen Yahya Khan the reason for not taking Akhnur in September 1965, the latter replied: "You know I was told not to do so". Brig Amjad Alik Khan Chaudhry reportedly wrote in his book, September 65-Before and After (p.56), that Gen Musa did not find it necessary to take Akhnur, and thus Akhnur was saved by India through diplomacy. Strategic Digest, IDSA, New Delhi, July 1984, p.734.
51. From Official Records.

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CHAPTER - VI


ALL-OUT WAR

As already stated, Pakistan did not call off 'Grand Slam' even when the Security Council called for an immediate cease-fire on 4 September 1965. She even carried out an air raid on Amritsar the next day. The warnings of the Indian leaders that an attack against Jammu and Kashmir would be treated as an attack against India had fallen on deaf ears. Apprehending a Pak attack, India had already formulated on 9 August her plan to meet the situation militarily(1). But before describing the plan and operations, it appears necessary to give some idea of the terrain, transport and communication of the area of operation.


Terrain

The limited offensive action planned by India stretched from Dera Baba Nanak, about 51 km north of Amritsar, to the south right upto the Sutlej. The frontier in this stretch meandered north to south across a flat, fertile plain, thickly populated and well served by roads, railways and canals. From Amritsar the Pak border was about 28 km, and many roads led to it. One of these, running through Ram Tirth and Kohali, connected Amritsar with Ranian. Another, running north-east by way of Ajnala, led to Dera Baba Nanak (DBN) on the river Ravi, near the Indo-Pak border. The most important was the Grand Trunk Road, on which was situated Lahore, 29 km from the border. The Indian border town, Khem Karan, was about 60 km south-east of Amritsar on the road that passed through Bhikhiwind. Cutting this road diagonally at Bhikhiwind, another highway ran from Harike, on the Sutlej, to Lahore by way of Khalra and Barki (in Pakistan). Harike was connected to Amritsar by a road that passed through Tarn Taran, which, in turn, was connected to Khem Karan by a road that passed through Patti and Valtoha. Another road running due west from Tarn Taran went upto the Indo-Pak border near Rajatal. The railway line ran alongside the major roads and linked Amritsar with Lahore. Dera Baba Nanak and Khem Karan were also linked by rail to Amritsar.

As far as the rivers are concerned, the Beas flowed 43 km east of Amritsar. There were two strategic bridges on the Indian side: one on the Beas at a place, named Beas, and the other on the Sutlej at Harike, where the two rivers met. The former lay on the GT Road and the latter on the Amritsar-Harike-Ludhiana highway. Hudhara Drain ran from the north-east of Amritsar towards the south-west, cut the



**INDO - PAK WAR 1965
PUNJAB THEATRE**



- INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY : - - - - -
- CEASE FIRE LINE (CFL) : - - - - -
- MAIN BATTLE AREAS : [Symbol]
- ROADS : [Symbol]
- RIVER : [Symbol]

GT Road about nine kilometres east of the Indo-Pak border, and then entered Pakistan, south of Rajatal. Hudiara village lay in Pakistan on the Bhikhiwind-Lahore road.

The Upper Bari Doab Canal with its headworks at Madhopur in India had several branches which crossed into Pakistan at various points. The Lahore branch crossed the Amritsar-Ranian road near Kohali and entered Pakistan near Wagah. The main branch ran south-west of Amritsar and entered Pakistan near Bedian. Further south was the Kasur branch that went past Khem Karan to Kasur.

Pakistan had constructed a multi-purpose waterway, the Bambanwala-Ravi-Bedian Link Canal, popularly known as the Ichhogil Canal, to protect Lahore. Running north to south at a distance of 5 to 14 km from the border, it connected the Ravi, in the north, with the water system of the Sutlej, in the south. About 5 metres deep, and some 45 metres wide, it had at the time partially prepared defences, manned sparsely. The canal crossed the GT road at Dograi, a village that lay east of it(2).

The retaliatory Indian plan was to threaten Lahore and drive a wedge between the Pak forces deployed around it and those based at Sialkot. The aim was not the capture of cities, but the destruction of Pakistan's war potential. Indian offensive action had the dual objective of ensuring the security of Punjab by shifting Indian defence line on to the Ichhogil canal as also to capture Pak territory to serve as a bargaining lever in the political parleys, on the conclusion of hostilities(3).

The XI Corps

In this context the tasks assigned to XI Corps in August 1965 and troops made available to it were:

- (a) To destroy any enemy forces which might enter Punjab and Ganganagar Sector in Rajasthan.
- (b) On orders from GOC-in-C Western Command, simultaneously-
 - i. To advance to the Ichhogil Canal along the axes GT Road, Bhikhiwind - Khalra, and Bhikhiwind - Khem Karan to secure Pak territory from opposite Ranian inclusive to its junction with Dipalpur canal opposite Hussainiwala inclusive;

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- ii. To eliminate Pak bridge-head in area Dera Baba Nanak and, if possible, capture the bridge intact.
- (c) On completion of (b) above, to be prepared to continue the advance on Lahore.

Troops available to XI Corps, and their groupings for operation were:-

- i. 4 Mtn Div consisting of two Mtn Bdes; one Arty Bde; and one Med Regt.
- ii. 7 Inf Div consisting of two Inf Bdes; one Arty Bde; one Armd Regt; and one Med Bty.
- iii. 15 Inf Div consisting of two Inf Bdes; one Arty Bde; one Armd Regt less one Sqn; one Hy Regt; and one Med Bty.
- iv. 2nd Indep Armd Bde consisting of two Armd Regts; one Fd Regt (SP); and one Motorised Bn.
- v. 29 Inf Bde consisting of three Inf Bns; one Sqn Armr; one Fd Regt; and one Lt Bty.
- vi. 57 Inf Bde consisting of three Inf Bns; one Sqn Armr; one Fd Regt (TA); 61 CAV, and two RAC(4) Bns for the defence of Ganganagar Sector.
- vii. 96 Inf Bde consisting of three Inf Bns(5).

Briefly, the plan was to move all the formations from their peace location at the last moment, and advance simultaneously into Pakistan: 15 Inf Div on Amritsar - Lahore, 7 Inf Div on Khalra - Barki, and 4 Mtn Div on Khem Karan - Kasur axes, to secure the east bank of Ichhogil Canal. 'H' hour was to be 0400 hrs, and there was to be complete wireless silence upto the 'H' hour. The major part of 4 Mtn Div was to get into a brigade-defended sector in the Khem Karan area to take the onslaught of the enemy's armd div and two inf bdes. It was considered that at the worst, 15 and 7 Inf Divs might each meet one enemy bn in hastily prepared defences in their respective sectors, and 4 Mtn Div might not be able to secure the east bank of the canal.

To carry out the offensive, the following tasks were allotted to the formations:-

- (a) 15 Inf Div's task was to secure Pak territory upto east bank of Ichhogil Canal from inclusive

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canal-river Ravi junction in the north to inclusive canal-track crossing in the south. In carrying out the task, priority should be given to the capture and holding of bridges over the Ichhogil Canal on GT Road, Road Ichhogil Uttar and road bridge at Jallo. Boundary between 15 Inf Div and 7 Inf Div was the Track Canal junction - Manihala - Rajatal - Dhand - Bundala, all inclusive to 15 Inf Div.

- (b) 7 Inf Div's task was to secure Pak territory upto east bank of Ichhogil Canal from (exclusive) canal-track junction to (inclusive) canal junction. In carrying out the task, priority should be given to the capture and holding of the bridge over Ichhogil Canal and Barki, and denying ingress through Bedian. One bn should be left for the defence of Hussainiwala bridge, and this bn would come under command 67 Inf Bde after its arrival. Boundary between 7 Inf Div and 4 Mtn Div would be canal junction - Patti - Sirhali Kalan, all inclusive 7 Inf Div.
- (c) 4 Mtn Div (less 33 Mtn Bde)'s task was to secure Pak territory upto east bank of Ichhogil Canal from (exclusive) canal junction to Pt RO 798439, destroy bridge over Ichhogil Canal on Rd Khem Karan - Kasur, occupy a defended sector to contain possible enemy offensive by one armd div and two inf bdes, particularly along Kasur - Khem Karan and Gandasinghwala - Khem Karan axes. For this, support of 2 Indep Armd Bde would be available on priority. Boundary between 4 Mtn Div and 67 Inf Bde was roughly along the northern bank of the Sutlej - Harike - all inclusive 4 Mtn Div.
- (d) 29 Inf Bde Gp's task was to destroy Pak bridge-head in area Dera Baba Nanak and, if possible, capture the Dera Baba Nanak bridge intact. Boundary between 29 Inf Bde Gp and 15 Inf Div was Ranian - Chuganwan - Majitha - road junction Mahta - Sri Govindpur, all inclusive 15 Inf Div.
- (e) 67 Inf Bde Gp's task was to hold Hussainiwala bridge; prevent enemy establishing bridge-head in area Sulaimanke; deny axes Hussainiwala - Ferozpur Twin Rajasthan canals, and Sulaimanke-Fazilka - Malaut - Tehri Lambi - Sirsa; be responsible for the security of Nos. 36 and 625 SU at Ferozpur; and destroy any enemy forces that might enter Ganganagar area. Boundary between 67 Inf Bde and D and R Area was all inclusive to 67 Inf Bde Gp: Chautala - Hanumangarh - Suratgarh - Bijenagar - Chuk.

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- (f) The Corps reserve consisted of 2 Indep Armd Bde located at Bundala and 96 Inf Bde located at Tarn Taran. 2 Indep Armd Bde's tasks were to contain and destroy enemy counter-offensive from area Kasur in conjunction with 4 Mtn Div; and on orders from Corps HQ, either by itself or in conjunction with 96 Inf Bde, restore situation in 15 and 7 Inf Div sectors, if required.
- (g) 96 Inf Bde's task was, on orders from Corps HQ, either by itself or in conjunction with 2 Indep Armd Bde, to restore situation in 15 and 7 Inf Divs and 4 Mtn Div sectors, if required(6).

On 9 August 1965, it was decided that in case of escalation of conflict, XI Corps would be required to carry out Phase I of the offensive task given to it during 'OP ABLAZE'. The difference this time would be that troops would move from the then peace locations and cross the International Border without going to concentration areas or occupying any defensive positions near the border. On 12 August 1965, 'H' hr was also discussed, and it was decided to cross the International Border at about 0400 hrs on the morning of D day. It was decided to synchronise the attack of the three Divs. As 4 Mtn Div had the longest to travel and had to cross Harike after dark to achieve surprise, it could not have its 'H' hr earlier. Also, movement at night was going to be very difficult in unreconnoitred country, particularly with high crops.

Code-word 'BANGLE' - indicating, hostilities imminent - was received from Army HQ on 1 September 1965, and the Corps Comdr gave verbal orders at Jalandhar Cantt the next day. Code-word 'BANNER' which was the executive order for carrying out the offensive task was received at midnight on night 1/2 September, and issued to lower formations on 3 September 1965(7). On the same day, 'K' date (date for commencement of road movement from permanent locations) was given as 6 September 1965. It was later changed to 5 September 1965. On 5 September 1965, 4 Mtn Div and 7 Inf Div requested for change of 'H' hr from 0400 to 0500 hrs, which was agreed to.

Before the commencement of the actual operation, the Corps Comdr, Lt Gen J.S. Dhillon, impressed on all subordinate commanders that attack must be pressed home with utmost vigour and determination, irrespective of casualties. The Army Comdr, Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh, Vr C, and the Corps Comdr visited the three Div Comdrs during the night 5/6 September before 'H' hr. Various formations moved from their peace locations on 5 September according to

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a planned time-table, so that at 0400 hrs, XI Corps could advance into Pakistan from Ranian in the North to Rohiwal in the south. The move was smooth and without incident.

The initial task of XI Corps, as already explained, was to secure the east bank of the Ichhogil Canal and to establish bridgeheads across the canal at certain points. Surprise was the key-note of XI Corps plan, and it was fully achieved. The three divisions achieved early and notable successes. In the south, 4 Mtn Div, under Maj Gen Gurbakhsh Singh, launched on the Khem Karan-Kasur axis, succeeded in taking all its objectives, either wholly or partially, by 1230 hours on 6 September. Further north, 7 Inf Div, under Maj Gen H.K.Sibal, captured Hudiara by 1030 hrs. It was, however, under Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad, GOC 15 Inf Div, that a battalion crossed the Ichhogil Canal at Dograi and reached Batapore on the outskirts of Lahore, and still another battalion of 15 Inf Div advanced upto the road bridge over this Canal near Bhaini Dhilwan, 9 km north of Dograi. The bridge over the river Dera Baba Nanak was captured by 29 Inf Bde. All these assaults were launched with speed and vigour which jolted Pakistan.

However, Pakistan Army's field formations were already in the forward areas which enabled them to react quickly and hit back fast, recovering several positions captured by the Indians. Later, 4 Mtn Div could not withstand the Pak counter-attack and had to fall back. Similarly, 15 Inf Div had to withdraw from Batapore and the bridge near Zhaini Dhilwan. 29 Inf Bde also lost the Dera Baba Nanak bridge over the Ravi. But attacks and counter-attacks in various sectors continued till the cease-fire, and several positions were retaken by India.

15 DIV OPERATIONS

Plan

The task allotted to this Division was to "secure Pakistan territory upto east bank of Ichhogil Canal from including canal-river junction 70221 to including canal-track crossing 740043". In carrying out the above task, priority was to be given to the capture and holding of bridges over Ichhogil Canal on Grand Trunk Road, Road Ichhogil Uttar and road bridge at Jallo.

The first warning order for this "Operation Riddle" was received by the Division on 1 September, and detailed instructions were issued by XI Corps on 3 September. The Corps plan envisaged the operation

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in two phases:-

Phase I

- (a) Advance upto Ichhogil Canal and capture of grand Trunk Road bridge over Ichhogil Canal and Grand Trunk/Jallo link road bridge by 54 Infantry Bde(8).
- (b) Advance and capture of road bridge over Ichhogil Canal by 1 Jat Group.

Phase II

Capture of Dogaich - Bhasin by 38 Inf Bde and securing east bank of Ichhogil Canal.

The troops allotted to 15 Inf Division, a newly raised Division, for these tasks were 38 Inf Bde, 54 Inf Bde, 15 Artillery Bde less 5 Field Regiment, plus 60 Heavy Regiment and one Medium Battery (with effect from 8 September 1965), 14 Horse less squadron, and 96 Inf Bde, commanded by Brig V.N. Malhotra, (taken out as Corps reserve)(9). 96 Bde was deployed astride the GT Road at Hudiana drain to cover Amritsar(10).

From the very beginning, Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad, GOC 15 Inf Div, had differences with his Corps Commandr and the Army Commander, so much so that the Army Commander at one stage had asked for his replacement. As XI Corps was ordered to secure the entire Ichhogil Canal, the Corps divided the canal into three parts and asked the 3 Divisions to secure one part each. For this purpose, each division was split up into battalion and brigade groups, and they were asked to advance towards the canal on widely separated axes. According to Gen Prasad, the higher Commanders did not indicate either the political objectives or the military objectives set for the armed forces. Plans for higher formations were not disclosed to the Divisional Commanders, nor was the role of the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy outlined. There was no appreciation of the enemy's aims, strength and intention. For security reason, briefing of troops below battalion level was ruled out. To achieve surprise, units and formations were asked to move over long distances and go straight into the battle without detailed briefing, marrying up with various arms and services, and taking adequate rest before battle. As the operation was to be launched just before day-break, giving the enemy full facility of observed strikes by his artillery and Air Force, Gen Prasad asked for air support, air photo cover and "Going maps". But he was told that he could not

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expect air support, as the IAF would be engaged in gaining air superiority. The Air Photo Cover and "Going maps" also did not materialise. As the artillery was deployed at night, it was not available for support for at least one hour after first light, whereas the anti-aircraft element for the Division, which was to move down from Dehra Dun, took quite a while to deploy and become effective(11). Moreover, 96 Inf Bde was taken away from the Division as Corps reserve, thus un-balancing the Division from the start.

Maj Gen Prasad appreciated that the main enemy defences were based on the Ichhogil Canal, which had been specially developed as a good water obstacle, and the covering positions of the main Pak defences were in the Gosal Dial area, manned by an infantry battalion and strong elements of supporting arms. Between the International Border and Gosal Dial, there were various Pak police and para-military forces manning the Wagah Check-post and a series of border posts. He suggested that the international border should be crossed immediately after last light, and not at first light, so that his troops could dig in on the eastern bank of the Ichhogil Canal during the hours of darkness. But the Corps Commander did not agree to this to achieve surprise along the whole front simultaneously.

General Prasad made the following operational plan within the restrictions laid down by his seniors:

- a) 1 Jat (From 38 Infantry Brigade) with under command one troop of Sherman tanks of Scinde Horse to capture the bridge Bhaini-Malakapur.
- b) 54 Infantry Brigade, under the command of Brig M.S. Rikh, firstly to advance on the GT Road axis, clear Gosal Dial and establish a firm base; and secondly, capture the main road and rail bridges over the Ichhogil canal.
- c) 38 Brigade, commanded by Brig P.W. Pathak, less one battalion - 1 Jat, under immediate Divisional control, to act as reserve for 54 Brigade operations(12).

Phase I of the operation was to be carried out by 54 Inf Bde and 1 Jat Group, commanded by Lt Col Balbir Singh. 54 Inf Bde had under its command 13 Punjab, 3 Jat and 15 Dogra, commanded by Lt Col M. Chatterjee, Lt Col D.E. Hayde and Lt Col Inderjit Singh respectively. 54 Inf Bde and 1 Jat

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Group crossed the Indo-Pak border at 0400 hrs on 6 September 1965 on the Grand Trunk Road axis and on Ichhogil Uttar axis respectively. The Plan of 54 Inf Bde was an advance by 3 Jat cross-country and the capture of Gosal Dial as the first bound(13). 15 Dogra were to clear the road axis by destroying any enemy opposition at Wagah and between Wagah and Gosal Dial, and blow up the steel gates at the border check post. 13 Punjab commando platoon was detailed to advance simultaneously along Wagah Distributary in a bid to capture the Jallo bridge over the Ichhogil Canal. After the capture of Gosal Dial by 3 Jat, 15 Dogra were to pass through and secure east bank of Ichhogil canal, including Grand Trunk Road bridge, if intact(14).





Initial Successes


After crossing the International Border, 3 Jat attacked the objective astride mile 14 on Amritsar-Lahore road and captured it by 0630 hrs. Village Dial was also cleared at 0658 hrs.

At 0700 hrs, Pak aircraft carried out intensive rocketing and bombing on 3 Jat and 15 Dogra positions(15). Later, Pakistani Sabres attacked several places on the Grand Trunk Road, including Gharenda, where the Div Commander had his command post and the Divisional reserves. The air attacks were pressed home with determination, and they took a heavy toll of vehicles. With the skies all to themselves, the PAF had no difficulty in picking out any vehicle which moved. Several ammunition trucks were hit, and the ammunition kept exploding for hours, obstructing the road, which in turn made it necessary to make detours through slushy rice fields. Almost the entire 'F' echelon vehicles of 54 Brigade were destroyed(16). 3 Jat lost its 2nd-in-Command, besides 5 of 6 RCL guns, and 3 mortars with their carriers(17).

During capture of Gosal Dial, 3 Jat killed 35 enemies and captured 2 Officers and 12 Other Ranks, along with 2x106 RCL guns, 3 mounted Jeeps, 3 trucks and 45 weapons. The battalion was then ordered to continue its advance towards Ichhogil Canal, which commenced at 0900 hrs. The east bank of Ichhogil Canal, about 1280 metres north of GT road, was assaulted and captured. The Jats also captured vital GT road bridge over the canal at 1130 hrs and tried to consolidate their position. Although the bridge had been demolished by the enemy, the Jats could scamper over the surviving portions of macadam and masonry. The Pakistanis, however, reacted at once. They attacked 3 Jat, first with two 8-ton truck-loads of soldiers and shortly after with three tanks and about

3 JAT ACTION IN DOGRA
(6 SEP 1965)

NOT TO SCALE
RIVERS:-  ROADS:- 
INDIAN THRUST :- 
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY :- 



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100 infantry in support. However, both these attacks were repulsed, and the enemy withdrew. Soon, a squadron of Pak Sherman tanks advanced south along the west bank of the canal. Due to the lack of anti-tank weapons, Indian troops withdrew to east bank. It was only after the arrival of 14 Horse in support that A and B Coys and CO's party again crossed over to west bank, and a series of tank-to-tank fights took place. 'C' Coy reached Batapore complex and fought against the enemy. Requests for immediate reinforcement of anti-tank weapons were repeatedly sent, while Pakistanis continued intense shelling of the Indian positions.

By the afternoon, the gallant Jats had expended most of their ammunition. At about 1420 hrs, the unit was ordered by the Bde Commander to withdraw to the firm base of 15 Dogra (Gosal Dial). During the action, 3 Jat's losses were 9 killed and 43 wounded(18). Hayde was wounded and awarded MVC, and Subedar Khazan Singh received a Vr Chakra.

15 Dogra also crossed the International Border at 0400 hrs to clear the Ranger Posts and the bridge. They attacked a weak coy of Pak regular army on the Upper Bari Doab Canal (UBDC) bridge and occupied it. Advancing further they attacked the Ranger Posts successfully and captured 20 PsOW, including one Officer, along with arms, ammunition, vehicles and a Pak flag. In its turn, the Unit lost one Officer and 13 ORs killed, and one Officer, 2 JCOs and 16 ORs wounded in this action. According to the plan, the battalion was to move forward with C Sqn 14 Horse to clear the main axis and press on to the GT road bridge over the Ichhogil Canal. But an exaggerated account of the casualties suffered by the Unit was reported to the Bde Commander. Consequently, the original plan was modified and the task of capturing the GT road bridge was entrusted to 3 Jat, while 15 Dogra was ordered to firm in at Dial.

13 Punjab commando platoon also advanced towards Jallo bridge, and despite enemy fire from the area 550 metres west of Wagah, went forward astride the railway track upto about 450 metres of the Rail bridge. Here they were subjected to heavy shelling and air attacks, forcing them to withdraw to Wagah Railway Station. On the other hand, 1 Jat Group after crossing the Indo-Pak border at 'H' hour was fired upon from the Pak police post at Ichhogil Hithar. The resistance was, however, overcome, and the Pak Ranger Post at Ichhogil Hithar as well as the Ichhogil Uttar bridge were captured by 0700 hrs. Reserve coys and tanks had also advanced for the operation, but were halted due to intensive Pak artillery shelling and air

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strafing. As no support was forthcoming from the Indian artillery, armour or air, the battalion withdrew to Ranian Bund, and was reorganised for fresh attack. As the men of this unit had not taken their digging tools with them, they could not hold the ground(19). During this action, the unit suffered casualties of 13 ORs killed, and one Officer and 28 ORs injured.

Change of GOC

Meanwhile, the dissension between the Div Commander and the Corps Commander continued. Maj Gen Prasad wanted 54 Bde to firm in at Gosal Dial, while 38 Bde was to advance towards the Ichhogil Canal with greater speed. But the Corps Commander, Lt Gen J.S. Dhillon, reportedly gave him a fresh set of orders(20):-

- (a) 54 Brigade to attack and capture Dograi on night 6 September.
- (b) 38 Brigade to send one battalion to capture Bhaini-Malakapur on night of 6 September.
- (c) 1 Jat from Ranian to rejoin 38 Brigade.
- (d) 38 Brigade with two battalions, one of them 1 Jat, to capture Bhasin on night 6 September.

Gen Prasad vehemently, protested against this, both verbally and in writing, arguing that the diversion of 38 Bde to secure Bhasin and Bhaini-Malakapur would be a wild goose chase and it would hamper his advance. However, he was asked to follow the orders.

Meanwhile, GOC 15 Inf Div had reported to the Corps Commander that the situation in his Div Sector was desperate due to heavy casualties, and that no further offensive action was possible. The Corps Commander did not accept this, and after meeting him personally in Atari area at 1400 hours on 6 September, opined that the casualties suffered by the Division were such that they in no way impaired the fighting efficiency of that formation. Div Commander was then told that the allotted task was to be carried out with full determination, and he was ordered to secure the bridge over Ichhogil Canal by first light 7 September(21). Commander 38 Bde, who was also present in the meeting, was asked to secure the east bank of the Canal between Bhasin and GT Road axis during 6th afternoon(22), i.e., within a few hours.

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It was at 1530 hrs on 6 September that 6 Kumaon ex 96 Infantry Brigade (Corps reserve) was told about the failure of 1 Jat attack over Ichhogil Canal bridge due to heavy air strafing, and was ordered to capture this bridge by first light 7 September 1965. The battalion moved from area Jandiala and concentrated behind Ranian Bund at 2230 hrs. As soon as the battalion moved out of the Bund at 2400 hrs, the Pakistanis started shelling. The battalion continued its march and attacked Ichhogil Canal bridge at 0500 hrs on 7 September. Although it captured the objective, it had to abandon it due to heavy Pak artillery and armour fire and counter-attacks, and then withdrew to Ranian by 1500 hrs(23).

Another attempt was planned to capture the bridge by a joint attack by 1 Jat and 6 Kumaon. They were grouped under Commanding Officer 6 Kumaon and ordered to recapture Ichhogil Uttar bridge on night 7/8 September 1965. This attack also failed, mainly due to heavy Pak artillery and armour fire, and by mid-day 8 September, the troops were back to their original position at Ranian.

On the Grand Trunk axis, 38 Infantry Brigade was ordered to carry out Phase II of the operation on night 6/7 September, i.e. to capture Dograich-Bhasin and secure East bank of Ichhogil Canal. In view of the above-mentioned set-backs, the task already allotted to the Brigade was slightly modified. It was then ordered to secure east bank of Ichhogil Canal in general area of the aqueduct. The Brigade moved after last light on 6 September on man-pack basis via Wagah-Singhpura along road Pul Kanjri, but could not make much progress, in spite of no opposition. The formation advanced some distance (upto general area RJ 7514) and firmed in there.

Not knowing the whereabouts of 38 Bde due to disruption of wireless link, GOC 15 Inf Div along with a small party set off to locate the Bde HQ at night. But unfortunately, the Pakistanis ambushed the party and captured 12 men and 4 jeeps, in one of which were left the General's memo pad and a personal file containing references to his representations against his removal from the command 4 Mtn Div in 1962. Maj Gen Prasad escaped in another jeep. But the Pak radio greatly exploited the incident by broadcasting extracts from his personal file, causing embarrassment to India, and particularly to Gen Prasad(24).

On 7th morning, Brig Rikh, Commander 54 Bde, was wounded and evacuated. He was replaced by Brig S.S. Kalha, CC Arty XI Corps. On night 7/8 September, Maj Gen Mohinder Singh, MC, took over

command of the Division from Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad.

On 7 September, fresh orders were issued to 38 and 54 Inf Bdes to complete their allotted tasks by first light 8 September(25). 38 Inf Bde Commander, Brig Pathak, ordered 1/3 Gorkha Rifles to advance north of the road and attack the bridge at 0530 hrs on 8 September. But the Pak troops shelled heavily and also fired with MMG on 1/3 GR and repelled this attack. From this date till the cease-fire, 38 Inf Brigade stayed in the same area, but was unable to secure the East bank of the Ichhogil Canal. Brig Pathak was punished after the cease-fire for his incompetence, and demoted to the rank of Lt Col. However, it does appear that he was given unrealistic tasks(26).

On the 54 Infantry Bde front, the attack was planned for the night 7/8 September on the canal bridge (RJ 7310) and rail bridge (RJ 7309) with 13 Punjab on the UBDC axis and 3 Jat forming a firm base (in Sq RJ 7510) while 15 Dogra were to exploit from west of Gosal Dial village on the main GT road with the assistance of 'A' Squadron 14 Horse after first light on 8 September. A and B coys 13 Punjab reached the objective and completed digging of fire trenches by first light. The Pak troops withdrew from the canal road bridge but reinforced the railway bridge. When D Coy advanced to the railway bridge, it came under heavy army shelling. By first light, Pak armour also arrived, and 13 Punjab withdrew without orders. Fresh orders were then issued for the reorganisation of the Brigade defence sector (with 15 Dogra at Square RJ 7611, 13 Punjab at Sq RJ 7610, and 3 Jat and Bde headquarters in Square RJ 7812). Thus the attacks by 38 and 54 Inf Bdes were unsuccessful.

During 8,9 and 10 September, Pakistan maintained pressure on all the Indian positions by raids, artillery shelling and armour attacks, which were, however, repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy, except on the Ranian axis. On 10 September, in face of enemy pressure the remnants of 1 Jat and 6 Kumaon withdrew to Lopoke; and Ranian and Kakkar fell into enemy hands. The same day, 96 Inf Bde was relieved by 50 Para Bde. 96 Inf Bde was placed under command 15 Inf Div for securing the right flank of the Div sector and preventing any ingress of Pak armour from the Syphon area. It was then moved to area Kohali to restore situation on that axis and be prepared to advance upto Ichhogil Canal bridge at the earliest.

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15 Inf Div ordered Brig V.N. Malhotra, Commander 96 Inf Bde, to:-

- (a) occupy battalion defence area astride road Lopoke-Chuganwan-Amritsar, based on UDBC Lahore Branch at Kohali;
- (b) deny use of road Kakkar-Lopoke-Kohali-Amritsar to the enemy;
- (c) capture area Ichhogil Hithar - Ichhogil Uttar by first light 11 September; and
- (d) destroy any enemy pockets remaining in Indian territory East and NE of Ichhogil Hithar.

Brigade Commander, 96 Inf Bde, issued instructions for OP Slash as under:-

- (a) 16 Dogra to advance to Thata Dhilwan and establish defensive positions in area Bund 772.
- (b) 6 Kumaon to occupy defensive area in Lopoke and organise tank-hunting parties.
- (c) 7 Punjab to occupy defensive area in Kohali and establish a platoon stop there.

16 Dogra completed the allotted task by 0445 hours on 11 September without any opposition.

In the second phase of Operation Slash, 6 Kumaon was directed to advance on axis Lopoke - Kakkar - Ranian and establish firm base along the Ranian bund by first light 12 September 1965; 7 Punjab was to provide firm base at Lopoke for 6 Kumaon operation, and 16 Dogra was to liquidate enemy opposition at Thata Dhilwan by first light 12 September. 6 Kumaon secured Kakkar at 2145 hrs on 11 September and Ranian at 0245 hrs on 12 September, while 16 Dogra secured Chak Allah Baksh at 2200 hrs on 11 September and area Visvian at 1000 hrs on 12 September. Phase 2 of Operation Slash was thus completed.

Phase 3 of Operation Slash envisaged the capture of Bhaini Dilwal bridge intact, if possible, and establish bridgehead across the Ichhogil Canal. If the bridge was blown, 7 Punjab was to hold east bank of Ichhogil Canal. Although there was heavy enemy shelling and bitter fighting, 7 Punjab was able to secure east bank of Ichhogil Canal in area Ichhogil Uttar bridge by the last light of 14 September.

Bharat Force

On 11 September, when a major enemy armour and infantry threat was reported developing on Ranian axis, 2 (Indep) Armoured Bde was moved into 15 Div Sector on night 11/12 September. But, the Brigade moved back to 4 Mtn Div Sector on 13 September after the situation in this Div sector was stabilised(27). On 11 September, Lt Col Raghubir Singh, CO 14 Horse, was replaced by Col Bharat Singh, as the former expressed fear in the face of the Pattons, and the infantry lost all confidence in his armour. Some reorganisation of the armour elements in the sector was made. In addition to 14 Horse (made available to 15 Infantry Division at the start of the operation), 1 Horse, Sqn 7 Cav (PT 76), 1 Sqn of 8 Cavalry (AMX), and a troop of Centurions from 3 Cav were also operating in this sector. To coordinate the efforts of the various armour elements there was a requirement for an overall commander. Colonel Bharat Singh, who had been posted as Second-in-Command of 2 (Indep) Armoured Brigade on 12 September 1965, was nominated by General Officer Commanding XI Corps to command these elements. The armoured group, thus formed, took the name of its Commander, and was designated Bharat Force on 14 September. Henceforth, the infantry had much more confidence in armour. By proper deployment of the various units and sub-units of the Bharat Force and by dominating the no-man's land, the enemy armour was put in its proper place on the whole of the 15 Inf Div front for the rest of the operations till 23 September.

Some of the exploits of the Bharat Force deserve mention here. On 15 September, when a sqn of Pak armour tried to probe into the northern flank of 54 Inf Bde, the well-sited AMX and Centurion tanks accurately fired upon the enemy tanks, destroying 2 of them. During the battle of Dograi, 2 Sqns of 14 Horse gave close support to the attacking Indian troops. After the capture of Dograi by 3 Jat on 21/22 September night, when the enemy armour started advancing to counter-attack the Jat position next morning, a Sqn of 14 Horse under the command of Maj Sanga foiled the enemy attempt and helped in the consolidation of the Indian positions in Dograi. Also, Sqn 1 Horse under Bharat Force gave good support to 7 Punjab, thus enabling it to recover its lost prestige. When in the evening of 21 September, the enemy Infantry, mounted on APCs, and supported by a Sqn of tanks, launched an attack on the forward bn of 38 Inf Bde, a Sqn of 14 Horse knocked out two enemy tanks and 2 tracked carriers. When Col Bharat Singh arrived with some more tanks, the enemy withdrew after suffering considerable casualties. The Bharat Force

captured 6 enemy Sherman-IVs by the end of the operations, and made them fit for use after repairs. These captured Shermans came to be called Bharat Squadron(28).

The Jallo Bridge

50 (Indep) Para Brigade, which on arrival at Hudhara Drain on 10 September was taken under command 15 Infantry Div on 11 September, was first given the task of capturing Bhasin by first light 14 September. However, after being relieved by 41 Mtn Bde on 13 September, the Para Brigade was given new tasks of securing Pak territory upto Ichhogil Canal, from including rail bridge to excluding Grand Trunk Road bridge, and capturing intact Jallo bridge by last light 16 September, later extended to last light 17 September, at the request of the Brigade Commander, Brig A.M.M. Nambiar.

54 Infantry Brigade was ordered to simulate activity towards Dograi as a diversion. At 1700 hrs on 16 September, 2 Para carried out a rehearsal for the capture of Jallo bridge. As for diversion, 15 Dogra was infiltrated from Dial at 2330 hrs on 16th night, and the village of Jhuggian was captured by A and C Coys, in which Indians suffered casualties of 7 killed and 52 wounded. This resulted in the reduction of the no-man's-land to 90 mts, enabling the Indian troops to observe the enemy defences at close quarters. HQ 15 Dogra was then moved from Dial to Mile 14.

3 Para secured the FUP for 2 Para after clearing some opposition, and 2 Para thereafter moved along the drain on both sides of the UBD canal. The enemy brought down heavy artillery concentration on the assault elements. Drains provided good protection and saved a lot of casualties. 2 Para reached the junction of Khaire Distributary and UBD canal and marched forward towards the target. Casualties were now heavy, as the enemy was bringing down every thing he had. Undeterred by the stiff opposition, 2 Para assault elements reached upto Jallo bridge. Lt B. Parab was nearing the bridge when he saw Jem Shirke falling down. While he was attending him, he was also hit by a shell and fell dead. Parab's Coy was reduced from 120 to 20 only. Maj B.P. Singh dashed to the bridge and informed his CO that the bridge was already destroyed by the enemy. Demolition party detailed for the bridge also came under heavy enemy shelling, and 2 sappers were killed and 6 wounded. The battalion was then ordered to move to occupy defences in the area allotted earlier(29).

6 Para moved from the FUP and attacked rail bridge frontally. Though a newly raised battalion, its battle drill and fighting spirit was superb. It hit the objective at about 0030 hrs on 17 September and occupied it. It raised its success signal 'GHORA', which was heard in the Brigade. The officers and men in the Brigade were overjoyed to hear it. After clearing the area the battalion occupied its allotted defended area. The casualties suffered by the Brigade in these operations were considerable: 1 Officer, 2 JCOs and 30 ORs killed, and about 72 wounded. The Pak army continued heavy shelling and small arms fire on Indian positions, which forced the Brigade to withdraw and to firm up in area Bhamma-Bhatha at night.

On 17 September, 38 Inf Bde was ordered to capture Wahgrian-Dogaich by first light 19 September. 16 Dogra ex 96 Inf Bde were ordered to establish a firm base to contain enemy in area Bhasin and support operations of 38 Inf Bde, which launched the attack on night 18/19 September with 3 Garhwal Rifles. However, the attack was repulsed by enemy artillery and small arms fire. 3 Garhwal Rif fell back to their original position in the brigade - defended sector, and 16 Dogra firm base was further reinforced with two troops of armour. On night 22/23 September, 38 Infantry Bde was again ordered to secure PUL Distributary/Ichhogil Canal junction, but it failed to accomplish it as the enemy launched an attack on one of its forward battalions, 1 Jat, on the evening of 22 September. The attack was effectively repulsed, but the plans of the Brigade for the attack on that night were upset, as no recce could be carried out by the unit and sub-unit commanders.

SECOND BATTLE OF DOGRAI

On 12 September, Brig Niranjan Singh, MC, an able officer, had taken over command of 54 Bde from Brig Kalha. 54 Inf Bde was ordered to plan for advance upto Ichhogil Canal astride Grand Trunk road which involved the capture of Dograi. It was believed that the main Pak defences were along the Ichhogil Canal and Dograi, with a screen along the general line Jhuggian Main-Daraswali - Lakanke, supported by armour along PUL Distributary and astride UBDC on the flanks.

The planning and preparations including domination of no-man's-land, collection of information, surprise and deception measures, development of tracks and other administrative arrangements connected with the stage management of the battle, preliminary operations, issue of orders,

and redeployment of troops for attack, were carried out between 13 and 20 September. During this period, the Brigade suffered 58 killed, including 3 Officers and 4 JCOs, and 205 wounded, including 5 Officers and 7 JCOs(30).

From this information extracted during the interrogation of two Pakistani Prisoners of War, captured on night 14/15 September, it was known that the disposition of Pak forces was:-

- (a) Two companies 16 Punjab (Pathan) astride the bridge SB 745114,
- (b) Mortar platoon West of the house at SB 743114,
- (c) Battalion Headquarters and remainder battalion at Dograi,
- (d) Company 15 Frontier Force Rifles deployed astride the Grand Trunk road, and
- (e) Squadron of tanks in Dograi.

Final orders for operation were issued on 20 September at 1700 hrs. The attack was to be launched in two phases. In Phase I, 13 Punjab was to attack on area Mile 13 at 2359 hrs on 21 September, and in Phase II, 3 Jat was to attack Dograi itself at 0130 hrs on 22 September.

Phase I - Attack by 13 Punjab

On 19 September, 13 Punjab had relieved 15 Dogra in area Dial and Jhuggian Mian Daraswali, and was ordered to capture area Mile 13 from the direction of Lakhanke. On 21 September, it was ordered that the area Mile 13 was to be captured in Phase I with D company on left and C company on right, astride the road, from Jhuggian. A company from Lakhanke on relief by a platoon of 15 Dogra re-joined the battalion at 2100 hrs on 21 September, and was approximately 180 metres ahead of Jhuggian. 'H' hour was at 2359 hrs 21 September, and the objective was to be captured by 0130 hrs 22 September. Artillery and brigade mortars were to shell Mile 13 position from H minus 10 to H plus 4 minutes.

At about 2200 hrs, a threat of Pak attack developed on D company, located south of Jhuggian. The enemy, approximately a platoon strength, supported by BMG and mortar fire, tried to close in. This enemy action which might have been intended as a spoiling attack, was beaten back by D company.

The Indian attack was delayed, and was launched at 0100 hrs on 22 September due to heavy enemy shelling during forming up. The attack was supported by a squadron of tanks from area south of Jhuggian, brigade mortars north of GT road, Bren guns of 15 Dogra, south of GT road, and Divisional Artillery. In spite of heavy enemy shelling which had commenced right from 2200 hrs, D and C companies formed up astride the GT road and carried out the assault. When they were approximately 180 metres from the frontline of the enemy defences, they were pinned down by intensive MMG, Mortar and arty fire from all directions. In spite of the heavy casualties suffered (1 Officer and 24 ORs killed, and 4 Officers 5 JCOs and 83 ORs wounded), both these coys did not leave the ground they had occupied. Soon after first light, the assault was resumed on either side of GT Road axis, with tanks moving alongwith both these coys, giving support to each other. As a result of this Infantry/tank advance, the enemy left their trenches and ran towards village Dograi. The objective was captured at about 0700 hrs after inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy on the ground and on those fleeing towards Dograi. This operation was a great success and positive contributions were made by 13 Punjab. By containing the bulk of the enemy on the main GT Road axis, they facilitated the task of the capture of Dograi by 3 Jat. By dislodging the enemy from Mile 13 area, they also provided security to 3 Jat; made possible 3 Jat's capture of a large number of prisoners as well as a large booty of enemy arms, ammunition and equipment; and opened the maintenance of the GT Road axis upto the Ichhogil Canal.

The battalion captured a number of weapons and ammunition including recoilless guns, MGs, mortars and other small arms. It suffered 31 killed, including one Officer and 5 JCOs, and over a hundred wounded, including 5 Officers and 5 JCOs, during the attack. The enemy casualties were 15 counted killed and 3 Prisoners of War.

Phase II - Attack by 3 Jat

Since early morning, 21 September, all ranks of 3 Jat had gone on patrol many times to have a look at Dograi which was to be attacked that night. They found that the Pakistanis were well entrenched, "some huddled over machine guns in pill-boxes and others tucked into the buildings of Dograi behind light machine guns and rifles, with piles of ammunition and grenades to hand"(31). With two light machine guns in each infantry section, "their automatic fire was going to spew forth from every 30 to 50 yards of front while artillery and mortar shells rained down"(32). The

Jats were to run through mine-fields, jump over or cut their way through wire entanglements and penetrate that veritable thunder storm of bullets and shells and only then to contact the enemy. The FUP was just 400 metres from the nearest enemy trench, and to reach it, 3 Jat (523 men) had to pass through the mine-fields in a single file(33). Taking the Pak defences into account, the battalion prepared its plan to attack the township of Dograi, which extended for 1100 metres from north to south along the Ichhogil Canal, and 760 metres from east to west across the GT road, by infiltration from the north. The town was guarded by reinforced concrete pill-boxes around its three approaches. The built-up area had been divided into four sectors as company objectives.

'A' company less one platoon secured the north-east flank of the battalion and the forming-up-place in area Ruins (SB 7412). The battalion moved from Santpura at 2330 hrs on 21 September, and reached its firm base north of Lakhanke at 0045 hrs the next day, after a march of 3700 metres. After a short rest, the battalion left the firm base at 0110 hrs and moved from the PUL Distributary into the forming-up-place.

The leading company (D company under Major Vatsa) crossed the start line at 0150 hrs on 22 September, and after fighting through the outskirts of the town and silencing a pill-box enroute, secured the north-east projection of the town against minor opposition.

C company, under Maj Yadav, passed through D company to secure the north-west portion of Dograi. Suddenly, it was subjected to very intense fire and got engaged in a fierce battle with a company of 18 Baluch, entrenched in pill-boxes along the east bank of the Ichhogil Canal in the Akbar School area, north of Dograi. The company charged the bank undaunted by the enemy's protective mine-field. Grenade and hand-to-hand fighting took place inside the enemy company-defended-locality, during which a platoon commander, Lt Thapa of D company, was killed. The price paid by the Jats was heavy, the survivors were only one officer and 7 men, but the enemy company was wiped out. The depth platoon of C company under Capt Bali was not drawn off into this assault. It attacked and captured the north-west projection of the town, which was actually the company's objective. Thus the gate to Dograi from the north-west had been opened wide.

B company under Maj Sandhu cut through the centre of Dograi to secure the south-west portion of

the town. They silenced a pill-box on the junction of GT road and Ichhogil Canal, and fought a platoon of 3 Baluch, entrenched on the eastern bank of the Ichhogil Canal.

'A' company, under Maj Tyagi, passed along the eastern edge of Dograi, where D company was still fighting, on to the southern edge of the town. The company silenced a MG in a pill-box on the GT road, and fighting across the road, took the surrender of a troop of 23 Cavalry, and the remnants of 16 Punjab and the brigade mortars, nine of which were in perfect order and five in damaged condition. This company came under very intense automatic fire of a company of 8 Punjab, entrenched along a pill-box guarding the southern approach to Dograi. The men of 'A' company fought a very gallant action under the inspiring leadership of Maj Asha Ram Tyagi, who was mortally wounded.

The battalion secured the objective by 0530 hrs on 22 September. A number of enemy pockets in Dograi still remained to be cleared. The houses along both sides of the GT Road at the eastern edge of Dograi had developed into little enemy strong-points. A platoon was detailed to clear out these houses. It flushed out about a dozen men from a room, one of whom attempted to dive under a captured enemy tank, but was dragged out. The man was Lt Col G.F. Golewala, Commanding Officer 16 Punjab. In these 27 incredible hours of non-stop combat, the Jats never paused to count or consider. The price paid by 3 Jat for the capture of Dograi was 58 killed, including 4 Officers, and 157 wounded, including 6 Officers and 4 JCOs(34).

Thus the operation launched by 54 Inf Bde was a complete success. Considerable amount of arms and equipment and over 108 prisoners, including the enemy battalion commander, were captured, and 300 Pak dead bodies were counted. The Battle of Dograi added a glorious chapter to the history of the Indian Army. Two officers were awarded MVC, and 2 JCOs and one Sepoy won Vr Chakra(35).

After this feat, 3 Jat was looking for the logistic support to hold on to the captured position. There was an urgent need for replenishment of ammunition and reorganisation of stores to secure the ground gained. But the battalion was neither re-inforced, nor supplies were pushed. This was a serious administrative failure, which enabled a brilliant success to slip away un-exploited. Air support for such a venture was essential, but it appears that the Corps Commander did not ask for it,

although there was a demand for it from the Div. The result was that when PAF was attacking Indian troops, guns and vehicles, there was no help forthcoming from the Indian Air Force. However, the cease-fire intervened to stop further action. According to Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh, the Dograi battle "will go down in history as one of the toughest ever fought".

7 INF DIV OPERATIONS

7 Inf Div, commanded by Maj Gen H.K. Sibal, was tasked to advance along Khalra-Barki axis. The international boundary between India and Pakistan cut this axis just 1.6 km north-west of Khalra, which was inside India. The road from Harike to Lahore ran through Bhikhiwind, Khalra, Hudiara and Barki. From the international border, Hudiara was 4 km inside Pakistan, Barki a little over 9½ km and Lahore 33½ km. On way to Lahore, the first obstacle inside the Pak territory was the Upper Bhuchar Distributary, and the next one was the Hudiara Drain - both running at right angle to the road. The Ichhogil Canal was the next obstacle, about 500 metres to the east of which was located Barki.

The likely enemy strength as appreciated on 3 September was:-

- (a) 10 Inf Div in Lahore Cantt
- (b) Only Sutlej Rangers and Mujahids east of Ichhogil Canal.
- (c) At the worst, one Inf Bn in hastily prepared positions east of Ichhogil Canal, partly on the Hudiara Drain and partly at Barki(36).

Plan

The Operation Plan of 7 Inf Div was to be carried out in two phases:-

Phase I

- i. Capture of Bridge at Barki by 48 Inf Bde Gp by last light 6 September.
- ii. Blocking enemy ingress through Bedian by 17 Rajput Gp by last light 6 September.
- iii. After capture of Hudiara Drain, 65 Inf Bde should be prepared to send one Inf Bn to secure and destroy bridge over the Ichhogil Canal near village Hir.

Phase II

Mopping up along east bank of Ichhogil Canal from including Canal Junction (763767) to excluding Tr/Canal Junction and destruction of all crossings over the Canal by 65 Inf Bde Gp(37).

Main HQ 7 Inf Div started functioning at new location Narla at 1330 hrs on 5 September. By 1800 hrs, the same day, the formation had concentrated astride road Bhikhiwind-Khalra as under:-

- i. 48 Inf Bde- Area Sidhwan-Mughal Chak
- ii. 65 Inf Bde- Area Mari Megha
less 17 Rajput
- iii. 7 Arty Bde- Area Bhikhiwind
(less elements
with 17 Rajputs
and Bty 82 Lt Regt
with 67 Inf Bde)
- iv. CIH Area Rahuwind
- v. Rear HQ, Div- Area Patti
admn units and
45 Fd pk coy.

By 2000 hrs on 5 September, firm base was established by 65 Inf Bde less 9 Madras astride road Khalra-Lahore in area IB Canal Giplan. The disposition of the forces was:-

- 16 Punjab - Left of the road Khalra-Barki.
- 4 Sikh - right of the road Khalra-Barki.
- Bde HQ - Amin Shah
- 9 Madras - Mari Megha
- 17 Rajput - Mari Kamboke

Advance to Hudiara

At 0445 hrs on 6 September, preliminary operations for the capture of Sutlej Rangers' Posts at Theh Sarja Marja, Rakh Hardit Singh and Ghawindi Barrier commenced. By 0515 hrs on 6 September, 4 Sikh had captured Theh Marja and Rakh Hardit Singh posts, and 6/8 GR had captured the Post at Ghawindi Barrier. 17 Rajput had commenced advance into Pak territory on axis Wan-Bedian, and 48 Inf Bde Group had advanced, with 6/8 GR leading, astride road Khalra-Barki.

The leading elements of 48 Inf Bde, commanded by Brig K.J.S. Shahaney, contacted enemy defences at Hudiara at about 0700 hrs on 6 September. They came under heavy, long-range automatic fire from enemy positions in Hudiara, Nurpur and Hudiara Drain. By this time, 17 Rajput Group under the command of Lt Col A.S. Gill had captured the enemy border post east of Bedian, achieving complete surprise. It was, however, halted about 550 metres east of Bedian bridge, when the enemy opened up with artillery, tanks and MMGs, making any further advance impossible. The Corps Commander ordered GOC 7 Inf Div to heavily mine the 17 Rajput area and prevent any enemy ingress from Bedian at all costs.

Preparations for the attack on Hudiara were in progress despite heavy artillery and automatic fire from Nurpur, Hudiara Drain and the village itself. By 1030 hrs, 6/8 GR under the command of Lt Col G.A. Nagle had secured Hudiara village, but no frontal attack was possible on Hudiara Drain, as the enemy was bringing down accurate artillery and SA automatic fire. The enemy dispositions estimated at Hudiara were: one company at village Hudiara, one company at Nurpur, and one company supported by elements of reconnaissance and support battalion on the western bank of the Hudiara Drain.

The plan was then proposed for an attack from the left, eliminating enemy resistance at Nurpur, east and west bank of Hudiara, and upto a distance of 900 metres from the west bank of Hudiara Drain. This was to enable the assaulting battalion to capture area behind village Hudiara and ensure prompt collapse of enemy resistance which had been holding up further move of 6/8 GR. The task was entrusted to 5 Guards, commanded by Lt Col F.S. Sondhi. The attack on Nurpur began on 1330 hrs on 6 September. The enemy put up stiff resistance and tried his best to beat back this attack by bringing down accurate automatic and artillery fire on the advancing troops, but the Guards remained undeterred. At 1710 hrs, they succeeded in cutting the enemy off by outflanking his position, which forced the defenders to abandon the Hudiara Drain and withdraw. However, they blew up the bridge over the Hudiara Drain before withdrawing.

48 Inf Bde then firmed in at Hudiara Drain with 5 Guards on the west of the Drain and south of Mile 18, 19 Maratha on the west of village Hudiara and north of Mile 18, 6/8 GR on the east of the Hudiara Drain astride road Khalra-Lahore, and the Bde HQ in area Dispensary (8092). 7 Inf Div Engineers started constructing a causeway and bailey bridge on the Hudiara Drain.

Capture of Barki

At 1800 hrs on 6 September, GOC 7 Inf Div ordered Brig Ferris, Commander 65 Ind Bde, to resume advance at 0700 hrs the following morning when the bailey bridge over the Hudiara Drain was expected to be ready. The GOC also appreciated the enemy strength as to be a brigade of two infantry battalions, supported by a sqn of armour and regiment of artillery, reduced, of course by the casualties the enemy had suffered at Hudiara. He placed under the Command of Brig Ferris, and in support, the following units:-

- (a) Under Command - CIH (Shermans) less one Sqn; 94 Fd Coy; and Tcl with ACT(38)
- (b) In direct support - 165 Fd Regt
- (c) In support - 7 Arty Bde less 165 Fd Regt, one bty 66 Fd Regt, and 82 Lt Regt.

As Brig Ferris had no time for reconnaissance, he managed to get a quick look at the ground from the Dispensary. From a study of maps, including one captured by 16 Punjab a few hours earlier, the Bde Commander decided to secure Barka Kalan for the following reasons:-

- (a) The distance from Hudiara Drain to the Ichhogil Canal along the road Khalra-Lahore was about 6 km. This road went through a wide open plain with no trees or any form of cover. The ground on the south of the road was under extensive paddy cultivation and the fields were flooded. On the north of the road, there were lesser cultivation and large patches of barren ground covered with saltpetre.
- (b) Barka Kalan was a large village located south of mile 16, approximately 400 metres from the road. It had many high brick buildings which dominated the surrounding mud huts. The minarets of the village mosque provided good view point upto the Hudiara Drain. The fact that this village was built on high ground and close to the main road, with visibility upto the Hudiara Drain, made it an ideal position for a screen for enemy defences in Barki(39).

BATTLE OF BARKI (7. INFANTRY DIVISION SECTOR)

NOT TO SCALE

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY APPROXIMATE:-


ROADS, TRACKS:-

RIVERS:-

INDIAN THRUST:-

CANAL

ENEMY POSITION:-



The causeway and a bailey bridge 200 yards west of Hudiarra were ready by 1545 hrs on 7 September(40). Shortly after, 9 Madras with B Sqn CIH advanced to capture Barka Kalan. It came under heavy fire from the village, but kept up a steady advance and secured it by 1800 hrs the same day. The enemy put in an immediate, half-hearted counter-attack, but it was beaten back.

Reports from 16 Punjab on 8th evening indicated that its patrols drew fire from the enemy-held village of Barka Khurd. Hence, it was decided to capture Barka Khurd, and the task was entrusted by 65 Inf Bde to 16 Punjab. Accordingly, the attack was launched by 16 Punjab at 2030 hrs on 9 September and Barka Khurd was captured by 2100 hrs without any casualty. 7 Inf Div continued relentless pressure on the enemy and advanced further to capture Barki and reach Ichhogil Canal. The task was entrusted to 65 Inf Bde, which decided to complete the task in two phases. In Phase I, Barki village was to be captured by 4 Sikh, and in Phase II, 16 Punjab was to capture area east bank of Ichhogil Canal and destroy Barki bridge. CIH less one sqn and 7 Arty Bde with 5 Fd Regt less one bty, 66 Fd Regt and 82 Lt Regt were to support the attack. 'H' hour was fixed at 2000 hrs on 10 September.

There were three approaches to village Barki, namely left, frontal and right. The left approach was ruled out as it lay across flooded paddy fields, with total absence of cover, and was dominated by the high canal bank south of road. The frontal approach to the village, i.e. along the road and north of it provided better going, although the ground was slightly undulating, having no cover. It was the shortest route; but movement on this was defiladed from enemy weapons on the canal banks. The right approach had better going, but involved a long detour from the Bde firm base, and was on an unprotected flank, exposed to enemy weapons on the canal bank, north of the road. As such, the frontal approach was chosen.

The accuracy and intensity of enemy artillery and mortar shelling, the absence of cover, and the fact that the enemy was in prepared defences, dictated a night attack(41).

The attack on village Barki commenced as scheduled by 4 Sikh (Commanded by Lt Col Anand Singh) which crossed the start line-Mile 16. Prior to this, the Indian guns engaged known enemy ground and mortar positions from 1930 hrs to 1955 hrs. From 1955 hrs to 2000 hrs Indian guns neutralised the enemy in Barki and along east bank of the Canal. At 2000 hrs, the

divisional artillery, including 5 Fd Regt, effectively engaged village Barki and covered the move forward of 4 Sikh. When the assaulting troops were very close to the objective, CIH less two sqns moved forward to provide fire support to them after the Indian artillery fire had lifted. It was a moon-lit night, and Indian armour was spraying the canal bank and the village with prophylectic fire. 4 Sikh captured village Barki after overcoming all resistance by 2110 hrs. Some enemy troops in pill boxes were killed or captured after the fall of the village. 4 Sikh dealt with them by lobbing grenades into the pill boxes. According to Commander, 7 Inf Div, due to the continuous Indian armour fire at night, the Pakistanis thought that India had brought in new tanks with night-firing capability, and hence abandoned Barki out of fear(42). When permission was given to the Pak troops to collect the dead bodies of their comrades from the battle-field, they took away 4 truck-loads of corpses, including the dead body of Major Aziz Bhatti, who was posthumously awarded Nishan-i-Haider, Pakistan's highest gallantry award.

Supported by the divisional artillery including 5 Fd Regt, 16 Punjab (Commanded by Lt Col J.S. Bhullar) now advanced (at 2130 hrs) to complete Phase II of the operation plan. It passed through Barki at 2230 hrs and secured east bank of Ichhogil Canal by 2340 hrs. The enemy ran in panic and demolished the bridge at Barki before withdrawing. In this battle, Commander CIH, Lt Col S.C. Joshi Vr C, who had dismounted from his tank and was trying to guide his tank forward, was killed, when the Indian tanks encountered an enemy minefield. All artillery available to the enemy both on the GT Road axis and in this sector was brought down on 16 Punjab for about half an hour after the objective was secured. The enemy also used RCL guns and guided missiles against Indian tanks.

During 10/11 September night, 621 Med Bty was moved up and it counter-bombarded enemy guns, some shells falling on Lahore also. This silenced enemy guns effectively, and was a contributory cause of the exodus from Lahore.

Struggle on the Ichhogil

The same day, 11 September, 48 Inf Bde was given the task of capturing and demolishing the bridge on the Ichhogil Canal at Jahman. The Bde decided to carry out this task on night 11/12 September with 5 Guards, supported by 41 Fd Regt. 5 Guards attacked Jahman bridge, but the attack was unsuccessful, and the battalion was pulled back to Hudiara on the morning of 12 September.

Another attack was launched on the target by 48 Inf Bde on 12/13 night with 6/8 GR and 5 Guards, supported by two troops of CIH and whole of divisional artillery. But the enemy brought down heavy mortar and automatic fire. Also, 6 out of 8 Indian tanks, which were to support the attack, got bogged down 700 to 900 metres short of the Canal. Thus, this attack also failed. Subsequently, the enemy re-inforced his positions at Jahman bridge.

48 Inf Bde was now allotted the limited task of clearing the enemy from the Jahman village and securing the east bank of the Ichhogil Canal. The Bde used 6/8 GR and 19 Maratha for this task, supported by two troops of CIH and the whole of divisional artillery. The operation began on 18 September, and by 1500 hrs, the area south-east of village Jahman was secured by 6/8 GR. 19 Maratha less two platoons attacked area north-west of village Jahman, and by 1730 hrs the whole of the area around Jahman was in Indian hands. Ten prisoners were captured, and Indian troops dominated the area upto the Canal line opposite Jahman. Meanwhile, 65 Inf Bde captured Manhiala on 16 September.

Then on 18 September, 7 Inf Div was ordered to secure the area between Ichhogil Canal and Rajoke-Thatti-Jaimal Singh-Kalia-Shankhatra-Katlohi Kalan by first light 20 September in order to assist 4 Mtn Division in its second attempt to recover Khem Karan from Pak hands. A force composed of 19 Maratha, commanded by Lt Col S.D. Parab, with 7 Cav less one sqn and one troop, was earmarked for the task, and Brig Piara Singh, MC, Vr C, commander 48 Inf Bde, was appointed leader of this Task Force. The Task Force advanced and captured the enemy's post east of Chathanwala at 1230 hrs on 19 September, but its attempt to capture Chathanwala village itself failed due to heavy mortar fire. In this attempt the Task Force suffered heavy casualties, and four tanks of 7 Cav also got bogged down, out of which three were later recovered. However, it continued to advance despite stiff opposition, including enemy tanks, from area between Rajoke and Dholan, and captured Dholan. Advancing further, it captured Thatti Jaimal Singh by 1615 hrs on 20 September.

Pak reaction was quick. They counter-attacked five times between 1730 hrs on 20 September and 1115 hrs on 21 September, the last one being with two squadrons of armour in support. This last attempt made some headway on the outskirts of Thatti Jaimal Singh, but the Task Force restored the situation by 1330 hrs. During this operation, the Task Force lost

three PT-76 tanks due to enemy ground action and shelling, but it took a toll of six enemy Chaffees. 7 Inf Div could not secure the area any further, and on 21 September this task force was placed under 4 Mtn Div. Then came the Cease-fire on 23 September.

Immediately after the cease-fire, the Pak troops in front of India's 7 Inf Div Sector undertook a bold and unscrupulous manoeuvre. After crossing the Ichhogil Canal in force at night, they surrounded one of the isolated Indian Company positions. The Pakistanis overpowered and gagged the Indian sentries and then caught the sleeping Indian soldiers and moved them some hundreds of metres away. Thus the Pak troops occupied the Indian Company position to prove that they had been there at the time of the cease-fire. Consequently, the Indian troops took proper retaliatory action. The whole of the 7 Inf Div Arty was brought down on that company position to teach the Pakistani intruders a good lesson. Some of the Pakistanis were killed, and the remainder withdrew in disgrace(43).

Conclusion

The main success of 7 Inf Div was the capture of Barki, which was a well-defended Pak bastion. Pakistan had deployed one company in Barki village and two companies on the east bank of Ichhogil Canal. There was also a Pak company of the Reconnaissance and Support battalion in this area, and the whole position was ringed round and swept with constantly surveyed Defensive Fire Tasks. A few tanks were also seen in the area. The defences were elaborately prepared and based on cement concrete pill boxes which were sited to cover all approaches to the village and cunningly camouflaged to resemble mud huts. Each pill box was about 4 metre square, with 30-centimetre thick concrete walls and equally thick roof. A team of three men equipped with automatic weapons manned each of these strong points. The pill boxes were well stocked for sustained operations and sited with care for mutual support. Extensive tunnelling within the village permitted speedy, uninterrupted movement inside these defence works even during spells of intense shelling. The major portion of Pak Artillery was also brought to support the battle of Barki. Thus Barki was a virtual fortress bristling with automatic weapons, armour and artillery. It presented a tough challenge, hence its reduction by 7 Inf Div was a creditable achievement.

Brig Ferris, who commanded 65 Inf Bde during these operations, has made the following observations:

- (a) Maps as supplied to the formations were out of date, and hence air photos and air recce would have been invaluable. An air OP was essential to locate enemy guns and mortars.
- (b) The unorthodox use of armour at night paid dividends, and its use in assault role demoralised the enemy.
- (c) As the radio sets used during this operation were heavy and cumbersome, radio operators got separated from their Commanders while going through enemy artillery fire and during the assaults, resulting in the break-down of signal communication for long periods(44).

4 MTN DIV OPERATIONS

4 Mtn Div, being a Mountain Division, was trained and organised to fight in the mountains and its normal operational role was on the northern border. During June 1965, GOC 4 Mtn Div was sounded that in the event of conflict with Pakistan, the Division would be given offensive task. The Division was moved to the forward area in April 1965, and was ordered on 4 September to move for Operation Riddle.

In early Sixties, a huge pond existed near Kasur in which the Rohi Nala and Sutlej outflow entered. Between 1961 and 1965 the whole area was drained off and a thick jungle was created to hide Pak tanks. Being a wooded area, Indian aircraft could not detect the presence of armour. Pakistan had also constructed two big aqueducts on the Ichhogil Canal, one north and another south of Khem Karan which was used by the Pak armour to launch a two-pronged attack on 4 Mtn Div(45). Maj Gen Gurbakhsh Singh felt that these long-term preparations by Pakistan should have alerted Indian Intelligence, but this did not happen.

Plan

Unmindful of these Pak preparations, 4 Mtn Div set about to carry out its allotted tasks in two phases. In the first phase, Pak territory upto the east bank of Ichhogil Canal from Ballanwala to Pt RO 798489 was to be captured by one brigade group. In the second Phase, Pak territory east of Ichhogil Canal from Canal junction RO 763767 to Ballanwala was to be captured by one brigade group less battalion.

HQ XI Corps ordered at 0330 hrs on 6 September that the securing of territory east of the Ichhogil

Canal was to be carried out with utmost speed and irrespective of heavy casualties. It was also clarified that compact defended sector would be occupied covering axes Kasur-Khem Karan and Gandasinghwala-Khem Karan.

According to the intelligence made available to the Division, Pakistan had only Sutlej Rangers and Mujahid Posts east of Ichhogil Canal, and at the most, one infantry battalion in hastily prepared positions - deployed from Bedian to Pt RO 798439(46). No firm information of the location of the Pak 1 Armd Div was available. Consequently, the time as to when the enemy would launch his offensive with 1 Armd Div and an Infantry Division (two brigades) was not foreseen, and quick Pak reaction was not expected.

In view of the quantum of resistance visualised, it was thought that initial occupation of east bank of Rohi Nala would delay enemy armour thrusts, enable the Indians to cause more attrition and economise troop involvement to defend the likely axes of the enemy advance. The Divisional plan envisaged:-

Phase I

- i. Securing of Pak territory upto east bank of Rohi Nala from road-Nala junction to area Rohi Nala (RO 8050) by 62 Mountain Brigade Group.
- ii. Occupation of defended sector by 62 Mtn Bde Gp with an additional battalion under command in the area west and west-south of Khem Karan, covering axes Kasur-Khem Karan and Gandasinghwala-Khem Karan.

Phase II

- i. Capture of Ballanwala - Theh Pannun and securing of Pak territory east of Ichhogil Canal from (including) Ballanwala (excluding) Canal junction by 7 Mtn Bde Gp less one battalion.
- ii. Securing of east bank of Ichhogil Canal from (excluding) Ballanwala to Pt RO 798439 by 62 Mtn Bde and destruction of bridge over Ichhogil Canal on road Khem Karan-Kasur.

Initial Successes

Before the advance commenced, firm base in area south-west of Khem Karan was established, consisting of 1/9 GR, 18 Raj Rif and 9 Horse less two squadrons. At 0500 hrs on 6 September, 62 Mtn Bde commenced

advance to secure area Rohiwal and the road crossing over Rohi Nala. 9 J&K Rif reported capture of Rohi Nala on the main axis at about 0915 hrs. It was then directed to continue with its task to push through and destroy the bridge on the Ichhogil Canal and occupy its near bank. However, the unit came under heavy artillery and MMG fire from the enemy on the Ichhogil Canal. 13 Dogra also succeeded in securing area Rohiwal by 1030 hrs, although it was under mortar and MMG fire from the enemy and two jawans were killed, and 7 persons injured, including two Officers(47).

Two battalions of 7 Mtn Bde - 7 Grenadiers and 4 Grenadiers also advanced towards Ballanwala and Theh Pannun respectively. By 1130 hrs on 6 September, these battalions secured the line of Rohi Nala and east bank of Ichhogil Canal from Theh Pannun southwards, except Ballanwala, where 7 Grenadiers' attack had failed, because Ballanwala was a stronghold of the Pak defenders.

Pakistan reacted quickly with strong armour thrusts of Patton tanks and motorised infantry. At 1530 hrs on 6 September, 13 Dogra were subjected to heavy artillery fire prior to counter-attack by one Pak battalion-cum-armour squadron group. The Dogra battalion abandoned this objective and disintegrated as a unit. Throughout the night 6/7 September, all defended localities and gun areas were subjected to very heavy, accurate and sustained artillery fire. By the first light, the Grenadiers also left position. At about 0700 hrs, 9 J&K Rif location was encircled by Pak tanks and strafed by the enemy aircraft. CO 9 J&K and one company withdrew. The rest was later extricated by armour.

By then, the enemy's violent reaction to the Indian move in this sector foretold his major offensive designs(48). The enemy advanced with tanks and motorised infantry not along the expected axes, but from flanks through Patto Kuhna and Ballanwala and threatened to bypass the firm base. By 0800 hrs on 7 September, it was realised that strong Pak armour thrust towards axis Khem Karan-Bhikiwind from the north of road Khem Karan-Kasur was imminent and that any defended sector occupied in the area west and south-west of Khem Karan would be bypassed. Accordingly, it was decided to fall back and occupy a defended sector north of Khem Karan to cover the axes Khem Karan-Patti and Khem Karan-Bhikiwind in the general area of Asal Uttar-Bhura Kuhna-Chima, while 7 Mtn Bde, which had captured area Theh Pannun and linked up with Bedian, was ordered to fall back on the defended sector. By last light 7 September, defences were occupied as under:-

were occupied as under:-

- | | |
|---|---|
| 18 Raj Rif | Area south of Asal Uttar covering the axis Khem Karan-Patti. |
| 1/9 GR | Area road-track junction, covering the axis Khem Karan-Bhikiwind. |
| 4 Grenadiers | Area south of Chima covering axis Khem Karan-Bhikiwind to give depth to 1/9 GR positions. |
| 9 J&K Rif
(Approx.
two companies) | Area north of Asal Uttar giving depth to 18 Raj Rif location. |


9 Horse with a company of 1/9 GR, to cover the preparation of defences, were deployed in area south-west of Khem Karan.

Pattons Smashed

At 0930 hrs on 8 September, approximately two squadrons of Chaffees approached 4 Mtn Div position through Ballanwala as a reconnaissance force. Approaching on a broad front, they surrounded Indian defended localities, and from their right flank sallied upto the gun area. In the action which followed, the Pakistanis lost two Chaffees and withdrew. Meanwhile, work on the preparation of defences was progressing. By the afternoon of 8 September, three and a half battalions of Indian troops had dug the defences around Asal Uttar and laid some mines.

Again at 1445 hrs, the Pakistanis carried out a recce in force with a regiment of Pattons. They over-ran the position of 1/9 Gr. 9 Horse now played an important role in stopping the enemy in front of the Indian defended sector. A diversionary attack by Pattons fell on 4 Grenadiers and the gun area, but it was halted in area Rattoke. Pak troops again tried to by-pass the defended sector on the north, but a squadron of 3 Cav in the area Bhikiwind had anticipated this move and was ready to receive it. It moved down immediately and attacked the enemy, inflicting heavy casualties and forcing it to withdraw(49).

After this recce in force by the enemy, it became evident that a major armoured thrust was likely to take place next day. Immediately, 2 Indep Armd Bde was placed in support, and moved from concentration area. It was ordered to concentrate 3 Cav less a



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squadron from the area Chabal Kalan and Rajatal to the 4 Mtn Div sector, and 8 Cav less a squadron from the Amritsar by-pass area to 4 Mtn Div sector and place itself under the command of GOC 4 Mtn Div. All moves were completed smoothly without incident on the night of 8/9 September, and the defences were strengthened by laying more mines. At 0200 hrs, the enemy combat group 4 Armd Bde (with two Patton regiments), making use of moonlight and infra-red equipment, attacked 18 Raj Rif. The Indian artillery and infantry engaged the enemy with concentrations and recoilless guns. Although the enemy tanks had a free and uninterrupted run, they failed to dislodge the Indian defences. What appeared to be desperate Indian situation, was thus saved.

At 0430 hrs on 9 September, 2 Indep Armd Bde was placed under the command of 4 Mtn Div for the battle. Orders were issued that the Indian armour would function at night, and 9 Horse would stay in forward defended localities and gun area in anti-tank role. The deployment of 4 Mtn Div sector troops in the morning of 9 September was:-

- (a) The Brigade-defended sector consisting of three and a half battalions in the Asal Uttar area with 9 Horse less a squadron.
- (b) One squadron 9 Horse was protecting the gun areas and was deployed between the brigade-defended sector and the gun area.
- (c) 3 Cav less two troops was between Dibbipura and Chima. One squadron 8 Cav was east of Valtoha to protect the southern flank.
- (d) 8 Cav less two squadrons was in the area Warnala in depth.

Pakistan's attempt to over-run 4 Grenadiers during early hrs on 9 September had already failed. It then made another attempt during the night to over-run 18 Raj Rif positions. However, the battalion was told to hold fast, and the enemy was taken on by medium artillery and tanks, located in forward defended localities. At 0330 hrs, the enemy infantry, brought up in armoured personnel carriers, probed forward, but, on hitting the mine-field, withdrew, and a lull followed. Pakistan carried out reconnaissance in force with tanks throughout the latter part of night 9/10 September.

The final enemy attack came at 0645 hrs on 10 September. Pakistan tanks concentrated in area Manawan, with a view to by-passing the Indian defended

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sector. At 0830 hrs, one enemy combat group from 4 Armd Bde was launched against 4 Grenadiers, but the attack was foiled by artillery concentration before the enemy infantry could close on to the Indian mine-field. Indian armour then came from the flank, resulting in a tank melee. Here, a recoilless gun manned by Havildar Abdul Hamid knocked out 3 Patton tanks, and he posthumously got the first Param Vir Chakra in the Division during this war. An outflanking move towards Mahmoodpura-Dibbipura by enemy 4 Cavalry (Pattons M-47) was then noticed. This was shadowed by Indian 3 Cavalry hinging on the defended sector. Enemy tanks were finally trapped in the area Mahmoodpura. It was at 1430 hrs that GOC Pak 1 Armd Div, Maj Gen Nasir Ahmed, who had earlier witnessed the battle from a helicopter, came with his 'R' group to area mile 37 on road Khem Karan-Bhikhiwind to push the advance personally. The party was surprised by 4 Grenadiers and heavy artillery concentration, and the entire 'R' group was destroyed at about 1800 hrs. After the death of the Pak GOC and the destruction of two combat groups and the 'R' group, 1 Armd Div (Pak) offensive was effectively foiled.

However, it was confirmed only on the morning of 11 September that enemy advance had been finally held, when officers and men of Pak 4 Cavalry started surrendering. Thus the enemy's drive with a superior force of armour, i.e. five Patton regiments - 4 Cavalry, 5 Horse, 6 Lancers, 19 Lancers and 24 Cavalry, - and one Chaffee regiment (12 Cavalry), directed to capture all territory west of river Beas and cut the rear of XI Corps, was frustrated. Instead of reaching Beas, the enemy went back to Kasur to lick his wounds having lost 97 tanks, including 72 Pattons(50). 4 Mtn Div suffered casualties of 60 killed, 206 wounded, 93 missing, and lost 10 tanks. 2 Indep Armd Bde suffered one OR killed and 2 tanks lost(51).

Pakistan's plan was to establish a lodgement area with 11 Inf Div with under command 5 Armd Bde upto the general line running east to west of Bhura Kuhna village. While 1 Armd Div with under command 4 Armd Bde was to advance along road Valtaha-Patti to secure Raya and the GT road bridge on River Beas, 4 Armd Bde under the command of 1 Armd Div was to advance on road Khem Karan-Bhikiwind to secure Jandialaguru. The role assigned to 5 Armd Bde was to revert to parent formation and to advance to road Khem Karan-Bhikiwind to protect the left flank of the forward two combat groups and to cut the rear of the Indian 7 Inf Div, operating on road Bhikiwind-Khalra-Barki. The enemy plan was to occupy

Harike bridge by 8 September and to secure Beas and other objectives by 9-10 September. It avoided the crossing of any water obstacle and aimed at capturing Indian territory west of river Beas and encircling XI Corps. If it succeeded, it would have brought the Pak Army quick and spectacular success.

Sikhs caught at Khem Karan

On 11 September, at about 1100 hrs, 4 Mtn Div received instruction for advance to Khem Karan as it was then thought that the enemy was withdrawing in haste. The same day, at 1615 hrs, 2 Indep Armd Bde less one squadron 3 Cavalry was taken out of command. But 2 Mahar was placed under 7 Mtn Bde, commanded by Brig D.S. Sidhu. On the night of 11/12 September, 4 Sikh was also moved from 7 Inf Div and placed under 4 Mtn Div. These two units, 2 Mahar and 4 Sikh, were ordered to advance to the left flank to establish a road block in area Khem Karan by 0500 hrs on 12 September.

The advance involved overcoming the enemy screen position along the Khem Karan distributary by 2 Mahar and a squadron of armour, linking up with 4 Sikh later. The advance of the Mahars started well. Bhura Kuhna was secured, and a fairly large number of enemy weapons, equipment and vehicles were captured. Further progress was checked tenaciously at the distributary, and the concentrated enemy air and artillery bombardment held up the advance. The Mahar battalion suffered heavy casualties and failed to reach the objective. Therefore, two companies 9 J&K Rif were rushed to continue the attack. The assault went in at 1600 hrs, but by last light it failed to close up to the distributary. Centurion tanks were used in this advance and they had four battle casualties. It was then ordered that Centurion and AMX tanks would not be used in the advance in future.

According to the plan, 4 Sikh, about 200 men, was to be established in Khem Karan during night 11/12 September. 4 Sikh was originally under the command of 65 Inf Bde and had fiercely fought the enemy during its advance to Barki. On 10 September it, along with other units, had captured Barki at 2000 hrs, and consolidated its position by 2200 hrs. During this operation, the unit had lost 3 JCOs and 20 ORs killed, and 2 Officers, 1 JCO and 93 ORs wounded. Being constantly in contact with the enemy, it could not get any rest during the night of 10/11 September, and on 11th morning it was engaged in the evacuation of casualties and other jobs. Consequently, when Lt Col Anant Singh, CO, was told that his battalion was being given an important operational order, he objected,

pointing out that his officers and men were tired and not in a position to undertake another operation immediately in a different, unknown area. His plea was not accepted, and he was inspired and his morale raised when it was said that this operation would coincide with the Saragarhi Day (12 September) and his battalion was chosen for the task by the Corps and Army Commanders(52).

Finally, in the afternoon of 11 September, 4 Sikh received the orders to move to Khem Karan sector. The battalion was relieved at 1700 hrs, and it moved back on foot upto Hudiara, where mechanical transport was provided. It reached Valtoha, about 32 km from Hudiara, on Patti-Khem Karan-Kasur axis, where the CO joined the battalion at about 2200 hrs with the orders that the battalion was to get behind the enemy lines during the same night, and establish a road block in Khem Karan by 0500 hrs on the 12th. The Corps Commander had told the CO that no enemy armour would be encountered at Khem Karan and the enemy resistance would be small.

The battalion was quickly organised, and 200 men were selected for the task. Lt Col Anand Singh chose to manhandle two RCL guns along with him. But as the heavy RCLs, each weighing about 400 kg, had slowed down the advance, the CO sent them back under one Officer and ten ORs(53). The battalion reached near its objective but could not get into the village due to the presence of enemy tanks. Some enemy trenches were also seen, and unfortunately 1 OR of 4 Sikh fell into one of them and got captured. Pak Commanders interrogated him and came to know about the movement of 4 Sikh. Under the orders of the CO, Maj Sidhu tried to fire at the Pak tanks with the Rocket Launcher from a distance of 150 metres, but it did not fire due to some mechanical fault(54).

By then the sustained exertions of the last three days were beginning to tell, and the Sikhs could barely stagger. The deadtired battalion lay doggo in the sugarcane crops and waited for Indian tanks to link up(55). At 0900 hrs, a Pak AOP flew over them for 15 minutes, after which enemy movement was seen. At about 1030 hrs, there were noises of tanks approaching Khem Karan. The battalion raised its war cry with great fervour in the belief that Indian tanks had arrived, and then tried to rush into the village to establish a block. But it came under a heavy MMG fire from a squadron of Pak tanks, deployed all around them, which had been mistaken to be Indian tanks. Maj D.S. Sidhu then ordered his men to break out of the Pak armour cordon and managed to bring out 40 of them. Approximately 126 men, including the CO, were taken prisoner, and the remainder escaped(56).

This was a wrong move to bring in two tired Bns, unfamiliar with the terrain, to fight against the enemy, whose strength was--under-estimated(57). HQ 4 Mtn Div did not provide and guides, as promised, and the signals party had disappeared, resulting in complete break-down in wireless communication between HQ 4 Mtn Div and 4 Sikh.

On night 12/13 September, 2 Indep Armd Bde consisting of one sqn 3 Cav, 8 Cav less one sqn, and 7 Cav less one sqn, was moved back to 4 Mtn Div sector. It was reported that the enemy armour was concentrating in area Kasur, possibly for another attack. From 13 to 15 September, while awaiting the enemy offensive, vigorous patrolling was carried out, followed by mopping up operations on 16 September by 9 Horse and one company 1/9 GR. Villages of Kalanjar Uttar, Manawan, Duhai Kuhna, Bhura Karimpur, Lakhna and Dholan were re-occupied during these operations. During the period 13 to 17 September, Pakistanis also re-inforced their position at Khem Karan. They became aggressive on 17 September and started harassing Indian defended localities with armour and infantry patrols, and made two attacks on an Indian patrol base at Bhura Kuhna, which were, however, repulsed. New plans were prepared for the re-capture of Khem Karan, and on 17 September, 1/5 GR was placed under command for the purpose(58). HQ 29 Inf Bde and 2 Madras with a field Regiment joined next day. The Brigade firmed in in area Bhura Kuhna and astride mile 37 on road Valtaha-Khem Karan. On 19 September, 41 Inf Bde was also placed under command, and it completed concentration by the evening of 20 September. The attack on Khem Karan was planned to be carried out in two phases. In the first phase, 41 Inf Bde was to capture Khem Karan by 0200 hrs on 22 September by a right-flank attack, and in the second phase, 29 Inf Bde was to capture Khem Karan distributary by 0500 hrs on 22 September.

Reconnaissance was carried out during night 19/20 September, but it proved inconclusive; and the attack had to be postponed for one day. The attack went in on the night of 21/22. Fire plan went according to the timed programme. But the leading company of 1/8 GR encountered a minefield, and the attack was held up. It was directed to hold on. 15 Kumaon, the follow-up battalion, was not quick to take advantage of the night hours. Meanwhile, the enemy managed to bring his armour and air strength against the attacking troops, who failed to capture the objectives. Although, 2 Madras ex 29 Inf Bde was partially successful in capturing the screen position, it had to come back due to heavy shelling and SA fire.

Assessment

After the initial Indian reverses suffered in Khem Karan, an Indian army top brass was so panicked that he thought of withdrawing the Indian forces behind the Beas, but the Army Commander overruled it. Faced with imminent enemy onslaught, Commander 4 Mtn Div undertook useful defence preparations from the afternoon of 7 September to the forenoon of the next day. This was made possible by 2 Coys of 9 J&K Rif and a Sqn 9 Horse holding on the Rohi Nala and preventing the enemy from using the main axis till the evening of 7 September. In this, a good contribution was made by 14 Med Regiment, which, despite orders to withdraw, made a continuous bombardment of Kasur, disrupting the enemy build-up. Also the quick move of 2 Armd Brigade to this sector on night 8/9 September prevented by-passing of the Indian defences by the Pak armour(59). Besides, the high standing crops on the ground neutralised the superior range of the Patton's gun, restricting it to about 800 metres only. The gallantry of 4 Grenadiers, 18 Raj Rif and 9 J&K Rif, and good fire support provided by the artillery, jointly saved the situation.

The decisive victory at Asal Uttar aborted the ambitious Pakistani bid to penetrate deep into Indian territory. The mighty 1 Armd Div of Pakistan was humbled and the Patton's invincibility was falsified. But 4 Mtn Div's abortive attempt to recapture Khem Karan was anti-climax to the brilliant performance at Asal Uttar. The plans were generally poor in conception; the troops were fed peacemeal to tasks that required well-coordinated action in strength, and attacks were launched in a hurry with inadequate preparation. Leadership at the brigade and battalion levels also left much to be desired in a number of cases. Thus the later operations were a series of disappointing failures.

Analysing the reasons of 4 Mtn Div defensive success against Pakistan in this sector, the then GOC 4 Mtn Div says that the Pakistanis followed US method of offense without capturing firm base, while the British method was to have a firm base first and then move forward. This led to Pakistani debacle. He thinks that 4 Mtn Div had planned and executed defensive battle properly and luck also favoured the Division(60). Lt Gen J.S. Dhillon (Retd) has observed that the Pak counter-offensive in Khem Karan area with only armour but no infantry was a lucky break for him(61). 4 Mtn Div, which had suffered humiliation in Sela-Bomdila area during the Chinese aggression of 1962, regained its lost prestige in 1965.

29 Brigade in Dera Baba Nanak

This Brigade was then away from 7 Inf Div to hold the strategic Dera Baba Nanak area. Dera Baba Nanak was located on the left bank of river Ravi, about 28 km north-west of Batala. On the other side of the river, opposite Dera Baba Nanak, was the Pak town of Jassar, about 14 km east of Narowal, an important centre of Pak railway communication. There was a 150-metre long road-cum-rail bridge over the Ravi at Dera Baba Nanak, with the railway line below and the road above. This bridge, along with some area on the Indian side of the river, about 1.6 km deep, between the river and the Dhussi Bund, north of Batala-DBN (Dera Baba Nanak) road, was under the control of Pakistan since 1959 Indo-Pak agreement. The Pakistani area on the Indian side of Ravi was known as the Pak Enclave, and similarly there was a small Indian Enclave on the Pakistani side of the river. The DBN bridge gave Pakistan the facility to bring troops to her Enclave on the Indian side of the river.

On 4 September, 29 Inf Bde was placed under Brig Pritam Singh, who came from 19 Inf Bde, ex-26 Inf Div. This Brigade comprised 2 Raj Rif, commanded by Lt Col Vohra, 1/5 GR, commanded by Lt Col S.N.S. Gurung, and 2 Madras, commanded by Lt Col C.V. Donoghou, and had the support of B Sqn 14 Horse, 5 Fd Regt, 35/36 Light Battery, and one Fd Coy. The Bde operated directly under the control of XI Corps. It moved from Ambala in the morning of 5 September, reaching its concentration area by 1800 hrs.

The Pakistanis were holding the DBN area with 115 Inf Bde ex-15 Inf Div, located in Sialkot area. One of its Bns, 3 Punjab, had taken defensive position in the Pak Enclave, with 30 CAV in support of the Brigade. However, according to Indian information, Pakistan had only one Inf Bn, supported by one Fd Battery and a Sqn of tanks in Narowal-Jassar area, and only two Pakistani Inf Coys could be expected in the Pak Enclave on the Indian side of the Ravi.

The Bde was given the task of destroying the enemy bridge-head at Dera Baba Nanak. Brig Pritam Singh decided to carry out the task in two phases. In Phase I, he planned to establish a firm base on the Indian Dhussi Bund with one battalion (2 Raj Rif), capture the southern end of the Ravi bridge with one battalion (1/5 Gorkha Rifles), and capture Pak Dhussi Bund with one battalion (2 Madras). In Phase II, Pak

Tower in Dera Baba Nanak was to be demolished, the area occupied, and a firm base established there by 2 Rajputana Rifles. Later, 2 Raj Rif was to provide firm base for the Bde attack on area Jassar and 2 Madras and 1/5 GR(FF) were to attack through this battalion to capture the Bund area and the Jassar bridge respectively. 'H' hour was fixed for 0400 hrs on 6 September(62).

From its concentration area the Bde had left for Dera Baba Nanak at 2330 hrs on 5 September and took up defensive position at 0045 hrs on 6 September.

2 Madras reached the Assembly area at 0100 hrs on 6 September and moved for forming up place (Dhussi Bund) at 0200 hrs, arriving there after an hour. Advancing further, B and C companies, under Maj R.C. D'Souza and Maj M.M. Khuller respectively, moved towards their objectives, i.e. Pak post and No.3 Bund. Complete surprise was achieved, till the Indian artillery fired on the enemy positions. By 0510 and 0515 hrs, C Coy and B Coy had captured their objectives. The Pak tower was also fired upon with RCLs and tanks, but not much impression could be made on its concrete structure. The Pak OP in the tower continued to direct artillery fire from there. The Indians also captured about eleven (Pak) Sutlej Rangers and 19 civilians along with arms and ammunition. Then, 'A' coy under Maj J.C. Pandey moved forward for mopping up, and apprehend four civilians and killed one Sutlej Ranger.

1/5 GR(FF) had arrived at Dera Baba Nanak at 0200 hrs on 6 September 1965, and on reaching the forming up place at 0330 hrs, started firing at 0400 hrs. Moving forward, 'A' coy captured its objective, i.e. the right side of the Bund at 0545 hrs without encountering much resistance. Overjoyous Gorkhas started dancing with 'Khukris' in their hands, but did not dig in to meet any enemy counter-attack. Now Pak forces started heavy shelling of the Indian positions. Tanks were also brought up by Pakistan and fired from the other side of the river. Two enemy aircraft also flew over the Indian territory. Unfortunately, telephone communication between the Bde HQ on the one hand, and the Corps HQ and the Bns on the other, was not functioning. At 1000 hrs, the enemy counter-attacked all the occupied positions and continued heavy and intense shelling with artillery and Mortars. Although there were tanks in the Bde HQ, they were not sent to the front(63). At 1230 hrs, Indian tanks were ordered to move forward to support 1/5 GR. Soon, information was received by the Bde HQ

that two enemy tanks had crossed the Ravi bridge, and there was rumour that two defending Gorkha Coys had been smashed. Being panicked, Brig Pritam Singh sought permission to withdraw to Kiran Nala, the rear line of defence. But this was refused(64). At 1530 hrs, the Bde Major went to 13 Punjab lines and informed the Corps HQ, by tapping the main line, about the loss of the objective, captured by 1/5 GR, and the casualties suffered by them. He requested the BGS to send more artillery and tank ammunition as well as mines, and urged for setting right the communication net.

At 1600 hrs, CO 1/5 GR came to the Bde HQ and reported that during the enemy counter-attack against 1/5 GR, 5 to 6 Pak tanks were brought over the bridge, out of which two could withdraw to the Pak side of it, and it was the arrival of one troop of 9 Horse at 1330 hrs which halted further Pak ingress. As the RCL crew was wounded and the RCL gun was destroyed by the enemy, the Pakistani tanks could not be prevented from withdrawing from the bridge. The two Gorkha Coys holding the south end of the bridge fell back to Dhussi Bund after suffering heavy casualties, he said.

At 1700 hrs, the Bde Cdr reviewed the situation and ordered CO Raj Rif to re-capture the positions lost by the Gorkhas. A plan was formulated for the purpose. Soon afterwards, Brig Bhide, Chief Engineer, and Lt Col Chhajju Ram, GSO-I(Ops) XI Corps, arrived with the order of the Corps Cdr that a counter-attack should be launched on the night of 6/7 September and further enemy advance must be checked at all costs. At 1730 hrs, some Indian aircraft attacked the enemy on the other side of the bridge. At 2200 hrs, the enemy started heavy shelling on 1/5 GR, and tank noises were heard from the bridge. Half an hour later, the enemy infantry attacked the left coy of 1/5 GR. However, the Indian tanks moved up and repulsed the Pak attack. At 0030 hrs, the enemy attacked the right coy of 1/5 GR, but this attack was also repulsed with the support of tanks. This unorthodox use of tanks at night played an important role in raising the morale of the Indian troops and scaring away the enemy tanks, which then withdrew.

Now, 2 Raj Rif launched a counter-attack and re-captured the lost positions by 0400 hrs. As one Indian tank, which went up to the bridge for blocking it had toppled over, another tank moved up and blocked the bridge. Anti-tank mines were also laid at the entrance to the bridge, and one troop of tanks was deployed in the forward coy localities of 2 Raj Rif to

prevent any more Pak counter-attack. At 0900 hrs on 7 September, the enemy blew up the Ravi bridge, and one span of the bridge near the enemy side went down. 2 Raj Rif captured two Pak tanks, a lot of arms and ammunition and 16 PsOW. At 1100 hrs, the OP in the Pak tower surrendered(65).

The destruction of the bridge by the enemy indicated his defensive intentions. As his right flank was now comparatively secure, the Corps Commander appreciated that he could:-

- (a) switch the 8 Cavalry less a squadron, which was deployed to protect the approaches to Amritsar on the North, to the 4 Mtn Div Sector, and
- (b) leave one battalion at Dera Baba Nanak and move the remainder of the brigade to Bhikhiwind to join the 7 Inf Div(66).

Accordingly, 16 PAP Battalion was put under command 2 Raj Rif to defend the DBN sector, and 29 Inf Bde HQ with 2 Madras and 1/5 GR(FF) was pulled out along with 5 Fd Regt for the Khem Karan Sector.

In the DBN Sector, both the Indian and Pakistani Bde Cdrs seem to have suffered from a lack of initiative and competence. According to Col Naresh Chandra (Retd), ex-Brigade Major, Brig Pritam Singh, who took up the command of the 29 Inf Bde on 4 September, was a weak commander and had a defensive mentality. He did not visit forward positions even when 1/5 GR captured the Pak Enclave upto the DBN bridge, and got panicky when the forward positions of 1/5 GR were overrun. Similarly, Brig Muzaffurddin, who was commanding the Pak troops in this area through remote control, ordered the blowing up of the DBN bridge on receipt of a false report from an equally jittery person, in spite of strong protests from the Bn Cdr, Lt Col Zulfiqar Ali. The picture of false Indian pressure at DBN, as painted before his superiors, caused the move of Pak 24 Bde from the threatened Chawinda Sector. Had the mistake not been rectified, and had the 24 Inf Bde not re-occupied its original position, the Pakistanis could have lost the crucial Chawinda battle(67).


With proper plan, resources and initiative, the Pakistanis could have taken advantage of the DBN bridge and the Pak Enclave on its Indian side to launch an offensive through this Pakistani bridgehead towards Gurdaspur and Pathankot. The damage to the bridge caused by the panicky Pak Bde Commander deprived Pakistan of this opportunity. Similarly, the

67 INF BDE SECTOR

NOT TO SCALE

INTERNATIONAL : - - - - -
BOUNDARY APPROX. : - - - - -

ROADS : ————
RIVERS : ~~~~~~
RAILWAYS : + + + + +



Indian army also with imagination, foresight and adequate forces could have launched an additional offensive towards Lahore or towards Sialkot after capturing the DBN bridge. But unfortunately, there was no bold plan for that.

67 Brigade Operations

Commander XI Corps tasked Brig Bant Singh, Commander 67 Inf Bde Group, to defend the area from Harike Headworks (excluding) to Anupgarh in Rajasthan. The Brigadier divided the area into three main sectors - Hussainiwala, Fazilka and Ganganagar. The Indian town of Fazilka in the Punjab, about 80 km south-west of Ferozepur, was located a few km from the Indo-Pak Border. It was connected by railway with Ferozepur and Kot Kapura, and with Ferozepur, Abohar and Bhatinda by road. Opposite Fazilka, was located Sulaimanke Headworks on the Sutlej river(68).

The Bde had under command 3/9 GR, 2 MLI, 14 Punjab, 61 CAV (Horsed), Indep Sqn 14 Horse, 144 Fd Regt (TA), four PAP and two RAC Bns. 67 Inf Bde plan was to hold Hussainiwala Headworks with one battalion group, Ganganagar sector with 61 Cavalry and two RAC battalions, and Sulaimanke sector with brigade less one battalion. As the main threat was expected against Ferozepur, 2 MLI was deployed in that area, supported by 1 Light Battery (3.7" Howitzers). The brigade took up the defence posture as per plan.

Pak 105 Inf Bde was deployed in Sulaimanke under the command of Brig Mohd. Akbar, and consisted of 10 Punjab and Baluch. When the Indian troops crossed the International Border in Lahore sector on 6 September, Brig Akbar decided to take initiative to launch the offensive against India in his sector. On 6 September, Pakistanis shelled Indian positions in Sulaimanke area, but no other activity was shown by the enemy. The Indian brigade was not operationally fit due to some deficiencies in essential items including ammunition, and, so was unable to counter-attack. However, Brig Bant Singh created a mobile force of 2 Coys of 3/9 GR and the Indep Tank Sqn (14 Horse) and deployed it at Fazilka to be available for movement to any threatened area. Its main task was the defence of Fazilka, the area around which was boggy, and consequently the tanks remained road-bound(69).

It was on the night of 7/8 September that the enemy made three attempts to attack 14 Punjab position at Sulaimanke, but all these were repulsed. On 10th and 11th, Pakistanis again attacked 14 Punjab positions, but were again repulsed. Meanwhile,

2 Maratha captured and destroyed an enemy observation post on the Western side of the Sutlej on 7 September. On 8 September, Pak F-86 jets bombed 2 Maratha positions from 1500 to 1505 hrs and enemy artillery also shelled it. During the night of 9/10 September, 1 Baluch attacked 14 Punjab defensive position in Fazilka, capturing a platoon locality. However, 14 Punjab, in spite of deficiency in arms, ammunition and other equipment, counter-attacked the enemy successfully and recaptured the lost ground(70).

During the period 12-18 September, the main activity was intermittent shelling by both sides. On the night 19/20 September, 2 Maratha at Hussainiwala were attacked by an enemy infantry battalion supported by tanks. The Pakistanis also attacked the Bhagat Singh Samadhi area at Hussainiwala and destroyed the memorial. The main attack was, however, repulsed. Two Pak Sherman tanks were left behind, destroyed by Indian 3.5" Rocket Launchers. On 20 September 1965, Lt Gen Dhillon, Commander XI Corps, reinforced the Indian garrison at Hussainiwala with two infantry companies, and two troops of armour which were despatched from Fazilka.

On 23 September, after the declaration of cease-fire, Pakistanis intruded towards Chananwala, thereby posing a threat to Fazilka. 3/9 GR less one Coy, supported by 4 Indep Armd Sqn less a troop and 144 Fd Regt (TA), was given the task of capturing village Chananwala, which was considered to be held by one enemy company. The objective was captured at 2030 hrs on 25 September in the face of intense artillery, MMG and SA fire. The enemy then launched three counter-attacks, which were beaten back. But the Pakistanis launched more counter-attacks. On account of Pak heavy bombardment, neither Reserve Company at Chananwala railway station, supported by two troops of tanks, nor the ammunition and re-organisation stores could be pushed through to 3/9 GR on the objective. The CO lost contact with his companies at 0130 hrs on 26 September, and made no further efforts to reinforce his troops, although a company of 8 Para was allotted on 26th morning for this purpose. Consequently, the operation was a failure mainly due to lack of detailed planning and proper execution(71).

There is no doubt that 67 Inf Bde was given too vast an area and too long a border to defend, and the resources given to the Brigade Commander to carry out his tasks were quite insufficient. The Bde was concentrated at a very late stage and even then its artillery and small arms ammunition and essential equipment were not available. Taking all this into

consideration, Brig Bant Singh deserved credit for stopping Pak aggression in Fazilka area and denying the Hussainiwala bridge to the enemy.

23 MTN DIV - A NON-STARTER

23 Mtn Div, commanded by Maj Gen D.K. Palit, Vr C, was located in Rangia (Assam) in early September 1965. After the Pak attack on Khem Karan, Gen Palit was asked to move his Division to the Western front. Accordingly, his Division, minus 30 Bde, came to Punjab by train and detrained at Ludhiana. In place of 30 Bde, he was given a new one, but 9 Gaurds were taken away to Hudiara for operations. Although earmarked as Army HQrs reserve, this Division was located within the Western Command Theatre.

Initially, during 15-18 September 1965, the formation was asked to be prepared for launching an offensive in the Kasur area with a view to drawing out Pak 1 Corps from the defences of Lahore. However, this was subsequently cancelled to give a higher priority task to the Division. Due to limited gains made by Indian I Corps and the virtual stalemate at Chawinda, it was planned to launch 23 Mtn Div across the Ravi in Dera Baba Nanak sector to hit the Pak forces from the south through the axis Dera Baba Nanak - Narowal - Pasrur. This was considered necessary to stimulate the progress of the Indian offensive in the Sialkot sector and also to open logistical life-line along the same axis to supplement the supplies coming to the Indian I Corps from the east through indifferent LOC.

On 20 September, orders were issued to Gen Palit to concentrate his formation in Dera Baba Nanak area by 26 September. 23 Mtn Div did not have any armour, so one Sqn of PT-76 tanks was provided to this formation. As the Division's task required the crossing of the river Ravi, and as the formation had no river-crossing experience, it was asked to practice the same on the Sutlej. When Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh came to watch this river-crossing exercise, Gen Palit told him that his troops would swim across the river, if necessary, to launch the attack against the enemy. But the Army Commander asked him not to hurry, but to get fully prepared before launching the attack(72). However, all these proved futile, as the cease-fire took place on 23 September 1965.

Assessment of XI Corps Operations

By the end of the war, XI Corps had captured approximately 362 sq km of Pak territory(73), and yielded a much smaller area, approximately 51 sq km, in the Khem Karan pocket(74). But more important than

this was its great success in crippling the Pak 1 Armd Div and foiling the ambitious Pak plan to achieve an armour break-through to Harike and Amritsar, via Khem Karan. After the cease-fire, the President of India, Dr. Radhakrishnan, visited the Bhikhiwind area where damaged and disabled Pak Pattons had been collected together. Those tanks were looking like dead elephants, and the area came to be called Patton Nagar or the Graveyard of Pattons. The President recorded an inimitable obituary for the Patton tanks in the following words: "Born in Detroit, died in Bhikhiwind".

Although, splendid successes were achieved at Dograi, Barki and Asal Uttar, war aims could not be fully achieved due to command failures at various levels. Indeed, the XI Corps plan "included the capture intact of the GT and Barki road bridges over the Ichhogil Canal to pose a threat to Lahore. To hold the bridges it was necessary to hold ground forward of them"(75). He and the Army Commander specially singled out Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad, Commander 15 Inf Div, for the initial reverses and withdrawal from Dograi on 6 September. Several Commanders lost their commands in this Corps on account of incompetence and lack of initiative. In some places Indian troops broke lines and vanished. However, Commanders of Divisions, Brigades and Battalions were not wholly responsible for the nonfulfilment of the war plans.

A review of XI Corps operations reveals underestimation of enemy resistance and the consequent allotment of insufficient forces for unrealistic task; the wrong tactics of sending the troops straightaway into battles after long marches from the barracks without proper concentration or recce; and the late arrival of supporting arms. Wrong objectives were selected as in the case of Bhasin; and hasty and defective plans were made to capture enemy-held positions, such as Khem Karan, with tired and unprepared battalions like 2 Mahar and 4 Sikh. Purposeless designs and incoherent plans led to inconsequential results, e.g. in Dera Baba Nanak. Frequent changes of plans against the advice of local commanders and panic reaction to events, instead of sticking to the aims and maintaining initiatives at all times, led to crises. Costly attacks on fortified enemy positions, which had little military importance, and the lack of integration of the IAF's capabilities into the Army plans thwarted the achievement of the objectives.

Interviews of the war veterans have revealed considerable disagreement between the formation

commanders. For example, while Lt Gen J.S. Dhillon (Retd) says that Indian Intelligence on enemy strength, disposition and defence works, especially the Ichhogil Canal, was adequate, commanders of Division, Brigades and Battalions have averred that it was most inadequate and the details of the Ichhogil Canal were not given to them, nor was the existence of the Batapore town known. It appears that the Corps commander did not allow the detailed information on the Canal to percolate downwards. Similarly, in case of the selection of objectives and the allotment of forces there were serious differences of opinion, especially in the case of Maj Gen Nirranjan Prasad of 15 Inf Div.

In sum, XI Corps failed to achieve its objectives as it arrived at a stalemate in various sectors, such as Dera Baba Nanak, Fazilka, etc. The loss of Khem Karan was a blot in the name of XI Corps. As Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh (Retd) has observed:-

"With more aggressive leadership and an imaginative direction of operations at divisional level and below, XI Corps might have achieved a unique distinction in the annals of Indian military history"(76).

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. From Official Records.
2. Praval, Maj K.C., pp.356-57.
3. From Official Records.
4. Rajasthan Armed Constabulary.
5. From Official Records.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Col Khazan Singh, (Retd) formerly GSO-I, 15 Inf Div, in Lahore Sector, in September 1965, stated in his interview on 18 September 1988, that the Army Commander had under-estimated the enemy resistance and hence employed only one Bde (54 Inf Bde) along GT Road axis to advance to Ichhogil Canal.
9. Ibid. Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh had said that the enemy would be taken by surprise and the Indian troops would have a cake-walk advance. Accordingly, 96 Inf Bde was taken out. GOC 15 Inf Div protested against this verbally and in writing.
10. Bhupinder Singh, Lt Col, p.77.
11. From Official Records.
12. Ibid. As per Official Records 1 Jat Group consisted of 2 troops Shermans and one fd platoon under command and 1 fd battery and one light battery in support.
13. Indian intelligence about the enemy terrain, defence work, etc. was most inadequate. This was also felt by Commander 15 Inf Div. Interview Report CO 3 & GOC 15 Inf Div.
14. After reaching the assembly area, 3 Jat found that the equipment for manpacking the wireless set that linked the battalion to Bde HQ had not fetched up. After some time, the contact with the battery commander was also lost. Two artillery observation officers allotted to the battalion also got separated from their own parties. All this deprived the battalion of artillery support and means of communication with Bde HQ - Praval, p.361.
15. The Corps Commander did not ask for air support, although there was demand from the Div. Possibly, IAF air support sorties were not allotted for this sector due to lack of interest shown by the Corps Commander. - Col Khazan Singh (Retd)'s interview on 18 September 1988.
16. From Official Records.
17. Hayde, D.E., pp.42-43.
18. From Official Records.
3 Jat casualties in this battle comprised 25 killed, including 1 Officer and 1 JCO; and 78 wounded, including 3 Officers and 3 JCOs. - Hyde, D.E., p.152.

19. Bhupinder Singh, Lt Col (Dr.), p.80.
20. From Official Records.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. According to Maj Gen Prasad (Retd), this was not surprising as 6 Kumaon was launched without any plan or preparation. From Official Records.
24. Praval, Maj K.C., pp.365-366.
25. From Official Records.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Lt Gen J.S. Dhillon's note dated 29 February, 1988.
29. 2 Para suffered 30 per cent casualties, but no gallantry award was given to any of them. According to Lt Col Ram Singh Yadav (Retd), his battalion was given confusing orders which were changed from time to time. Although aerial photographs showed that the Pakistanis had already destroyed the Jallo Bridge, even so, order was given to 2 Para to capture and destroy it. The alignment of the Ichhogil Canal, shown in the maps supplied to the Indian forces, was wrong, and as a result the Indian artillery fire fell 500 yards short, and the covering fire fell on the Indian troops advancing towards the Canal. He further says that as the west bank of the Ichhogil Canal at Jallo Bridge was 2 to 3 feet higher than the east bank, it would have been very risky to hold the lower east bank and become target of the enemy defensive positions, situated on the west bank of the Canal. But the Corps Commander was very unhappy that 2 Para withdrew from the east bank to a defensive position at Bhama. However, Lt Col Ram Singh says that his Bde Commander gave him the order to withdraw to Bhama after destroying the Jallo Bridge. - Interview with Lt Col Ram Singh Yadav (Retd) on 28 October 1987.
30. From Official Records.
31. Hayde, D.E., p.ix.
32. Ibid. An Indian infantry section had only one LMG.
33. Ibid., p.x.
34. From Official Records. However, Hayde says that 3 Jat suffered casualties of 63 killed, including 4 Officers; and 153 wounded, including 6 Officers and 5 JCOs. Hyde, D.E., p.152.
35. Unfortunately, Lt Col D.E. Hayde, the architect of the victory, was not awarded a second MVC this time, which he amply deserved.
36. From Official Records.
37. Ibid.
38. Tentacle with Air Control Team
39. From Official Records.

40. Lt Gen Dhillon has blamed the Sappers for the delay in constructing the bridge. Interview with Lt Gen Dhillon dated 12 October 1987
41. From Official Records.
42. Bhupinder Singh, Lt Col, Dr., p.97.
43. Lt Gen J.S. Dhillon (Retd)'s note dated 29 February 1988.
44. From Official Records.
45. Report of interview with Maj Gen Gurbakhsh Singh, MVC (Retd) dated 16 March 1989.
46. There was no indication of the presence of an entire Armd Div and Inf Div in the vicinity.
47. Commander 62 Mtn Bde says that he did not expect that the Pakistani armoured Division would be opposite his position before 7 to 10 days from the start of the operation. Also, he did not know about the existence of two canals in Pak territory (the Icchogil and Rohi Nala) opposite him. He knew about one only. Consequently, he was not prepared for crossing both. Interview with Maj Gen H.C. Gahlaut (Retd) dated 22 February 1989.
48. See Appendix III for Pak HQ 4 Armd Bde OO dated 8 September 1965, as captured by India during the War.
49. According to Maj Gen Gurbakhsh Singh (Retd), ex-GOC 4 Mtn Div, the defended area on the flanks was flooded by breaching the canals. The area being heavily cultivated, Indian armour in static position could neutralise the Patton tanks' advantage in range. Interview dated 16 March 1989.
50. From Official Records.
51. Ibid.
52. Interview dated 12 September 1988 with Brig D.S. Sidhu, formerly Commander 'B' Coy 4 Sikh. On 12 September 1987, a Sikh outpost fought to the last against Pathan raiders at Saragarhi in the North-West Frontier. This has, however, been denied by Lt Gen Harbakhsh, Singh, Vr C (Retd).
53. Interview with Brig D.S. Sidhu, former Commander 'B' Coy 4 Sikh, dated 12 September 1988.
54. Ibid.
55. The group hit an enemy tank lagger about 1,500 metres east of Khem Karan. The tank crew were asleep. Lt Col Anant could have left them alone, or put in an attack. He did neither. Instead, he deployed his men in a sugar-cane field nearby. - Praval, p.385. Lt Gen D.S. Dhillon (Retd) thinks that the 4 Sikh debacle was due to the incompetence of its CO, Lt Col Anant Singh. Lt Gen Dhillon (Retd)'s interview on 12 October 1987.
56. From Official Records.
57. It is said that "Gen Harbakhsh was carrying a Scotch whisky bottle in his brief case for celebrating Saragrahi Day of his Bn in Khem Karan

- on 12 September. Such personal interest should be curbed while playing with the lives of men" - Bhupinder Singh, Lt Col (Dr.) (Retd), p.159. When on repatriation from PsOW Camp in Pakistan, Lt Col Anant Singh met Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh, he expressed regret saying: "Anant, I am very sorry, I should not have sent you for that task". Ibid, p.144. However, Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh, Vr C (Retd), during his interview on 1 August 1989, denied totally the above mentioned observations.
58. It was felt that the strength at the disposal of Commander 4 Mtn Div was inadequate for the task, and also there was no element of surprise. - Maj Gen Gurbakhsh Singh's interview dated 16 March 1989.
 59. Lt Gen J.S. Dhillon, says: "Looking back I consider that committing my armour reserve at that time and place was the greatest decision of my military career". - Lt Gen Dhillon's note dated 29 February 1988.
 60. Interview with Maj Gen Gurbakhsh Singh, MVC, (Retd), dated 16 March 1989.
 61. Lt Gen J.S. Dhillon, (Retd)'s note dated 29 February 1988.
 62. According to Col Naresh Chandra, ex-Brigade Maj 29 Inf Bde, no intelligence about Pak strength and intentions was made available to the Bde. From its observation post it was estimated that Pakistan had only one Infantry battalion and some armour and artillery in this area. - Interview with Col Naresh Chandra (Retd) dated 21 January 1989.
 63. From Official Records.
 64. Ibid.
 65. During the action on 6 and 7 September, 1/5 GR suffered casualties of 17 men killed, including one Officer, 27 wounded, and 22 missing. The casualties of 2 Raj Rif during these two days were 10 killed and 29 wounded, while 2 Madras had 5 of their men wounded. In this battle, Lt Col Chhajju Ram was awarded Vir Chakra for gallantry. Actually he was recommended for MVC. However, he neither planned the Indian counter-attack, nor participated in the attack against the enemy. He had only brought the message from the Corps Cdr for launching the Indian counter-attack against the enemy, and again personally reported the victory to the Corps Cdr next morning. However, Lady luck smiled on him. - Interview with Col Naresh Chandra (Retd) dated 21 January 1989. However, Lt Gen J.S. Dhillon (Retd) thinks that Lt Col Chhajju Ram richly deserved Vr C, and the success in DBN and Barki "was largely due to the leadership and determination of Chhajju", who, on 7 September 1965, called for and got an air

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sortie to hit enemy concentrations behind the DBN bridge. "The enemy panicked, blew up Bridge and retreated far from the Ravi". - Lt Gen Dhillon's note dated 29 February 1988.

66. From Official Records.
67. Having blown up the Jassar bridge, the Pak Bde Cdr even persuaded his Corps Cdr to counter-attack the imaginary enemy bridgehead. - Mehdi, S.G., Col (Retd), Defence Journal, Karachi, December 1977, p.24 - Our Lost Defence Cause: The Tragedy of 1971 and its Fore-Runner.
68. Bhupinder Singh, Lt Col, (Dr.) p.100.
69. Ibid, p.101.
70. Ibid.
71. According to Official Records, 3/9 GR suffered about 97 casualties, which included 60 missing, and 14 Punjab's casualties were 8 killed and 13 wounded, while 4 Indep Armd Sqn had one OR missing and one Sherman tank destroyed by enemy RCL gun. Enemy casualties were estimated at 60, plus one APC destroyed.
72. Report of interview with Maj Gen Palit, dated 11 May 1987.
73. From Official Records.
74. Bhupinder Singh, Lt Col, (Dr.), (Retd), p.249.
75. From Official Records.

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CHAPTER VII

OPERATIONS IN SIALKOT SECTOR

ORBAT AND PLAN

Terrain

The newly created I Corps, commanded by Lt Gen P.O.Dunn, undertook operations in Samba-Jammu-Sialkot sector. This sector stretched between the Ravi and the Chenab rivers, with the Indo-Pak border running close to the foothills in the east. The only road-link between J&K and the rest of India ran through a narrow stretch of the lower foothills, close and parallel to the border, thus rendering this vital artery vulnerable. The international border was 28 km from Jammu and 14 km from Sialkot. The latter was a major Pak communication centre for rail, road and air, and Pakistan's main administrative depot as well. The Pak supplies to Chhamb sector went via Sialkot which was connected with Lahore by rail via Wazirabad-Gujranwala and also via Pasrur-Narowal. Sialkot-Pasrur portion of this railway line was a vital link in Pak defence system. Chawinda was a strategic small town and an important point on the Sialkot-Pasrur railway line. From Sialkot, roads led to Shakargarh via Phillora-Zafarwal; and to Lahore via Pasrur-Narowal, via Wazirabad-Gujranwala and via Daska and Gujranwala.

The terrain on the Pak side of the border in this sector was generally flat and intensively cultivated. It was bisected by the Degh Nadi (Basantar river) which flowed from Samba in India to south of Pasrur in Pakistan, running north-east to south-west. The river was fordable by tanks and 4x4 wheeled vehicles, except when in flood. Another important water obstacle in the area was Aik Nala which ran past Sialkot to its south where it had been turned into an anti-tank obstacle, protecting the town from the south. The main artificial obstacle in the sector was the Marala-Ravi Link (MRL) canal which ran north to south from the Chenab to the Ravi, passing west of line Sialkot-Pasrur, and affording protection to main communication lines inside west Punjab. The MRL canal was a formidable obstacle, over 100 metres wide with steep lined banks(1).

Build-up

HQ I Corps was established in Kaluchak (near Jammu) by 4 September 1965. Troops made available to the Corps Commander, Lt Gen Dunn, were I Armd

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Division, commanded by Maj Gen Rajinder Singh, MVC, 6 Mtn Div, under Maj Gen S.K.Korla, DSO, MC, 14 Inf Div led by Maj Gen R.K. Ranjeet Singh, and 26 Inf Div under Maj Gen M.L. Thapan.

In spite of this impressive strength, I Corps was rather in a sorry state for operations. The Corps HQ having been raised only in mid May, was beset with all the teething troubles common to a new raising. Of its four Divisions, two were new and truncated. 6 Mtn Div, which had come into being on 26 March 1963, consisted of only two Bdes (69 Mtn Bde and 99 Mtn Bde) and ever since had been deployed on the Himalayan border. It was neither equipped nor trained for plains warfare. 14 Inf Div was still in the process of raising and not yet in a fit state of operational functioning, and when called up for action, had to make frantic efforts to assemble the formation HQ and units, grouped with it, from outstations. Initially the Division had on its order of battle only two infantry brigades, 35 and 58, and until August 1965, these had been deployed on the UP-Tibet border. The third Bde, 116 Inf Bde, joined the Div in August 1965 at Babina. Neither 6 Mtn Div nor 14 Inf Div had any opportunity for collective training, and yet both these formations had to be launched into brigade and divisional actions. 1 Armd Div had 1 Armd Bde comprising 4 Horse, 16 Cav, 17 Horse and 9 Dogra, and 43 Lorried Inf Bde, composed of 5/9 GR, 5 JAT and 8 Garhwal Rifles. 2 Lancers and 62 Cav were placed under command of 1 Armd Div for the ensuing operations. 26 Inf Div had two Bdes, 162 Inf Bde and 168 Inf Bde. 1 Corps itself had never trained as a full group. In fact, it was introduced to most of its formations virtually in the concentration areas. Only 1 Armd Div and 26 Inf Div were suitably located and trained for the type of operation that had been envisaged for this Corps.

Logistically, the Corps was far from being a going concern. There was a frantic last-minute rush to scrape together ad hoc administrative units to provide logistical support. The Corps had no third line transport; civil vehicles had to be commandeered to fill in this gap in the administrative chain.

Plan

The task assigned to I Corps was to secure area Pagowal (Bhagowal), Phillora (Phillaurah), Chawinda and the Cross Roads with a view to advancing towards the Marala-Ravi Link Canal, and eventually to the line of Dhallewali-Wuhilam-Daska-Mandhali(2).

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Code-word "NEPAL" was given to the operation that would be launched to fulfil this task

Pakistan had already concentrated substantial forces in the Sialkot Sector. This sector was the responsibility of Pakistan's I Corps commanded by Lt Gen Bakhtiar Rana(3). His Formations included 6 Armoured Div under Maj Gen Abrar Hussain and 15 Infantry Div beefed up with 115 Brigade. 10 Infantry Brigade, 14 Para Brigade and 4 Corps Arty were also rushed up to the sector from Chhamb area, thus giving up all Pakistani hopes of capturing Akhnur. Sluggish moves of India's I Corps enabled Pakistan to bring up by 12 September even the 1 Armoured Div (less one brigade) from Khem Karan sector to the Pasrur area.

The Indian plan was elaborate. Deployment of troops along the International Border, to seal off the main Pak routes of ingress to the road Pathankot-Samba, prior to the commencement of concentration, was necessary. Units of 6 Mtn Div were to be employed for this purpose with instructions to be in position by D Day. This would be Phase I.

Move and deployment of the Strike Force units in their respective concentration areas preparatory to mounting the offensive was Phase II.

Phase III was establishment of bridgehead. According to the Corps plan, 6 Mtn Div and 26 Inf Div were to secure the right flank of the main advance : the former by seizing the area Maharajke and Charwa, and the latter by capturing Bajragarhi and Anula nearby, so as to establish a 'bridgehead' across the International Border to serve as a springboard for launching India's main strike element, 1 Armd Div. These objectives were to be secured before first light on 8 September 1965.

Concurrently with the above action, 14 Inf Div less two Bdes was given the task of capturing Ikhna (Nakhna). At the same time, 26 Inf Div was to contain the enemy forces in Sialkot area and thus protect the right flank of the main thrust towards Phillora and Chawinda.

Phase IV was to be the break out. After the establishment of the bridgehead, 1 Armd Div was to strike out for the capture of Phillora and subsequently exploit towards Pagowal and Chawinda en route to the Marala-Ravi Link Canal. 62 Cav less one squadron and four "tentacles" were grouped with 1 Armd Div for this task; 26 Arty Bde, 24 Med Regt (on priority call), and two Air Control Teams were placed in support.

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At a suitable stage in the battle, 14 Inf Div was to capture Zajarwal and secure area Cross Roads - Chawinda, as a complementary action to the thrust of 1 Armd Div. 1 Arty Bde, 6 Mtn Arty Bde and 24 Medium Regiment were provisionally placed in support of 14 Inf Div for this task. 6 Mtn Div was to act as Corps Reserve.

SECURING THE RIGHT FLANK

By last light 7 September 1965, I Corps was ready to cross the international border on a frontage extending from west of Basantar River to Suchetgarh. The formations were deployed according to plan except for 14 Inf Div, which could not be concentrated to participate in the establishment of the bridgehead, as its 58 Inf Bde employed for the security of Madhopur Road Bridge and the Headworks could not be relieved from Pathankot for this role. 28 Inf Bde, which had been promised to 6 Mtn Div, also could not be made available, as it was inextricably involved in the Chhamb sector. Still, promptly at 2300 hrs on night 7/8 September 1965, 6 Mtn Div and 26 Inf Div crossed the international border into Pakistan. 'Operation Nepal' was under way.


6 Div Takes Charwa and Maharajke

As already explained, the task assigned to 6 Mtn Div was to capture Charwa and Maharajke with a view to establishing bridgehead for the break-out of 1 Armd Div by first light of 8 September 1965 and then exploit towards Pagowal. The operation was to begin at 2300 hrs on 7 September and to be completed by 0430 hrs next day. The Div assigned Charwa to 99 Mtn Bde and Maharajke to 69 Mtn Bde Gp in Phase I of the operation. The 35 Inf Bde which had joined the Div on 7 September was to explore further towards Pagowal in Phase II of the operation(4).

99 Mtn Bde, assigned the objective Charwa, appreciated that the capture of the village would involve clearance of built-up areas, and so the Bde selected objectives on the flanks, to avoid fighting in the village proper during the hours of darkness.

At 2030 hrs on 7 September, two coys of 6 Garhwal Rifles along with their commando platoons crossed the international border to secure the Bde Forming Up Place (FUP), which was secured by 2200 hrs.

2/5 Gorkha Rifles (FF) on the left and 4 Rajputana Rifles on the right completed Forming Up by



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2255 hrs and crossed the Start Line (SL) at 2300 hrs. Intensive artillery fire support covered the assault.

The Gorkhas swept swiftly over the objective and quickly evicted an enemy rifle coy supported by a coy of Mujahids. 106 mm recoilless guns were effectively used to blast an enemy stronghold, especially in the area of the village school. On the right flank, 4 Rajputana Rifles was equally successful in crushing the combined opposition of an infantry (Rifle) coy plus a coy of Mujahids. When finally compelled to vacate the area, the enemy left behind large quantities of mines, ammunition and rations. The main opposition was cleared by both the battalions by 0300 hrs - well ahead of schedule. Exploiting their success, the assaulting battalions pushed forward beyond their objectives to cover the roads coming into Charwa from Maharajke, Chobara and Ikhnal (Nakhnal).

The fight for the village of Charwa, however, was a grim one. The village was a formidable stronghold fortified with elaborate defence works and an intricate net-work of underground tunnelling. Moreover, the defenders fought with courage and determination, and although the main opposition subsided on the night of the attack, pockets of resistance lingered on for another two days.

The capture of Maharajke by 69 Mtn Bde was again aimed at facilitating the subsequent operations of 1 Armd Bde. The attack was planned in two phases. In Phase I, two battalions, i.e. 3 Madras and 9 Kumaon, were to capture the right half of the objective and also block the road to Pagowal/Badiana and Sialkot. In Phase II, 4 Madras was to capture the left half of the objective and then block the road to Charwa and Zafarwal.

By 1700 hrs two companies from 4 Madras had secured the Forming Up Place in area south-east of Jabwal Kalan. At 2250 hrs the assaulting troops for Phase I, 3 Madras and 9 Kumaon, formed up ready for action. The operation was launched at 2300 hrs from the FUP and the right half of the objective was secured against light enemy opposition of about a company plus, by 0130 hrs(5).

Phase 2 commenced at 0300 hrs, but soon after crossing the SL, 4 Madras came under heavy enemy MMC and small arms fire. The assault was held up till 0430 hrs. Now, their gallant Commanding Officer, Lt Col H.L.Mehta, rushed forward to lead the assault. The attack was pushed through with determination, and the objective was secured by 0530 hrs, but the brave CO of

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the battalion fell to an enemy bullet. He was given the award of MVC posthumously. On 8th morning, enemy tanks made a probing attack from the south, approaching to within 1500 metres of the Forward Defended Localities (FDLs). The attack was, however, repulsed by the combined fire of artillery and armour. The Bde thereafter remained at Maharajke until 12 September, and merely provided a firm base for operations by 1 Armd Div towards Phillora and Pagowal. After the capture of Charwa and Maharajke, 35 Inf Bde was ordered to move forward and clear area Cross Roads near (Sabzpir). Thereafter this Bde was placed under command 1 Armd Div.

The casualty figures for the battles of Maharajke and Charwa were as under:-

	Maharajke			Charwa		
	Killed	Wounded	Captured	Killed	Wounded	Captured
<u>Pak</u>						
Officers	-	-	1	3	-	1
JCOs	-	-	1	-	-	-
ORs	33	-	55	205*	-	34
<u>Indian</u>						
Officers	1	4	-	-	-	-
JCOs	1	3	-	-	-	-
ORs	15	42	1 (missing)	-	19**	-

* including Mujahids

** 3 died in hospital later

26 Div Takes Wains and Bajragarhi

26 Inf Div, detailed to contain the enemy forces at Sialkot, went into the offensive with two Bdes on night 7/8 September 1965 for the capture of area Unche Wains, Niwe Wains and Bajragarhi. 162 Inf Bde was given the task of capturing the Wains laying north of Aik Nala, while 168 Inf Bde was ordered to capture Bajragarhi south of it (7).

162 Inf Bde, consisting of 6 Jat and 1 Sikh Light Infantry, was allotted C Sqn 18 Cav for carrying out its task. 26 Arty Bde and 1 Arty Bde were placed in support. The formation decided to launch the attack in two phases. During Phase 1, 1 Sikh LI was to capture Point 857 nearby, and in the second phase, 7 Jat was given the objective Wains. 6 Jat was to be brigade reserve.

The battalions crossed the International Border according to schedule and went on to capture Point 857, and Wains, astride the main Suchetgarh-Sialkot road. Despite heavy shelling by enemy artillery (field, medium and heavy guns) and the fire of his light and medium machine guns, 7 Jat and 1 Sikh LI, pressed on regardless, completing their assigned task by 0210 hrs on 8 September 1965. C Squadron 18 Cavalry moved in with the reorganisation group and the Bde Sector was consolidated according to plan.

168 Inf Bde, composed of 2/1 Gorkha Rifles, 5/4 Gorkha Rifles and 8 J and K Rifles, was allotted A Squadron 18 Cavalry for capturing Anula and Bajragarhi. 168 Field Regt was in direct support(8).

The Bde carried out its task in two phases. In Phase I, 5/4 Gorkha Rifles captured Anula near Bajragarhi. The opposition being comparatively light, the Bde established itself on the assigned objectives by 0530 hrs on 8 September 1965 without much fighting(9).

Thus, both 6 Mtn Div and 26 Inf Div took their objectives on schedule. By first light on 8 September 1965, 6 Mtn Div had established the planned bridgehead in area Charwa-Maharajke. Further north, 26 Inf Div had secured the general areas Unche Wains - Niwe Wains and Bajragarhi, to threaten Sialkot and, in consequence, tie down enemy forces in that sector with a view to minimising opposition to the main thrust.

Although Wains, Bajragarhi, Maharajke and Charwa were all very close to the border, Pak reacted sharply to the threat posed to Sialkot, for it was an objective to which she was most sensitive, militarily and politically. Massive artillery fire was brought to bear on the various dispositions but Indian troops held on gamely to their ground. In fact, A Sqn 18 Cav displayed remarkable audacity in probing forward to the Ura Bridge just 8 km short of Sialkot during the exploitation phase. Enemy Shermans and Chaffees supported by artillery took place, and the Indian armour, after inflicting four tank casualties at the expense of only one listed as missing, withdrew to the bridgehead.

The first round of the contest was thus a clear success, due to tactical surprise. The ground was now ready for the Armoured Division to show its mettle.


ARMoured THRUST TO PHILLORA

Attack Launched

1 Armd Div was located in Jalandhar before it reached Ramgarh area for operations on 5 September 1965. On the night 6/7 September, the Div completed its concentration near Ramgarh for the offensive. The task allotted to the Div was to smash through enemy territory at first light on 8 September to capture Phillora. The advance was to be carried out as follows(10):-

- 1) 1 Armd Bde under command Brig K.K.Singh on axis Ramgarh-Kangre (Kangre)-Sabzkot-Chobara-Phillora.
- 2) 43 Lorried Inf Bde under command Brig H.S.Dhillon on axis Deoli-Sabzpur Cross Road-Mastpur-Pagowal.
- 3) One regimental group (4 Horse) with one company (9 Dogra) motor battalion was to form the GOC's reserve, and was to be prepared to operate on any of the two axes.
- 4) One Squadron from 62 Cavalry was to act as left flank guard of the Division and operate west of Degh Nadi from Ikhnaal to Kangre under command 1 Armd Bde.
- 5) 1 Arty Bde (under command Brig O.P.Malhotra) -2 Field Regt (SP) and 101 Field Regt (SP) were placed in direct support and under command of 1 Armoured Bde and 43 Lorried Inf Bde respectively. 71 Med Regt was placed in direct support of 1 Armd Bde, to move on the Centre Line.

At 0600 hrs on 8 September, 1 Armd Div crossed the International boundary in two columns: 43 Lorried Inf Bde on the right and 1 Armd Bde on the left. The march of the right column slowed down because due to rain on 7 September some tanks of 2 Lancers got bogged down, and the Bde had to be diverted to an alternative route via Ramgarh(11). The left column (1 Armd Bde Gp) pushed forward smoothly, 17 Horse on the left and 16 Cav on the right going past Sabzkot and Chobara localities. At 0930 hrs, the leading armour (16 Cavalry) encountered some enemy tanks, recoilless guns



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and dug-in infantry in area Gadgor. In the action that followed, 8 enemy tanks and 2 recoilless guns were claimed as destroyed. About the same time, 17 Horse encountered a similar opposition in area Tharoh, south-east of Phillora. A serious tank-to-tank fighting ensued, and in this the enemy air force also took a hand. However, the Regt knocked out 3 Pakistani tanks and one recoilless gun. Knowing that enemy was pushing more tanks in the battle area, the GOC 1 Armd Div ordered his reserve regt (4 Horse) to take enemy armour from one of the flanks and placed the regiment under 1 Armd Bde. But in the meantime, 17 Horse were pulled back to counter enemy threat to area Pindi Bhago. 16 Cav was also disengaged and deployed along Hasri Nala.

One Squadron 62 Cavalry which was given the task of left flank protection by operating west of Degh Nadi could not keep pace with the initial advance of 1 Armd Bde owing to ground conditions. This Bde was, therefore, asked to detach some armour to contain enemy threat in area Kangre. Just before last light 5/9 GR captured Narsing(12). But the tank thrust had been stalled.

Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh (Retd), the then GOC-in-C Western Command, has severely criticised the immature handling of this operation, which was planned to storm through the Pak defences in the area, but had soon limped to a halt. According to him, the Bde Commander (1 Armd Bde) made the unfortunate decision to withdraw 17 Horse from Tharoh for countering an allegedly serious tank threat on the left flank. This was a grave error of judgement as 4 Horse, which by this time had been released to the Bde by GOC 1 Armd Div, could have been used to meet any flank threat posed by the enemy armour. Due to this they could make an advance of only four miles beyond the bridgehead, when a much deeper penetration could have been achieved(13).

43 Lorried Inf Bde fared even worse. By 1800 hrs on 8 September, the formation had cleared village Salarion only and advanced upto Sabzpir cross-roads, where the Bde concentrated and harboured for the night(14). During the day's engagement the enemy lost 20 tanks against India's loss of twelve(15).

1 Armd Div, staked to turn the tide of the war, had made a bad beginning. Much was expected from this powerful formation, but it was unable to achieve the necessary breakthrough. In fact, it was perhaps wrong to launch the two main fighting elements of the Armd Div, the Armd Bde and the Lorried Bde, on

divergent axes. The separation of the Lorried Bde from the Armd Bde compounded the weakness of both.

In view of the developments of the day, the GOC 1 Armd Div ordered the following readjustments in the position of the troops:-(16)

- 1) 35 Inf Bde to establish a firm base in area Sabzpir cross-roads so as to serve as a spring-board for the subsequent operations of 1 Armd Bde.
- 2) 1 Armd Bde was to manoeuvre to the east and west of road Chobara-Phillora with a view to attracting maximum enemy armour in this area.
- 3) 43 Lorried Inf Bde was to establish a firm base at Gat near Kaloi to prevent a breakthrough by the enemy towards Maharajke from the side of Pagowal. It was to adopt a defensive posture.
- 4) 5 Raj Rif with 2 Lancers and one Sqn 62 Cavalry was to establish a left-flank firm base in area Kangre so as to meet any enemy threat from Zafarwal.
- 5) 1 Artillery Bde was to deploy in area east of Sabzpir cross-road and Gangial.

Advance to Kaloi

Commander, 1 Armd Div then ordered the Lorried Bde to continue advance to Pagowal on axis Maharajke-Kaloi-Pagowal. 2 Lancers were detached and placed under command 35 Inf Bde. The advance began at 0700 hrs on 9 September with 62 Cav less one Sqn, and 8 Garhwal Rifles as an advance guard. The enemy air force was again very active and strafed the forward troops as also the gun positions. The Bde succeeded in taking Kaloi but could not reach Pagowal. On 10 September, enemy shelling and air attacks continued. However, the Bde was well dug-in. 62 Cav foiled enemy probing moves towards the evening(17).

The enemy air, which had been very active since 8 September, had destroyed a number of the Indian administrative vehicles. This coupled with the indifferent state of communications in enemy territory, caused a virtual breakdown in administrative support. 1 Armd Div decided that it could not continue its advance, and spent 9 and 10 September reorganising and replenishing.

In the meantime, 6 Mtn Div undertook a series of minor operations for clearing the villages Thikarwala, Jarwal, Khanor, Sangial, Joia, Dinga, Tirke and Saidanial, in which the enemy, on withdrawal, had left

a number of armed civilian snipers. The civilians were rounded up and pushed into enemy territory(18). At this stage it was confirmed that 6 Armoured Div and 15 Inf Div of Pakistan were opposing I Corps.

Meanwhile, on the 26 Inf Div front, the enemy launched desperate counter-attacks in a determined bid to force back 162 and 168 Inf Bdes from their positions in areas Wains and Bajragarhi respectively. The counter-attacks were preceded by heavy artillery bombardment. 26 Inf Div, however, continued to hold on to the ground captured and retaliated with counter-bombardment fire to neutralise detected enemy gun positions(19).

Revised Plan for the Assault

On 10 September, GOC I Corps issued Operation Instruction No.2/65 for the capture of Phillora and exploitation towards Chawinda. 35 Inf Bde and one Battalion from 116 Inf Bde were grouped with 1 Armd Div for this battle, and 6 Mtn Arty Bde and I Corps Arty Bde (24 Med Regt) were placed in support. In addition the following relief and regrouping was also ordered:-

- (a) 58 Bde less one battalion, with one battalion from 99 Mtn Bde was to defend Charwa.
- (b) 99 Mtn Bde less one battalion was to concentrate to the west and adjacent to 43 Lorried Inf Bde. The formation was to come under command 1 Armd Div at 0530 hrs, 11 September 1965.

After an extensive reconnaissance carried out by the GOC 1 Armd Div on 9 and 10 September for launching 1 Armd Div, he located an opening in area Rurki-Kalan, through which no direct route led to Phillora. Moreover, the ground in this area was full of paddy fields and sugarcane plantations. Further, the area was subjected to enemy shelling and infested with enemy parties including Mujahids. GOC 1 Armd Div, however, chose to mount the attack from this most unexpected direction, in spite of the risks involved, to achieve the element of surprise. As a further measure of deception, 1 Armd Bde was to put in a realistic demonstration to entice the enemy armour towards Sabzpir and to create the impression that the attack was being launched from that direction. It was subsequently confirmed that these efforts did achieve a measure of surprise.

After selecting the direction of the attack the GOC 1 Armd Div ordered the concentration of troops as

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follows(20):-

- 1) 1 Armd Bde was to concentrate near Rurki Kalan before mid-night 10/11 September. Tank noise during the move was to be drowned by heavy artillery shelling to keep the move secret.
- 2) 43 Lorried Inf Bde was to leave one battalion (8 Garhwal Rifles) supported by 62 Cavalry less one Sqn located in Gat position. (As a preliminary operation 8 Garh Rif was to capture Gat by 0200 hrs on 11 September). The remainder of the Bde was to be ready to move out for operations by 2200 hrs on 10 September.
- 3) 35 Inf Bde, supported by 2 Lancers less one Sqn, was to continue to hold the firm base in area Sabzpir cross-road.
- 4) 5 Raj Rifles (ex-116 Inf Bde) supported by one sqn 62 Cavalry and one sqn from 2 Lancers, was to hold Kangre.
- 5). 1 Arty Bde was to redeploy in area west of Sabzpir in support of 1 Armd Div assault on Phillora.

43 Lorried Inf Bde, less 8 Garhwal Rifles, were to carry out a night march and clear area Rurki Kalan by first light 11 September, where a firm base would be established for subsequent operations. On further orders, and depending upon the progress of armour action, 43 Lorried Inf Bde was to move to Nathupur for launching an attack on Phillora.

1 Armd Bde was to advance at first light 11 September at full speed from its night assembly area to Rurki Kalan with three regiments up. From Rurki Kalan, two regiments (4 Horse and 17 Horse) were to open out and encircle Phillora by a pincer movement from both flanks. This manoeuvre was intended to split enemy armour echelons into small groups. These groups were to be subsequently isolated for destruction in detail.

16 Cavalry was to establish itself in area Khanawali north-west of Phillora, and in conjunction with the 62 Cavalry and 8 Garhwal Rifles Group deployed on its right, in area Gat, was to provide right flank protection against any threat from the direction of Sialkot. 35 Inf Bde, with 2 Lancers less one Sqn, were to continue in their firm base at Sabzpir cross-roads to secure the flank against any

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armour threat. The dispositions on the left flank were further improved as 116 Inf Bde had by this time established itself in area Ikhnal with its two battalions (5/5 Gorkha Rifles and 18 Madras). It also remained firmed in at Kangre supported by armour. 1 Arty Bde was to continue to be deployed in area west of Sabzpir(21).

Preliminary moves to the respective areas were carried out according to plan. Despite light rain, 1 Armd Bde concentrated in area Kaloi-Rurki Khurd, alongwith 43 Lorried Inf Bde, for the assault on Phillora.

The Battle

The launching of the Armd Div from an unexpected direction at first light on 11 September surprised the enemy, as he was expecting an attack either from axis Zafarwal-Phillora or Chobara-Phillora. In fact he had prepared defences to cover these two approaches. The cross-country operation from the direction of Rurki Kalan, therefore, greatly upset the enemy plan of defence.

By first light on 11 September, 2 Lancers' tanks had been deployed in battle positions covering the Gadgor-Phillora axis. As per plan, 8 Garh Rif secured Gat (near Kaloi) by 0600 hrs(22). By 0640 hrs, 4 Horse had advanced beyond the village of Rurki Kalan. Meanwhile, 17 Horse moved on to Libbe axis and joined the assault on the right of 4 Horse. 16 Cav established a road-block in area Khananwali, 62 Cav moved to area Pagowal cross roads in order to protect the west flank of 1 Armd Div(23).

The enemy opposition along the axis to Phillora was estimated at two armoured regiments composed of Pattons and tank destroyers. 4 Horse, which formed the left of the Bde advance, was the first to encounter enemy armour. The regiment was assigned the task of protecting the left flank of the Bde attack with a view to preventing a break-through of the enemy armour from Gadgor-Lalapur towards Phillora. The regt was expected to cut the road Phillora-Chobara and also help 43 Lorried Bde(24).

Following the capture of Rurki Kalan by C Sqn, A and B Sqns 4 Horse advanced in the direction of Wachoke and Saboke (just north and north-east of Phillora) respectively. RHQ 4 Horse along with the Battery Commander's tank advanced south between A and B Sqns from the east of Rurki Kalan. In this area one Sqn of enemy armour was found deployed between Libbe and Kotli Khadim Shah just to its east. These were

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immediately engaged by the CO's tank and 3 of them were knocked out(25). Meanwhile, A Sqn came within 1000 yards of the road and engaged enemy tanks in position there. B Sqn also reached the vicinity of Wachoke and engaged enemy armour there. Meanwhile, C Sqn was also asked to join on the right of 'B' Sqn.. In the tank battle that ensued a total of 29 enemy tanks were claimed as destroyed or damaged, while 4 Horse suffered only 3 tank casualties.

The 17 Horse was detailed to lead the centre of 1 Armd Bde's advance on Phillora. It was to advance to Libbe at 0600 hrs with C Sqn as the vanguard. On capturing Libbe, C Sqn was to establish a firm base there and the other sqns were to pivot on it and occupy positions from Libbe to Khananwali and Kot Izzat (a little to the south) so as to provide fire support for the attack on Phillora(26).

The regiment commenced advance at 0800 hrs on 11 September. Care was taken to coordinate movement with that of the 4 Horse advancing to the east of the regiment. The enemy armour was first encountered at 0817 hrs between Phillora and Libbe by the C Sqn. In the ensuing skirmish 3 enemy tanks were destroyed. The Sqn suffered 2 tanks damaged. Three more enemy tanks were destroyed by C Sqn while probing the flanks. The Sqn also lost 3 more tanks from enemy RCL/tank fire coming from village Libbe. Seeing the enemy pressure, B Sqn was consequently ordered to move up and deploy on the west of C Sqn and deal with the enemy threat there.

At this juncture, 5/9 GR was asked to clear village Libbe and the surrounding sugarcane fields. This was done by 1230 hrs, and C Sqn commenced advance towards Phillora with B Sqn holding the firm base at Libbe. When C Sqn had reached east of village Libbe on road Libbe-Phillora, it came under fire from five enemy tanks at a range of about 800 yards. The Sqn retaliated and in the process destroyed three tanks and captured one. Again, nine enemy tanks came to check the Regt's advance. C Sqn, however, claimed to have destroyed seven of them in a gruelling tank action(27).

The grand finale had, however, yet to come, when A Sqn had built upon B Sqn 17 Horse at Libbe, and the latter moved on to take up fire position between Khananwali and Kot Izzat, just to its south. At this stage, information was received that approximately one sqn of enemy tanks was moving from the direction of Alhar towards Phillora. B Sqn thereupon adjusted its positions to meet the approaching threat. A Sqn moved up two tank troops to guard the west flank of B Sqn.

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At the same time, two enemy tank troops emerged from the direction of Kot Izzat, presumably with the intention of taking on C Sqn from the flank. The stage was then set for the battle. The ground was open and the only cover was provided by the sugarcane fields. Hence, maximum security was obtained by movement. The engagement took place at a range of only 100 yards between moving tanks and lasted for about 45 minutes, until surviving enemy tanks withdrew(28). Lt Col A.B. Tarapore, CO 17 Horse knocked out two enemy tanks just in the beginning of the battle in which the enemy lost a total of 28 tanks as against only one of 17 Horse(29).

The enemy armour was thus completely defeated and the hard crust of the defences of Phillora was breached. The objective was now open to a physical assault by infantry. 43 Lorried Inf Bde launched the attack with two battalions up (5/9 Gorkha Rifles and 5 Jat). The objective, including the cross-roads was secured by 1530 hrs, and the battle for Phillora was over. The feats of courage and skill during the day included the outstanding performance of Lt Col M.M.S. Bakshi and Lt Col Tarapore, Commanders 4 Horse and 17 Horse respectively.

The enemy armour was badly mauled during this battle. As many as 67 enemy tanks were destroyed/damaged on this day for Indian loss of only six Centurions. It was an impressive victory. This was mainly due to a combination of excellent gunnery and skillful manoeuvre of tanks and gallant leadership of commanders in action. Because of the heavy concentration of armour in this battle, it was considered to be the biggest tank battle since World War II.

In coordination with 4 Horse and 17 Horse which were responsible for the left and the centre of the 1 Armd Bde advance, 16 Cavalry was to take care of the right. 16 Cav, which had moved to Rurki Khurd on 10 September, was assigned the task to cover road junction and area Khananwali to prevent any enemy armour from breaking through from Sialkot side and interfering with 1 Armd Bde operations towards Phillora. The Regt moved to take up position on 11th morning and was attacked by enemy air en route. At Cross-Roads the enemy attacked B Sqn with a Squadron of Pattons supported by RCLs. In this encounter 6 enemy tanks and 3 RCLs were claimed as destroyed. The Regt lost 4 tanks.

62 Cav (less C Sqn) was employed further west to protect the right flank of 1 Armd Bde attack on Phillora by securing the important Cross-Roads. The

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Regt commenced advance at 0930 hrs along track Kaloi-Haral-Pagowal Cross-Roads, and secured village Haral. But no sooner had it skirted village Pagowal, about 1500 yards from the objective, enemy Pattons located in a grove near Pagowal opened fire on the leading tanks. The enemy armour was taken frontally and on the flanks, two Pattons were destroyed. But the progress of the Regt soon came to a stop owing to heavy enemy artillery fire. Next, a serious counter-attack on Pagowal developed from south-west. This was, of course, a reaction to the thrust made by the Regt which threatened to cut off enemy forces still fighting in Phillora. Two Patton Sqns supported by heavy artillery tried to envelop the Regt around village Haral, a little north of Pagowal. But when the Regt thwarted this plan of envelopment, the enemy launched two parallel thrusts to the east and west of Haral to cut off the Regt from the Bde-defended sector at Kaloi and possibly to drive a deep wedge towards Maharajke.

This counter-attack was checked by the Regt. A strategy of holding lay-back positions one after another delayed the enemy advance. Finally, heavy artillery fire blunted the enemy thrust. Though 62 Cav did not succeed in securing Cross-Roads, it did succeed in providing flank protection to 1 Armd Bde in its operations at Phillora(31).

In this 1 Armd Bde advance on Phillora, 43 Lorried Bde also played a significant part. Its two battalions, i.e. 5 Jat and 5/9 GR, kept on advancing alongside the armour in spite of persistent enemy air attacks. At about 0900 hrs, 17 Horse forward elements had come into contact with the enemy armour along line Libbe-Kotli Bagga. At this juncture, 5/9 GR attacked Libbe with one Coy and cleared it of the enemy. 5 Jat held on in area short of Kotli Bagga. The Bde now conceived the attack on Phillora with the Jats following the left of 5/9 GR. The assault could not, however, go well. Intensive enemy shelling from the right staggered the assault-line, inflicting heavy casualties on the troops(32). The Bde Commander, therefore, chose to clear village Khananwali and Wachoke first, with a view to facilitating a smooth advance on the axis. In this, one troop of C Sqn 17 Horse was to support the attack of 5/9 GR in two-Coy strength. The enemy reacted sharply to this flanking move and attacked from the right with two troops of Pattons. C Sqn 17 Horse foiled this attack, and Khananwali was cleared. As already stated, 5/9 made the final assault on Phillora and captured it by 1530 hrs on 11 September; 5 Jat, who had cleared Wachoke (north of Phillora), also captured their objective, exploiting upto Josun to the east.

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(c) 14 Inf Div

- To establish a patrol base at Zafarwal on night 11/12 September and build it up to one battalion by the 12th.

14 Inf Div Sector

In accordance with directions received from HQ I Corps, 5/5 Gorkha Rifles was ordered to secure Zafarwal. The battalion despatched one company at 2130 hrs on 11 September 1965 on a probing mission with instructions to occupy the town in case it was not held by the enemy. The battalion lost contact with the coy soon after its departure due to wireless failure. A second company was ordered to move by transport to Mirzapur at 0555 hrs on 12 September 1965. This company was instructed to contact the first company at Zafarwal after securing Mirzapur. The company after clearing a minor opposition at Deoli secured Mirzapur at 0910 hrs.

It was later revealed that 5 Rajputana Rifles at Kangre had made radio contact with the 5/5 Gorkha Rifles coy at Zafarwal at about 0500 hrs, when the latter had asked for another coy to be sent up immediately. This message was conveyed to Bde HQ only at 1020 hrs. On receipt of the message the remainder of 5/5 GR was ordered to move forthwith to Zafarwal. B Sqn 2 Lancers, which had been placed under command 14 Inf Div, was also directed to move to reinforce the garrison at Zafarwal, but it took over two hours to refill and did not move out till 1230 hrs. Enroute to Zafarwal the Sqn came under enemy artillery fire in area Pindi Mahrasan just east of Kangre. After the shelling, it made no attempt to push forward to Zafarwal, and having idled away the rest of the day, returned to Kangre at 1850 hrs.

Meanwhile, the first coy of 5/5 Gorkha Rifles, which had met no opposition at Zafarwal, was engaged at first light by a strong roving jeep patrol, equipped with medium machine guns and recoilless guns. As the coy did not get any reinforcement, it withdrew to Mirzapur at 1145 hrs. The rest of battalion built up in this area by 1300 hrs and made an attempt to capture Zafarwal. In the absence of B Sqn 2 Lancers, which continued to linger at Pindi Mahrasan, it was not possible to overcome the opposition at Zafarwal with the available troops. 5/5 GR, therefore, failed to capture their objective and was ordered to fall back on Mirzapur and firm in there for night 12/13 September(33).

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These piecemeal and disjointed attempts, in which the armour had shown no interest, saved Zafarwal. For, while the Indians were making ineffective jabs at the objective, the enemy had reinforced the town with armour and infantry. When, on 13 September, a full fledged brigade attack employing 116 Inf Bde, supported by a sqn of 2 Lancers, was at last mounted, it was too late. 5/5 Gorkha Rifles attacking from the direction of Mirzapur was held up by strong enemy tank fire. The squadron of 2 Lancers came to a halt in the Degh Nadi when opposed by recoilless guns and tank fire, and hence failed to contact 5/5 Gorkha Rifles. The attack fizzled out short of the objective.

Capture of Pagowal

On 12 September 1965, 69 Mtn Bde was ordered to secure area Pagowal by 0600 hrs 13 September, and then hold that position to protect the right flank of 1_ Armd Div(34).

About 500 metres south-west of Pagowal, there was an important intersection of roads. Here the road Maharajke-Pagowal-Badiana crossed the roads to Sialkot Cantt and Sialkot city from Phillora. On account of its vital importance, it was decided to secure this road intersection complex as part of the plan for the capture of Pagowal. According to the plan, 69 Mtn Bde with under command 62 Cavalry less one sqn, was to commence the advance led by 3 Madras, from Kaloi at 0400 hrs on 13 September. On capturing area Pagowal, the road junctions were to be secured by physical occupation. The Brigade Commander ordered the leading battalion group not to get involved in clearing Pagowal in the initial stages, but to compel the enemy to withdraw by outflanking the village from the right.

The advance commenced at 0400 hrs on 13 September, as scheduled. 3 Madras Group, after clearing light enemy opposition of approximately one platoon in area north of Pagowal, established itself in area Mile 8 on road Sialkot Cantt-Phillora by 0600 hrs. The rest of the enemy, approximately a weak company group, was based on the village. As the leading elements advanced beyond the village, the enemy, to avoid being encircled, withdrew without giving a fight. 9 Kumaon and the Brigade Reconnaissance Group fetched up at 0630 hrs. 9 Kumaon secured the Sialkot City Road adjacent to and south of the 3 Madras position. By 0700 hrs, the defended sector was adjusted to secure the entire road intersection area. The artillery supporting the Brigade was moved up and redeployed to give added range beyond the objective.

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The disposition of the 69 Mtn Bde at 0630 hrs on 13 September was as follows:-

- (a) 3 Madras - Area Koga
- (b) 9 Kumaon - Area Mile 54

The move of the Bde group into the new defended sector came under observation of the enemy at around 0630 hrs. An hour later, the Bde sector was engaged by heavy artillery fire directed by two enemy Air Observation Posts. Approximately 1000 shells rained into the Bde sector within two hours, but the troops held their ground. Having failed to evict the Indian forces through massive artillery shelling, the enemy switched on to intermittent and harassing fire up to 1600 hrs. Then the Pakistanis attempted a counter-attack from the south-west with approximately two squadrons of Patton tanks supported by infantry. The enemy infantry and tank group approached to within 1500 metres of the Forward Defended Localities, when it was brought to an abrupt halt and disintegrated by the accurate arty and tank fire of the Indian troops. With the repulse of this counter-attack, the Bde defended sector around Pagowal area was well consolidated.

The Indian casualties suffered during the capture of Pagowal included 3 Officers, 2 JCOs and 11 ORs killed, and 4 Officers, 1 JCO and 44 ORs wounded. The casualties were mostly due to enemy artillery and air strikes(35).

First Battle of Chawinda

On 13 September 1965, 1 Armd Div was leaning heavily on Chawinda, and it was decided to make an attempt for the reduction of this area by a pincer movement employing 43 Lorried Infantry Brigade from the north and 99 Mountain Brigade and 1 Armd Brigade from the north-west. GOC 1 Corps ordered 1 Armd Div to cross the railway line Sialkot-Chawinda-Pasrur to encircle the town from the west as a preliminary manoeuvre preparatory to launching the main assault.

The pattern of assault was planned as follows(36):-

4 Horse was to advance cross country to cut Badiana-Pasrur road and then swing south-east with a view to destroying any enemy armour which might try to escape from Chawinda or attempt to reinforce Chawinda from Pasrur. 17 Horse was to thrust towards Kalewali and be prepared to support 43 Lorried Inf Bde assault on Kalewali

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and later on Chawinda, if so desired. 69 Mtn Bde Group, including 16 Cavalry, was to ensure that enemy armour was prevented from joining the main armour battle in area south of Phillora and Chawinda from the direction of Sialkot. 43 Lorried Inf Bde, was to advance and attack Chawinda from the firm base at Phillora, while 1 Arty Bde was to concentrate in support of 1 Armd Div.

The plan was put into execution at first light on 14 September. In the very initial stages of its advance, Indian armour ran into an enemy anti-tank screen in the area west of Phillora and north of Alhar. The enemy opposition was approximately one Patton Regiment, which after giving battle throughout the day withdrew west of the railway line. By last light 1 Armd Div had secured areas Kalewali, and Alhar after inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. Eighteen enemy tanks were destroyed, besides a number of recoilless guns and other equipment. But the progress of the battle fell short of expectations. The armour having failed to create the tactical pre-condition for an infantry assault on Chawinda, the attack on the objective by 43 Lorried Inf Bde was called off.

All this time the right flank had remained comparatively calm, except some minor skirmishes. 168 Inf Bde, which had earlier captured Bajragarhi, had by now occupied Kalarwanda and Rasulpur without any enemy opposition. On 14 September, the company at Kalarwanda was driven off its objective by an enemy force of tanks and infantry, supported by heavy medium artillery shelling. The village, however, was recaptured on night 14/15 September 1965.

On 15 September 1965, Indian forces were deployed as follows:-

1 Armd Div

HQ 1 Armd Div and 35 - Chawra
Inf Bde less one
battalion

43 Lorried Inf Bde,
99 Mtn Bde Less one
battalion, with one
battalion from - Phillora
35 Inf Bde

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1 Armd Bde	- North of Phillora
<u>6 Mtn Div</u>	
69 Mtn Bde less one battalion with under Command - 62 Cav less one Sqn	- Pagowal
<u>14 Inf Div</u>	
58 Inf Bde less one battalion	- Area Cross Road
116 Inf Bde	- Area Kangre-Ikhnal- Wadhala
<u>26 Inf Div</u>	
168 Inf Bde	- Area Rasulpur- Kalarwanda.

Regrouping and New Plans

The 15th and 16th September 1965 were spent in making fresh plans for the capture of Chawinda and for certain preliminary operations essential for the task. Several villages in area Khananwali were cleared on 15 September. 1 Armd Div (4 Horse) had also been able to cut the railway line between Sialkot and Chawinda at Alhar, and occupied it with one battalion (4 Raj Rif) from 99 Mtn Bde(37).

The situation was reviewed on 16 September at a conference attended by the Corps Commander and the Commanders of 1 Armd Div and 6 Mtn Div at Maharajke, and fresh plans were made to capture Chawinda, Badiana and Zafarwal. 6 Mtn Div was given the task of capturing Chawinda. The responsibility of capturing Badiana and Zafarwal was delegated to 1 Armed Div and 14 Inf Div respectively. Since both 69 and 99 Mtn Bdes of 6 Mtn Div were committed to ground, major regrouping became necessary. 35 and 58 Infantry Brigades were taken away from 1 Armoured Division and placed under command 6 Mountain Division. 99 Mountain Brigade was also reverted from 1 Armoured Division to its parent formation.

So, the plan in outline was made as under:-

6 Mtn Div, with under command 35 and 58 Inf Bdes and 99 Mtn Bde, was to capture and hold Chawinda on night 17/18 September 1965. Thereafter it

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was to exploit towards Pasrur and the Cross Roads. On capture of Chawinda and after leaving sufficient armour under command 6 Mtn Div for the security of the area, 1 Armoured Division was to capture and hold Badiana. One infantry brigade from 6 Mtn Div was to be made available to 1 Armd Div after the capture of Badiana. 14 Inf Div was to be prepared to capture Zafarwal as soon as Badiana was secured. One Sqn of armour was to be made available to this formation by 1 Armd Div for this task.

In addition to the above, the following attacks were also planned and ordered by HQ I Corps:-

26 Inf Div (52 Mtn Bde) was to capture area Tilakpur and Muhadipur (north of Wains) on night 17/18 September 1965; while 14 Inf Div was to capture Cross Roads near Dugri to secure the left flank of 6 Mtn Div.

As a preliminary to launching an attack on Chawinda it was decided to capture certain villages in the vicinity and to the rear of the town, which were of tactical importance. These areas were to be used as pivots to hinge the attack on Chawinda, as also to intercept any enemy reinforcements interfering with the operations. Having earlier on secured, Kalewali and Alhar, plans were now made to capture Jassoran and nearby areas.

In a series of brisk actions, these positions were secured by 1 Armd Div, employing 4 Horse, 17 Horse and 8 Garhwal Rifles, by last light 16 September against stiff resistance. The enemy losses on this day came to 28 tanks destroyed. It was during the intense fighting on this day that Indian forces lost a number of good officers and other ranks. Lt Col A.B. Tarapore, CO 17 Horse, got killed by enemy artillery fire on his return to Jassoran at 1730 hrs(38). He was posthumously awarded the nation's highest award, Param Vir Chakra, for exceptional gallantry displayed by him. Lt Col J.E.Jhirad, CO 8 Garhwal Rifles, was also killed near Jassoran whilst leading his troops.

The Indian armour/infantry pivots held on to all the positions tenaciously on 17 September, in spite of heavy casualties inflicted by the enemy. The Pakistanis reacted violently and put in fierce attacks. A tank battle raged throughout the morning and afternoon. The attack was repulsed. Eight enemy tanks were destroyed. The Indians also lost the same number(39).

The Second Failure at Chawinda

The GOC 6 Mtn Div decided to carry out his task in two phases. In Phase I, 35 and 58 Inf Bdes were to attack simultaneously from west of Chawinda, with the Railway line Sialkot-Chawinda as boundary between the two brigades. In Phase II, 35 Inf Bde was to carry out mopping up operations. 1 Armd Div was ordered to maintain existing pivots at the little villages west of Chawinda, and secure the flanks of 6 Mtn Div till the capture of Chawinda. The Armd Div was to ensure that enemy armour did not ingress into Chawinda.

Unfortunately, at this stage, certain factors intervened to jeopardise the success of the operation. According to plans made at the conference at Maharajke, orders were issued by HQ I Corps placing 35 Inf Bde under command 6 Mtn Div from 1 Armd Div, but the Bde through a misunderstanding was moved forward from its location Gadgor to area Phillora by HQ 1 Armd Div on night 16/17 September. This had apparently been done to support an attack on Chawinda planned earlier by 1 Armd Div and scheduled to go in during night 16/17 September 1965. The Bde was later moved back to its original location, but valuable time was lost in the process.

In view of this development, the attack on Chawinda by 6 Mtn Div on night 17/18 September was again postponed by 24 hours on representation from GOC 6 Mtn Div. GOC 1 Armd Div, however, pointed out that his troops had been holding Butur Dograndi, Fatehpur and Jassoran - villages west of Chawinda - against heavy enemy opposition, and that it would be difficult to stick on to these positions for another 24 hours. It was, therefore, decided to withdraw 1 Armd Div elements from Butur Dograndi and Fatehpur, but the pivotal position at Jassoran was to be held by 1 Armd Div at all costs in view of its vital importance of being a firm base for the operations of 35 Inf Bde. Commander 1 Armd Div assured that enemy armour would not be allowed to interfere with the operations at Chawinda(40).

But due to some more misunderstanding, 1 Armd Bde withdrew its troops from Jassoran also on 18 September 1965, along with the vacation of the other pivots, before 6 Mtn Div could mount the attack. GOC 1 Armd Div, therefore, ordered Comdr 1 Armd Bde to reoccupy Jassoran and establish a firm base for the attack of 35 Inf Bde. Comdr 1 Armd Bde, however, did not comply with this order as he thought that it would not be possible to recapture this position at such a short notice. He, however, promised to

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position his tanks at Jassoran by first light 19 September, in approximately eight hours after 6 Mtn Div had launched the assault.

According to the version of 1 Armd Bde, favourable conditions had been created by 1 Armd Bde Gp for an infantry assault on Chawinda on 14, 15, 16 and 17 September. As both Chawinda and Badiana had been isolated and cut off from three sides and as both had also been invested from the rear by 1 Armd Bde, particularly on 16 and 17 September, it was possible to capture easily both these objectives by an infantry assault. These objectives were thinly held by enemy infantry, possibly not more than two Coys in each place. The armd bde was precluded from assaulting these objectives, as both were built up areas. A great opportunity was thus lost. Due to one reason or another, the assault was postponed from one day to another. Finally, when it became evident that no assault would materialise until night 18/19 September, armd sqns in Jassoran, Butur Dograndi and Sodreke had to be withdrawn to north of the railway track, during night 17/18 September. These pivots, if kept indefinitely, were exposed to an enemy counter-stroke(41).

As the securing of Jassoran was considered vital preliminary to mounting an attack on Chawinda, 6 Mtn Div assigned this task to 20 Rajput from 35 Inf Bde. This created a serious set-back in the scheduled plan of operation, as 35 Inf Bde was one of the assaulting brigade.

6 Mtn Div mounted the attack as planned on night 18/19 September. However, probably on account of lack of proper security, the element of surprise had been lost. The enemy started shelling the forming-up places while the troops were being marshalled for the attack. The operation was, in consequence, dislocated from the very beginning.

However, 35 Inf Bde did achieve partial success in its assault; 6 Maratha were able to capture their objective by 0410 hrs, whereas 5 J&K Rifles met with heavy enemy resistance. By first light, enemy tanks opened up from Chawinda. It was found that enemy was using tanks as pill boxes from inside the town and the defences were well dug in and organised in depth. Heavy casualties were sustained and the troops were compelled to fall back on Jassoran. Two Companies of 6 Maratha which had fought their way to Chawinda Railway Station had to be extricated with the assistance of 4 Horse.

The situation that developed on 58 Inf Bde front was even worse. Enemy shelling created such confusion

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that all control was lost. The pounding was so heavy that it unnerved the troops. The leading troops lost direction, and 14 Rajput barged into neighbouring Indian position in Wazirwali, held by a Coy of 5 Jat and sqn of 2 Lancers of 43 Lorried Inf Bde. There was a brisk exchange of fire between the two Indian units. Stunned by the unexpected opposition en route to their objective the Rajputs dispersed in confusion. Two companies of 4 J&K Rifles (the other assaulting battalion) which had managed to reach Chawinda were thrown back by the enemy's combined infantry and tank fire. By that stage, all control at battalion and brigade level was lost and the formation ceased to be a cohesive force. The Comdr 58 Inf Bde decided to send forward 3/1 GR, the reserve battalion, to restore the situation, but it did not succeed in the face of intense artillery and tank fire of the enemy. According to the Comdr 58 Inf Bde, about 500 J&K Riflemen deserted due to Pak armour threat, and the remnants of Gorkhas were found near Lebbe(42).

This was the second time that Chawinda eluded the Indian dragnet. The failure at Chawinda automatically ruled out the pursuance of operations to capture Badiana and Zafarwal.

While giving his observation about the operations at Chawinda, Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh (Retd), the then GOC-in-C Western Command, has stated that (43):-

" Following in the wake of our deplorable performance in the first attempt on Chawinda by 1 Armd Div, the fiasco in the battle of Chawinda-Badiana-Zafarwal complex, added to the series of disappointing failures we had been courting ever since the outbreak from the bridgehead. A critical analysis of the battle reveals the following shortcomings:-

- (a) The approach to the battle was sluggish and complacent. The operation was being postponed, day by day, in a leisurely fashion. A peculiar smugness and inertia appeared to dominate the higher levels of command. At last, after much exhortation, the action was mounted on the night 18/19 September, 72 hours too late. By this time the enemy had had the much badly needed breather and had poised itself to meet our action half way. The result was a foregone conclusion.
- (b) The battle for the Chawinda-Badiana-Zafarwal area involved the coordinated action of

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three formations - 1 Armoured Division, 6 Mountain Division and 14 Infantry Division. It was undoubtedly a Corps battle at a very crucial phase in our campaign for a vital area, the capture of which would have had far reaching consequences. A firm grip of the situation combined with resolute direction at Corps level would have tipped the scales in our favour. A determined leadership at lower levels could have done the rest to score a striking success. Both these vital ingredients were unfortunately missing. The guiding hand of the Corps Commander was conspicuously absent - in fact, he appeared to have played hardly a part in the battle, which even at that late stage, could have laid the foundation of ultimate victory. In the event, however, the rot initiated by the lack of forceful direction at higher levels of command deteriorated into a dismal disaster at lower levels through atrocious execution. We came out of the battle badly battered and bruised, to usher in a stalemate that lasted for the rest of the conflict. It was an inexcusable command failure.

- (C) The lack of rapport between General Officer Commanding 6 Mountain Division and 1 Armoured Division made a further contribution to the chaotic performance at Chawinda. This was reflected in the unnecessary move of 35 Infantry Brigade to Phillora on the night previous to the attack and the vacation of the vital pivot at Jassoran. The refusal of 1 Armoured Brigade to re-establish a firm base at Jassoran in time reflected a sad lack of cooperation between commanders in the field.
- (d) It was obvious that the battle for Chawinda demanded the best in any unit. To ensure the success of this exacting action, it would have been advisable to have provided general Officer Commanding 6 Mountain Division with his own brigades - the Commanders and troops he knew. On the other hand on the eve of this decisive battle, 35 and 58 Infantry Brigades, from 14 Infantry Division, were placed under his command. Through foresight and intelligent staff duties a suitable regrouping could have been achieved to enable General Officer Commanding 6

Mountain Division to go into battle with his own formations. Failure to do so was, in my opinion, a major blunder in staff duties.

- (e) Leadership at battalion and brigade level was lacking. There was a tendency on the part of Brigade and Battalion Commanders to hold themselves back instead of being well forward to dominate the situation. In consequence they had no grip over the circumstances as they developed.

This battle is a classic study in command failure and poor execution. Lack of control at Corps level paved the way to defeat - an indifferent leadership at lower levels made disaster inevitable. The depressing combination decided the fate of the battle and foredoomed the outcome of the entire campaign."

26 Infantry Division Sector

On the far right flank, 52 Mountain Brigade was nominated to capture Tilakpur and Muhadipur on the Chaprar-Sialkot road on night 17/18 September 1965. The D Day was, however, postponed to night 18/19 September to conform with operations at Chawinda. As a preliminary to the main operation, 5/11 Gorkha Rifles carried out a series of actions for clearing areas Nandpur, Malane and Dhure. 1 Madras was given the task of capturing Tilakpur, while 10 Mahar was given Muhadipur as its objective. In a well executed outflanking manoeuvre, 52 Mountain Brigade launched the assault from the right rear at 2230 hrs on 18 September 1965. The enemy, though completely taken by surprise, quickly rallied round to offer a stiff resistance. Nevertheless, by 0300 hrs, 19 September 1965, areas Mile 8 Road Sialkot-Chaprar, Tilakpur and Muhadipur had been captured by the Indian troops.

The enemy reacted sharply to the loss of Tilakpur and Muhadipur, for these villages dominated the axis Sialkot-Chaprar. His medium and heavy guns continuously pounded Indian positions. A number of determined counter-attacks with infantry and armour groups, supported by heavy artillery fire, were also launched on the Brigade Defended Sector. But the Indian troops stuck on doggedly to their positions and repulsed the assaults with heavy loss to the enemy.

The most serious of these counter-attacks was launched on the night of 22/23 September 1965. The enemy demonstrated against 1 Madras at Tilakpur, but carried out the actual assault against 10 Mahar from the area west of the road. A penetration was effected

into the left hand forward company, posing a direct threat to Battalion Headquarters at Muhadipur. After a brief but bitter fighting, the enemy withdrew in confusion. Indian artillery took full advantage of the inviting targets offered by the disorganised, retreating enemy and inflicted heavy casualties(44).

Meanwhile, 1 Armoured Division gave its formations and regiments a general order for refitting and recoupment. Organised rest without prejudicing operational security was insisted upon. A mobile reserve was created and placed at a high state of operational readiness to forestall any opportunistic action by the enemy during this temporary lull.

In the period intervening upto the cease-fire, there were some fluid armour actions, conspicuous amongst which was the fight in the area across the rail line south of Alhar where an enemy infantry and armour concentration was effectively engaged by Indian tanks and artillery.

Cease-Fire and Conclusion

At about 1410 hrs on 22 September 1965, a message was received from Army Headquarters ordering a cease fire with effect from 0330 hours on 23 September 1965. The orders were communicated to all concerned. The troops were, however, cautioned to remain vigilant. It was apprehended that enemy forces might put in a series of strong offensive actions in a last-minute bid to save face and strengthen their subsequent bargaining capacity. In the event, this proved to be a correct surmise. The Pak army made frantic efforts to recapture lost areas in the period intervening upto the deadline for the cease-fire. The most desperate of these attempts was an assault on village and railway station of Alhar. This was repulsed with heavy casualties to the enemy. Pak artillery continued shelling in the entire area of operation until the very last. Indian guns retaliated suitably. At 0330 hrs, on 23 September 1965, however, the last of the shells was fired, and all became quiet.

When the cease-fire came into effect, I Corps had approximately 500 square kilo-meters (about 200 square miles) of Pak territory under its control. It had also taken a heavy toll of enemy armour. The number of enemy tanks destroyed was estimated to total 144, of which 31 lay scattered in enemy territory firmly held by India. The captured equipment included 11 tanks and a large number of arms and ammunition.

The number of enemy troops killed was placed at 693, while the prisoners of war with the Corps

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numbered 448 (including 310 civilians). I Corps' losses in armour were 29 tanks destroyed and 41 damaged. Casualties in personnel were heavy: 38 officers killed, 116 wounded, nine missing; 29 Junior Commissioned Officers killed, 76 wounded, eight missing; 508 Other Ranks killed, 1688 wounded and 410 missing(45). The total number of killed, wounded, and missing were 575; 2880; and 427 respectively.

The I Corps operation in the Sialkot sector is a typical example of a promising action being foiled through a combination of faulty strategic concept and indifferent tactical execution. For, with the exception of a few minor successes, the formation's performance was virtually a catalogue of lost victories. No doubt, it dealt a telling blow to the enemy, but the fact remains that it fell short of a decisive defeat which it was within India's capacity to inflict. In consequence, the enemy's armour was only mauled, instead of being crippled beyond recovery.

The armoured Division fought a good and successful action at Phillora, where it badly hurt the enemy armour. This was the only bright spot in the otherwise lack-lustre performance of the formation. The battle of Phillora was perhaps the biggest engagement of the war in which about 400 tanks took part from both sides. The Indian armour here succeeded in drawing the Pak armour on to the ground of its own choice and then inflicting heavy losses on it.

The Commander 1 Armoured Division claimed that, besides gaining complete victory over the enemy and capturing the total battle field area, the destruction caused on the enemy's ranks and material was quite out of proportion to what India lost and what at any previous time had been the case in one-day tank battles of this magnitude. For instance, it was claimed, the tank losses on the enemy side (67) as compared to India's own tank losses (6) had no parallel when compared with any previous tank battle of World War II. In spite of its overall superiority in tanks both in number and in quality (Pak was estimated to have 5 Patton tank regiments as opposed to India's 3 Centurion regiments) and in spite of fighting in defence on its home ground, Pakistan was defeated. This indeed was a tremendous achievement(46).

The Pakistani version, naturally, gives a somewhat different picture. According to Gen Mohammed Musa, the then Pak Commander-in-Chief: "The enemy attacked Sialkot several times and all these attacks

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were repulsed. But he was able to make headway on the Samba-Chawinda road by sheer force of numbers, till his advance was held up in front of Chawinda.

By all military logic, he should have broken through our dispositions and reached GT road within a few days, because of (a) the great disparity between the opposing forces, (b) the fact that his armoured division had additional and powerful infantry support, whereas ours relied on its own meagre infantry resources, (c) the terrain upto Shakargarh to the east and GT Road to the south was ideal for armoured warfare, and (d) he had the initiative to an extent, being the aggressor.

Despite these favourable factors, he did not even capture Chawinda, against which he struck his head day and night for nearly a fortnight"(47).

Gen Musa faulted the Indian Chief for not making wide encircling moves in spite of his convincing superiority in forces and also because the Pak threat in the area was limited to vigorous and daring patrolling(48). He concluded that "both sides suffered tank losses, but thanks to the superb performance of the PAF the enemy had to lick a much bigger wound"(49).

These observations, however, do not appear quite correct. In the Sialkot sector, India had not even double the strength of the Pak army, that is, eleven infantry brigades and six tank regiments against Pakistan's six infantry brigades and four tank regiments. More Pak forces arrived from 12 September. Indians, owing to their offensive role, should have, in fact, maintained a ratio of 3:1 in their favour, which was not available. Again, the aim of the Indian commander in the sector was, it is argued, not the capture of Pak territory but the destruction of Pak armour, and so he chose a narrow front to attack. Spreading his forces in wide encircling moves would not have given the Indian General the needed armour superiority in Phillora to destroy the Pak tanks.

It is a known fact that the Pakistanis could not use their sophisticated armour with skill and, therefore, lost heavily to the Indians. In this connection a Washington Post report of 17 October 1965 is very revealing. "In terms of equipment, military circles in Washington concluded, on the basis of the post-war information, that Pakistan lost 200 tanks, with another 150 put out of action but recoverable. India by this assessment, lost between 175 and 190, with another 200 temporarily out of commission"(50).

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It does, however, appear that the progress of I Corps on Sialkot front was too cautious and slow. The five brigades of 26 Inf Div were not fully employed. The planners appear to have over-estimated the threat on the flanks of 1 Armoured Division, which incidentally never materialised. In fact, the Pakistanis had neither resources nor a plan to carry out such a threat, though they always made a pretence of it to keep the Indians guessing. The Indians also could not take any important town or communication centre in the Sialkot sector. The tremendous advantages of surprise and initiative were wasted on 8 September, and a rapier thrust degenerated into a slogging bout(51)

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Sandhu, Gurcharan Singh, Maj Gen (Retd), PVSM, pp. 382-383
2. From Official Records.
Some place names have different spellings in the Survey of India maps and in official records. Apart from Bhagowal and Phillaurah, it may be noted that Iknal is same as Nakhnal, Rangre as Kangre etc.
3. Musa, Gen, p.64.
4. From Official Records.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. This would not have happened had it carried out a proper reconnaissance of the area.
12. From Official Records.
13. Harbakhsh Singh, Lt Gen (Retd), pp.218-219.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Harbakhsh Singh, Lt Gen (Retd), p. 221.
20. From Official Records.
21. From Official Records.
After orders had been given by the GOC, the Brigade Group and Column Commanders were allowed to use their initiative whilst fighting their own battles within the frame work of this overall divisional plan.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
Within a short time, 5/9 GR had suffered 40 casualties and 5 Jat approximately 20.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.

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39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Report of interview with Lt Col J.S. Mandher (Retd), formerly Bde Comdr 58 Inf Bde, held on 23 August 1989.
43. Harbakhsh Singh, Lt Gen (Retd), p.240-242.
44. From Official Records.
45. Harbakhsh Singh, Lt Gen (Retd), Appendix 'C'.
46. From Official Records.
47. Quoted by B.M.Kaul in Confrontation with Pakistan, pp.89-90, from an article in Dawn, Karachi, of 6 September 1969, by Gen Musa. Also see "My Version" by Gen Musa, page 67.
48. But the fault was Maj Gen R.S. Sparrow's, not Gen Chaudhuri's.
49. Russel Brines, on the other hand, gives credit to Gen Chaudhuri for his bold planning. "General Chaudhuri daringly manoeuvred his armour to mount the Sialkot offensive. He left one force in the Lahore sector and sent the other, mainly the newest equipment, into action around Sialkot. This required the movement of some 3,000 vehicles along a single road and into enemy terrain under potential aerial threat of considerable proportions. The gamble was two-fold; first, that the forces defending the road to Delhi would not be disproportionately weakened and secondly, that the movement toward Sialkot could be accomplished without devastating loss to enemy action. The gamble succeeded to the extent that the Indians were able to inflict heavy punishment on Pakistan's armoured striking force on two fronts". - Russel Brines - The Indo-Pakistani Conflict, p.342. In fact, "tactically, the judgement of impartial experts is that the Indians demonstrated somewhat greater skill and better strategy in the use of armour". - Ibid, p.345.
50. Quoted by Russel Brines, p.344.
51. However, Maj Gen R.S. Sparrow, MVC (Twin Awards) has made the following interesting observation in his interview in Delhi held on 7 May 1987:-
"In every sector, Indian armed forces did badly against Pakistan, excepting Sialkot sector. We lost 150 sq miles near Gadra Road in Rajasthan and 21 villages in Fazilka. We also lost Hussainiwala, Khemkaran, Dera Baba Nanak and Chhamb-Jaurian. Pakistan had total superiority over us in armour, Arty and Air. But as far as our Armoured Div was concerned, our training was better, so were our use of the ground, our gunnery and the decoding system. I ran about between my formations 3 days and nights without any sleep. My plan was to go behind the enemy armoured formations through a right hook after engaging the

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enemy on the front with a small force as part of my deception plan. After getting to the rear of the enemy, I veered round to attack the 3 enemy armour positions one after another and destroyed them completely. By battle front was 25 miles wide in Phillora area. I captured 337 Pak villages opposite Sialkot between Ek Nadi and Dek Nadi.

The armour was the deciding factor in that war. If cease-fire had not been declared I would have captured Wazirabad in the next bound and then Islamabad, and Pakistan had no armour to stop me. We did not plan to capture cities, which would have consumed our trained manpower as in the case of Berlin during the 2nd World War. Our political leaders were kind and the UNO was crying, so we had to agree to a cease-fire. The cause of the success of our armour was good training given to our tank crew."

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CHAPTER - VIII

RAJASTHAN SECTOR : 11 INF DIV OPERATIONS

After the Kutch crisis, the deployment of Pakistani forces opposite Rajasthan border was defensive, though a Pakistani infantry division was located in Hyderabad(Sind), which could create trouble in Rajasthan or in Gujarat. In order to engage this division, India opened a new front in the Rajasthan Sector, and Indian troops of 30 Inf Bde under 11 Inf Div entered West Pakistan in Sind on 8 September 1965 from Gadra Road, in the Barmer district of Rajasthan.

Terrain

The Rajasthan-West Pakistan frontier was about 1,040 kms long, the longest Indo-Pak border in one Indian State. It passed through the border districts of Ganganagar, Bikaner, Jaisalmer and Barmer. Ganganagar district had about 200 kms of common border with Pakistan. The rest of State's western frontier with West Pakistan was in the desert belt, popularly known as the Thar or the Great Indian Desert.

The bordering district of Ganganagar, the granary of Rajasthan, was inhabited by martial races like Sikhs, Jats and Ahirs. The border villages of the Thar Desert were inhabited by Hindu and Muslim cattle breeders and sheep farmers. In the years of drought these inhabitants used to migrate to distant places in search of fodder and water. The Pakistan Rangers and Mujahids looted border villages in this area and kept this part of the border 'hot'. The district of Barmer had about 240 kms of common border with Pakistan. An eight-kilometre sand track linked Gadra Road railway station with the Pakistani village of Gadra. It was situated about 40 kms east of Munabao, the Indian railway terminus on the Barmer-Hyderabad line(1). Being an important railway point it had strategic significance. As for airfields, there were only two airfields in Rajasthan in 1965, - one at Jaipur and another at Jodhpur.

Since the terrain of this sector was peculiar in nature and posed many logistical problems, it needs an elaborate discussion. The inhospitable desert of Thar was characterised by loose and shifting sand dunes, shaped in long ridges, and covered by wave-like curves, formed by the winds. The north-east region was sandy and barren, but the area bordering Sind was comparatively fertile. The only vegetation was phog, bui and thorny bushes. At some places bharoot and siwan grass, and a limited number of trees also grew. The climate, both during the summer and the winter,

was extreme. The hottest months were May and June. However, due to sandy soil the area got very hot around noon and cooled off very quickly after sun-set. In winter this region had quite a cold climate. Rainfall in the sandy region was very scanty, though once in five or six years it could be noticeable. Sub-soil water was generally found 60 to 90 metres below the surface(2). People depended mostly on the rain water stored in tanks and reservoirs. On either side of the international border, most of the water available was from hand-dug wells which were very deep, and situated far apart in the desert. The water in them might be sweet, saline or brackish. Saline and brackish water was also fit for consumption, except during the mid-day hours in summer. But the pond water was not good from the hygienic point of view. In this terrain, water conservation needed special emphasis. The only way to conserve body water was to travel during the hours of the night or in the early hours of the morning. However, in case of emergency, leaves of phog bush, roots of bui bush and dachabri grass were also used as substitute for water for survival during long-range patrolling and battles(3).

In this stark desert terrain, landmarks existed only near water points. To overcome these handicaps, mastery in the art of navigation was required. In addition to other aids of navigation used by the Army, the use of prismatic compass was significant. A thorough knowledge about the stars, shape of the sand dunes, direction of the wind blowing during different seasons, and services of expert 'pagis'(4) were also of great help in this sector.

The area was ill-served with communications. Only a few camel and cart tracks joining villages and water points passed through a series of sand hills(5). Due to frequent sand storms these tracks were soon obliterated and covered with sand. Between the two sand hills, small mounds were also created by the strong winds around the roots of the bushes. In addition, there were small shifting sand dunes. Their position changed rapidly according to the direction and velocity of the wind. However, due to lack of obstacles, the terrain was excellent for tank movement.

As the vast area in this sector was a sea of sand, the camel served as the 'ship'. It was largely used for the transportation of military stores, troops and water. In this terrain, dominated by the sand hills and mounds, the mobility of vehicle column was generally restricted to the sandy tracks. The vehicles were slow to get adapted to the requirements

of the desert. On the contrary, a camel-mounted column could move off the tracks freely and unnoticed by the enemy, even during long range patrolling(6). Thus, the camel had its own suitability and perhaps an edge over mechanised transport for warfare in this unchartered sandy terrain.

The Rival Forces

During the 1965 operations against Pakistan the main battle-field was along the border of the Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir. The bulk of the forces had to be employed in the north, and therefore neither Pakistan nor India was in a position to reinforce its troops along the Rajasthan Sector. The aim of Indian operations in this Sector was to tie down maximum Pakistani forces in the Sind area(7).

Till August 1965, the Rajasthan Sector (less Ganganagar Sector) was part of the operational responsibility of HQ Delhi and Rajasthan Area under Western Command with the task of defending the area against aggression by Pakistan and of launching limited raids across the border(8). In September 1965, when the fighting in Jammu and Kashmir Sector intensified, and the Western Command found it difficult to deal with such a vast theatre, Barmer Sector was handed over to the Southern Command(9). Northern limit for operational responsibility of Southern Command was fixed as follows(10):-


Gadra Road - Barmer - Chawa - Marwar - Erinpara to where it joined Rajasthan border.

Lt Gen Moti Sagar, GOC-in-C, Southern Command, entrusted the task of tying down Pak Forces in Sind to 11 Inf Div under Maj Gen (later Lt Gen) N.C. Rawley, MC.

30 Inf Bde (under Brig J. Guha) of 11 Inf Div was given the operational responsibility of Barmer Sector. Its projected operations were upto and including Railway line Barmer - Gadra Road, and the responsibility of denying the road and railway between Barmer and Gadra Road devolved on this Brigade(11). Following troops were placed under its command:-

5 Maratha LI, 1 Garhwal Rif, 3 Guards, and D Sqn
13 Grenadiers.

The Indian Army was aware that a Pakistani infantry division was located in Hyderabad(Sind). By the end of August 1965, GOC Delhi and Rajasthan Area, Maj Gen D.G.R. Rajwade, had appreciated that Pakistan was likely to deploy one infantry brigade in general



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area Nayachor opposite Barmer Sector(12). On 5 September 1965, 51 Inf Bde (2 Inf bns : 18 Punjab and 8 Frontier Force) of Pakistan Army moved from Karachi to the battle locations opposite Barmer Sector(13). In addition, there were three wings of Desert/Indus Rangers located in that area. Keeping in view her offensive in Jammu and Kashmir, it was estimated that Pakistan's posture in the Rajasthan theatre with the forces available was likely to be defensive. Her activities here were expected to be confined to hit-and-run raids all along the border. However, there was a possibility of her resorting to an advance along the Munabao - Barmer axis by a battalion group with a view to capturing some territory(14).

Operations

On 1 September 1965, Comdr 11 Inf Div assigned 30 Inf Bde the task to capture Gadra City and establish firm base in area Nayachor with a view to exploiting towards Mirpur Khas(15). The Bde HQ including Sig Coy and 1 Garh Rif left Dharangadra for Barmer on 2 September. On the same day, 3 Guards and 5 Maratha left Ahmedabad and Baroda respectively for Barmer. HQ 30 Inf Bde completed its concentration at Barmer as per schedule by 2200 hrs on 4 September with the 3 Guards, 5 Maratha LI, 1 Garhwal Rif, and 85 Fd Coy, under command. After placing 1 Garh Rif at 4 hours notice to move for operations, the Bde Comdr left for reconnaissance of general area Gadra Road - Munabao.

On 4 September 1965, GOC 11 Inf Div issued operation instructions to 30 Inf Bde for carrying out offensive operations against Pakistan in Sind and allotted the following tasks(16):-

- (a) to capture Gadra City and defend it against Pak counter-attacks;
- (b) to carry out strong harassing raids against Nayachor, Umarkot and Dali; and
- (c) to be prepared to reinforce Bakhsar Rajasthan Armed Constabulary(RAC) garrison with one coy, should a threat develop in that area.

The Bde received the Code-word 'Barrel' for offensive operations in Rajasthan Sector from HQ 11 Inf Div on 6 September at 1100 hrs. Immediately, the Bde moved for Gadra Road and completed its concentration there late in the evening.

Capture of Gadra City

The Bde attack to capture Gadra City, which was planned for the night of 6/7 September, had to be postponed by 24 hours for lack of information about the enemy and lack of armour and artillery support. But on arrival of 95 Mtn Comp Regt, one bty of 167 Fd Regt, and 3(Indep) Armr Sqn (less one troop) at Gadra Road on 7 September, the Bde issued orders for the capture of Gadra City and sent OC 5 Maratha to cut off the enemy line of withdrawal(17).

It was at 0100 hrs on 8 September when the international boundary between India and Pakistan was crossed by 3 Guards and the sand dunes north of Gadra City were captured by 0230 hrs. 1 Garh Rif, Commanded by Lt Col K.P. Lahiri launched the attack on Gadra City at 0645 hrs and captured it by 1300 hrs. This town was held by a weak battalion of Indus Rangers who did not offer much of a fight(18). In this action eight Pakistani ORs were killed and four captured. Indian troops suffered casualties of one Officer and five ORs wounded. The enemy left behind sizeable amount of arms and ammunition and two vehicles which were captured by 1 Garh Rif. In retaliation, Pak aircraft strafed Gadra City next morning, but could not cause any damage to the Indian troops.

After the capture of Gadra City, one coy 5 Maratha was sent to cut off enemy line of withdrawal to Kumharon-Ka-Par. This coy captured two Pak ORs. Another coy of 5 Maratha was despatched to reinforce an RAC post at Munabao.

A Night of Confusion

The night of 8/9 September 1965, became a night of confusion. Frantic telephone messages were received at main HQ, Ahmedabad, of enemy para and sea landings in area Jamnagar. Information was received from Home Secretary, Gujarat, that 700 Pak para-troopers, heavily armed, had landed at Kanalus near Jamnagar on 8 September at 2300 hrs, and were proceeding towards the coast to a place called Sika. Another message was received of sea landing at Sika. After protracted telephone calls between Gujarat Govt. and HQ 11 Inf Div/HQ Southcom, Southern Command decided to fly in two coys of 3 Punjab from Poona to Jamnagar to restore the situation. Brig S.M. Pahilajani was ordered by the Div Comdr to take a nucleus HQ with him and to fly to Jamnagar to take control of the situation. However, enquiries and assessment by Brig Pahilajani in Jamnagar revealed that the whole story had been baseless and probably fabricated by pro-Pak elements(19). By afternoon of 9 September the scare was over.

On 9 September, 5 Maratha less one coy with under command 3 (Indep) Armd Sqn (Shermans) less two tps and 1673 Fd Bty 167 Fd Regt. Det 30 Inf Bde Sig Coy and one ambulance car, resumed advance along track Gadra City - Sakarbu - Khokhropar with the aim of capturing Khokhropar. It was reported to be held by one coy of the Pak regular army and one platoon Indus Rangers. This convoy was strafed and rocketted by F86 aircraft twice during the day. The air attack resulted in the killing of two ORs of 5 Maratha and one civilian. A civilian truck carrying 75 mm HE ammunition was completely destroyed. 5 Maratha firmed in in area Sakarbu as further movement was not possible due to vehicles getting bogged down in the sand and also due to enemy strafing(20).

PAF's F-104, F-86 and B-57 aircraft, which were active in the sky throughout the day, raided and strafed Gadra Road and Gadra Railway Station several times. The air raids resulted in casualties to the Indian troops. In addition, a railway train coming from Barmer was hit by Pak rockets near Gadra Road Railway Station. Four railway wagons were destroyed. In view of the enemy air strikes, Army HQ and HQ Western Air Command had been requested on 9 September to allot some air support to HQ 11 Inf Div(21), but no such support was provided.

After an appraisal of the overall situation on 10 September, the Div Comdr instructed the Bde Comdr(22):-

- (a) to withdraw 5 Maratha from Sakarbu, in case it was serving no useful purpose;
- (b) to organise deep raids; and
- (c) to raid Dali with a balanced force latest by the night of 11/12 September.

Skirmishes around Munabao

On 9 September, one coy of 3 Guards with 954 heavy mortar battery was ordered to reinforce RAC post at Munabao which was held by 5 Maratha. But the reinforcement could not move by train during the day due to air raids. Its movement could commence by road only at night(23). But Pakistani troops resorted to intensive shelling in this area in the afternoon of 10 September, and it continued throughout the night. Consequently, the Indian troops at Munabao withdrew under pressure to area mile 336 without any casualty(24). 5 Maratha group pulled back to Gadra City and 954 heavy mor bty and the coy of 3 Guards

withdrew to Gadra Road, leaving behind one 3-ton truck loaded with 120 mm mortar ammunition. 5 Maratha coy with some RAC personnel took up defences on ridge, south-east of Munabao. The Bde received information about the fall of Munabao on the night of 10 September, from the RAC sources next morning.

As a result of 4 air raids carried out by the PAF on 10 September, Indian troops suffered 2 ORs killed and 4 wounded. In addition, a number of civilian buses, trucks and military vehicles were damaged.

After reconnaissance of Gadra Road on 11 September, the Bde Comdr made some readjustments in his defences. 5 Maratha group from Sakarbu was pulled back to Gadra City for further operations. 3 Guards less one coy was ordered to take defences astride Gadra Road - Munabao to ensure security of Gadra Road. Nos. 6 and 7 battalion of RAC were placed under command of the Army and deployed along the border with HQ at Barmer and Sakarbu respectively on 12 September(25). The Pak troops with approximately one coy strength had moved into Munabao area, and were well dug in. Also, the presence of Pak anti-aircraft guns in Khokhropar area was indicated by Tactical Recce reports.

3 Guards less one coy was ordered to take position astride road Gadra Road - Munabao to ensure security of Gadra Road. One platoon 3 Guards with a section each of RCL and MMG was despatched in transport along road Gadra Road - Munabao to go as far forward as possible and establish contact with the Pak forces and interfere with their advance. This platoon, however, returned on seeing some vehicle movement in area ahead. Earlier, a strong camel patrol was despatched to establish contact with the troops in Munabao area and to report Pak activities. On receiving the information through the camel patrol that RAC personnel were still holding Jaisindhar ridge in Munabao, 5 Maratha coy reinforced Jaisindhar ridge during the night of 11/12 September.

Again in the morning of 12 September, a coy of 3 Guards with a battery of field guns was ordered to establish contact with the Pak forces, interfere with their build-up and occupy Munabao, if not already occupied by Pak troops. The advance started at 2000 hrs. On 13 September, the coy of 3 Guards established firm base in area Jaisindhar, while rest of 3 Guards halted for the day a little behind. But the attack on Munabao was postponed, as the enemy strength there was found to be approximately three rifle coys supported by a battery of field guns and a troop of heavy mortar.

Indian Raids

As per instructions of GOC 11 Inf Div, Dali was to be raided on the night of 11/12 September. One coy of 1 Garh Rif with one section of camels (13 Grenadiers) and a detachment of MMG and 3" mortars left Gadra City for Dali on 11 September night(26). However, as the coy neared Dali it came under Pak mortar and MMG fire next morning(27). The Coy returned to Gadra City in the evening, and intimated the occupation of Sand Dunes, south and south-west of Dali, by approximately one coy of Indus Rangers with MMG and Mortars. A camel patrol which returned from Dali on 14 September, however, reported that Pak troops had withdrawn from Dali on the night of 12/13 September, but reoccupied it by the evening of 13 September, and that Dali was held by approximately 200 Indus Rangers.

Meanwhile, 95 Mtn Compo Regt, which had been temporarily placed under command of 30 Inf Bde, was pulled back to Gadra Road on 13 September for concentration at Jodhpur by 16 September on orders from HQ Southern Command.

On 14 September, the Bde Comdr instructed 5 Maratha to detail one coy with one section each of MMG and 2" mortars supported by a section of field guns to advance along route Gadra Road - Sajan-Ka-Par - Jessa-Ka-Par - Dali, and raid Dali. However, this raid did not materialise, as the route was unfit for the movement of guns and heavy vehicle traffic. Again, this coy of 5 Maratha with a section of MMG and 3" mortars was despatched on the night of 14/15 September on route Gadra City - Dali, while one troop of tanks was to follow after first light on 15 September. The troop of tanks despatched after first light could not however, join the coy as one tank got bogged down approximately 5 km beyond Gadra City. This coy was therefore ordered to return to Gadra City.

5 Maratha coy with RAC personnel which had moved from Khadin and Jaisindhar Ridge on the morning of 13 September established its firm base in Sakarbu by the evening. The coy was ordered to raid Pak positions in Khokhropar between 0300 to 0500 hrs on 15 September to synchronise with 3 Guards attack on Munabao(28). One det of 3" mortars and one det of MMG was also sent to join the coy for the task. 5 Maratha raid on Khokhropar was carried out successfully as planned(29). However, as already stated, 3 Guards attack on Munabao was postponed as the Pak strength at Munabao was found to be approximately 3 rifle coys, supported by a battery of guns and a troop of heavy mortars(30).

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On 13 September a raiding column of D Sqn 13 Grenadiers with an Engrs det based on camels embarked upon the mission to raid Nayachor with the primary task of disrupting rail communication by blowing up railway line between Khokhropar and Nayachor. The column penetrated deep into Pak territory in area west of Khokhropar and successfully blew up railway line south-west of Lapla Khara on the night of 16 September(31). No enemy was, however, encountered by the raiding party.

On instructions from the GOC on 16 September, 5 Maratha was ordered at 1730 hrs to attack Kachbe-Ki-Dhani RAC post which was reported to have fallen to Pak attack during the night of 15/16 September. It was planned to carry out a night approach march to area Sand Dunes, south-west of Kachbe-Ki-Dhani post, during the night of 16/17 September and to recapture it in a dawn attack. However, by 2000 hrs this information was found to be incorrect, and one officer from 1 Garh Rif was despatched immediately to contact OC 5 Maratha and to inform him not to attack Kachbe-Ki-Dhani post. The officer moved at great speed through enemy infested territory and managed to stop the column when the attack was about to be launched. The column moved back to Jessa-Ka-Par after contacting the RAC post at Kachbe-Ki-Dhani(32).

Pak attacks at Panchla and Munabao

On 13 September morning, 2 Pak regular coys supported by MMG attacked the RAC post of Panchla (under operational control of HQ Delhi and Rajasthan Area/Western Command). In this attack, Panchla, held by one coy RAC, was over-run by the Pak troops. The RAC coy put up a good fight, but fell due to enemy superiority in strength(33). Stragglers from this post reaching Girab confirmed that the RAC coy comdr was killed, and that after the capture of Panchla the Pak forces were advancing towards Girab via Sundra. In view of the enemy threat from Panchla-Girab-Harsani on L of C Barmer-Gadra Road, patrolling of this route was intensified. One RAC and 13 Grenadiers patrol with a section each of mortar and MMG was despatched to Panchla on 19 September to ascertain enemy strength and to cut off Munabao-Panchla Road. The camel patrol returned on 25 September and reported that the post was held by one platoon Indus Rangers and approximately 40 armed civilians.

Two coys of Pak 8 Frontier Force attacked the 3 Guards position in area East Munabao from the north-west on 17 September(34). The attack was preceded by strafing from air and shelling by guns,

and was supported by MMG. However, 3 Guards repulsed the attack. Due to enemy shelling, air strike and attack, 3 Guards suffered 7 ORs killed and another 7 wounded. The Pak troops left behind 3 dead and 2 wounded ORs. Interrogation of the captured ORs revealed the presence of 51 Inf Bde in this area with 8 Frontier Force, 18 Punjab and 6 Baluch(35). Captured ORs also revealed that HQ 52 Inf Bde from 8 Div had moved to Jammu and Kashmir 4 days earlier and that there were two bns in area Khokhropar and Munabao.

Jessa-Ka-Par and Dali

As per orders of HQ 30 Inf Bde, operations were launched in area Jessa-Ka-Par - Dali. One coy of 1 Garh Rif with a section each of MMG and 3" mortars on camels was sent at 2200 hrs on 15 September to raid and capture Jessa-Ka-Par with the aim of providing firm base for projected raids on Khinsar by 5 Maratha(36). The coy of 1 Garh Rif occupied area Jessa-Ka-Par without any opposition. After establishing firm base there by early morning next day, it started sending patrols towards village Dali to obtain information about enemy strength and dispositions there. However, one of the patrols was ambushed by Pak troops in village Alamsar, and the Pakistani troops captured 4 ORs, and 3 camels(37).

One coy of Pakistan troops supported by 81 mm mortars and MGs raided 1 Garh Rif firm base at Jessa-Ka-Par in the early morning of 17 September(38). But the raid was repulsed, and the Pak troops fled leaving behind 12 bodies, one jeep, several weapons and a large quantity of ammunition. 1 Garh Rif suffered casualties of 2 ORs wounded(39).

Indian troops, consisting of 2 coys of 5 Maratha and a coy of 1 Garh Rif, commenced advance on Dali on the morning of 18 September. A map captured from the Pak troops had indicated that Dali was held by one coy of Indus Rangers, and one pl 18 Punjab, supported by three sections of motars and two sections of machine guns(40). The force reached Dali at about 1100 hrs and captured it without any opposition. Pak troops, as it was later detected from an intercepted message, had anticipated this move and withdrawn to Khinsar(41).

17 Madras left Ahmedabad for Barmer on 15 September to join 30 Inf Bde. On arrival the battalion concentrated in area near Utarlai airstrip and was subjected to PAF strafing on 17 September. The casualties suffered by the battalion were 2 ORs killed and 17 wounded(42). The battalion was made responsible for the defence of Gadra Road, and it occupied 5 Maratha positions there next day. One coy, sent to

Dali on the night of 18/19 September, relieved a coy of 1 Garh Rif. Later, on regrouping 17 Madras came under HQ 85 Inf Bde on 21 September.

85 Inf Bde Comes In

The newly raised HQ 85 Inf Bde (Brig H.N.Summanwar) arrived at Barmer from Ahmedabad on 18 September and commenced regrouping for further operations. In the process of re-grouping, 5 Maratha and 17 Madras came under the command of 85 Inf Bde, while 30 Inf Bde had 3 Guards and 1 Garh Rif. HQ 30 Inf Bde changed its location to area north-west of Lilma Railway Station, and HQ 85 Inf Bde moved into Gadra area.

From 1200 hrs on 21 September, the division of responsibility between the two Bdes was to be as under:-(43)

Headquarters 30 Inf Bde established in general area Munabao railway station was given the operational responsibility for Munabao-Khokhropar Sector.

Headquarters 85 Inf Bde located in general area Gadra City was given operational responsibility for Gadra Road - Gadra City - Dali - Khinsar Sector.

The deployment of the troops which came under the command of 85 Inf Bde was:-(44)

17 Madras

17 Madras less two coys at Gadra Road, one coy at Harsani, and one coy at Tamlor. (17 Madras was being conc at Dali).

5 Maratha

5 Maratha less two coys in area Jessa-Ka-Par - Dali, Coy 5 Maratha at Sakarbu and the other coy at Khadin. (Both these coys were to relieve 1 Garh Rif by first light on 21 September).

1673 Fd Bty

1673 Fd Bty at Gadra Road. (It had no prime movers to move forward).

3 Indep Armd Sqn less 3 tps

Sqn HQ at Gadra City and one tp at Dali.

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On 21 September, a combined force of two coys 5 Maratha two coys 17 Madras (under their respective COs) and a tp of tks of 3(I) Armd Sqn concentrated at Dali for further advance to Khinsar-Chachro-Dali. While the firm base was held by two coys 17 Madras, 5 Maratha column along with tanks advanced to Khinsar. The enemy was holding defence in area Naupatia, Dhole-Ki-Beri and Khutkari with two coys 18 Punjab and one coy Indus Rangers, supported by 81 mm mortars and MMGs. The Indian force comprising 2 coys and 5 Maratha with under command one coy 17 Madras attacked the enemy positions at 0600 hrs. The attack was successful. The objectives were captured by 1130 hrs after minor opposition, and 2 coys 5 Maratha established themselves on high ground in the vicinity of Naupatia for undertaking further operations(45).

The change of command was effected at 1200 hrs on 21 September. However, the wireless communication between this force and HQ 85 Inf Bde and its firm base had broken down. Meanwhile, at 1630 hrs, Pak troops commenced shelling Dali, and this was followed by strafing at 1730 hrs. The counter-attack came at 1930 hrs, and Dali fell at 2030 hrs, on 21 September. The Indian position held astride Naupatia was cut off and surrounded, and had to be abandoned. Due to a breakdown of radio link, HQ 85 Inf Bde was not aware of the fall of Dali till some stragglers reported there. A patrol under Maj C.K.Karumbaya was sent to Dali at 0400 hrs on 22 September. The patrol returned to base at 1200 hrs and confirmed that Dali was in enemy hands. Both the COs, i.e. CO 17 Madras and CO 5 Maratha, fell back and occupied Jessa-Ka-Par. Indian casualties at Dali were : wounded 1 Officer and 4 ORs; missing 3 Officers and 37 ORs. Indian casualties in area Naupatia were : killed 2 ORs; wounded 29 ORs; missing 3 Officers and 120 ORs(46).

Meanwhile, the Pak aircraft put in more air attacks on 85 Inf Bde positions on 21 September. The Bde had brought all its vehicles into the defences and these became easy targets for the Pak aircraft. Not much damage was, however, caused as the air attacks were generally very inaccurate throughout(47). In reply to the Pak air raids, the IAF went into action for the first time in the Barmer Sector on 22 September. As a result of IAF raids, eight Pakistani vehicles and a helicopter were badly damaged near Khinsar(48).

Pak attempt to Recapture Sakarbu

30 Inf Bde less one coy 1 Garh Rif had completed concentration, as planned, by 0700 hrs on 22 September. However, in view of the imminent cease-fire, Pak troops started on the mission of

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grabbing as much ground as possible. In a bid to recapture Sakarbu, Pak troops launched two attacks on the D coy location of 1 Garh Rif with approximately two coys, using 81 mm mor and 120 mm hy mor at 1225 hrs and 1530 hrs on 22 September. 1 Garh Rif pl enroute from Gadra City and an additional coy of 1 Garh Rif were sent to reinforce Sakarbu. Two tps of tanks were also ordered to come up to Khadin. Thus both the attacks by Pakistani troops to recapture Sakarbu were foiled. In this action Pak troops suffered about 25 men, killed and approximately 50 wounded, while 1 Garh Rif casualty was 4 ORs wounded. It ws one of the big set-backs that Pakistan suffered in this Sector.

The Div Comdr, who arrived at the Bde location in the morning on 22 September, idscussed the plans for the capture of Munabao with Comdr 30 Inf Bde. Orders to capture Munabao by the first light on 23 September were issued. Meanwhile, report came in that Sakarbu had fallen and 1 Garh Rif coy was falling back, severely mauled. This information later proved to be incorrect. At this stage, the Bde Comdr informed the Co 1 Garh Rif that the attack on Munabao had been called off, as he had received orders that there was to be no further offensive in view of the cease-fire announcement(49).

Following the receipt of fresh operatinal instructions by the Bde Headquarters from higher authorities, plans were modified(50) and a coy of 1 Garh Rif alongwith a coy of 3 Guards were ordered to attack and capture Maratha Hill and Sand Dunes by 0300 hrs on 23 September. But during the night, both the coys lost their way and could not reach the objective. At 0300 hrs when cease-fire came into effect, both the coys were ordered to firm in wherever they were.

Assessment

As the main fighting during the 1965 operations was concentrated in the Punjab and the Jammu and Kashmir theatres, neither India nor Pakistan was in a position to reinforce its troops in the Rajasthan Sector. India's aim in opening the new front in the Rajasthan Sector on 8 September with a Division strength was to tie down maximum Pakistani forces in Sind area. Army HQ had no specific offensive plans here. Before opening this front, India had, of course, appreciated that in view of the initial Pak offensive in Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan's posture in the Rajasthan theatre, with her limited forces available there, would be essentially defensive. However, there was the possibility of a Pak advance along the Munabao - Barmer axis in battalion group

strength with a view to capturing some Indian territory. General Chaudhuri also explained later that Indian thrust in Rajasthan was but a diversionary move.

In the vast desert terrain, Indian troops had a lot of logistical problems. Most of the troops had no practical training in desert warfare. 1 Garh Rif had undergone intensive training in the NEFA jungles and mountains for about three years prior to its arrival in Rajasthan and its totally different terrain. There were hardly any 'pucca' roads or proper tracks for vehicles to carry supplies. Sand storms were frequent and tracks were prone to be covered by Sand. There was also acute water shortage. The only source of water was from wells, which were situated 25 to 50 km away from each other. The inhospitable desert terrain also posed the problems of navigation due to lack of land-marks, and the mobility of the vehicles and troops was hindered due to loose sand, shifting sand dunes and sand storms. Tanks and vehicles were often bogged down in the sand and rendered unserviceable. However, the problem of navigation was solved to a great extent by deploying 'pagis' (local guides). Despite all these problems, the vast open terrain provided an excellent ground of manoeuvring.

The Pak Air Force entered the Rajasthan theatre on 9 September with a series of air attacks. Air strafing by Pak aircraft after this became a routine matter. India had only two air-fields in Rajasthan in 1965 - Jaipur and Jodhpur. IAF Hunters had limited range to fly to the border and back. Hence, much needed air support could not be provided to the Indian troops by the IAF. Indian troops also lacked an efficient communication system. Wireless sets were inadequate and they often failed to work.

As regards operations, Indian troops initially succeeded in capturing Gadra City, where a weak battalion of Indus Rangers did not offer much fight. But, the Indian area of Munabao fell into Pak hands on 9 September, and efforts to recapture it did not succeed. Indian tanks could not reach the objective, and were bogged down in the sand near Sakarbu. The first raid to capture Dali could not materialise. However, Indian troops of 13 Grenadiers succeeded in penetrating deep into Pak territory and blowing up the railway line between Khokhropar and Nayachor. Pakistani troops succeeded in occupying Panchla Post on Indian territory, on 13 September, which was held by RAC under Delhi and Rajasthan Area. Though the RAC coy had put up a good fight, it fell back due to enemy superiority in strength. But the Pak position at Jessa-Ka-Par was captured by 1 Garh Rif without any opposition, and a subsequent attempt by Pak troops to recapture it was repulsed. Dali was captured by a

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mixed force of 5 Maratha and 1 Garh Rif on 18 September without any opposition, as the Pakistanis had anticipated this move and withdrawn to Khinsar. A Combined force of two coys 5 Maratha with under command one coy 17 Madras captured objectives in Naupatia area, after minor opposition, on 21 September. But after heavy shelling and air strafing by PAF, Dali fell into Pakistani hands. Finally, the plans for the capture of Munabao by 1 Garh Rif had to be called off in view of the ceasefire agreement on 23 September 1965. For either side, it was a mixed record of successes and failures.

Immediately after the cease-fire, Pak columns of regular troops, Indus Rangers, Mujahids and dacoits violated the cease-fire agreement and resorted to large-scale infiltration into Indian territory and occupied areas where there were no posts. The Pakistan Army extended its area of infiltration by capturing Miajlar, Sato, Chohtan, Udisyar, Dedusar, Baori, Kelnor, etc. Sodhi column, Hammer Force and Bull Force, formed to clear the Pak infiltrators from the Indian villages, succeeded in their mission to a great extent. 1 Garh Rif and 4 Maratha with attached troops attacked Miajlar on 16 November and captured it, despite tough resistance by Pak troops. In the Rajasthan Sector, the Battle of Miajlar was the first well-planned, well-executed and gallantly contested action in which Pak troops had to yield after much loss of men and material. The Pak forces, especially the Indus Rangers, fought boldly.

Pakistan's intention, it appears, was to capture as much Indian territory as possible in the Rajasthan Sector and to create panic and disorder in the area. At the time of cease-fire, India held about 390 sq km of Pak territory across the Barmer border, whereas, Pakistan had only occupied a small Indian outpost at Munabao. There was no other territory in Rajasthan under Pakistani occupation. Besides, a large number of police out-posts, which were occupied after the cease-fire by the Pak infiltrators, were ultimately vacated after the Tashkent Agreement.

Although the Rajasthan operations had no significant influence on the fate of the Indo-Pak War of 1965, due to lack of plans and preparations on either side, nonetheless they offered some good training to the Indian troops in desert warfare. The next generation of Commanders should have got the lesson that here was the area through which a major well-planned offensive could be successfully launched in future, because, this highly tankable area did not have water obstacles, hard lines of defences or defence canals. On the other hand, it offered great scope for manoeuvre to both armour and infantry(51). These operations also highlighted the great efficacy of airpower in the open desert. But the events of the 1971 war showed that neither side had fully absorbed the lesson of the 1965 war in the desert.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Gupta, Hari Ram, Vol.I, p.19.
2. Sharma, M.L., p.1.
3. Jai Singh, Lt Col, SM, p.169.
4. 'Pagis' are the local guides who know the terrain well.
5. The height of sand hills might differ from 3 to 30 metres, and in some places even more than 60 metres.
6. Jai Singh, Lt Col, SM, p.173-174.
7. From Official Records.
8. Ibid.
9. Report of Interview with Lt Gen Moti Sagar, AVSM(Retd), former GOC-in-C Southern Command, held on 22 May 1987.
10. From Official Records.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ahmed, Brig Gulzar (Retd), p.157.
14. From Official Records.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid. However, it was mentioned that no enemy was located there except for some Hindu population.
28. From Official Records.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
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45. Ibid.
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47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Report of Interview with Lt Gen N.C. Rawlley, the then GOC 11 Inf Div, held in New Delhi on 30 November 1989.

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CHAPTER IX

THE AIR WAR

The Contending Forces

By 1965, the IAF and the PAF both had come a long way since the Partition days of 1947-48.

The PAF had grown into a well-equipped, highly trained force of about seventeen squadrons, i.e., two squadrons of B-57 bombers, one of F-104 fighters, eight of F-86 Sabres, one of SA-16 Albatross amphibian aircraft and H-43 helicopters for maritime recce and sea-air rescue, two transport squadrons of C-130 Hercules and Bristol planes, one high-altitude recce squadron of RB-57s, including the hush-hush RB-57F, and two squadrons of T-6G, T-33 and T-37 trainers, which were used also for tactical recce and ground attack(1).

It is estimated that actual aircraft strength was: B-57:29; F-104:12; F-86:116; SA-16:4 and H-43:6; C-130:6; Bristol:15; RB-57:3; T-6G(Harvard):25; T-33A:16; RT-33:6; T-37B:21; and a Viscount, making a total of 260 aircraft of various types(2). One of the F-86 squadrons, No.14, was based on Tejgaon airfield near Dhaka.

The F-104 "Starfighter" was indeed the star fighter of the PAF. Among the first planes capable of flying at twice the speed of sound (Mach 2), and armed with a rapid firing 20mm gun and two Sidewinder heat-seeking missiles (AIM.9B), it had radar for interception and fire control. It was expected to be particularly useful for intercepting and shooting down night bombers. The F86 Sabre was a modern fighter already tested in combat and highly regarded all over the world. With a high subsonic speed and carrying six machine guns of .5 inch calibre plus two bombs of thousand pounds each or 56 rockets of 2.75 in., the Sabre had more manoeuvrability than a Hunter in a dog fight. A substantial number of the PAF Sabres had been modified to carry Sidewinder missiles also.

The American B-57 bombers were like an improved version of the Canberra, with a flying ceiling of over 16,000 Metre (50,000 ft) and capable of carrying about 4 tons of bombs. The RB-57F was meant for photo and electronic reconnaissance from a high altitude (above 24,000 Mtr or 70,000 ft) where ~~neither the IAF fighters nor anti-aircraft guns or missiles could harm it.~~ ^{Took} (L)

The USA had not only gifted the war planes to

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
Pakistan to fight Communist USSR and China under the Mutual Aid Programme, but it had also set up sophisticated radar stations in Pakistan to detect hostile aircraft and to guide PAF fighters to intercept them. The radar sites were at Sakesar in the north and at Badin in the south, near Karachi. Sargodha was the biggest base of the PAF, defended by 64 anti-aircraft guns, while Mauripur near Karachi had 48 and Peshawar, Sakesar, Badin and Dhaka had 16 AA Guns each(3).

The IAF had, in 1965, 26 Fighter and 4 Bomber Sqns, with 13 Sqns of Transport planes, and 5 Helicopter Units. The 26 Fighter Sqns comprised of 1 Sqn of MiG-21 still under raising, 6 Sqns of Hunters, 5 of Gnats, 5 of Mysteres, 6 of Vampires and 3 of Toofanis (Ouragons). Canberras represented the only bombers the IAF had. The Transport Sqns were 3 of Dakotas, 3 of Packets, 2 of the Russian AN-12s, 1 of IL-14, 1 of Caribou, 2 of Otters and 1 Sqn of Super Constellations. The Mi-4 and the Alouette represented the Helicopters.

Although this added upto a force about three times the strength of the Pakistan Air Force, it should be noted that the 6 Sqns of Vampires and 3 of Toofanis were definitely outdated, and could not be used against a modern air force like the PAF in 1965. Some of the remaining 17 Sqns of Fighters, and many Bombers, had to remain earmarked, and located far in the east, for guarding against the Chinese threat. The Contending Air Forces in the west were, therefore, well and evenly matched. The IAF MiGs were comparable to the F-104, but were not yet fully operational and integrated. The Hunters and the Gnats were comparable to the Sabres, but, they had no air to air missiles. The Hunter was less agile, while the Gnat had still some control problems and jamming of the guns. The Mystere was a dedicated ground attack aircraft and could not hold its own against the versatile Sabre. The Pakistani radar and electronics was also definitely superior to what was available to the IAF, which was critically dependent on the radar unit at Amritsar. Indian superiority in numbers was, therefore, more than off set by Pakistani advantage in better quality equipment gifted by the USA.

The Americans, it seems, had given to the PAF not only modern aircraft but also modern training and operational doctrine. The PAF had already formulated and issued a clear cut war plan on 29 June 1965(4). The plan was to launch surprise attacks against major IAF bases to destroy many planes on the ground, and thus to reduce the disparity in numbers. A

AIR RAIDS: EAST & WEST, SEP 1965



NOTE:-
 THE TERRITORIAL WATER OF INDIA
 EXTEND INTO THE SEA TO A DISTANCE
 OF TWELVE NAUTICAL MILES MEASURED
 FROM THE APPROPRIATE BASE LINE

certain strength of the Sabre force was earmarked for close support of the Pakistani Army. Even the timing of the surprise attacks against IAF bases was carefully considered and decided, and a strike at dusk was preferred to a morning strike. After the sudden strike by the large force of Sabres, the bombers based at Mauripur were to continue and rain bombs over the IAF bases the whole night. Even the training aircraft like Harvard(T-6G), T-33 and T-37 were to operate in the Amritsar, Jalandhar, Ferozepur and Ludhiana areas from the very first night of the war. Compared to this elaborate and determined plan of attack, the IAF, it seems, operated on the basis of ad-hoc decisions, and in the hope that full-scale war would simply not come.

In keeping with its prompt and eager preparations for war, the PAF activated its Commander-in-Chief's Operational Headquarters "Somewhere in Pakistan" on 31 August 1965. The next day, the entire PAF was put on "highest state of alert"(5). On 2 September, the civil defence organisation was activated and on 4 September, Air Priorities Board was set up to control all Pakistani transport aircraft, including those of the Pakistan International Airways. All out war on 6 September might have caught by surprise the Pakistan Army, but certainly not the Pakistan Air Force.

Air Operations Begin

Being foiled in its attempt to capture Kashmir through Operation Gibraltar, when the desperate Pak army made a major armour-cum-infantry thrust into the Chhamb area and threatened the vital Akhnur bridge and the Jammu-Punch road, at around 1600 hrs on 1 September 1965, General Chaudhuri, the Army Chief, alongwith Air Marshal Arjan Singh, the Air Chief, met Defence Minister Chavan and Defence Secretary P.V.R. Rao for permission to use the IAF. 'Go Ahead' was immediately given, and the IAF aircraft were launched within an hour to stem the enemy onslaught.

Twenty-six fighter-bombers of the Indian Air Force (twelve Vampires of No.45 Sqn and fourteen Mystere aircraft of Nos. 3 and 31 Sqns) took off from Pathankot just before sunset for the Chhamb Sector. This was the start of the air action by the Indian Air Force and the first offensive mission by the IAF fighters to counter the Pakistani attack in Chhamb with two regiments of tanks. In the swift and fierce action, ten tanks, 2 ack ack guns and 30-40 vehicles of the Pak Army were destroyed. However, PAF Sabres were patrolling just inside the Pak border, and the IAF lost four of the obsolescent Vampires. Three of

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the Vampire pilots were killed, and the pilot of the fourth aircraft baled out and reached the base safely. Thus, the IAF paid a heavy price by sending obsolete and purely ground-attack aircraft without providing some superior Fighters to give top cover.

Neither Vampires nor Ouragons were actively used in operations after this, reducing IAF's effective strength by about one third at a single stroke. Although it was an unhappy start and a big shock to the Indian Air Force, the IAF steeled its determination to fight back in the following days.

On 2 September 1965, IAF aircraft were mainly employed for fighter sweeps, and six Mysteres carried out PR/Cover sorties in Chhamb sector. Pak Sabres attacked some ground targets and also a convoy in the Jaurian sector and destroyed some civilian buildings. Next day, the IAF decided to provide good fighter cover for the PR sorties against Pak Sabres, which were certainly much superior to the Vampires and Mysteres. The IAF, therefore, introduced the Gnat fighters into the operation. Eight Gnats of No. 23 Squadron took off for an offensive sweep in the Chhamb sector. The Indian pilots were determined to punish the PAF for their loss of four Vampires earlier. In the very first encounter with three Sabres and one F-104 Star fighter, the Gnats drew blood on 3 September. A very fine technique was employed for this purpose. Two Mysteres were sent on normal operational sorties with a high altitude cover by a formation of Gnats. When the Sabres tried to shoot the Mysteres down, the Gnats pounced on them from above, and Sqn Ldr T. Keelor shot down the first Sabre in a dog fight. Unfortunately, one Gnat, short of fuel, failed to return to the base. The shooting down of a battle-hardened Sabre by the small Gnat had a stimulating effect on the morale of the Gnat pilots. This was the first time that the Gnat was used in combat and it opened its account with a 'Kill' in the very first encounter, without suffering any loss due to enemy action.

The Indian ground situation had become worse with the enemy armour threatening the 41 Brigade position. The Indian Air Force, therefore, carried out extensive fighter sweeps over the battle area, involving fourteen Gnats and four MiG-21s, and gave close support to the Army. Two attacks were carried out by Mysteres on enemy positions at Troti and Kalit in the Chhamb sector. In the air, four Gnats escorting four Mysteres engaged in close support in Chhamb sector spotted four Sabres attacking Indian positions near Akhnur bridge. The Gnats engaged the Sabres, and Flt Lt V.S.Pathania shot down one Sabre

during a low-level dog-fight. Three other Gnats got behind three Sabres for sure kills, but all the three pursuing aircraft suffered gun stoppage after firing a couple of rounds each. But for the jamming of guns, three more Sabres would have been downed, and this would have dealt a severe blow to the morale of the PAF. All the same, the excellent job done by the Gnats was recognised by Vir Chakra awards for Sqn Ldr T.Keelor and Flt Lt V.S.Pathania. On this day, the Pak Sabres and F-104s had reportedly fired six side-winder missiles, but none could hit the small, agile Gnats.

For the first time, on 4 September, Mig-21s came on the scene, and two of them made a sweep in support of Gnats and Mysteres, and later in the day two more MiGs went up as top cover to them. One MiG got behind one of the Sabres and fired two K-13 missiles, but both failed to hit the target. Though the MiGs did not get any kill, their presence in the battle area gave confidence to the Gnat and Mystere pilots and also created apprehension in the minds of the adversaries(6).

The same day, F-86s escorted by F-104s carried out three attacks on Indian ground positions in Rajouri sector, two F-86s carried out rocket attacks in Ranbir Singhpura sector, and enemy aircraft also attacked the Akhnur bridge.

On 5 September 1965, while enemy positions were attacked by Mysteres at Jaurian and Garabi in the Chhamb Sector, the Gnats and MiG-21s flew fighter sweeps. In the evening, F-86s attacked Amritsar, the holy city of the sikhs(7).

PAF Raids Against IAF Bases: 6 Sep.

In the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting held at 8.30 a.m. on 6 September, and presided over by President Ayub Khan, Air Vice Marshal Nur Khan, the PAF Chief, was given full authority to conduct air operations as he liked. The latter told the President that his top priority would be to implement the long-standing War Plan No.6 of June 1965 to launch a preemptive attack on certain selected IAF bases with a view to neutralising some vital IAF aircraft and installations, and also to allot part of the PAF fighter force for close-support operations as well as for air defence(8). However, the Pak Air Chief had to argue with himself whether PAF could accept the result in terms of IAF retaliation, especially the possible loss of its radar eyes at Sakesar. He knew that like the PAF, the IAF was also equally prepared to meet raids on air bases, but significantly the IAF was

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better equipped to absorb high casualties in aircraft and pilots. While 50% of PAF pilots were highly trained, the rest were untested youngsters, and moreover, Pakistan had no reserves of either fliers or machines. Nur Khan reasoned that even with a favourable aircraft loss ratio of 1:4, his air force would not be able to recover from heavy initial casualties. Considering the result of inaction potentially more hazardous than the risk of preemptive strike, he went ahead with the airfield strike plan on the strength of the support he received from his staff. He took the crucial decision at 1100 hrs on 6 September, and by 1300 hrs the mission signals were received by the concerned PAF units. The finalised strike plan was(9):

<u>Take-off Base</u>	<u>Commitment</u>	<u>Target</u>
Sargodha	8F-86Fs	Adampur
Sargodha	8F-86Fs	Halwara
Sargodha	4T-33s	Ferozepur Radar
Sargodha	6F-86Fs	
	1RB-57 ELINT	Amritsar Radar
Peshawar	8F-86Fs	Pathankot
		Srinagar
Mauripur	8F-86Fs	Jamnagar
Mauripur	4T-33s	Porbunder Radar
Mauripur	12B-57s	Jamnagar

However, problems were faced in launching the raids from Sargodha. The PAF planners delayed the flight of 12 F-86Fs and 6T-33s from Mauripur to Sargodha to avoid exposing too many machines to likely IAF attacks on the already overcrowded tarmac of Sargodha for too long. What is more, four of the Mauripur Sabres landed with major defects, requiring repairs. Even as late as 1615 hrs, Gp Capt Masud, Sargodha PAF Station Commander, rang the C-in-C requesting postponement of the strike by 24 hours, as only four F-86s were available for strike against each of the three targets - Adampur, Halwara and Amritsar Radar. But this was not accepted. Finally, only 6 Sabres took off from Sargodha to strike at Adampur and Halwara. A vital part of the plan was for the participating PAF strikers to cross the international border simultaneously to achieve maximum surprise. However, while the Peshawar element of 8 Sabres, escorted by 2 Star fighters carrying Sidewinders as top cover at 15,000 ft, arrived precisely on time at 1740 hrs TOT (Time On Target) on 6 September, the first section of three aircraft from Sargodha did not get airborne until 1810 hrs to attack Adampur, and the second section left for Halwara 10 minutes later(10). Thus the surprise was lost.

Pathankot

Eight F-86s carried out a highly successful raid at 1740 hrs. The base was caught napping with no CAP airborne. The F-86s, supported by two F-104s, carried out multiple attacks on selected targets. They destroyed two MiG-21s, 6 Mysteres, one Gnat and one C-119 Packet, and damaged two more Gnats and one Mystere. Three IAF personnel were injured, and one killed. The base was again attacked between 2345 and 0100 hrs by B-57s, but no further damage was caused(11). *Surprise
Protection
for ac*

Halwara

At 1840 hrs, four F-86s attacked the Halwara base. At that time four Hunters from Nos. 7 and 27 Squadron were 'capping' the base in pairs. The F-86s saw two of the Hunters of No. 7 Sqn, pulled up behind them and shot them down. However, before his plane was shot down. Fg Offr Gandhi had fired at one F-86 and claimed hitting it. But no wreckage was found. In the meanwhile, Sqn Ldr Rathore and Fg Offr Neb of No. 27 Sqn got behind the Sabres, and shot down two of them. The ack ack claimed one more F-86.

Amritsar Radar Station:

F-86s attacked this radar station thrice between 1050 and 1715 hrs. One B-57 raided the station again at 2330 hrs. However, there was no significant damage and the radar remained operational. One B-57 and one F-86 were claimed shot down by ack ack, and wreckage of the bomber was also found near village Attari(12).

Jamnagar:

This base was raided six times during 6-7 September night by six B-57s at 1945, 2345, 0100, 0200, 0400 and 0530 hrs. Four Vampire aircraft were damaged, and although no Pak aircraft was claimed by the IAF, the wreckage of a B-57 was located. Probably an ack ack gun shot it down.

According to John Fricker, two sections of 3 B-57s each headed south from Mauripur down the coast, flying at a height of about 70 metres and then skimming the shore-line while entering the Indian sky. The flashes from the Mandvi lighthouse across the gulf of Kutch provided an additional fix. About one and a half kms short of the Jamnagar airfield, the Pak raiders pulled up into a steep climb and then dived to deliver 4,000 lb of bombs each on the target. One of the aircraft also launched rocket attacks which caused fire in a hangar. All the aircraft returned to

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Mauripur safely, without encountering any IAF fighter or flak. Thereafter, single B-57s from Mauripur continued harrasing raids on Jamnagar throughout the night, with some crows flying as many as 3 missions in a period of 9 hours(13).

Adampur:

The F-86 mission for Adampur was intercepted near Tarn Taran by four Hunters. The attack was disrupted, and one Hunter with its pilot was lost when the aircraft hit the ground in a turn during combat. Again, a night raid by B-57s resulted in the loss of one MiG-21.

According to John Fricker, one of the early lessons learnt by Pakistan from the PAF's preemptive attacks on the Indian Air Force bases was that in a small Air Force, casualties were felt as keenly and as personally as in a family, with corresponding effect on morale(14).

Pak Paratroopers

On the night of 6-7 September, the enemy implemented its audacious plan of dropping paratroopers near the Indian airfields in Punjab. In the early morning of 7 September, a series of reports trickled in, indicating that Pakistan had dropped groups of paratroops near the airfields at Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara. Information pieced together from interrogation of captured Pak personnel revealed that the strength of each batch was approximately three officers, one Junior Commissioned Officer and 60 Other Ranks, selected from Pakistan's crack "Special Service Group". Only C-130 aircraft were used for para-dropping. Approximately, 64 Pak army personnel (one C-130 load) were paradropped at night close to each of the three I A F operational airfields. They jumped from a height of about 350 metres using both the side doors and landed about 3-4 miles away from the perimeter of the airfield. They carried with them small arms, including automatic weapons and 2" mortars, explosives, wireless sets, torches and wirecutters. After landing they buried the parachutes.

They were to assemble with the aid of torch flashes, subdued whistles or barkings akin to the jackal's. Movement towards the airfield was to be effected in three to four batches and wirecutters were provided for entry into the airfield(15).

Their mission was to destroy the aircraft and vital installations on the airfields mentioned above.

On completion of their task, the paratroopers were to be picked up by aircraft on a pre-arranged signal, failing which they were to trickle back unobtrusively into Pak territory on their own.

In Pathankot area, the paratroopers were dropped at about 0230 hrs on 7 September, which meant that they had a margin of about three hours before daylight to complete their task. However, by mistake they landed on a marshy piece of ground, leading to great confusion. By the time the various "Sticks" were collected, it was too late to fulfil their mission. The first warning about this drop was conveyed to Pathankot SubArea HQ by a villager. Hurriedly, approximately 200 men were collected from the transients at the Base and the chase began in the early hours of the morning. By about 1000 hrs, the intruders were completely surrounded and they began to give themselves up in groups. The last group, which included their Commander, surrendered towards the 7th evening.

In Adampur area, the paratroopers landed in the vicinity of a village, where the barking of dogs gave away their presence. The only force available at the airfield at that stage was some elements of PAP. This local force was reinforced by two armoured cars from the NCC Squadron at Ludhiana and a company of infantry from XI Corps to assist in rounding up the paratroopers. By the evening of 8 September, most of the paratroopers dropped near this airfield were effectively dealt with.

At Halwara, apart from the PAP Garrison, the only other troops available to deal with the paratroopers were the muleteers from the animal transport company at Ludhiana. Later, in the afternoon of 7 September, two armoured cars from the NCC Unit at Ludhiana also fetched up to strengthen this force. It was subsequently learnt that the group dropped at this airfield was composed of two Officers and 46 Other Ranks. The paratroopers, after only a token show of resistance, surrendered en masse willingly.

Thus, the paratroopers failed in their mission completely. Their plans were ill-conceived and based on scanty information about the airfields and their defence arrangements. Low in morale, the paratroopers appeared to have very little faith in their mission. Some of the officers frankly admitted on capture that they were doubtful of the success of their operation even before they had started. Finally, the active response of the civil authorities and the spontaneous reaction of the local villagers, who cooperated enthusiastically with the forces to hunt the

paratroopers, knocked the bottom out of this venture. The sturdy peasants, in fact, ranged through the green fields thumping and rattling their sticks, as if they were flushing out juicy partridges instead of Pak Commandos. But, under different circumstances, the Pak move could deliver a telling blow to the IAF.

IAF Counter-attack: 7 Sep

Till 6th morning both the PAF and IAF had been fighting a limited war, employing the air forces only for recce and army support roles in the Chhamb area of J&K. But this day marked the beginning of a new phase in the employment of air power. The Indian Army made successful thrusts into Pakistan in the Wagah-Jassar-Bedian areas, and in the afternoon, the Pakistani President, Ayub Khan, formally declared war on India. Henceforward, the air war escalated and the air forces were now utilised for interdiction and bomber tasks also. 31 Mystere sorties from Pathankot and Adampur, 16 Hunter sorties from Halwara and six Canberra sorties from Agra were flown on 6 September in the Chhamb sector in support of the Army, and on offensive recce in XI Corps area. Fourteen Gnat and 4 Mig-21 air defence missions of escort and 'sweeps' were undertaken in the areas of operation of the groundattack aircraft. The IAF claimed as destroyed 9 tanks, 12 heavy guns, 4 ack ack guns, 26 vehicles and one military train. It also bombed the railway tracks at Rahwali(16). There was virtually no interference with these activities possibly due to the presence of the Indian air defence aircraft, or because the PAF was busy with the last minute preparations at Sargodha for the big pre-emptive strikes against the IAF bases the same afternoon.

However, the official records of the Indian army lament a lack of IAF ground support during its offensive in Punjab areas against vigorous PAF ground attacks on its advancing formations. John Fricker has also corroborated this : "Incredibly, the Indian offensive struggled on without any form of air support, and the IAF did not challenge the repeated ground attack sorties flown without loss by the PAF throughout the day upto 1545 hrs. Eleven sorties were completed from Sargodha in support of the Pak Army on the Lahore front, plus a further four in the vicinity of Jassar Bridge, striking at Indian army vehicles, troops and artillery. The PAF was also very sensitive towards possible IAF strikes against its bases, which accounted for the 22 F-86 and 15 F-104 CAP sorties flown from Sargodha and six each from Peshawar and Mauripur on 6 September"(17).

On 7 September, the IAF retaliated with counter-air strikes over the PAF bases of Sargodha, Chhota Sargodha, Rahwali, Chander, Gujrat, Bhagatanwala, Chaklala and Pasrur. No aircraft were found at any of the bases except Sargodha. At Rahwali, the IAF planes attacked a radar unit and destroyed it. But while flying back, Sqn Ldr Jasbeer Singh crashed into the ground in an accident, and was killed. Seven of the IAF Canberras attacked Chaklala airfield and started a huge fire; probably a big petroleum dump was hit.

Seven counter-air strikes were undertaken against the Sargodha complex just at dawn, entailing considerable risk, as the enemy airbase complex was heavily defended by guns and fighters. Out of these, five reached the targets (Sargodha, Bhagatanwala and Chhota Sargodha), and two did not - one having been intercepted en route and the other being diverted for another task. In the first strike by Mysteres of No.1 Sqn, seven out of the eleven aircraft pulled up over the target undetected, as the rest failed to arrive due to navigational problems. From the attack position at height, nothing could be seen on the ground due to the poor light condition. However, on pulling out of the dive, the leader of the formation spotted a number of aircraft on ORP and warned the rest of the formation, but none of them could spot the targets. All aircraft had to attack blindly, but caused considerable damage to the BPIs(18) and to aircraft parked on the ORP and in the hangars(19). One Mystere was reported missing. It came to light later that Sqn Ldr A.B. Devayya, who was reported missing after the strike, had actually gone down fighting, only after shooting down a superior aircraft in a dog fight. Having accomplished a successful raid over Sargodha airfield, the Mystere piloted by Sqn Ldr Devayya was intercepted by a supersonic F-104 Star-fighter, piloted by (then) Flt Lt Amjad Hussain of PAF, who succeeded in hitting and damaging Sqn Ldr Devayya's Mystere. Undaunted and with utter disregard for his personal safety, Sqn Ldr Devayya, manoeuvring his damaged aircraft, finally shot down the F-104, from which Flt Lt Husain ejected successfully. Sqn Ldr Devayya was posthumously awarded Maha Vir Chakra in 1988 for this exceptional act of gallantry.

During the next strike at Chhota Sargodha by a formation of No.27 Sqn, the airfield was found deserted. The attack was perfect with no air opposition, although heavy ack ack was experienced. On the way back, two Sabres on ORP at Sargodha were attacked, though the result was not clear. But about 50 km from Sargodha, a Hunter developed engine trouble and crashed.

The next striking formation of six Hunters from No.7 Sqn was intercepted by F-86s, and two Indian aircraft were shot down by the Sabres. The most successful raid on Sargodha was carried out next by a Mystere formation of 4 aircraft from No.1 Squadron. Two bombs were dropped on the BPI by Sqn Ldr Handa, who later strafed 3 F-86s parked on the ORP. As a result, one F-86 burst into flames immediately. Another Mystere dropped bombs on the ORP and strafed the aircraft parked at the other end, while the third dropped its bombs on the other ORP. As the fourth aircraft's bombs did not release, those had to be jettisoned over a hangar. All the aircraft returned to base safely.

The fifth strike from No.8 Sqn Mysteres over Bhagatanwala went off perfectly, and all the aircraft delivered their weapon loads on the target. The formation did not encounter any air opposition. However, later in the afternoon, in an unsuccessful strike over Sargodha by a 2-aircraft formation again from No.1 Sqn, one Mystere was shot down by F-86s.

On its part, the enemy raided Srinagar airfield at 1605 hrs, in which four Sabres carried out strafing by front guns, damaging one UN Caribou aircraft, destroying one IAF Dakota and one IAC Dakota.

Overall, On 7 September 1965, in the IAF counter air strikes on the Sargodha complex, the IAF lost 2 Hunters and 2 Mysteres shot down by enemy aircraft and one Hunter lost due to engine flame out, leading to ejection over enemy territory. Against this, PAF possibly lost 4 F-86s and 2 F-104s at Sargodha. The attrition for the IAF strikes on the Sargodha complex was 4 aircraft lost due to enemy action against 25 IAF aircraft involved in these strikes, representing 16% losses. PAF on the other hand has admitted a loss of total of 4 F-86 aircraft in their 14 counter air strike sorties on 6 September 1965 in the West, and 9 sorties on 7 September in the East, giving an attrition rate of 17.4% which was also much above the acceptable 5% daily losses in counter air strikes(20). This led to both the Air Forces avoiding any more major counter air strikes by fighter aircraft in the day-light hours.

Air Operations in the East

Although the policy of the Indian Government at that time was not to extend the conflict into East Pakistan, the Indian Air Force ordered a Canberra probe sortie to Chittagong to see if any PAF aircraft were there, and, if so, to neutralise them on the

ground(21). Since the decision to strike Chittagong air base was taken by AOC-in-C Central Air Command at 2300 hrs on 6 September, it was too late to make use of the moon, and a first-light attack was the only solution. The route plan was Kalaikunda - Lighthouse south of Calcutta - direct across the Bay to Lighthouse south of Chittagong-Chittagong airbase. It was a low-level flight by 2 Canberras of No.16 Squadron, led by Wg Cdr P.M. Wilson. The time gap between the two aircraft was 10 minutes to allow for safe transit and possible fighter opposition at Chittagong. The No.2 aircraft was to orbit the second lighthouse until called in; if there was fighter opposition, it was to return to base. Unfortunately, the raid was fruitless. No enemy aircraft was seen on the ground, but the bombs were dropped by the first Canberra on the run-way. The second was then called in, but its bombs undershot and exploded on the Flying Control building. No other targets were attacked(22).

This was followed up by the Vampires of No.24 Sqn striking Jessore, and the Toofanis (Ouragons) from Nos.4 and 29 Sqn striking Lalmunirhat. Also four Hunters of No.14 Sqn carried out fighter sweeps over Dhaka. In all this effort nothing was achieved, as no enemy aircraft could be seen on the ground or in the air. But, the lone PAF F-86F Squadron of 12 aircraft located in East Pakistan was able to destroy a sizeable number of Indian aircraft on the ground(23).

When the two Canberras and four Hunters returned to Kalaikunda after their futile missions at about 0600 hrs on 7 September, the PAF struck Kalaikunda at 0640 hrs after flying at low level, partly over the sea. Six F-86s destroyed two Canberras, and four fully armed Vampires. One airman was also injured. They faced no air opposition since the Indian Hunters were patrolling between Dum Dum and Kalaikunda at that time, and the Pak raid was a complete surprise(24).

At 1030, four Sabres pulled up for another attack on Kalaikunda. This time the IAF had got a few minutes' warning, and the two Hunters flown by Flt Lt A.T. Cooke and Flt Lt Mangain were brought overhead. One F-86 was shot down after a thrilling low-level combat by Flt Lt Cooke. Another F-86 was seen spinning onto the ground and was claimed by Mangain. Subsequent reports from the Army stated that one more F-86 had probably crashed across the border, and a wireless intercept indicated that a fourth F-86 crashed near Dhaka after the pilot had ejected. The IAF claimed two F-86s, but the PAF probably lost all the four aircraft involved in the second strike. Two more Canberras were destroyed on Kalaikunda airfield. Cooke and Mangain were awarded Vir Chakra. All

remaining Canberras were sent away to Gorakhpur and the Vampires to Panagarh.

Indian offensive operations in the East were restricted to the early missions mentioned above. After these raids, instructions were received from Delhi, on 7 September itself, that no offensive action was to be undertaken in East Pakistan. After receipt of these instructions, all the aircraft were prepared for air defence duties and they flew CAP sorties only for the remaining period of hostilities(25).

However, this did not deter the PAF, based in East Pakistan, from raiding IAF stations in West Bengal. Pak Sabres attacked Bagdogra airfield near Siliguri on 10 September, destroying a Packet and damaging a Vampire, the pilot of which, Sqn Ldr Marston, died of injuries later in the hospital. Indian ack ack guns engaged the enemy fighters, claiming to have shot down two of them. Actually, the wreckage of one Sabre was found lying in Pak territory just across the border(26).

Again on 14 September, three F-86s attacked Barrackpore, north of Calcutta, causing damage to the Flying Control Tower, and destroying one Packet and one Dakota(27). Enemy aircraft also raided the Agartala airfield damaging the ATC building slightly and killing the Flying Control Officer. However, the IAF was not allowed to retaliate against these attacks. Consequently, air operations in the East were over by mid September.

Further Air Operations: 8-22 Sep

On 8 September, the Indian Army opened two more fronts, one in the Jammu-Sialkot sector and the other at Gadra in Rajasthan. Indian aircraft carried out strike sorties in support of the army in the Sialkot and Chawinda areas. Hunters from 9 Wing, Mysteres from 8 Wing, and Mysteres and Gnats from 18 Wing carried out armed recce and attacks on enemy tanks and other targets in Khogal canal-G.T. Road junction, south of Sialkot, east of Lahore, and in Chawinda area. Canberras from 5 and 35 Squadrons and JBCU(Jet Bomber Conversion Unit) dropped bombs over Chak Jhumra, Akwal, Sargodha and Mianwali airfields, damaging blast pens, BPI, etc. Huge fires were observed on the airfield at Sargodha after the Indian attack.

The same day, i.e. 8 September, at 1030 hrs, a formation of four aircraft from No.1 Sqn went to attack enemy concentration near Mandiala ridge in the Chhamb sector. However, no troop concentration was

seen in the area. One enemy bunker was destroyed, and six trucks were destroyed/damaged(28).

In the afternoon, the Indian Army asked for close support in the Sialkot sector. The mission was to attack enemy convoy/transport moving along the Sialkot-Pasrur road. A formation of four aircraft from No.1 Sqn, was sent, but there was hardly any vehicular movement seen along the road. However, one 3 tonner was seen and destroyed(29). CA S

PAF also did not remain idle. Pak Sabres attacked Jammu where one F-86 was claimed as shot down. One B-57 attacked Pathankot at 2330 hrs, but no damage was caused to the Indian installations(30). However, the PAF dropped napalm bombs killing many civilians in Amritsar, and at Ferozepur three civilians were killed and six others wounded. One F-86 was reported to have been shot down by ack ack at 230 SU(31).

Close support sorties were carried out on 9 September to strafe the Pakistan Army all along the Lahore-Ferozepur axis. Canberras from 5 and 35 Sqns and JBCU attacked enemy airfields at Chak Jhumra, Sargodha, Gujrat, Akwal and Dab. At Gujarat and Sargodha airfields a huge explosion and fire were observed, a few minutes after the bombs had been dropped. Heavy damage was caused to the airfield installations, dispersal and pens in all the airfields(32). CA S
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Hunters from 7 and 27 Sqns, and Mysteres escorted by Gnats from 18 Wing attacked enemy tanks and gun positions in Khemkaran, Kasur, Chawinda, Troti, Dalanwala and Mandiala ridge destroying enemy targets. During these engagements, one Hunter of No.7 Sqn was shot down by ground fire at Kasur and the pilot Fg Offr M.V. Singh taken POW. CA

At the end of another strike when the four Hunter aircraft were rejoining circuit at Halwara, there was a mid-air collision between two Hunters, piloted by Flt Lts Ahuja and S.K. Sharma, in which Flt Lt Ahuja was killed. In the strikes carried out, Indian Fighters destroyed 14 enemy tanks and 20 vehicles. An enemy gun position was also put out of action(33).

The enemy, in its turn, attacked Amritsar, Adampur, Halwara, Pathankot, Jamnagar and Jodhpur; however, no significant damage was caused at any of these places. Two enemy planes (one Sabre and one B-57) were brought down by ack ack fire, - one in the Wagah sector and the other near Halwara(34). At

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Halwara, the ack ack put up a magnificent barrage, hitting the bomber, which crashed at village Sidhwan Khas. Two Pakistani helicopters were also engaged by Indian artillery, and one of them was believed to have been damaged. On the night of 8/9 September, Pakistani aircraft were reported to have flown over Delhi, and when the Indian missile wing opened fire, a bright flash was seen in the sky. However, no wreckage of aircraft was seen anywhere around Delhi. From the aircraft tracks, it appeared that the enemy raids were being staged from Chak Jhumra and Gujrat.

Photo recce was successfully carried out in the Sialkot area. It is interesting to note that during an armed recce over Sialkot, one enemy aircraft was seen with IAF markings.

On 10 September, Indian planes continued their attacks on Pak airfields and armour concentrations. Canberras belonging to 5 and 35 Sqns bombed Sargodha, Wagawal, Risalwala and Chak Jhumra airfields. The dispersal area at Chak Jhumra was heavily damaged. Heavy ack ack fire was encountered at Sargodha(35).

Hunter aircraft belonging to 7 and 27 Sqns attacked positions south-east of Kasur and troop movement west of Ferozepur bridge, besides carrying out interception tasks. A large number of enemy vehicles were reported destroyed. The Canberras also carried out strikes on enemy armour concentrations in the Kasur and Khemkaran Sectors, and almost continuous bombing of the area went on. Consequently, the Pakistanis were forced to withdraw to reform and consolidate. Later, Indian Mysteres also struck further north in the Sialkot-Pasrur sector. While one F-86 was shot down in an air battle over Pasrur, one Mystere was shot down by the enemy ack ack in Lahore sector; but the Pilot, Fg Offr Chinoy walked back to the safety of the Indian territory(36). Shortly afterwards, the army sent a message that the IAF had done a magnificent job by rendering timely assistance and dealing a severe blow to the enemy armour.

Four F-86 aircraft again attacked 230 SU at Amritsar at 1330 hrs on 10th in an attempt to destroy the Radar installations, causing damage to the IFF aerial. Three enemy aircraft were reported to have been hit by ack ack(37). There was a second raid at 1600 hrs. PAF B-57s carried out heavy raids at Halwara airfield. The enemy attacked eight times during the night 10/11 September, dropping a total of 31x1000 lb bombs. Front gun attacks were also carried

out during the first raid. Five Hunters besides buildings and telephone cables were damaged. However all the five damaged Hunters were repairable within one to three days(38).

On 11 September, Indian Canberras carried out bombing sorties in the Punjab Sector over Chak Jhumra, Risalwala, Sargodha and Wagowal airfields, destroying taxi tracks, blast pens, and other installations on the ground. The dispersal area at Chak Jhumra was also heavily damaged. In the same sector Mysteres from No.18 Wing took a heavy toll of tanks, vehicles and bunkers in Phillora, Chawinda, Sialkot and Zafarwal. A total of 18 enemy tanks were reportedly destroyed by this air action, as against the Indian loss of one Mystere. Canberras carried out strikes on enemy armour concentrations in the Kasur and Khemkaran sectors also, and Mysteres and Gnats also carried out patrol over air bases, while Vampires of 220 Sqn carried out Tactical recce over Gadra, Nayachor, Khokropar and Munabao areas.

The same day, five enemy Sabres carried out an attack on Amritsar, and two of these aircraft were reportedly shot down by Indian ack ack guns(39). Halwara airfield was attacked thrice during the night, but no damage was caused. Ferozepur and Pathankot were also raided by the enemy, and an unserviceable Packet aircraft was destroyed on the ground in the latter place. The enemy carried out raids over Indian airfields with B-57s, and two F-86s raided Srinagar at 0823 hrs on 11th, but as the Indian ack acks drove them away, no damage could be done. However, on their way back, they raided an army camp at Pattan. One F-86 was reported to have been hit by ground fire over Pattan.

On 12 September, Indian Canberras carried out raids over Nawabshah and Multan, dropping a total of 44,000 lbs of bombs. The runway, dispersal area, pens and installations were damaged.

While Mysteres of 8 Sqn carried out strikes against enemy concentrations in the Punjab sector at Jahman, Mysteres of No.1 Sqn bombed Pasrur airfield and damaged the runway at three places, and Hunters and Gnats blew up a bridge on the Upper Bari Doab canal along the Lahore-Kasur road. A total of 18 tanks were claimed by Indian aircraft in their strikes during the day, and all of them returned safely to base. Vampires and Harvards from Jodhpur carried out Tac recce over Gadra, Khokropar, Gumapur, and Maunabao areas in the Rajasthan Sector(40). Although some enemy F-104 and F-86 aircraft were found in the air, PAF's opposition had considerably reduced. It

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appeared they were not willing to stay and fight, but were there to act as a deterrent.

On 12th, the enemy attacked Indian airfields a number of times. B-57s carried out four raids on Jamnagar airfield. One Hunter trainer and Dakota and the R&S hangar were damaged. In the four raids on Jodhpur airfield, the enemy B-57s damaged only the taxi track and the electrical section. Amritsar and Halwara were also raided, but no damage was caused. In attacks on Adampur airfield, an AOP hangar and a petrol dump were hit, and in a raid on Pathankot one Mystere and one fuel bowser were destroyed. Three Pak F-86s were reported to have been shot down, one near Suchetgarh and two near Pasrur.

On 13 September, Canberras from 5 and 35 Sqns and JBCU carried out bombing sorties over Chhota Sargodha, Sargodha, Risalwala and Wagowal airfields. As a result, the south-eastern portion of Chhota Sargodha airfield was damaged; at Risalwala the bombs were seen dropping on 22 Runway, and the eastern and western dispersal areas and pens in Sargodha were blasted(41).

Mysteres from 18 Wing and Hunters from No.9 Wing carried out attacks on Daska, Pasrur, Kasur and other areas, while Hunters bombed the railway yard at Raiwind station also. Cover was provided by fighter aircraft for the Indian convoy moving from Amritsar to Khemkaran. A total of 15 enemy tanks were destroyed and another 11 damaged due to IAF action on 13th. Many vehicles were also destroyed. India lost two Mysteres one each in the strikes over Dhaka in the Pasrur and over Lahore area. At 1000 hrs, two Gnats which had taken off from Ambala to provide air cover to a mission from Halwara got engaged with four enemy Sabres. In this action, Flt Lt Kale was hit by a Sabre, and he ejected near Ferozepur.

The same day, i.e., 13 September, some Pak bombers, escorted by F-86s, dropped 18 bombs on Srinagar airfield, damaging a UN Caribou and 3 Mi-4 Helicopters(42).

Adampur was raided by enemy aircraft four times. A hangar and a fuel dump were destroyed, and two Mysteres on the ground belonging to No.32 Sqn were destroyed by a bomb falling between them. In enemy raid on Halwara at 2228 hrs, an army gunner was killed and some buildings were damaged. In the attack on Jammu by four B-57s, escorted by four Sabres, one unserviceable Dakota was burnt and damage was caused to the Ops room and ATC stores. In the three raids over Jodhpur by eight B-57s, the Electrical section,

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ESSO yard and some buildings were damaged. In the raid over Gurdaspur railway yard, one F-86 was shot down by ack ack, and the pilot, Sqn Ldr Alauddin Ahmed (OC No. 18 Sqn), was killed.

On 14 September also, close support missions were flown by the IAF. Morale was very high and the Indian pilots were itching to deal a death blow to the PAF. Enemy armour had taken severe punishment and the Pakistani thrust in Khemkaran sector had all but fizzled out. IAF Canberras in their attack on Kohat airfield dropped a total of 12x1000 lb bombs, as a result of which built-up area east of Runway 05 and the POL dump were destroyed. At Peshawar the bombers dropped 6x4000 lb and 8x1000 lb bombs damaging the POL installations, runway and dispersal area, despite heavy ack ack fire. While returning from this raid, enemy aircraft tried to intercept IAF raiders, 80 km south of Srinagar. However, all the aircraft returned safely to base. Kasur railway station was also attacked, and 16x1000 lb and 4x4000 lb bombs were dropped. The marshalling yard and rolling stock were damaged. Hunters carried out strikes on targets in the Lahore, Kasur and Khemkaran sectors, and an installation looking like a power station was destroyed near Lulian Bridge. While providing top cover for Hunters in the Khemkaran area, IAF lost one Gnat aircraft due to accident near Halwara and one Canberra was shot at by F-86, but returned safely to base. Four Gnats escorting Canberras over the target engaged the F-86, and the Canberras cleared out of the battle area, and all the aircraft returned to the base. It was later confirmed that Wing Cdr Bharat Singh had shot down one F-86.

In its turn, Pakistan raided Indian airfields at Adampur, Halwara, Pathankot, Barrackpore, Agartala, and Jodhpur. Srinagar was also raided by four F-86s in low-level bombing attack and strafing. A total of eight 1000 lb bombs were dropped at Srinagar as a result of which four Mi-4 helicopters were damaged. The raid at Adampur was carried out by two B-57s, of which one B-57 was shot down by LAA. The pilot, Flt Lt Sheikh Altafur Rehman, and the navigator, Flt Lt Bashir Ahmed Choudhry, were captured. During the raids by two B-57s at Halwara, IAF lost two Hunters on the ground and two more Hunters were damaged. Raid over Pathankot was carried out by three B-57s, in which an ATC building and one Dakota was totally destroyed. Jodhpur was raided nine times during the night, and fifty bombs were dropped, damaging an ASC Depot and the taxi track. Most of these bombs fell in Mathania village. B-57s raided Jamnagar three times, destroying four Indian aircraft - 2 Vampires, 1 Dakota and 1 Hunter.

On 15 September, Indian Canberras from No.35 Sqn again attacked Sargodha airfield, causing extensive damage to the pens and hangars. Canberras also attacked Chak Jhumra airfield where damage was caused to the hangars and built-up area near the runway. Fighters were mainly employed on recce and CAP sorties. A few of the IAF aircraft were employed on strikes at Raiwind and Kamoke in order to cut off the communication line and isolate the Lahore sector. Flt Lt Chowdhary of the IAF, whose aircraft had suffered a bird hit while taking off from Halwara airfield and who had ejected, died later in the hospital. The same day, on a special request by the US Government, six US C-130 aircraft were permitted to land at Lahore to evacuate American nationals(43).

// Ten Pak F-86s flew over 230 SU (Amritsar) between 0700 and 1700 hrs apparently for recce, as no bombing or strafing was done. Indian ack ack guns shot down one F-86 near Amritsar, and the pilot, Flg Ofr Mohd Shaukat-ul-Islam, was captured. There were five raids over Halwara airfield also. The signals section was damaged, and two Hunters were destroyed. Enemy aircraft also raided Jodhpur, but no significant damage was caused.

On 16 September 1965, five Canberras of No.35 Sqn raided Peshawar airfield. A total of 8x1000 lb and 2x4000 lb bombs were dropped which hit the technical and dispersal areas. Canberras also carried out two raids on Sargodha airfield, inflicting heavy damage to the installations there, despite heavy ack ack fire. The bombers were also utilised for carrying out strikes against enemy concentrations near Ugoke, as a result of which heavy damage was inflicted on the enemy. More than three tanks were left burning. MiGs, Gnats and Mysteres carried out CAP sorties over base airfields in the western sector, while Hunters were employed for CAP duties over Calcutta and Kalaikunda. Ops recce was carried out by Mysteres around Gujranwala, Daska and Pasrur, and Liberator aircraft from Pune were sent out into the Arabian Sea on search patrols. IAF Helicopters dropped 60 bombs and fired 702 rounds of ammunition in infiltrator positions, 8 km east of Rajouri.

Enemy F-86 aircraft near Halwara/Adampur area on 16 September were intercepted by Indian fighters. In the ensuing dog-fight Flg Offr Pingale shot down one Sabre, against the loss of Hunter aircraft(44). The enemy was reported to be using Napalm bombs in its attacks on Indian positions. The 750-pounder Napalm bombs that were used bore the US marking Order No. NY-128, lot Nos 28 to 41.

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Next day, on 17 September, Canberras from No.5 and No.16 Sqns attacked Pakistan air bases at Chak Jhumra, Akwal and Sargodha, but damage could not be assessed. Indian Fighters were mostly employed on recce missions. Strike sorties sent out did not sight anything significant to attack. Besides, the Indian aircraft provided ground support to the army. While the enemy fighters carried out Napalm bomb attacks in Gadra and Sialkot areas, enemy bombers attacked Sujwan village, approximately 6 km from Samba, killing 25 civilians and wounding 40 others.

On 18 September 1965, two Canberras were sent out to attack Chak Jhumra airfield, but they dropped their bombs blindly due to poor visibility. IAF Fighters were mainly employed on CAP sorties and sweeps. The same day, an aerial engagement took place over Kasur in which four of the Indian Gnats from 18 Wing engaged six F-86 aircraft. Sqn Ldr Sandhu shot down one F-86, and another Sabre was reportedly brought down by ack ack. All Gnats returned safely to base. In reply, a Pak B-57 bomber attacked Ambala, but its bombs fell on the military hospital, killing 12 patients. Some of the bombs also fell in a residential locality, Model Town, killing many civilians.

The following day also, Canberra bombers again carried out attacks on Sargodha airfield. Damage could not be assessed due to the height of the release of the bombs. Two other Canberras were detailed to strike the Radar base at Sakesar. Only one could reach the target area, but did not drop any bombs, as the actual target could not be sighted. Mysteres carried out strikes against enemy concentrations at Hussainiwala, Gandasinghwala, Jassoran and Chawinda, and tanks and gun positions were destroyed. Vampire aircraft in their attacks on the road/railway line near Suleimanki destroyed 3 to 4 goods wagons and caused damage to the railway line.

On PAF's part, six Sabres "bounced" or intercepted the Indian formation of Mysteres and Gnats. In the ensuing dog-fight two Sabres were shot down, one each by Sqn Ldr D.Keelor and Flt Lt Kapila flying Gnats(45). Low level dog-fight in the jet age was said to be impossible, but Keelor and Kapila fought such an engagement over Chawinda in Pakistan. The battle was joined at about 500 metres above the ground and ended a little above the tree-top. Sqn Ldr Denzil Keelor and Flt Lt Kapila proved the superiority of the IAF officers by their adroit manoeuvre and flying skill, while fighting the air battle against Pakistani Sabres. While shooting down an enemy Sabre, Denzil realized that he himself was skimming the

treetops, and in the heat of battle, he had barely missed coming to grief himself. With Flt Lt Kapila, he had a great experience of a dog-fight between transsonic jets at tree-top height. However, one of the Indian Gnats was shot down by a Sabre and the pilot Flt Lt Mayadeo, taken POW.

The enemy attempted two raids on Jodhpur without causing any damage. In the raid over Jammu, the Indian transmitter building was damaged. On 19 September, 625 SU Garages (near Ferozepur), meant for specialist vehicles, were attacked by four F-86s. Technical areas and POL depot caught fire. The same day, Jamnagar airfield was bombed at 0235 and 0310 hrs, and 12 bombs were dropped. One petrol bowser was destroyed and two persons lost their lives. This day a civilian Beechcraft aircraft, belonging to the Government of Maharashtra and carrying Shri Balvantray Mehta, the Chief Minister of Gujarat, his wife and five others, was shot down by Pakistani Sabres, 25 Km north-west of Mandvi, and all the occupants were killed.

On 20 September, Canberras attacked Sargodha air base and caused damage to the dispersal area and pens. They also raided Chawinda railway station and damaged railway line and road within the target area. Vampires of No. 45 Sqn attacked enemy encampments in Haveli (Rajasthan), and rolling stock, railway line and wagons near Arifwala. Mysteres of No. 31 Sqn attacked tank and gun concentrations around Jassoran, destroying 3 tanks, 3 vehicles and a signals mast.

On the Indian side, Halwara, Patiala, Jammu and Ambala were raided by Pakistani aircraft. At Halwara a Gnat on the ground was destroyed, but there was no significant damage at Jammu and Patiala. A church near the airfield at Ambala was completely destroyed, and a B-57 was reported to have been brought down by ack ack near the Shambu railway station(46) though it was not confirmed.

A formation of 2 Gnats and 4 Hunters was engaged by four F-86s near Lahore in which one F86 was shot down by Flt Lt Majumdar flying a Gnat. Indian ack ack also claimed three F-86s, two of which were in 4 Div sector. The third crashed in Pakistani territory. India lost two Hunter aircraft(47).

Next day, i.e. 21 September, in a daylight raid on Badin airfield, Indian Canberra interdectors caused extensive damage to the radar installation. Wg Cdr Wilson got a direct hit on the radar dome with his rockets. Bombs dropped in the vicinity of the radar installation caused considerable damage. Sargodha airfield was also raided. While returning from the

raid, one of the Canberras was hit, probably by a Sidewinder, and it crashed. Mysteres and Hunters carried out armed recce and close-support sorties for the army in the Chawinda, Kasur and Lahore sectors, destroying two tanks and a few vehicles. This day, the enemy planes carried out four raids over Jodhpur without causing any significant damage. 311 SU at Patiala was also raided, but no damage was reported.

On 22 September, Indian Canberras, escorted by Hunters, attacked troop concentrations in the Chawinda area, damaging railway lines and the railway station. These aircraft encountered small arms and ack ack fire. While a Hunter from 20 Sqn operating from No.9 Wing was shot down by the enemy ground fire in Khemkaran area, a Mystere was shot down in the Lahore area by own troops. Besides, No.1 TAC was attacked by enemy aircraft, but fortunately no damage was done. There were two enemy attacks on Jodhpur. In the second raid, 6x500 lb bombs were dropped on the jail and locomotive shed area, killing 35 people and injuring several others(48).

India and Pakistan agreed to a general cease-fire with effect from 0330 hrs on 23 September 1965. However, even after the cease-fire was announced, two B-57s escorted by 2 F-86s attacked Amritsar town at 1615 hrs. They dropped bombs in the Chheharta residential locality causing many casualties. Both the F-86s were, however, shot down by the ack ack guns. One of them fell at Thima and the other near a gun position. A third plane was seen flying away towards Pakistan, emitting smoke. Thus ended the air war of the 1965 conflict.

Assessment

The Air Force, like the Navy, not having been alerted about the possibility of another war over Kashmir, no inter-Service contingency plans were drawn up, nor was any course of action agreed upon with the Air Force in the event of its being called out to support the Army. It was only on 1 September 1965 when the Pak Army threatened to cut the Jammu-Srinagar highway, that the Air Force was asked for air support, which it gave at very short notice..

The air operations consisted of close air support, fighter sweeps and interceptions, interdiction and counter-air operations. The IAF carried out these missions throughout the period of hostilities. With its intensive air attacks during the opening phase of the operations in the Chhamb sector, it caused a serious setback to Pak offensive action. The failure of Pakistani armour to break

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through on the Khemkaran sector was, it was claimed, partially a result of effective IAF strikes which blunted the Pakistani armour thrusts and forced the armour to give up the offensive drive. Bearing in mind the wide theatre of operations, the location of airfields and the suddenness with which events took place, it would appear that air support was not too bad. These operational sorties not only inflicted considerable damage on the enemy installations and equipment, besides destroying/damaging a number of tanks and guns, but also demoralised the enemy considerably.

However, there were certain clear deficiencies in the control of IAF operations. Air-defence and offensive support operations were controlled by two separate organisations, i.e. AD(Air Defence) Area and Advance HQ, WAC(Western Air Command) respectively, creating grave problems. As in the initial stages of the war the aim of the IAF was to achieve a favourable air situation, it was essential that all air effort in the tactical area was controlled by a single authority. It was found that since a favourable air situation had not developed, it became necessary to devote a large proportion of IAF effort to defensive measures. CAPs and escorts used up 66% of the entire GA/AD effort, which at times used some of the air effort the advance HQ urgently needed for offensive support. Also, ground attack aircraft on offensive (close support for the army) missions required fighter escort which could not be effectively dovetailed with the requirement of Air Defence, because of its limited availability and dual control by two organisations with different aims. Due to this, offensive effort could not be sub-allotted by Air HQ to TACs (Tactical Air Centres) as planned. ✓

The actual situation was like this: When a Brigade or Division Commander required Close Air Support, he would make a request to the next higher Commander, and all such requests would reach the Corps HQrs. The same evening, the Corps Commander and Tactical Air Centre Commander, and some other concerned officers would consult among themselves and decide the priorities of the different requests for Close Air Support. The TAC Commander would then project the requirements to the Commanders of the two or three Air Stations allotted to him, and with whom he was in direct contact by wireless. Some Air Stations were allotted to more than one TAC. The Air Station Commander would be having requirements for Counter-Air Operations, Interdiction Missions, Air Defence, etc. Also, some of the requirements like Air Defence and Counter-Air were ordered by Western Air Command or by Air HQrs. The Air Station Commander

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would naturally give first priority to orders from Air HQrs and Western Air Command, and the remaining sorties available to him would be allotted to meet the requests for Close Air Support, according to priorities decided by the particular Air Station Commander. He would then launch the Close Air Support sorties the next morning at the earliest(49).

When these sorties arrived over-head, the Air Contact Team(ACT) operating on the ground with the forward troops would visually direct the IAF planes to the enemy targets. For this purpose, the ACT was in Radio or RT contact with the planes. Sometimes, the ACT was unable to contact the planes over-head, because his RT set, the frequency of which had been synchronised with the RT of the planes, had got disturbed by the jolting of the jeep which had carried the RT set to the forward area. Again frequently, there was enemy shelling, requiring the ACT to take shelter under-ground, and so he could not visually direct the IAF planes to the enemy target(50).

During the hostilities the IAF flew some 4000 sorties in the Western Theatre, as detailed below(51):

(a) <u>Fighter Sorties</u>	- 1,017
(b) <u>Fighter Bomber Sorties:</u>	
i. Close support	- 696
ii. Others	- 676
	- 1,372
(c) <u>Bomber Sorties:</u>	
i. Close support	- 33
ii. Bombing	- 163
	- 196
(d) <u>Fighter CAP Sorties over only four of the IAF bases</u>	- 1,352

TOTAL :	3,937

A total of 738,000 lbs (335 tonnes approx) of bomb load was expended in bombing raids over Pakistan(52).

Pakistan's losses due to air attacks were estimated as under(53):-

	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
Tanks	123	20
Guns	56	3
Vehicles	281	27
Railway Wagons	64	--
Locomotives	8	--
BPIS	2	--

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Pakistan suffered an estimated loss of 43 aircraft as under(54):-

<u>Type of A/c</u>	<u>By Air Action</u>	<u>By Ground Fire</u>	<u>Total</u>
F-86	15	19	34
B-57	--	4	4
F-104	1	--	1
Unidentified	2	2	4
	-----	-----	-----
	18	25	43
	-----	-----	-----

The enemy Air force carried out a number of bombing raids on some of the Indian airfields and military installations. The airfields of Adampur, Halwara, Pathankot and Ambala, and the Radar Station at Amritsar were the principal targets of repeated attacks by the PAF, in addition to the air fields of Srinagar and Jammu, and the air bases at Jodhpur and Jamnagar.

According to the Pak version and claims, "Halwara received the most attention from the B-57s, which dropped 134 tons of bombs on it, followed by Jodhpur (98 tons), Adampur (85.5 tons), Pathankot (77 tons), Jamnagar (66.5 tons), Sirsa (12 tons), Jammu (10.5 tons), and Srinagar (7 tons). Close support targets received 77.5 tons of bombs from the B-57s, which also delivered 10.5 tons against the Beas bridge, two tons in the Gadra area in the south, and 14 tons on the Amritsar radar,"(55) giving a total of close to 600 tons, or 20 tons per bomber on the PAF strength.

But despite almost nightly attacks on these IAF bases, there was no evidence of any serious damage to them. An analysis of the effect of bombing on various airfields showed that the structural damage caused was small, compared to the effort expended by the enemy. However, the IAF suffered heavy aircraft losses on the ground, especially at Pathankot and Kalaikunda air bases, which were ill-prepared initially and taken by surprise.

Total IAF aircraft losses in action during 1-22 September 1965 amounted to 59, which included 24 shot down in air combat or by ground fire and no less than 35 written off during enemy attacks on airfields.

A detailed break-up is as follows(56):-

Type	Air Battle Casualties	Raid Casualties	Total
MiG-21	--	3	3
Gnat	2	2	4
Hunter	10	3	13
Mystere	6	9	15
Vampire	4	6	10
Canberra	1	4	5
Packet	--	3	3
Dakota	--	5	5
Auster	1	--	1
Total	24	35	59

Both countries' losses in aircraft, percentage-wise, were as under:-

	Total No. of combat aircraft	No. of aircraft lost(excluding accidental losses)	Losses as percentage of total number of aircraft
India	460	59	12.8%
Pakistan	186(57)	43	23.1%

India lost 19 air crew killed as against Pakistan's 13, and 7 were POW in Pakistan, and 5 ejected safely in Indian territory. Many IAF officers were honoured with gallantry awards. The IAF won, in all, four Maha Vir Chakra and forty-three Vir Chakra awards for acts of gallantry in operations in September 1965(58).

Both the IAF and PAF performed comparably in spite of Pakistan having high performance F-104s and Sidewinder-equipped F-86s. But both the air forces were reluctant to use their full potential. This over-cautious attitude was possibly due to the impression that the conflict would be long-drawn and hence there was a need to conserve resources. Again, both avoided day-light raids on enemy airfields after 7 September 1965.

The IAF failed to carry out a preemptive strike of PAF airfields just after (or before) the Indian Army advanced across the border in Lahore sector, thus losing a golden opportunity to destroy at least part

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of the Pak air war machine on the ground. Had the IAF attacked in full strength the Pak airfields on 6 September 1965, a different scenario would have emerged. This lapse did not only enable the PAF to assist in stemming the Indian advance in the Lahore sector, but also gave Pakistan an opportunity to carry out surprise attacks against the Indian airfields and radar stations the same evening, inflicting substantial damage.

An unacceptably large number of IAF aircraft were destroyed on the ground. This was primarily due to:-

- (a) Insufficient radar coverage, hence lack of warning.
- (b) Too many aircraft clustered at one base, e.g., Pathankot and Kalaikunda.
- (c) Lack of aircraft shelters.
- (d) Inexperience of local Commanders.

As a result of the successful, initial PAF attacks against the Indian airfields, the IAF spent a huge effort (almost 60%) on combat air patrols over the airfields for the rest of the war, thereby reducing greatly its ability to support the army and strike targets inside Pakistan. CAP sorties were not only flown over the forward IAF bases, but also at Hindon, Agra, Kalaikunda and Dum Dum.

Prior to the 1965 conflict, the Army and IAF had not carried out sufficient joint exercises. This seems to have been due to the almost complete lack of joint planning. Both the Army and the IAF had their sights firmly fixed on their respective objectives, and cooperation between them was incidental, rather than well-planned. In the absence of joint plans, large gaps remained in the air cover over the combat zone. As already explained, there was no reliable and quick system by which the Indian army could call for interceptors, when attacked by the PAF. It is true that 'sweep' sorties were flown over the tactical areas, but this was more of an attempt to draw the PAF fighters into combat, rather than providing a means to intercept the PAF ground-attack aircraft or even provide a deterrent against them. On the other hand, coordination and joint planning between the Pak Army and PAF appears to have been equally rudimentary and casual, though Indian troops advancing on 6 September towards Lahore were effectively bombed and strafed by the Sabres.

There was almost a complete lack of air intelligence at the commencement of hostilities. The IAF could not locate the PAF aircraft in East Pakistan at all(59). In the west, it was not known for quite some time that almost all the PAF's air effort in the Jammu and Punjab sectors was launched from the Sargodha area and Peshawar.

It may be noted that this was the first real air war that the IAF had experienced, and insufficient attention had been paid to the vulnerability of the IAF installations. The Indian facilities for air defence and tactical support were inadequate. However, it is to the credit of the IAF that after the initial reverses, the field units more than recovered their ground, not so much due to the mistakes made by the PAF, but due to the individual initiative and valour of the IAF officers and men. The aircrew performed magnificently, doing all that was expected of them, and even more.

✓ Taking an overall view of the air war, it appears clear that neither side won any decisive victory. The IAF and the PAF mauled each other, but could not kill. They operated according to no clear-cut, well-considered plan or priorities, nor concentrated their resources on close support or counter-air missions to achieve good results. Heavy day-light attacks to knock out enemy air bases and destroy enemy planes in bulk were given up prematurely, even though they alone could have given decisive results, at a heavy but acceptable cost. Night bombing was ineffective, and CAPs on such extensive scale resulted in a major diversion of effort. In a nut-shell, it was the failure - or rather the absence - of a clear-cut operational doctrine to achieve definite victory, which resulted in an inconclusive struggle. /

It may be worthwhile to quote one of IAF's distinguished bomber pilots, Air Cmde P.M. Wilson, who assessed the air operations thus:

"My impression about all air force operation, whether East or West, was that nobody seemed to know what to do. According to me the level of professionalism at all levels was extremely low and I do not exclude my own performance".

✓ "The lessons learned in 1965 were all negative ones - in other words what not to do, should there be another conflict. These lessons were so numerous and so cogent that they were more valuable than any positive lessons"(60). /

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Details were as follows, as gleaned from Fricker, Hussain and Qureshi, etc:-
 - B-57 bombers - No 7 and No 8 Squadrons
 - F-104 Starfighters - No 9 Sqdn
 - F-86F Sabres - Nos 5,11,14,15,16,17,18 and 19 Sqdns
 - SA-16 and H43 helicopters - No 4 Sqdn
 - C-130 Hercules - No 6 Sqdns
 - Bristol 170 - No 12 sqdn
 - RB-57B and RB-57F - No 24 Sqdn
 - T-6G, T-33 and T-37B - No 2 and No 20 Sqdns
2. From Official Records. Many different sources give many different figures for actual strengths of the PAF and the IAF, as also for the losses suffered during the war. Even books sponsored by PAF - such as "Battle for Pakistan" by John Fricker, "The Story of the PAF" published by Shaheen Foundation, Islamabad, and "History of the Pakistan Air Force" by Hussain and Qureshi - give conflicting figures and accounts. For example, Fricker (page 11) gives combat strength of PAF as 141 with 25 B-57, whereas "Story of the PAF" (p.429) says PAF had 130 combat planes with 26 bombers. They include or exclude, as convenient, the Sqdn of PAF stationed in East Pakistan. Same confusion prevails regarding figures concerning the IAF.
3. "Story of the Pakistan Air Force" (published by Shaheen Foundation, Islamabad, 1988), p.416.
4. "The Story of the Pakistan Air Force" (published by Shaheen Foundation, Islamabad, 1988), pp.332-33; and Fricker, John, pp.46-48.
5. "Story of the PAF".
6. From Official Records. However, the Indian Army records and John Fricker present a different picture. Wing Cmdr K.Y. Singh, who as Flt Lt served in the radar unit at Amritsar, has stated in writing that on 4th evening, a MiG-21 hit and damaged a Sabre near Chhamb, and Pak radio announced at 1800 hrs that the Sabre had crashed after the pilot bailed out safely.
7. Gupta, H.R., p.283.
8. Fricker, John, pp.87 and 90.
9. Ibid., p.91.
10. The timings given are based on personal testimony of Indian pilots, and differ slightly from Fricker's account.
11. According to Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh(Retd), a wrong decision by Wg Cdr Kurian, the then OC Flying, Pathankot, to recall the airborne Gnats

even though he had 10 minutes warning of the impending PAF attack, resulted in the losses. - ACM Arjan Singh's interview of 6 August 1987.

12. From Official Records.
13. Fricker, John, p.10.
14. Ibid. p.100.
15. From Official Records.
16. Ibid.
17. Fricker, John, p.90. These details suggest that PAF attacks on the Indian supply vehicles on the GT road axis on 6 September could not have been very heavy.
18. Bulk Petroleum Installation.
19. From Official Records.
20. Fricker, John, pp.115,118 & 183.
21. ACM Arjan Singh (Retd)'s interview of 6 August 1987. The Air Chief Marshal thinks that possibly as a result of this raid, the PAF struck Kalaikunda. According to Shri PVR Rao, the then Defence Secretary, as far as East Pakistan was concerned, there were no instructions to enter that country on the ground or in the air. He felt that the few IAF strikes in East Pakistan were the result of local initiative, and this possibly caused PAF retaliation on Kalaikunda. "The news of IAF strikes in East Pakistan came as a complete surprise to all including the CAS", said Shri Rao, who personally issued orders to stop air raids into East Pakistan. - Shri Rao's interview of 25 June 1987.
22. Air Cmde P.M. Wilson (Retd)'s letter, dated 15 August 1987.
23. Fricker, John, p.64.
24. According to Air Vice Marshal MB Naik(Retd), who was then Commander IAF Station Kalaikunda, the meticulous way in which the Pak air attack was planned goes to prove that some Pak agent had been planted in the airfield.- AVM Naik's interview 26 June 1987.
25. Interviews with AVM Naik (Retd), 26 June 1987 and ACM DA La Fontaine, 3 July 1987.
26. From Official Records.
27. According to one eye-witness, an unfortunate member of the ground crew, who was carrying out his usual checks on the packet aircraft, was gunned down by an enemy F-86. From Official Records.
28. From Official Records.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid
34. Ibid
35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid. Fricker, John, p.151, also.
45. While it is stated in the book, Battle for Pakistan-The Air War of 1965, by John Fricker, pp.127-128, that one Sabre F-86 piloted by Flt Lt S.M. Ahmed was hit by 30 mm cannon of a Gnat and crashed on way back to its base (Sargodha), the version, given in the book History of the Pakistan Air Force by Syed Shabir Hussain and Sqn Ldr M. Tariq Qureshi (p.163), states that one F-86 aircraft was damaged in the combat forcing the pilot (Flt Lt Malik) to eject on his way back to the base.
46. From Official Records.
47. From Official Records. Fricker, John, p.184, also.
48. From Official Records.
49. Ibid.
50. Report of Interview with Air Cmde S. Banerjee (Retd), held on 2 February 1989.
51. From Official Records.
PAF CAP sorties over major IAF stations were: Pathankot-818, Adampur-238, Halwara-108, and Ambala-188.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid
54. Ibid.
According to John Fricker, Total PAF losses were 19 aircraft (F-86=13; F-104=2 and B-57=4) out of which 4 (2 F-86s, 1 B-57 and 1 F-104) were lost due to accident and 2 were shot down by the guns of the Pak Army itself. - Battle for Pakistan, p.183.

It is a matter of great surprise and regret that the fog of war still persists and a clear, fully reliable picture of the losses suffered by the IAF and the PAF is still not available. Pakistani accounts appear blatantly propagandist and one version contradicts another. For example, Fricker (p.11) gives combat strength of PAF as 141 with 25 B-57s while "Story of the PAF" (pp.4-9) says PAF had 130 combat planes with 26 bombers. Again, Fricker states (pp.127-128) that one Sabre piloted by Flt Lt S.M. Ahmed was hit by 30mm cannon of a Gnat and crashed on way back to its base, Sargodha, while the version given in "History of the Pakistan Air Force" by Hussain

and Qureshi (p.163) states that a Sabre was damaged in the combat and the pilot, Flt Lt Malik, had to eject on his way back to his base. The records of the IAF have even more discrepancies and conflicting versions. While an Official document states that the total number of enemy B-57 bombers destroyed was four, another lists seven wreckages of B-57 seen in area under Indian control only. It is not at all surprising, therefore, that the Indian and Pakistani versions differ greatly with regard to the number of aircraft destroyed on either side. In the present account or official history, best efforts have been made to meticulously examine all available evidence and arrive at the most probable figures.

55. Hussain and Qureshi, p.411.

56. From Official Records.

In addition to the above, 12 IAF aircraft were lost due to accidents and other causes (Gnat-3, Hunter-4, Mystere-3, Canberra-1 and Auster-1). However, some other Records give slightly different figures. Some aircraft at first considered total loss were repaired, while some reported as only damaged were later written off.

57. As estimated by IAF.

If John Fricker's figure of 141, as the effective strength of Pak combat aircraft, is taken into consideration, then the Pak percentage of aircraft losses comes to over 31% - Fricker, John, p.11.

58. See Appendix X - Indian Air Force.

59. Perhaps they were hidden in camouflaged pens.

60. From Official Records.

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CHAPTER - X

INDIAN NAVY IN THE WAR

As narrated in the earlier chapters, the 1965 War was planned neither by Pakistan nor India. One thing led to another in a process of spiralling escalation, and it became a full-fledged war between the two countries. But even then India tried to limit the hostilities, and no major operations were undertaken against East Pakistan. For perhaps the same reason, the Indian Navy was not unleashed in a total war against Pakistan.

War Approaching

Till September 1965, the Indian Navy was not given any specific task, except the general responsibility to defend the Eastern and Western Coast lines totalling about 5,600 km, the outlying islands in the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal, including the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, located approximately 1,280 km off the mainland(1). With the limited number of ships available to the Indian Navy at that time, it was a difficult responsibility in terms of physical distances and areas concerned, especially in view of the on-going expansion of the navies of Iran, Indonesia and China. Not only was Iran building up a blue water capability, but Chinese and Indonesian submarines were also sighted in the Bay of Bengal, especially in the vicinity of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. However, the Indian Naval Commanders counted Pakistan as the main potential adversary.

It should be mentioned here that during the Kutch trouble, INS Vikrant was moved to the Saurashtra Coast, and this had a sobering effect on the Pak armed forces(2). After the Kutch operations Vice Admiral Soman, the then Chief of Indian Naval Staff, thought it appropriate to concentrate the Indian fleet in the Bay of Bengal off the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, keeping in view the disturbed political atmosphere in Indonesia and the likelihood of that country's naval interference in this area(3). Some Indonesian leaders had laid a vague claim to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and started calling the Indian Ocean as the Indonesian Ocean(4). He issued necessary directives to the fleet to operate in the east and put landing parties on those islands(5). Around end August 1965, he received some secret intelligence through a foreign contact and became convinced that Indonesia was not likely to interfere in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and, therefore, decided to shift the fleet to the West Coast(6).

Vice Admiral Samson, who was then commanding the Indian fleet and operating off the East Coast, recalls that on 10 August 1965, when he reached Madras on board the flag-ship INS Mysore, he realised that things were hotting up on the Indo-Pak border, and it was wrong to be away from the Western coast. He, therefore, went ashore and telephoned to the Chief of Naval Staff from the office of the Resident Naval Officer. He suggested that in view of tension developing between India and Pakistan, his fleet should be allowed to return to Bombay immediately. But the Chief of Naval Staff replied that the Fleet should continue its cruise to the Andamans and the other parts on the Eastern Coast, as it was the Government policy not to give any impression to Pakistan that India had the intention of using her Fleet in operations against the Pak Fleet or her naval bases(7).

One evening when Vice Admiral Samson was with the Chief Commissioner of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, in Port Blair, a message informed him about the Pak army's advance into Akhnur, threatening to cut off Kashmir from India. He immediately sent a coded message to the Naval Headquarters for permission to return to Bombay. However, he was told to proceed according to the previously planned programme, i.e. INS Mysore and Brahmaputra to go to Calcutta and some of the remaining ships including INS Ranjit to sail to Vishakhapatnam. He had no other alternative but to do so. Nevertheless, on arrival at Sandheads (the entrance to the mouth of river Hugli), he decided with Capt D.R. Mehta, the Captain of INS Mysore, that the Cruiser should remain at anchor there itself. Meanwhile, Vice Admiral Samson went to Calcutta on board INS Brahmaputra, which being a frigate, could more easily get out of the Calcutta harbour. This was necessary as INS Mysore being a larger vessel would have taken at least two days to clear the river once she had reached Calcutta, and, in an emergency, would have virtually been bottled up there. While the battle was continuing in the West, a lot of prominence was given in the Press to the impending arrival of the Indian fleet at Calcutta on a goodwill visit. It was broadcast in the evening of 1 September that the IAF had launched its attack against Pak Armour and Infantry in the Chhamb area, and thus it became clear that the Indo-Pak conflict was not going to be a limited affair. Indian Naval HQ now realised that Pakistan was likely to extend the war to the sea as well(8). Vice Admiral Samson, thereupon, spoke to the Naval HQ and got permission to proceed to Bombay with all his ships at the earliest. Unfortunately, INS Brahmaputra was locked up in the Hugli and would take time to clear that river, and in any event, with its

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lesser speed, would never catch up with Mysore. So the Fleet Commander ordered all his ships to proceed with despatch to Bombay, and he, on his part, could rejoin Mysore by flying down to Vishakhapatnam and then boarding one of the faster Destroyers.

There was no air service at that time from Calcutta to Vishakhapatnam, but with the help of the local Air Force Commander, Vice Admiral Samson managed to get an aircraft to fly him out in the morning. The journey from Calcutta to Air Force Base Barrackpore proved very interesting. In the early morning when the Admiral and his companions were on the way to Barrackpore their car broke down, and there was no taxi or any other vehicle available on the road. Suddenly, they saw a bus running on the road, and they commandeered it, with its passengers protesting. However, the bus could not take them inside the Air Force Station and dropped them near the main gate, a fair distance from the aircraft. With a lot of luggage with them, it was a bit of a problem to walk down to the run-way. To their great relief they found a bullock-cart near the gate of the Air Force Station, and they soon dumped their luggage in it and finally got into the aircraft.

On reaching Vishakhapatnam, Admiral Samson drove to the naval jetty and embarked on board INS Ranjit and sailed immediately. Although almost a day behind the remaining ships of the fleet (less INS Brahmaputra still in the river Hugli), Ranjit proceeded at full speed and overtook the Fleet south of Sri Lanka. Despite adverse weather conditions, the Fleet Commander got himself transferred to flagship Mysore by jackstay(9).

The Rival Fleets

Compared to the Pakistan Navy, the Indian Navy was definitely larger, and had the following units, apart from training, supply and minor vessels :-

(a) Aircraft Carrier

VIKRANT (Flag Ship)

(b) Cruisers

MYSORE
DELHI

(c) 11th Destroyer Squadron

RAJPUT (D 11)
RANJIT
RANA

(d) 22nd Destroyer Squadron

GODAVARI (D 22)
GOMATI
GANGA

(e) 14th Frigate Squadron

KHUKRI (F 14)
KUTHAR
KIRPAN

(f) 15th Frigate Squadron

TRISHUL (F 15)
TALWAR

(g) 16th Frigate Squadron

BRAHMAPUTRA (F 16)
BEAS
BETWA

But a few of these ships were not fully operational when the war broke out in September 1965. The fleet had been operating in the Bay of Bengal on prolonged missions and several vessels and their equipment required repairs or over-hauling. INS Vikrant was long overdue for refit, and had disembarked her Air Squadrons (INAS 300 and INAS 310) at Goa at the end of April 1965(10). When the ship was on her way back to Bombay for docking, she was asked to sail back to Goa and reembark the Air Squadrons because of the Kutch trouble. Thus the docking of this Carrier was delayed till end June 1965. Had this delay not occurred and the ship was taken for repairs in time, she would have been fully operational in September 1965.

Several other ships were also programmed for refits and repairs as per the peace-time schedule, as there was no particular Government directive to prepare for the war. During the period of the conflict, apart from INS Vikrant, Delhi, Rana, Trishul, and Sutlej were also under refit. Even INS Mysore required immediate dockyard attention, but Vice Admiral Samson used her as the Flag ship(11). The operational state of the material and equipment of the Frigate class of ships was lower than the desired level. This was mainly due to lack of spares and carrying out repairs by tinkering, instead of repairs by replacement. Both the Destroyer Squadrons, i.e. Ganga, Gomati, Godavari, and Rana, Rajput, and Ranjit were ageing. However, compared to the Pak Navy, the

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Indian Navy was better equipped both ship and equipment-wise, excepting the fact that the Indian Navy did not have a submarine at that time. Although INS Brahmaputra, Beas and Betwa had good guns, they had some machinery problems. INS Trishul and Talwar were first-rate anti-submarine ships, but the latter, tasked to carry out patrol of Kori Creek on the eve of the war, developed boiler trouble and had to be anchored off Okha. INS Shakti, the only ship which could refuel other ships of the Fleet on high seas, was also in bad condition, and it was clear that she would not be able to steam reliably. Consequently, Admiral Samson directed her to be anchored off Diu on the Gujarat coast, where hopefully she might get some protection from the Pak submarine. However, the ships would be highly vulnerable when they would be immobile alongside Shakti for refuelling(12).

India

Cruiser Mysore, 6 Frigates,
4 Destroyers and oiler
Shakti.

Maritime Reconnaissance
(MR) Aircraft of IAF from
Pune, limited to flying one
sortie per day upto 21°30'
North Latitude, under the
control of Maritime
Operations Room (MOR),
Bombay; two Alizes and
Hawks at Bombay under MOR
(The strike range of the
Hawks was 240 km from
base).

Pakistan

Submarine Ghazi,
Cruiser Babur, 6
Destroyers, and the
oiler Dacca.

4-6 Long-range MR
aircraft with Radar and
homing capabilities;
some Sabres and B-57
Bombers based at
Karachi, with strike
ranges upto 480 km and
1,040 km respectively.

The comparison of forces indicated that while the Indian Navy was superior to the Pak Navy in gun power, enemy had greater advantage in torpedo attacks. Enemy also had distinct advantage in speed over the Indian fleet - speed of Indian naval forces while remaining concentrated was 15 knots, while enemy speed was over 22 knots. And Pakistan had better airborne maritime reconnaissance and strike capability than India(13).

Even so, the FOCIF decided to operate within the Pak air strike range (1,040 km from Karachi), which meant accepting some risks. He chose to operate upto a range of 320 km from Karachi by day, and close to Karachi at night, with the precaution that by first light the Indian ships should reach beyond the range of most of the Pak aircraft. Consequently, with the

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Indian fleet's speed limitation of 15 knots, the farthest north they could operate was in the vicinity of Okha(14).

While the main part of the Indian Fleet was steaming from the East Coast towards Bombay, the overall disposition of the major naval units as on 1 September 1965 was:-

- (a) MYSORE, RANJIT, KHUKRI, KUTHAR and KIRPAN - at Vishakhapatnam.
- (b) BRAHMAPUTRA and BEAS - at Calcutta
- (c) TALWAR had been sent to the Kutch area earlier to carry out patrol off Kori Creek.
- (d) The only operational ship at Bombay was RAJPUT with reduced speed. The other ships at Bombay were KISTNA, SUTLEJ and DARSHAK, getting ready after essential repairs, and hence not available for any operations immediately.
- (e) GODAVARI and GOMATI were available at Cochin for local defence.
- (f) Two Minesweepers - CANNANORE and KAKINADA - were at Goa.
- (g) VIKRANT, TRISHUL, BETWA and RANA were under scheduled refit at Bombay(15).

Plans and Preparations

As regards intelligence about the impending threat from Pakistan, the Navy did not have adequate early warning, as already explained. Even in mid-August 1965, the Navy had neither the knowledge of the impending conflict, nor was asked by the Government to make necessary preparations to meet the threat. It seems the Navy was asked to lie low, and plans made were for only a defensive role, and not for an offensive one.

However, the enemy threat was appreciated by the Naval HQ as under:-

- (a) Use of Pak surface ships as raiders of Indian ports and Indian Merchant Ships at sea.
- (b) Chances of Indonesia's sporadic raids on Andaman and Nicobar group of Islands could not be eliminated completely.

- (c) Pakistan's submarine Ghazi was a real threat which might cause considerable damage to the Indian ports and shipping.
- (d) Pakistan would have an impossible task of supplying East Pakistan through the sea. Indian ships were to prevent Pak supplies between East and West Pakistan.

It was planned to concentrate the majority of the fleet ships off West Coast as early as possible, while only token presence of fleet ships would be at Goa, Vizag, and Cochin. The seaward defence of ports was completely left to the local Port Authorities and the Naval Administrative Authorities concerned.

The Indian Fleet was tasked to deploy ships in the north Arabian sea in an area decided by the fleet commander to meet the requirement of defending all Indian ports along the West Coast, and to destroy Pakistani fleet ships whenever opportunity arose or the situation called for. It was also to strike Karachi if and when ordered, and provide general cover and protection to Indian merchant ships in the Arabian Sea, plying to and from the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea(16).

Only essential measures for naval control of shipping were implemented, such as seaward defence by activating coastal batteries, examination of ships, seizure of Pakistani merchant ships, and diverting away the Indian ships from Pak ports. Plans were made for implementation of blockade in case of necessity. However, no blockade was imposed during this conflict. Precautions were taken to avoid unnecessary movement of ships, particularly in areas where operations were expected to take place.

One day, the British Naval Adviser called on Cmde B.K. Dang, Director, Naval Plans, at the Naval HQ in New Delhi, and asked him about the measures taken for the Naval control of shipping, with particular reference to the sinking of Pakistani merchant ships. The reply was given to him that no such action would be taken during this conflict. The Naval Adviser said that he would convey this to Pakistan(17).

The War Orders that were earlier issued were modified to suit the circumstances prevailing at that time and also the weaponry and equipment that were available then. The three coastal batteries - one at Colaba, the second at Worli, and the third at Middle Ground (Bombay Harbour) were activated. However, these batteries were ill-equipped and had old 6" guns of limited range. Manually-controlled Bofor guns

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(40/60mm) were deployed in anti-air role(18). Off-shore patrolling beyond 100 km by minesweepers and in-shore patrolling by in-shore minesweepers were carried out throughout the period of operations. Normal anti-sabotage measures, such as sending frogmen and divers to defuse mines, were taken.

There was no air cover worth the name, and Early Air Warning system was poor. The IAF Station at Bombay was responsible for taking necessary measures to counter air attacks. The security measures available were inadequate. However, contingency naval plans of 1962 were updated. The Bombay Naval Command provided logistics to the Naval Air Squadrons, but operationally they were under the Fleet Commander.

Ship Channels were arranged, convoys were formed for the safety of the merchant ships, and convoy escort ships were provided by the Fleet. Ships undergoing refit were handed back to the fleet after hasty repairs wherever possible. Maritime reconnaissance was negligible. Blackout was organised in Bombay, but fishing boats along the coast had their lights on, making it possible for the enemy to identify Bombay harbour easily. The Naval Officer-in-Charge Bombay organised body search and vehicle search in the Dock area and other vital places with the help of Naval Intelligence personnel/Provost Marshal/Military Police. Anti-limpet mine measures were taken, but Indian frogmen had very limited capabilities.

The Cochin Command also made an assessment of the possible threats from the enemy as under:-

(a) By Sea

- i. Bombardment from seaward of vulnerable points, ships in harbour, and approaches to the harbour by enemy naval vessels or armed merchant vessels. This could have serious results.
- ii. Mine-laying in the approaches to the harbour, mainly by surface vessels and aircraft, and possibly by submarine also.
- iii. Blocking the harbour by scuttling a ship in Pakistani employ, in the channel.
- iv. The possibility of the Pakistani submarine approaching the exposed examination anchorage at periscope depth and torpedoing identifiable Indian ships.

(b) By Air

- i. From intelligence available, the possibilities of an attack from air could not be ruled out, although it might not be possible for the enemy to mount a sustained attack.
- ii. Reconnaissance of the area by the enemy to determine the amount of naval forces based at Cochin.

(c) Sabotage

This was considered as the most important and major threat to the Cochin Naval Base and adjacent areas. This part of the country was reported to have some sympathisers of China and Pakistan. In view of the existing friendly ties between the two countries, a collusion between the two in letting loose saboteurs could not be considered improbable. The possibility of landing saboteurs/commandos by submarine or surface craft was, therefore, taken into consideration. Considerable damage could be caused by them in the absence of adequate defence along the coast. The enemy could well use the Lakshadweep area for refuelling and regrouping with a certain degree of concealment. To combat the threat from sabotage, strict precautionary measures were taken to guard the vulnerable points in the Base, the Naval Coast Batteries and the Naval Armament Depot, Alwaye(19).

Operations of the Fleet

In accordance with Operation Order, code-named GONDOLA, dated 13 August 1965, the FOCIF (Flag Officer Commanding Indian Fleet) was given the task of deploying the ships under his command for the protection of the ports on the West Coast. Realising that the need for such protection had arisen, GONDOLA was given effect to in the afternoon of 1 September. Naval Commands were directed to take precautionary measures against enemy attack and sabotage, the War Room at Naval Headquarters was activated, and liaison was established with Army and Air Headquarters Operations Rooms.

Intelligence on enemy naval forces received from Karachi indicated that all major Pakistani naval units had proceeded to sea on 3 September morning for exercises, and returned to harbour at night, minus PNS Ghazi, which must have proceeded to take an advantageous position for attacks on Indian ships.

On 5 September, the Flag Officer Commanding

Indian Fleet was given the freedom to hunt and destroy the enemy submarine, if detected on passage. This was necessary, as earlier directives had permitted Indian ships to hunt and attack the submarine only inside Indian territorial waters.

On the morning of 6 September, an order was issued that although no declaration of war was made, hostilities had commenced with Pakistan, and all units were ordered to be prepared for action. At noon, the President of Pakistan stated over the Pakistan Radio that a state of war existed between India and Pakistan, and a Pak Naval HQ message to the Pakistani naval units to execute "RESPONSE" was intercepted by an Indian agency.

All leave to personnel was cancelled and those on leave were ordered to be recalled. Drafts from the Fleet and appointments to commands and important appointments in the Fleet were frozen. Orders were issued for the detention of all Pakistani ships in harbour in retaliation for the detention of Indian ships by Pakistan. All Indian ships were ordered to keep clear of Pakistani ports and of the Pakistani Coast.

On 7th morning, the major Units of the Fleet (MYSORE, KHUKRI, KUTHAR and RANJIT) arrived at Bombay with FOCIF on board, and action was taken immediately in coordination with the Naval Dockyard to attend to all operational defects of the ships. On the basis of intelligence that an attack on Bombay was probable that night, the FOCIF sailed at night on board MYSORE with RAJPUT, RANJIT and BETWA in company for defensive patrol outside the harbour. However, RAJPUT and RANA were on one boiler only, and BETWA had just come out of her long refit. Alizes started search operations upto 180 km off the port, and Maritime Reconnaissance aircraft of the IAF were utilised for searches outside the ALIZE coverage.

VESCA (Vessel Calling) System of reporting was introduced with immediate effect and Reporting Officers were directed to report movements of all ships, including neutral ships.

According to Vice Admiral B.S. Soman, the then Chief of Naval Staff, when the war started, he received a Government directive that the Indian Navy was to play a defensive role and not to operate beyond the latitude of Porbandar. He was unhappy with this restriction imposed on him, and met, in turn, the Defence Secretary, the Defence Minister, the Prime Minister and even the President, and complained about this order. But the order was not changed and the

Indian Navy had no option but to play a defensive role during the earlier period of the operations(20).

Policy directive ("REBOUND"II) was issued on 7 September. According to this, Pakistani action at sea was to be anticipated and ships and naval authorities were ordered to take both offensive and defensive action as circumstances dictated.

At midnight on 7 September, some Pakistani naval ships, including cruiser PNS Babur, disguised as merchant ships, came near the minor port of Dwarka on the Saurashtra Coast and bombarded it. They were supported by Pakistan Air Force which also carried out bombing of the area. About 125 shells were fired by the Pakistani ships. However, very little damage took place, as most of the naval shells landed on the beach. A railway rest-room and a small part of a railway track were slightly damaged. One unexploded 5.25" shell and some 4.5" shells were subsequently recovered from the area(21).

On 8 September, INS Kirpan arrived in Bombay, and ships of the 11th Destroyer Squadron - Rajput and Ranjit -, along with Betwa were employed on patrolling the approaches to Bombay during the dark hours. While Talwar, after carrying out repairs to her machinery, sailed from Okha at 1600 hours at her best speed, Savitri and Sarayu were sailed from Bombay to Okha to carry out barrier patrol at the entrance to the Gulf of Kutch, INS Tir, a training ship, anchored at Madras and bound for Port Swettenham on a goodwill visit, was asked to cancel the programme and go to Port Blair to carry out patrols in the Andaman seas(22).

Air Defence of Bombay was handed over to the Navy, as the IAF at Pune did not have sufficient resources to undertake this task. The SEA HAWKS at Bombay were kept at readiness for strikes, and ALIZES were used for close reconnaissance and searches off the approaches to the port.

The following measures were taken for the control of shipping:-

- (a) All merchant ships were ordered to keep clear 60 miles off Bombay during dark hours.
- (b) Wireless silence was ordered for all Indian merchant-men at sea.
- (c) All navigational aids north of Sadashivgad and Sacramento Shoal were ordered to be switched off.

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- (d) Orders were issued to institute 'examination service' at Bombay, Goa, Cochin, Madras, Vishakhapatnam and Calcutta.
- (e) Pakistani ship AL HASAN was impounded at Vishakhapatnam, and 14 Officers including the Captain, 35 crew, the Captain's wife and son were interned, but not the Chief Officer and the Chief Engineer who were German nationals(23).

On 9 September, INS Brahamaputra and Beas arrived at Bombay from the Eastern Coast, and INS Talwar came from Okha. On their passage to Bombay, Brahmaputra and Beas had made a suspected submarine contact about 60 km south of Bombay, and Beas carried out a deliberate attack. However, contact was lost at extreme range. It turned out later that one of the merchant ships, S.S. Jalaveer, was also in radar contact with a disappearing vessel, about 60 km from the position, reported by Brahmaputra.

Another interesting thing happened that day. Telephone message was received at Bombay from INS Valsura that the Collector of Jamnagar reported that 700 heavily armed enemy paratroopers had landed at a place, 45 km away from Jamnagar, and they were proceeding towards that town. Based on this report, a battalion of troops was transported by air from Bombay to fight this menace. However, it turned out later that the report was false. Actually, a railway engine driver had seen some people near the railway tracks, and in panic he wrongly reported them as enemy paratroopers. This underlined the importance of verification of such reports by local commanders before passing them on to higher authorities.

On 10 September, as availability of naval ships on the Western Coast improved considerably, FOCIF ordered Operation GALLANT for an offensive sweep of the sea areas upto Okha. INS Mysore, Rajput, Ranjit and Talwar, 14th FS and 16th FS were available for this task; and Rana and Ganga were employed for local defence off Bombay. Liberator and Alize aircraft were ordered to carry out maritime reconnaissance searches ahead of the fleet to give early warning and anti sub-marine protection.

Stages 2 and 3 of the war-watching service were implemented on 10 September, and a Naval Liaison Officer was established at Okha to coordinate all reporting in his area.

Next day, the Indian fleet patrolled the Kathiawar Coast. In close support of the fleet, Alizes were flown under the control of MOR Bombay, and the Liberators were employed in searching sea areas to the south and south-west of the fleet's position. Six to eight Sea Hawks were positioned at Jamnagar for striking against the enemy on 12 September. At one stage, the fleet reported that it was being shadowed by enemy reconnaissance aircraft for about 45 minutes. Consequently, 2 Sea Hawks took off from Bombay for interception but no contact could be made with the enemy aircraft.

On 11 September, an order was issued in respect of the naval control of shipping. It laid down the following:-

- (a) Pakistani crews of neutral vessels should remain on board.
- (b) Indian crew bound for Pakistani ports in neutral vessels were to be permitted to remain on board as reciprocation from Pakistan was anticipated.
- (c) Pakistani export cargo was not normally to be interfered with.
- (d) Cargoes consigned for Pakistani ports would be considered on merit individually.
- (e) Cargo for Indian ports should be discharged before a neutral ship proceeded to Pakistan ports.
- (f) Detained Pakistani ships should be handed over to the Shipping Corporation for maintenance and manning. All merchant ships should keep 30 miles clear off Goa and Cochin at night.

The same day, an enemy aircraft reportedly tried to intrude into Vishakhapatnam area(24). However, it could not do any harm, and the naval coast batteries engaged it, and the enemy aircraft fled from the scene. This aircraft could have come from East Pakistan.

As the Indian fleet was running short of fuel on 13 September, and the tanker, INS Shakti was not available for refuelling, the fleet returned to Bombay at 9 a.m. on the 14th, after a successful sweep in the Arabian Sea. FOCIF reported that as a result of his operation, the enemy was avoiding action with the Indian fleet and operating north of 22°50'N. It was

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also evident that the Indian naval forces were under constant surveillance by enemy aircraft which were on call to support the Pak naval forces. Although a number of radar contacts with enemy ships were reported during the sweep, no Pakistani vessel could be intercepted. Also sonar contact was made twice and anti-submarine hunts were launched. However, there was no evidence of any damage done to the Pak submarine.

On 14 September, the Indian High Commissioner in London reported that the British Government had placed an embargo on all shipments of stores to India and Pakistan. To improve the reporting in the Kathiawar Coast, naval reporting posts were established at Sikka, Salaya, Dwarka, Porbandar, Mangrol and Veraval.

On 15 September, some jet aircraft arrived over Cochin, but did not carry out any raids. These aircraft were engaged by naval ships and coast batteries. Subsequent analysis revealed that these aircraft belonged to a British or American carrier Task Force which might have been operating off the southern coast of India.

On 17 September, in view of the likelihood of the enemy submarine Ghazi operating in the southern approaches to Bombay, FOCIF sailed the 14th F.S. for offensive anti-submarine sweep in the southern approaches to Bombay. Gun support was provided by INS Ganga and INS Rana. During 17-22 September, the Squadron carried out a thorough search of an area of about 7,500 sq. km. without finding the elusive enemy.

On 18 September, the Indian fleet (Mysore, Beas, Betwa, and Ranjit only) sailed for operation 'SPREE-I' in the general direction of the Gulf of Aden to provide support for some Indian merchant ships bringing vital defence stores from the U.K. The distance from Bombay to Aden is approximately 2,640 km. However, at the last minute the course of the fleet was diverted to cover the likely landing of Pakistani forces on the Kathiawar Coast, and the fleet rushed towards Porbandar at its maximum speed. As no contact was made with the enemy, on 22nd September, the FOCIF decided to proceed again to the Central Arabian Sea to afford protection to the Indian merchant ships bringing defence cargo from abroad. However, on receipt of signal regarding acceptance of cease-fire by the Government, he decided to return to the Kathiawar coast to forestall any attempt by the Pak Navy to create mischief in that area. Next day, the fleet returned to Bombay.

At about 0730 hours on 23 September, INS Kuthar obtained a Sonar contact, about 8 km south of Bombay.

Immediately, Kuthar alongwith Khukri launched an anti-submarine attack. Although no definite indication of damage to the submarine was noticed, on subsequent analysis it was established that Kuthar was in real contact with a submarine which might have been damaged in the action that ensued. FOCIF reported that inspite of every effort to seek the enemy and draw him to battle, he was unable to engage him, as the enemy was keeping well clear of 23°N and avoiding battle.

And thus ended the war for the Indian fleet.

The Naval Air Arm

When INS Vikrant went for docking in July 1965, Indian Naval Air Squadrons 300 (Sea Hawks) and 310 (Alizes) were disembarked at Goa. As the junior pilots of Squadron 300 required armament practice, on 1 September, 8 Hawks and 1 Vampire trainer were sent to Jamnagar via Santa Cruz for armament work-up. With the declaration of emergency, the Squadron was placed under the operational control of the Western Air Command with effect from 3 September 1965. When war appeared imminent the squadron was tasked for air defence and interdiction in Pak territory. IAF Toofanis were also given the task of air defence.

On 5 September 1965, the squadron was assigned the task to attack BADIN radar and airfield in Pakistan, about 210 km from Jamnagar. Armed with T-10 rockets and guns, the squadron remained at a high state of readiness, waiting for the order 'Go', but its task was transferred to the IAF.

At dusk, on 6 September 1965, six B-57 Bombers of PAF attacked Jamnagar air station at 1920 hrs. At first it was thought that they were Indian aircraft. The attack lasted for 10 minutes, during which the PAF bombed and rocketted the air station which was later subjected to heavy bombing throughout the night. However, the enemy failed to notice the Sea Hawks on the dispersal area, and the squadron did not suffer any damage. One Dakota, one Fighter, the ATC building and certain parts of the main run-way were damaged. But the run-way was still useable by the Indian aircraft. Early in the morning of 7 September 1965, orders were received from the Western Air Command to deploy the Sea Hawk squadron at Santa Cruz.

On 7 September 1965, the squadron with 8 Sea Hawks and one Vampire moved to Santa Cruz. The tasks assigned were:-

- a) Defence of Bombay against air attack.

b) Anti-shipping strike.

The squadron carried out dawn-to-dusk CAP sorties, and stayed in condition 1 (2 minutes notice for launch) for anti-shipping strike throughout the day-light hours. The squadron of Sea Hawks, in two divisions of four aircraft each, which had sighting problem at night, flew to Jamnagar on the night of 11/12 September 1965, and was airborne at dawn in pursuit of the enemy ships, reported off the Saurashtra coast. There was, however, no contact as the ships had withdrawn out of range. The squadron returned to Santa Cruz the same day.

But one aircraft, Sea Hawk-192, had to be left behind due to a technical snag. Lt PD Sharma stayed back to ferry this aircraft on completion of repairs, which were difficult, as workshops on the station had been damaged during the air attacks. Temporary repairs were effected by the afternoon of 13 September, and Lt Sharma got air borne for Bombay from Jamnagar. While climbing to the assigned height, he realised that his RT was not functioning. On approaching Bombay and fearing that he might be mistaken for an enemy aircraft by his squadron mates, air borne on a CAP, against an evening sky, he decided to dive down and make a low approach to land at Santa Cruz. As his aircraft approached for a landing, all the guns opened up, and Bombay experienced its first air raid alert ever(25).

On the morning of 18 September, Sub-Lt K.P. Verma lost his life in an air accident soon after take-off for a dawn CAP sortie over the sea.

During the operations, the Squadron undertook the following sorties :-

From	Under the Operational Control of	Duration	Task	Remarks
Jamnagar	HQ Western Air Command	3 Sep to 6 Sep 65	1. Air defence 2. Interdiction	8 Hawks 1 Vampire
Bombay	Flag Officer Commanding Bombay	7 Sep to 23 Sep 65	1. Air Defence 2. Anti-ship strike	8 Hawks/1 Vampire upto 13 Sep 65; 10 Hawks & 1 Vampire upto 18 Sep 65; 9 Hawks & 1 Vampire upto 23 Sep 65 due to the death of Sub Lt K.P. Verma.

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GOA : 3 SEA HAWKS plus available VAMPIRES

COCHIN : 3 SEA HAWKS plus 3 ALIZES.

On 11 September, One Alize contacted probably a group of enemy ships in position 248 Okha light - about 120 km, at 2202 hrs. The enemy ships switched on their lights on the closing Alize and fired green verey lights for identifying the aircraft. Finding no response from the Alize, they realised that this was not their aircraft, switched off their lights, and quickly retreated towards Karachi. However, unfortunately, Alize's enemy contact report was not received by FOCIF due to unexpectedly poor radio communication(26).

On 12 September, Pak aircraft bombed ATW Jamnagar, but fortunately INS Valsura did not suffer any damage. Jamnagar airfield was bombed again during the night 18th/19th by the PAF. Some damage was caused to hangars and residential buildings only.

Nothing much happened thereafter till the end of hostilities on 23 September.

Conclusion

Armed forces are mainly trained for war, and their effective strength also serves as a deterrence to the evil designs of the enemy. During the Indo-Pak War 1965, the Indian Government did not perhaps give an adequately offensive role to the Indian Navy(27). The reason might be that the Government wanted to localise the war mainly as a land war, without resorting to full-scale naval engagements, which could involve extensive damage to ships and ports of both countries. According to some naval Commanders, who participated in the operations, the Indian Navy should have played an offensive role and attacked the Pak fleet in their base as well as the port of Karachi, and this was within its capability, despite the threat of PAF intervention. Vice Admiral M.K. Roy (Retd) has observed:

It was for the Naval HQ to convince the Government that the Navy should be allowed to play its role fully during the war, and then the Indian Navy could play havoc with the port of Karachi and the Pak Navy, because in training and in morale the Indian Naval personnel were superior to their Pakistani counterpart. In all wars, some element of risk must be taken. As the Pak Air Force was busy in Lahore and Jammu Sectors, it could not have attacked Indian ships

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off the port of Karachi so easily, nor the old coast battery of Karachi could shell the moving Indian ships accurately. Indian Naval leaders did not show boldness or initiative during the 1965 War(28).

However, it is difficult to blame the Indian Navy, as it was the Government which had reportedly limited its role for political and economic reasons. Shri Y.B. Chavan, the then Defence Minister, has succinctly summed up the naval contribution:

"I greatly appreciated the silent but efficient role which the Navy played in the defence of the country. The Navy protected islands which were vital to our security, guarded our ports and the long Indian coast-line. All merchant ships destined for our ports reached safely and our international trade was not permitted to be interfered with by the Pakistan Navy. I take this opportunity to emphasise again that the Navy has done and achieved all that the Government desired of it within the bounds and compass allotted to it"(29).

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The total strength of the coastline of mainland, Lakshadweep group of Islands and Andaman and Nicobar group of Islands is 7,516 km. - India 1986 : A Reference Annual, Page 1.
2. Admiral R.K. Tahiliani's interview of 24 April 1987.
3. At that time there was only one Indian fleet looking after both the Eastern and Western Coasts.
4. Later, on 11 September, when Air Marshal Asghar Khan (Retd) of Pakistan visited Jakarta to seek military aid, Admiral Martadinata, the Indonesian Naval Chief, is alleged to have discussed attacking the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to harass India, vide The First Round, by M. Asghar Khan, London 1979, p.45.
5. Vice Admiral Soman's interview on 6 March 1987. Although it was a normal practice for the Indian fleet to operate in the Bay of Bengal during the period of South-West Monsoons, that year they especially exercised with a British submarine - Also Cmde D.R. Mehta's interview on 27 February 1987.
6. Vice Admiral Soman's interview.
7. Vice Admiral Samson's letter of 7 March 1987. This was confirmed by Admiral Tahiliani's interview of 24 April 1987.
8. From Official Records.
9. Vice Admiral Samson's letter of 7 March 1987.
10. Report of Interviews with RADM R.V. Singh, held on 7 March 1987, and with Cmde D.R. Mehta (Retd), held on 27 February 1987.
11. Cmde D.R. Mehta (Retd)'s Interview on 27 February 1987.
12. Vice Admiral Samson's letter of 7 March 1987.
13. From Official Records.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Cmde B.K. Dang's interview on 17 March 1987.
17. Interview with Cmde B.K. Dang (Retd), of 17 March 1987.
18. Interview with Cmde P.D. Sharma, IN, of 12 April 1989.
19. From Official Records.
20. Vice Admiral Soman (Retd)'s interview of 6 March 1987.
21. From Official Records.
22. According to Vice Admiral M.P. Awati (Retd), who was the Captain of that ship at that time, he had sent a signal from Madras to the Naval HQ, requesting the cancellation of the foreign trip in view of the developments then taking place on the western front, and his request was accepted.

- He was asked to patrol the area from Port Blair to Campbell Bay. He carried out the task throughout the period of operations, but no worthwhile incident took place. - Vice Admiral Awasthi (Retd)'s interview of 28 February 1987.
23. From Official Records.
 24. Ibid.
 25. Cmt: P.D. Sharma's letter No.DO/PDS/89 dated 19 April 1989.
 26. As the aircraft did not transmit the message by HFCW, the report did not reach either FOCIF or ATW Jamnagar. At about midnight, after landing at Jamnagar, the Alize sent the enemy contact report to MOR Bombay through INS Valsura. MOR Bombay then put it out on Broadcast I.N. at 0200 hrs on 12 September, but even this failed to reach FOCIF due to a complete fade-out from 2000 hrs on 11 September to 0700 hrs on the 12th. From Official Records.
 27. According to Admiral Soman, when the war began he was the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, but as the Navy was not given any offensive role, he left the Chairmanship in favour of the Army Chief, Gen Chaudhuri. There was no joint planning with the Navy by the Army or the IAF at the higher levels. - Admiral Soman's interview of 6 March 1987.
 28. Interview with Vice Admiral Roy (Retd) on 2 April 1987.
 29. From Official Records.

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CHAPTER - XI

WAR DIPLOMACY, CEASE-FIRE, AND TASHKENT

UN Efforts

The time chosen for Pakistan's attack against India, first through infiltration of armed men, and subsequently by full military action on 1 September 1965, was not favourable to her diplomatically. Pakistan's case was further weakened by her collusion with China. During the middle of the Sixties, the Western powers considered China and the Soviet Union as their enemy number one, and they made every effort for the containment of Communism in the world. Military blocs, such as the SEATO and the CENTO, were brought into existence for curbing Communism in Asia. So, it was naturally an embarrassment to Western powers, particularly the US and the UK when Pakistan, a member of both the SEATO and CENTO, decided to join hands with China against India. On the other hand, in the eastern bloc (the Communist bloc) differences between the Soviet Union and China surfaced to such an extent that the former could not welcome the growth of influence of the latter in South Asia at the cost of a big non-aligned country, India, where it was developing significant economic and political stakes. So, as soon as the news of the Pakistani attack against India was flashed out, sincere efforts were made in Moscow, Washington, London, and also in the Security Council, for immediate cessation of hostilities.

Due to an unprecedented number of incidents involving the violation of the Cease-Fire Agreement and the Cease Fire Line (CFL) in Kashmir, involving an increasingly large number of armed men belonging to the Army and Air Force since August 1965, the UN Secretary-General, U. Thant, drew the attention of the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India, by addressing a cable to them on 1 September 1965, and appealed to them to take immediate steps to respect the Cease-Fire Agreement in the interest of peace in the region(1). The Secretary-General clearly emphasised in the cable that if immediate steps were not taken to defuse the situation along the Cease Fire Line, an outright military confrontation between the armed forces of India and Pakistan would be imminent and could have the gravest implications for world peace and for the lives of the peoples of India and Pakistan. In his cable, the Secretary-General also pointed out that he fully realised the complexities of the problems between India and Pakistan, but wondered if these problems could not be solved by peaceful means. He further pointed out that "resort to force in the settlement of a dispute of this kind is

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contrary to both the spirit and letter of the charter of the United Nations and the obligations undertaken by India and Pakistan as members of the Organization"(UN)(2). He called upon President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri, in the interests of peace in the sub-continent and in the world, to respect the Cease-Fire Agreement and to take the following steps immediately:

- (1) Cessation of crossings of the Cease Fire Line;
- (2) the withdrawal of armed personnel of each side that had occupied positions on the other party's side of the Line; and
- (3) a halt to all firing across the Cease Fire Line from either side of it.

Before receiving a reply from President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri, the Secretary-General, on 3 September 1965, circulated a Report on the current situation in Kashmir with particular reference to the Cease-Fire Agreement, the Cease Fire Line, and the functioning of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). The purpose of the Report was to inform the members of the UN Security Council of the grave situation that was developing in Kashmir, of Secretary-General's deep concern about it, and of the steps he had been taking in the recent past in seeking to avert further deterioration of the situation and to establish peace in the region. This Report was based on the field reports sent to him regularly from the middle of June to 2 September 1965 by Lt General R.H. Nimmo, Chief of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan. Giving the nature of violations of the Cease Fire Line in Kashmir since 5 August 1965, the Secretary-General wrote in the Report: "General Nimmo has indicated to me that the series of violations that began on 5 August were to a considerable extent in subsequent days in the form of armed men, generally not in uniform, crossing the CFL from the Pakistan side for the purpose of armed action on the Indian side. This is conclusion reached by General Nimmo on the basis of investigation by the United Nations Observers, in the light of the extensiveness and character of the raiding activities and their proximity to the CFL even though in most cases the actual identity of those engaging in the armed attacks on the Indian side of the Line and their actual crossing of it could not be verified by direct observation or evidence(3).

The UN Secretary-General's Report also indicated that he made a few attempts to defuse the situation

along the Cease Fire Line in Kashmir by conveying his serious concern about it to the Governments of India and Pakistan through their permanent representatives in the UN. But it seems that he was not successful in his endeavour as Pakistan refused to co-operate with him. On 9 August 1965, the UN Secretary-General met the permanent UN representatives of India and Pakistan in the United Nations and, on the basis of General Nimmo's report on the violations of the Cease Fire Line in Kashmir, requested them to convey to their respective governments his very serious concern about the deteriorating situation along the Cease Fire Line in Kashmir. The UN Secretary-General wrote in the Report: "I have not obtained from the Government of Pakistan any assurance that the Cease-fire and CFL will be respected henceforth or that efforts would be exerted to restore conditions to normal along that Line. I did receive assurance from the Government of India, conveyed orally by their Representative at the United Nations, that India would act with restraint with regard to any retaliatory acts and will respect the Cease-Fire Agreement and the CFL if Pakistan does likewise"(4). He further reported that "in the meantime reports from UNMOGIP as of 30 August indicate a continuation of violations of the Cease-fire and the CFL from both sides"(5).

Giving details of Pakistani attack in the Chhamb and Jaurian areas, the Report of the UN Secretary-General said that military situation in Jammu and Kashmir had further aggravated due to massive Pakistani attack launched at 0230 hours on 1 September 1965 by two regiments of tanks and aircraft supported by Pakistani troops in brigade strength in the Chhamb area of the Jammu-Bhimber Sector of the Cease Fire Line(6). According to the Report, Pakistan had admitted the crossing of the Cease Fire Line in the Chhamb area on 1 September to thwart Indian action in this sector(7). However, for restoration of the Cease-fire and return of normal conditions along the Cease Fire Line, the Secretary-General suggested the following five conditions(8):

- (a) "A willingness of both parties to respect the Agreement they have entered into.
- (b) "A readiness on the part of the Government of Pakistan to take effective steps to prevent crossings of the CFL from the Pakistan side by armed men, whether or not in uniform.
- (c) "Evacuation by each party of positions of the other party now occupied and withdrawal

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of all armed personnel of each party to its own side of the line, which would include the withdrawal once more of Indian troops from Pakistan positions in the Kargil area.

- (d) "A halt by both parties to the firing across the CFL, that has been occurring from both sides in some sectors with artillery and smaller guns.
- (e) "Allowing full freedom of movement and access to United Nations Observers by both parties on both sides of the line".

After the Secretary-General's Report on the deteriorating situation in Jammu and Kashmir was circulated among the members of the Security Council, the President of the Security Council for September 1965, Arthur J. Goldberg of the US realising gravity of the problem, announced a meeting of the Security Council to consider the Secretary-General's appeal for cease-fire in Jammu and Kashmir.

During the course of debate on the resolution, the Pakistani representative, Amjad Ali, made strong plea to include references in the preamble of the resolution to earlier UN resolutions and a plebiscite in Kashmir. But his plea was rejected by the sponsors of the resolution saying that they were dealing with the immediate issues of peace and restoration of cease-fire agreement and the cease-fire. The resolution "does no more that call a halt to the escalation" of the conflict in Kashmir, observed Malaysian delegate, Radha Krishna Ramani. Similarly, other supporters of the resolution also emphasised the need for immediate cessation of hostilities and establishment of peace in the region on the basis of five points suggested by the UN Secretary-General in his report of 3 September 1965 to the Security Council.

Indian representative, G. Parthasarathi, putting forward India's point of view on the situation in Jammu and Kashmir, informed the Security Council before the resolution was put to vote that since Pakistan was responsible for the then conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan should be declared aggressor and it should not be allowed to get away with the aggression. He made it clear before the Council that India being a peace-loving country was desirous of peace being restored in Jammu and Kashmir, but it could not agree to accept a one-sided cease-fire. Parthasarathi argued that since Pakistan had not accepted the responsibility for massive infiltration in Jammu and Kashmir, it would be

premature for the Council to issue an appeal for cease-fire. However, he pointed out that cease-fire was to be enforced on the following conditions:

- (1) Acceptable guarantees by Pakistan that infiltration would be stopped and that its troops would be withdrawn.
- (2) Acceptable guarantees that there would be no recurrence of the same events again.

Pakistani representative, however, could not make any comment on the cease-fire proposal as he had no instructions on the issue from his government. The Malaysian representative said that the main thrust of the appeal was immediate cease-fire by both India and Pakistan, and it did not intend to pass any judgement on who was responsible for the conflict. But France, Jordan and, to some extent, Britain, took a different stand saying that while the immediate issue was armed conflict in Kashmir, at a later date the Security Council should revert to the more "basic political issues". On her part, the United States pointed out that one of the essential pre-requisites of the cease-fire should be withdrawal of all armed personnel of India and Pakistan who had crossed the cease fire line. However, the Soviet Union, while supporting the cease-fire appeal, took a neutral stand by neither criticising nor upholding the Indian or Pakistani version of the situation in Jammu and Kashmir.

On 4 September 1965, the Security Council, adopted a resolution jointly sponsored by the six non-permanent members of the Council - Bolivia, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, the Netherlands and Uruguay - calling for an immediate cease-fire in Kashmir(9). All the eleven members of the Council voted for the resolution. The Council requested the Secretary-General to report to it on the implementation of the resolution within three days. The resolution called upon the Governments of India and Pakistan:

- (1) "to take forthwith all steps for an immediate cease-fire,
- (2) "to respect the cease fire line and have all armed personnel of each party withdrawn to own side of the line; and
- (3) "to co-operate fully with the United Nations Military observer group in India and Pakistan in its task of supervising the observance of the cease-fire".

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On 4 September 1965, the Prime Minister of India, in his reply to the UN Secretary-General's appeal of 1 September 1965, clearly held Pakistan responsible for the dangerous developments in Jammu and Kashmir. He pointed out that the real cause of present tension along the border was massive infiltration of armed personnel including members of Pakistani armed force from the Pakistan side, and Indian action along the Cease Fire Line was forced upon her by Pakistani aggression in Jammu and Kashmir and was defensive in nature(10).

The Indian Prime Minister, narrated the facts which led to the grave situation along the Cease Fire Line, and demanded that Pakistan should "stop infiltration across the Cease Fire Line and withdraw the infiltrators and its armed forces from the Indian side of the Cease Fire Line and the international frontier between Jammu and Kashmir and West Pakistan" and also give an assurance that "there will be no recurrence of such a situation" in future(11).

On the other hand, the President of Pakistan, Mohammad Ayub Khan, in reply to the UN Secretary-General's cable of 1 September 1965, sent a lengthy and controversial letter on 5 September 1965 where he put all the blame for the unprecedented acts of violence along the Cease Fire Line in Jammu and Kashmir on India. According to him, the source and origin of the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir was the "so-called integration measures" of India, and the denial of the right of self-determination to the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, who "have taken to arms against Indian tyranny". Under these circumstances, "the Azad Kashmir Force backed by Pakistan Army, were forced in the exercise of the inherent right of self-defence to cross the Cease Fire Line in the Bhimber Sector for the first time since the cease-fire agreement was reached 17 years ago, and after repeated Indian armed attacks and occupation of Azad Kashmir territories by the Indian army"(12). As a resolution of the conflict between India and Pakistan he suggested that the people of Jammu and Kashmir "must be permitted freely to decide the question of accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan"(13).

By the time the UN Secretary-General received reply to his cable of 1 September 1965, from the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India, situation along the Cease Fire Line became very turbulent due to heavy fighting between the armies of India and Pakistan. Pakistani Army had reached Jaurian, and was advancing towards Akhnur to occupy the strategic road connecting Srinagar with Punjab

through Jammu. Apart from that, Pakistani aircraft heavily bombed Ranbirsinghpura, and heavy concentration of Pak forces took place at a number of places along the India-West Pakistan border. It seemed that Pakistan was poised for a big offensive against India, and a situation was created in which action restricted to Jammu and Kashmir could no longer meet the threat to India's security and sovereignty. Realising this critical situation, India, in the hope of minimising Pakistani military pressure in Chhamb sector, opened on 6 September 1965 a new front towards Lahore. Justifying the Indian Army's move in the Lahore sector, India's Minister for External Affairs, Swaran Singh, observed on 7 September: "Since the UN has throughout accepted that the security of Jammu and Kashmir is the responsibility of India, the Government of India had no alternative but to give active assistance by moving across the Wagah border to stop Pakistan at the bases from which attacks in Jammu and Kashmir were being mounted and supported"(14).

The UN Secretary-General received reports of these serious developments along the Indo-Pakistan border from General Nimmo on 6 September 1965. The same day the Security Council in an emergency session discussed the situation of the Indo-Pak conflict with a declaration by the Secretary-General that neither India nor Pakistan had responded to its call of 4 September for an immediate cease-fire. Under these circumstances, the Security Council, in unanimous resolution, requested the UN Secretary-General to visit India and Pakistan in an effort to bring about a cease-fire in the war. The Security Council also unanimously passed a resolution calling upon India and Pakistan "to cease hostilities in the entire area of conflict immediately, and promptly withdraw all armed personnel back to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965"(15).

India did not participate in the deliberations of the Security Council meeting. Her conditions for accepting the cease-fire proposal was made clear by her Foreign Secretary, C.S. Jha, just before the meeting started by reading out a letter from India's Minister for External Affairs, Swaran Singh, addressed to the UN Secretary-General in response to the Security Council's resolution of 4 September 1965. Jha said that, as the primary cause of the present conflict was Pakistani infiltration in Jammu and Kashmir, India would accept the cease-fire proposal if (1) Pakistan admitted sending infiltrators in Jammu and Kashmir, and (2) Pakistan would give an assurance that it would withdraw all the infiltrators from the Indian side of the Cease Fire Line(16).

Armed with the resolution of the Security Council, U. Thant reached Rawalpindi on 9 September 1965. After having "useful talks" in Rawalpindi but without any positive result on the question of cease-fire in Kashmir, the UN Secretary-General reached Delhi on 12 September to seek India's co-operation on the issue. The Indian Prime Minister, told the UN Secretary-General that India would, under no circumstances, accept a military solution of the Kashmir problem, and it was equally opposed to the idea of a plebiscite in the State, as Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of India. India would go for cease-fire when Pakistan would undertake to withdraw all her infiltrators from the Indian territory. But as the Secretary-General could not give any such assurance to Shastri, the cease-fire talks between them remained inconclusive.

In the evening of 12 September 1965, U. Thant sent letters to Shastri and Ayub Khan urging immediate and unconditional cessation of hostilities in the entire area of the conflict, on the line of the resolutions passed in the Security Council on 4 and 6 September 1965, as a prelude to further measures towards the restoration of lasting peace. But as both Shastri and Ayub Khan in their replies to his request for an unconditional cease-fire had added conditions and qualifications, upon which he had no right under the Security Council resolution to give such undertakings, he referred them to the Security Council for its urgent consideration.

Making a statement in Parliament, on 16 September 1965, Shastri put the blame on Pakistan as it did not agree to the UN cease-fire proposal, unless India agreed to accept Pakistan's "Peace-Plan" - involving the withdrawal of the armed forces of India and Pakistan from the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir, induction of an UN Afro-Asian Force, and plebiscite within three months thereafter. According to Shastri, India could not accept any of those conditions(17).

China's Role

Since the conflict of October-November 1962, China kept the border issue with India alive by occasionally issuing notes to the Indian Embassy in China on the alleged violation of India-China boundary by the Indian troops. On its part, the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, always denied the alleged charges of border violation by the Indian troops and termed them as "baseless". A Sino-Pak axis against India emerged very clearly with the progress of the war between India and Pakistan.

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To show her sympathy with Pakistan, China issued notes to the Indian Embassy alleging border violations by the Indian troops. Her press also carried out extensive propaganda against the role of India in the Indo-Pak conflict. On 7 and 8 September, the Pakistani Ambassador to China, Maj Gen Raza, conferred with the Chinese Head of State, Liu Shao Chi, and received a letter which was a reply to Pakistani President Ayub Khan's request for China's assistance. On 8 September China's active support to Pakistan was displayed by issuing a warning note to India which read:

"China cannot but pay serious attention to the Indian Government's expansionist action against its neighbours and strengthen China's defences and heighten her alertness along her borders. The Chinese Government once again solemnly warns the Indian Government: India must dismantle all the aggressive military structures it has illegally built beyond or on the China-Sikkim boundary, withdraw its aggressive armed forces and stop all its acts of aggression and provocation against China in the Western, Middle and Eastern sectors of the Sino-Indian border. Otherwise India must bear responsibility for all the consequences arising therefrom"(18).

The Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, on 12 September, in its reply to the Chinese Note of 8 September, turned down the alleged Chinese charges as: "adding some more baseless allegations to the old charges and issuing unwarranted warnings and threats to the Government of India"(19).

China issued another ultimatum to India on 16 September regarding the same old charges and reiterated the support to Pakistan on Kashmir(20).

On 17 September, Shastri, in reply to China's ultimatum, agreed to a joint inspection of the points on the Sikkim-Tibet border where India was alleged to have set up military structures. He further agreed: "If any structures" (alleged to have been built by Indian personnel)" are found on the Tibet side of the border, there can be no objection to their being demolished"(21).

As the Government of India considered the Chinese ultimatum a Sino-Pakistani collusion against the security and integrity of India, she without losing any time, launched a diplomatic offensive against this joint move, and informed all powers - big and small - and also members of the UN Security Council about it. India's Ambassador in Moscow,

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T.N. Kaul, on 17 September, met the Soviet Prime Minister, Alexei Kosygin, and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko separately and discussed the Chinese ultimatum with them. Gromyko assured Kaul that there was no change in Soviet Union's Kashmir policy and the Soviet Union would try to solve this problem peacefully through the Security Council(22). The Soviet President, appealed to the friends of the peoples of India and Pakistan "to prevent those who would like to add fuel to the flames", and do their utmost to see that the conflict was immediately extinguished(23).

On 17 September, the British Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, described China's ultimatum to India as a serious and dangerous development(24).

The US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, publicly advised China not to intervene in the India-Pakistan conflict and let the Security Council settle the matter(25). B.K. Nehru, the Indian Ambassador to USA, on 17 September, requested Dean Rusk that the United States in conjunction with the Soviet Union and Great Britain should make a joint declaration warning China to keep its hands off India and in the event of non-compliance resume arms aid to India, suspended since 8 September 1965(26). The US strategy on the question of Chinese support to Pakistan in the Indo-Pak conflict was to break the Pakistan-China axis without any embarrassment to Pakistan and to bring a cease-fire agreement through negotiations under the auspices of the UN Security Council. So, at this stage, the US preferred to watch further developments along the India-China border.

In his second report to the Security Council on 17 September 1965, U. Thant said that infiltrators from Pakistan were increasingly involving in the conflict on the Indian side of the Cease Fire Line; the Cease Fire Line had been crossed by the Indian forces at Kargil, in the Tithwal area, and the Uri-Poonch bulge upto the Haji Pir Pass; further south, Indian forces had crossed the Jammu border in force towards Sialkot and the India-Pakistan border, about 56 km south-east of Sialkot, and from Amritsar and Ferozepur in the general direction to Lahore; and Pakistani forces in strength had crossed the Cease Fire Line in the direction of Akhnur(27).

In reply to UN Secretary-General's report to the Security Council, the Indian Education Minister, M.C. Chagla, told the Security Council that as Kashmir was an integral part of India, as Texas or

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Alaska was part of the US, India could not accept Pakistani proposal of a plebiscite in Kashmir for the cessation of the Indo-Pak hostilities. Chagla branding Pakistan as aggressor requested the members of the security Council to call upon Pakistan to desist from carrying out hostilities against India so that peace could be established in the subcontinent(28). On the question of Chinese warning and ultimatum to India, Chagla charged that it was a deep conspiracy against India by Pakistan as it wanted India to fight on two fronts. He also brought it to the notice of the Security Council that President Ayub Khan had full knowledge of China's ultimatum to India, which was nothing but a threat of invasion by China(29). He made an appeal to the US to stop supply of arms to Pakistan as President Eisenhower, had assured India that if Pakistan used US-supplied arms against India, the United States would stop all such aid.

Pakistan, in the hope of settling the Kashmir problem by force with Chinese military pressure on India from the north, objected to the need for enforcement action by the Security Council to impose a cease-fire. Pakistan's Law Minister, S.M. Zafar, addressing the Security Council on 18 September, expressed doubt whether the Security Council's resolution threatening UN "coercive action" would lead to the end of the Indo-Pak War. He said: "I venture to doubt the necessity for such action"(30). He cautioned that to adopt such a procedure "would be a momentous decision, and its implications would have to be carefully weighted before the Security Council proceeds further in this matter"(31). Zafar pleaded to accept the conditions for a cease-fire as elaborated by President Ayub Khan.

When members of the Security Council put their heads together in search of a peaceful solution of the Indo-Pak conflict, China again tried to un-nerve India by moving troops on her side of the Sikkim-Tibet border and north of Demchok area in Ladakh(32). On 18 September, Chinese troops kept on moving around Nathu La, and the following day moved forward to near the track-junction, south of Daulat Beg Oldi(33). Along the sikkim-Tibet border, the Chinese troops were seen placing heavy field guns on mountain tops and digging trenches and holes near Nathu La and Jelep La(34). China had deployed 15 divisions of troops in Tibet, including two armoured divisions. At least three divisions supported by armoured regiments were deployed around Sikkim. Besides the land forces, China deployed about 300 aircraft, including transport planes, in Tibet(35).

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On 19 September, China issued another Note to India, reiterating its allegations, and putting off the time-limit, set in its Note of 16 September, - 'before midnight of 22 September 1965'. On this Note, China extended "all-out support to Pakistan in her just struggle against Indian aggression"(36).

Before India could study and send a reply to China's Note of 19 September 1965, China, sent another Note on 20 September 1965, alleging intrusion by the Indian troops into "Chinese territory of Dumchele"(37). The Note demanded immediate stop to all such intrusions and provocations and a guarantee by India that it "will not again invade and occupy Dumchele....otherwise, India must bear full responsibility for all the consequences that may arise therefrom"(38).

India replied that the Chinese "distorted the facts and accused India of intrusion into Dumchele in order to cover up their own intrusion and firing on Indian civilian personnel in undisputed Indian territory near Tsaskur"(39). After this action three Indian personnel were reported missing.

Besides Tsaskur, the Chinese troops also intruded all along India's northern border and started firing at Indian border posts in Ladakh and Sikkim. In the Western Sector, on 19 September 1965, the Chinese troops intruded into Indian territory near the Indian check-post at the track-junction between Daulat Beg Oldi and Murgo and took up position approximately about 3 km inside Indian territory(40). They also entrenched themselves in strength on the Indian side of the line of actual control at several points opposite the Indian Hot Spring check-post. Again, the Chinese forces moved forward in strength in the eastern part of Demchok right up to the Charding Nullah and assumed a threatening posture at the Indian civilian post on the western side of the Nullah. In the Middle Sector, the Chinese troops were seen on the Indian side of the international boundary at Barahoti on 19 September 1965. In the Sikkim Sector, the situation became very tense, as on 20 September 1965, the Chinese troops moved over the Dongchui La Pass in Sikkim and occupied an Indian border(41).

Though Chinese troop movements and firings on the Indian border-posts appeared provoking in real sense she had neither any intention nor any capacity to strike against India in favour of Pakistan, as Pakistan was basically an ally of the US, which considered China as her enemy number one. China also knew it well that Pakistan had extended her hand of friendship to her against India, as they both

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considered India as their common enemy. Perhaps, she thought that with the improvement of US-Indian relations, the US might put pressure on Pakistan to normalise her relations with India which would ultimately bring about a rupture in Pakistan-China relations.

Moreover, China and the Soviet Union were supplying a considerable amount of military assistance to Vietnam to assist the latter in her struggle against the US intervention in that country. It was difficult for China to open a new front against India, while keeping her supply of military assistance to Vietnam intact.

The Cease-Fire

The Super Powers and other members of the Security Council were keenly watching China. Their strategy was to persuade India and Pakistan to accept a cease-fire proposal before China's second ultimatum expired on 22 September 1965, so that China could not get any chance of intervention in the Indo-Pakistan conflict.

In the resumed debate in the Security Council, the US delegate, Arthur Goldberg, made a forceful plea on 18 September for immediate cease-fire before this conflict spread to other nations. He accused China of trying to "spread the conflict and exploit what was already a tragedy"(42). The Soviet delegate, Nikolai Foderenko said the conflict would profit only those who followed a "criminal policy of dividing the world's peoples to serve their own imperialist and expansionist aims"(43).

After a long debate, on 20 September 1965, the Security Council adopted a resolution calling upon India and Pakistan to cease-fire on Wednesday, 22 September 1965, at 07.00 hrs GMT (12.30 hours IST). The resolution directed "both Governments to issue orders for a cease-fire at that moment and a subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel back to the positions held by them before August 5, 1965"(44). The resolution requested the Secretary-General "to provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the cease-fire and withdrawal of all armed personnel", and "to exert every possible effort to give effect to the Resolution, to seek a peaceful solution, and to report to the Security Council". It warned all the States not to "aggravate the situation in the area".

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Neither India nor Pakistan was happy with the resolution of the Security Council as it did not fulfil the demands of either country. India wanted a cease-fire on two conditions, i.e., (1) Pakistan should be declared aggressor and (2) Pakistan should give an assurance that in future she would in no way interfere in the affairs of Kashmir. Pakistan wanted a cease-fire linked with plebiscite in Kashmir. However, India accepted the cease-fire proposal without any conditions, and its decision was conveyed to the UN Secretary-General on 20 September. India said that if the Secretary General could convey Pakistan's acceptance of the cease-fire to her on 21 September before 4.30 p.m (IST), appropriate instructions would be passed on to the army commanders to cease fire from 12.30 p.m. on 22 September 1965. But as no communication was received, there was no cease-fire on 22 September 1965(45).

The UN resolution on cease-fire did not satisfy Pakistan either. Pakistan had probably thought that with the active help of China she would be able to defeat the Indian Army. When this did not happen she pinned her hope on the Security Council, which was expected to force a resolution upon India for a plebiscite in Kashmir. As even that did not happen, on 21 September, a huge crowd burnt the United States Information Service Library in Karachi and pulled down the UN flag from the UN building(46). A general strike was observed in the city to protest against the UN resolution. Similar demonstrations took place in Lahore also, where the mob stoned the United States Consulate and tore down the US flag. The mob raised anti-US, anti-UN and anti-India slogans and demanded from the Pakistan government to quit CENTO and SEATO. Life-size portraits of the rulers of China, Indonesia, Turkey, Jordan and Iran, who helped Pakistan in its war with India, were displayed by the crowd.

When demonstrators were busy in raising anti-
cease-fire slogans in different parts of Pakistan, —
Z.A. Bhutto, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, quietly dashed to New York, probably to seek some clarifications on certain points on the cease-fire, particularly on the steps: "to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict".

Addressing an emergency session of the Security Council on 22 September, Bhutto made an impassioned speech on the Kashmir issue. He then read out a message from President Ayub Khan describing the Security Council's resolution on cease-fire as "unsatisfactory", but "in the interest of peace", Pakistan had decided to "honour it", and ordered its

troops to cease fire at 12.05 p.m (West Pakistan Time), on 22 September, provided India had given similar orders to its troops. Bhutto also threatened that Pakistan would leave the UN and "wage a war of one thousand years" if the Security Council failed in its "last chance" to solve the Kashmir problem which was pending before the Security Council since 1947(47). It no doubt sky-rocketed Bhutto's popularity in Pakistan.

After Pakistan's acceptance of the cease-fire was announced, India's Permanent Representative at the UN, G. Parthasarathi said that India had already conveyed its acceptance of the cease-fire to the Secretary-General on 20 September 1965, a new time might be fixed for the implementation of the cease-fire. The Security Council fixed 3.30 a.m (IST) of 23 September, as the new deadline for the cease-fire(48). Accordingly, guns went silent on both sides, and peace returned to the sub-continent.

Soviet Role

The Indo-Pak war on its south flank predominantly inhabited by Muslims did not serve the political objectives of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the Soviet Union, since the beginning of the Indo-Pak conflict of September 1965, made sincere efforts to restore peace in the sub-continent. The Soviet press maintained strict neutrality in reporting news about Indo-Pak war, and the Soviet delegate in the Security Council also maintained a neutral stand throughout the Council's deliberations and advised both India and Pakistan to accept cease-fire without any delay.

Thus, desirous of a peaceful and quick settlement of the Indo-Pak War, Soviet Premier, A.N. Kosygin, wrote letters to Indian Prime Minister, Shastri, and Pakistani President, Ayub Khan on 20 August, 4, 11 and 17 September 1965, urging them for a speedy and peaceful solution of the conflict, as it was not only affecting two major Asian states but also aggravating tension in South Asia, South-East Asia and even the Soviet Union, as the war-torn region was "immediately adjacent to the frontiers of the Soviet Union"(49). Kosygin made it clear that "any disputes, including the questions connected with Kashmir can best be settled by peaceful means. The military way cannot lead to their solution"(50). He suggested that "the main efforts should be concentrated on immediately halting military operations, stopping the tanks and silencing the guns", and it was no time to trace out "what caused the conflict and to find out who is right and who is wrong"(51). In the opinion of the Soviet leader, "the

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first step after immediate cessation of hostilities could be reciprocal withdrawal of troops beyond the cease-fire line established by the Agreement between India and Pakistan in July 1949"(52). To achieve peace between India and Pakistan, the Soviet leader suggested that "both sides should enter negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the differences", and to achieve this end both India and Pakistan could count on Soviet Union's "good co-operation" or "good offices" provided "both sides consider this useful"(53).

Finally, Kosygin through his letter of 17 September 1965 invited the Prime Minister of India and President of Pakistan to hold peace talks in Tashkent or any other part of the Soviet Union so that a direct contact could be established between them to achieve an agreement on peace. Kosygin also expressed his desire to take part in the meeting, if the leaders of both India and Pakistan desired so(54).

India accepted the proposal on 22 September 1965(55). However, Pakistan did not accept the Soviet proposal for a meeting immediately and waited for the outcome of China's ultimatum to India. As the Chinese threat to India did not materialise, Pakistan approached the West, particularly the US, for a negotiated settlement of the issue(56). It appears that the West advised her, to go for a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir problem under the auspices of the Soviet leader at Tashkent. Pakistan, being dependant on huge American economic and military aid, could not go against the US advice. Thus, when Pakistan realised that there was no room left for any manoeuvre, in early November 1965, she accepted the Soviet good offices for a meeting with the Indian Prime Minister. On 16 November - 1965, Lal Bahadur Shastri expressed his willingness to meet President Ayub Khan in Tashkent.

Nonetheless, President Ayub Khan thanked China for her help to Pakistan during the conflict, and Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto even said that the inclusion of the proposal on steps "to assist towards a settlement of political problem underlying the present conflict" in the resolution of the Security Council, dated 20 September 1965, was due to the Chinese ultimatum to India.

Meanwhile, Pakistan tried to grab as much Indian territory as possible before the actual cease-fire. Within a few hours of the Pak Foreign Minister's solemn assurance to the Security Council that Pak armed forces would stop fighting at 1205 hrs (West Pakistan Time) on 22 September 1965, five Pak B-57

bombers with top fighter cover bombed Chheratta, a suburb of Amritsar, at 1610 hrs (Indian Standard Time), killing over fifty-five civilians and wounding about the same number. The bombing raid also destroyed about fifteen houses(57). The Pak Permanent Representative to the United Nations said that it was just "to relieve the mounting pressure of Indian ground forces" in the Wagah Sector where "fighting continued right up to the time of the cease-fire".

Fighting after Cease-fire

There was a resumption of fighting as a result of violation of cease-fire by Pakistan, "to capture the maximum possible territory of India"(58). The Pakistani troops supported by the irregulars (Mujahids) renewed infiltration into India and occupied Indian territories wherever possible, in violation of the cease-fire. In this way, in Rajasthan Sector, Pakistani troops occupied the villages of Ghotaru, Longanwala, Buily, Bhuttewala and Achchri Toba on 23 September, Dharmi Khu on 25 September, and Sarkari Tara, Churanwala and Kishangarh on 26 September(59). However, Pakistani attacks were repulsed at the Rajasthan armed constabulary posts of Asutar on 23 September, Sachu and Tanot on 26 September, and Karora on 27 September(60). On 23 September, the Pakistani troops, advanced over the Cease Fire Line and occupied a position half a mile inside India, near Naushera in Kashmir. On 24 September, Pakistani troops fired with rifles and LMG towards the Uri-Punch road from dominating positions west of the road(61).

Pakistan's attitude towards the cease-fire becomes further clear from a letter of her Permanent Representative dated 26 September 1965 addressed to the UN Secretray-General regarding the schedule for withdrawal of troops. The Pakistani Representative said: "In our judgement.... military disengagement should proceed concurrently with an honourable political settlement. In other words, it is imperative that we should evolve a self-executing arrangement and procedures that would ensure an honourable settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute which is the basic cause of the present conflict. Without such an arrangement it is hard to envisage an effective programme for the withdrawal of forces. Moreover, if immediate steps are not taken to bring about an honourable settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, we would be faced with the real danger of resumption of hostilities which may well lead to a conflict of much greater dimensions(62).

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The UN Secretary-General reported the violation of cease-fire by India and Pakistan to the Security Council. Realising the serious nature of the resumption of conflict by India and Pakistan, the Security Council, on 27 September 1965, passed another resolution re-expressing its "grave concern" over the non-implementation of the cease-fire by India and Pakistan, called upon them to observe the cease-fire and "promptly to withdraw all armed personnel as necessary steps in full implementation of the resolution of 20 September 1965(63).

But, the Security Council's resolution of 27 September 1965, had little impact on Pakistan, as the latter did not "visualise the cease-fire as providing an opportunity for reduction of tensions and establishment of peace and good neighbourly relations with India"(64). On the contrary, she wanted to utilise the cease-fire period to occupy Indian territory through clandestine military operations. In the meantime, Pakistan accelerated the training activities of her irregulars in different camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and trained new recruits for sabotage and similar activities in India. According to the information of the Government of India, 14,000 raiders from the North-West Frontier were recruited and dispatched to different parts of Pak-occupied Kashmir for guerilla activities in Kashmir(65). On 2 October 1965, 150 recruits were sent to Shinkiari from the Afzalpur Training Centre in Mirpur Tehsil, and on 7 October, 400 guerillas completed their training at Durigi(66). Pakistan Government also planned to recruit 1,000 additional men under the age of twenty-five from Poonch district for training at Shinkiari Training School, and also trained a large number of irregulars in different camps along the border in Sind for guerilla activities in Rajasthan.

In Rajasthan, Pakistan occupied the villages of Shahgarh and Murar on 30 September and 3 October respectively. But Pak attacks on Rajasthan armed-constabulary posts at Khara (2 October), Tanot and Asutar (3 October), Bakhri Toba (5 October), Karnewala (7 October), Tanot (11 October) and Bandah were repulsed. The last post in Jaisalmer district, over 57 km deep inside Indian territory, was strafed by Pakistani aircraft on 13 October(67). Pakistan took similar aggressive steps in Kashmir and Punjab and made serious attempts to grab as much Indian territory as possible. On their part, the Government of India took defensive steps to prevent Pak intrusions into India. As a consequence of these developments, the cease-fire violations were committed frequently by both India and Pakistan.

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Realising the grave situation along the Indo-Pak border, the UN Secretary-General, in a message to the Governments of India and Pakistan, on 14 October 1965, requested them to take the necessary steps to bring about the quick withdrawal of their troops as per the Security Council's resolution. The Indian Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, in his reply of 14 October to U. Thant wondered how the Security Council's resolution on cease-fire and troops withdrawal could be properly implemented if Pakistan continued to have "scant regard for the cease-fire"(68). In the same letter the Indian Prime Minister stated that India had "accepted the cease-fire without any pre-conditions or reservations" but "since a cease-fire has not yet been effectively established, the stage for a planned schedule of withdrawal over the entire area of conflict has not yet arrived. The local Commanders in particular areas should first meet under the auspices of the observers and enter into discussions with a view to reaching agreement on the stabilization of the cease-fire. Thereafter, we are agreeable to appropriate representatives of India and Pakistan meeting in the sub-continent to consider the question of withdrawals, together with the Chief Military Observer of the UNMOGIP whom you have entrusted with overseeing the operations"(69).

The situation along the Indo-West Pakistan border became so tense, that the Security Council passed another resolution on 5 November 1965. It requested the Governments of India and Pakistan for full implementation of cease-fire and withdrawal of all armed personnel back to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965, as called for in its resolutions of 4, 6, 20 and 27 September 1965(70). The resolution also called upon them to co-operate with the United Nations to end the violations of the cease-fire, and prepare a plan and schedule for the withdrawals by both parties with a time limit on its implementation(71).

However, Security Council's resolution of 5 November 1965 could not bring peace. Attacks and counter-attacks by the troops of India and Pakistan continued. At last, on 26 November 1965, the UN Secretary-General announced that India and Pakistan had agreed to work with Brigadier General T. Morambio of Chile for the withdrawal of their troops to pre-5 August 1965, positions.

TASHKENT DECLARATION

After accepting the Soviet offer to hold bilateral talks with the Indian Prime Minister at Tashkent, on 23 November 1965, Pak Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto dashed to Moscow on a four-day visit to discuss with the Soviet leaders the whole gamut of Pakistan-Soviet relations and the issues to be discussed during the Tashkent Summit. In New Delhi, on 2 December 1965, the Soviet ambassador I.A. Benediktov, met Prime Minister Shastri and discussed the prospects of the forthcoming Indo-Pak conference at Tashkent with him. On 8 December 1965, a simultaneous release in New Delhi, Karachi and Moscow said that the Indo-Pakistan summit at Tashkent would commence on 4 January 1966.

However, before going to Tashkent, India and Pakistan made their respective stands very clear on the subject to be discussed in the meeting. India's stand was that since Kashmir was an integral part of India, it could not be an issue for discussion at Tashkent. Moreover, India was not willing to withdraw her troops from Haji Pir, Tithwal and Kargil, occupied during the conflict. But Pakistan made it clear that it would not sign any no war pact or pledge with India, unless Kashmir problem was solved on the basis of the stand taken by her(72).

Welcoming the Indian and Pakistani leaders in the opening session of their conference at Tashkent on 4 January 1966, Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin did not refer to the "Kashmir problem", but strongly advocated friendly relations between India and Pakistan. In reply, Shastri expressed the hope that if an agreement could emerge for renouncing the use of force for settling the differences between India and Pakistan, it would be remarkable achievement of the meeting at Tashkent.

On the other hand, Ayub Khan, said that to establish firm and lasting basis of peace in the sub-continent he was ready to sign a "No-War Agreement" with India after solving the "basic problem". The "basic problem" i.e. the Kashmir issue, thus indirectly, influenced the Tashkent conference, and in spite of several meetings no solution could be arrived at.

Seeing the conference turning into a deadlock, on 9 January, the Soviet Prime Minister made herculean efforts to save the conference from collapse. He undertook long discussions with the Indian Prime Minister and the Pak President since morning to late night, and succeeded in persuading the two Asian

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leaders to agree to a Joint Declaration. In the morning of 10 January, Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub Khan again met and a final agreement was reached on the text of the Joint Declaration at around 1.30 p.m. At about 4.30 p.m the Joint Declaration was signed by both in the presence of Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin, and it came to be known as Tashkent Declaration(73). A few hours after the signing of the Tashkent Declaration, Shastri, died of heart attack at about 1.30 a.m on 11 January.

The Tashkent Declaration may be considered a unique and very significant agreement for the improvement of Indo-Pakistan relations. In this agreement, it was not only resolved by both India and Pakistan "to restore normal and peaceful relations" between them and "to promote understanding and friendly relations between their peoples", but they also agreed to reaffirm their obligation under the UN Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means. Both resolved that all their armed personnel "shall be withdrawn not later than 25 February 1966, to the position they held prior to 5 August 1965, and both sides shall observe the cease-fire terms on the cease fire line".

The Prime Minister of India and President of Pakistan agreed, inter alia, not to interfere in the internal affairs of each other, discourage hostile propaganda, restore normal functioning of diplomatic missions, consider measures for the restoration of economic and trade relations and communications, promote cultural exchanges, repatriate the prisoners of war and create conditions to prevent the exodus of people and return of the property and assets taken over by either side during the conflict.

The Tashkent Declaration not only paved the way to remove differences in Indo-Pak relations, but also satisfied the leaders of both countries to some extent. Shastri was happy that the conference did not take any decision on Kashmir, and Ayub was satisfied that he got back from India the lost areas of Tithwal, Haji Pir and Kargil, and Kashmir was at least discussed in the conference. President Ayub said on 1 February 1966, that "the Tashkent Declaration not only strengthens the integrity of Pakistan but also provides a possibility for the peaceful settlement of the dispute of Jammu and Kashmir"(74). However, the Tashkent Declaration created mixed reactions in India and Pakistan, and the hawks in both countries expressed unhappiness over it.

Casualties and Loss of Territory

The total number of casualties of Indian personnel during the Indo-Pak War 1965 and in the subsequent cease-fire violations had been 11,479, out of which 2,862 were killed and 8,617 wounded(75). The details of the wounded are: from 5 August to 23 September 1965: 6,684; and from 24 September 1965 to 25 February 1966: 1,933. The break-up of the 8,617 persons wounded was: Officers - 436, JCOs - 347, ORs - 7,768 and NCsE - 66. The ratio of killed to wounded was:


Officers 1:2.6; JCOs 1:3, ORs 1:3.8 and NCsE 1: 5.1.

According to a statement of the Defence Minister of Pakistan, dated 4 December 1965, 1,033 Pakistanis were killed during the Indo-Pak War(76). The Indian official sources, however, go to prove that about 5,800 Pakistanis were killed in the war(77).

The territories occupied by India in Pakistan and by Pakistan in India totalled approximately 1,920 sq km and 540 sq km respectively as shown below(78):-

Approximate areas occupied by India in Pakistan and Pak-Occupied Kashmir on cease-fire:

Area around Gadra in Rajasthan	- 390 sq km
Bedian, Barki, Padri, Dograi, Bhasin and Ichhogil Uttar along the eastern bank of the Ichhogil Canal	- 360 sq km
Some areas of Narowal opposite Dera Baba Nanak of India; and Chawinda, Phillora, Deoli, Pagowal, Bajra Garhi, Suchet Garh and Chaprar on the south-east and north-east of Sialkot	- 470 sq km
Haji Pir Pass, Tithwal and Mirpur area	- 650 sq km
Kargil area	- 50 sq km
Total	= 1,920 sq km



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Approximate areas occupied by Pakistan in India on cease-fire:

Khem Karan area	-	50 sq km
Chhamb area	-	490 sq km

Total	=	540 sq km

To implement the Tashkent Declaration, the Pak Army Chief, General M. Musa, arrived in New Delhi on 21 January 1966, and signed an agreement on the withdrawal of troops with his Indian counterpart, General J.N. Chaudhuri, the following day. In this agreement, plans were approved for disengagement of troops and reduction of tension along the Indo-Pak border by withdrawing forces from the line of actual control and removing and nullifying all defences. It was further agreed that Lt Gen Bakhtiar Rana of Pakistan and Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh of India under the Chairmanship of UN representative Maj Gen T. Morambio would formulate ground rules to implement the withdrawal agreement in the Western Sector. This agreement came into effect from 0600 hours IST (0630 hours WPT) on 25 January 1966.

On 25 January Lt Gen Bakhtiar Rana and Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh met in Amritsar in the presence of Maj Gen T. Morambio and discussed the withdrawal plans. The final agreement for the withdrawal of troops was signed by them in Lahore on 29 January 1966. By 30 January, the first phase of the withdrawal of the Indian and Pakistani forces was completed. Gen J.N. Chaudhuri paid a two-day visit to Pakistan on 9-10 February 1966 and discussed with Gen M. Musa, further troops withdrawal and exchange of PsOW(79). On 16 February 1966, India and Pakistan agreed to reduce their overall military strength in Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with the 1949 cease-fire agreement by 1 April 1966. The impact of these measures was such that on 18 February 1966, the UN Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that "there has been no confirmed incidents involving breaches of the cease-fire"(80).

Meanwhile, the Indian Parliament approved the Tashkent Declaration on 22 February. Withdrawal of troops by India and Pakistan went on satisfactorily in the Eastern Sector also. On 22 February 1966, Lt Gen Manekshaw of India and Maj Gen Fazal Muqueem Khan of Pakistan, expressed satisfaction in Dhaka over the "Operation Pullout" in the Eastern Sector, in accordance with the 1959 Agreement.

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As per the schedule of the Indo-Pak Agreement signed on 22 January 1966, the withdrawal of troops to pre-5 August 1965 position was completed by India and Pakistan on 25 February 1966. On 26 February 1966, the Indian troops and civilian authorities reoccupied the areas vacated by Pakistan. On the same date, the UN Secretary-General U. Thant, reported to the Security Council that India and Pakistan had implemented the Security Council's resolutions of 27 September and 5 November 1965(81).

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4. Ibid., p.77.
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7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
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14. The Hindu, 8 September 1965.
15. Dev Sharma, pp.92-93. UN Security Council Resolution (No.220) of 6 September 1965.
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17. Ibid., 17 September 1965.
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21. Ibid., p.45. Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 17 September 1965.
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24. Ibid.
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26. Ibid., 19 September 1965.
27. Ibid., 18 September 1965.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid. In his letter of 16 September to Mr U. Thant, President Ayub Khan rejected the UN Secretary General's suggestion for immediate cessation of hostilities and face-to-face meeting between the leaders of India and Pakistan.
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33. Ibid., 20 September 1965.
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49. Dev Sharma, p.105. Letter of 4 September 1965, from Soviet Prime Minister, A.N. Kosygin, to Lal Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister of India and Mohammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan.
50. Ibid., p.106.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid., pp.107-108. Letter dated 17 September 1965, from Mr. A.N. Kosygin to Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri and Mohammad Ayub Khan.
55. Ibid., p.7. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri's statement in the Lok Sabha on 22 September 1965.
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58. Ibid.
59. Some of the training centres of the irregulars were run by Pakistan opposite the Indian border posts of Harbhaj-Ki Dhani, Halwa Head, Mandi Siddique Ganj, Nagarparkar and Chachro. - Ibid., p.71.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid., p.72.
62. Government of India publication, p.63.
63. Dev Sharma, p.94.
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67. Ibid.
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69. Ibid., p.100.
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72. International Studies Quarterly, The Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi, Vol.8, July 1966-April 1967, p.6, M.S. Rajan, "Tashkent Declaration: Retrospect and Prospect".
73. Appendix VII - Text of Tashkent Declaration.
74. Dev Sharma, p.114.

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75. Report on the Health of the Armed Forces, 1965, pp.37-39. According to the Ministry of Defence, Govt of India, Report 1965-66, p.4, However, India's total casualties were 12,714, with 2,763 killed, 8,444 wounded and 1,507 missing.
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77. Statement made by India's Defence Minister, Y.B. Chavan, in the Rajya Sabha, on 23 November 1966, as quoted by Hari Ram Gupta, p.368.
78. Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Annual Report 1965-66, Map, facing p.6.
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CHAPTER - XII

REVIEW AND REFLECTIONS

While the Kutch conflict of April 1965 was caused by an accidental border clash between the para military forces of India and Pakistan, the Indo-Pak War of September 1965 resulted from the miscalculated and miscontrolled Pakistani armed infiltration across the Cease Fire Line in Jammu and Kashmir. The Pak rulers thought that their armed infiltrators, with the support of the local population and some small help from the Pak Army, if necessary, would be able to capture the Kashmir Valley quickly, before the Indians could react effectively, and the UN also could not intervene in time to reverse a 'fait accompli'. Although they planned well, they could not execute the plan adroitly; and before the Pak army could capture the strategic Akhnur bridge to cut the supply line between Jammu and the western part of Kashmir, the Indians launched a direct attack against Pakistan in three sectors in Punjab-Khem Karan, Lahore, and Sialkot. But before we proceed further, the politico-military background needs to be made clear.

Just after the partition of the country, the popular slogan in Pakistan was: "We have got Pakistan with a laugh, we will take Hindustan with arms". Thus, Pak entry into SEATO and CENTO, and her acquisition of large quantities of arms and equipment through the US military aid programme were aimed at the conquest of Kashmir. Once the Indian army was humiliated by China on the Himalayan border in 1962, Pakistan jumped up to take advantage of the situation before India could strengthen and modernise her armed forces.

Again, the assumed Pak victory in the limited war in Kutch in April 1965 encouraged the Pak military leaders to turn their attention to Jammu and Kashmir. However, neither India nor Pakistan was keen to fight a real war in the inhospitable Rann of Kutch. Pak Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, told the Pak National Assembly that if Pakistan were to fight, "then it is not in Dharmasala or Chad Bet or Biar Bet that we have to fight, we have to fight where the problem lies, i.e., in Jammu and Kashmir", and that Pakistan "can never be complete without the people of Jammu and Kashmir". On the other hand, the loss of a few forward posts by India in the Rann led to the exertion of a lot of public pressure on the Indian Government and the Army to seek redress elsewhere(1).

Although there had been a long debate in Pakistan to pinpoint the responsibility for planning

"Operation Gibraltar" in Jammu and Kashmir in August 1965, neither Field Marshal Ayub Khan, nor General Md. Musa, nor Z.A. Bhutto could be absolved of it. "Ayub Khan, overconfident due to Pakistani successes in Rann of Kutch, tried to repeat the action in Kashmir"(2).

Unfortunately for Pakistan, the assumptions of the Pak rulers for the success of the ambitious Operation Gibraltar came to naught because:

- (a) Wide-spread local support was not available to the Pak infiltrators,
- (b) India did neither respect the Cease Fire Line to pursue the infiltrators, nor restrict the anti-infiltration offensive within Kashmir, and
- (c) the Indian soldier destroyed the Pakistani myth that one Pakistani was equal to three Indians.

When the first few captured Pak infiltrators disclosed the entire plan of their operation to the Indian captors, and this was openly broadcast on the All India Radio on 8 August 1965, Pakistan's Director of Military Intelligence, Brigadier Irshad, remarked ruefully - "the blighters have spilled the beans".

The Pakistanis tried to follow the Chinese example of people's war to stage an insurrection in Jammu and Kashmir through massive infiltration, sabotage and subversion, but they could not adequately organise, plan, and train for that purpose, nor could they in 1965 prepare the common people of Jammu and Kashmir psychologically to support such a "liberation" movement.

Ultimately, when Operation Gibraltar failed in capturing the Kashmir Valley and the Pak infiltrators started retreating towards the end of August 1965, Pak Army's "Operation Grand Slam" was launched by mounting an infantry-cum-tank thrust through Chhamb to capture the strategically located Akhnur bridge and bottle up the Indian forces in Rajauri-Punch area. However, for unknown reasons the early thrust into Chhamb was not vigorously followed up, and before Akhnur could be taken, India launched a massive attack on Pakistan in Punjab to divert the Pak forces from Chhamb-Jaurian. Later, Gen Yahya Khan, who had commanded 12 Inf Division of the Pak Army in Chhamb area on 4 September 1965, reportedly told Lt Col I. Rashid that he "was not allowed to" take Akhnur(3). A Pakistani writer has correctly assessed India's predicament at that

time. If Pakistan captured Jammu and cut the vital Indian road linking Srinagar with the plains of India, "Indian forces in Kashmir would be encircled. Thus India was left with the choice of yielding or expanding the war. She decided to escalate the war"(4).

It was India's XV Corps that bore the brunt of Pak infiltration campaign and Pak Army's thrusts into Jammu and Kashmir. It met with resounding success against the Pak infiltrators, especially in capturing the Kargil heights, Haji Pir Pass, OP Hill and the Kishanganga bridge. Indian officers and men proved their mettle and regained their honour, lost in the 1962 debacle. However, in Chhamb-Jaurian they tasted defeat due to lack of proper military appreciation, purposeful planning and appropriate preparations. The Indian army top brass was under the misconception that the initial Pak military thrust would come through Punch, and not through Chhamb. That is why, in spite of the field commander's warnings that the Pakistan Army was moving towards Chhamb, the XV Corps HQ did neither construct adequate defence works nor provide sufficient armour and artillery to stop the Pak advance. On the other hand, the Pak Commanders, expecting strong opposition at the crossings of the Munwar Tawi, delayed their advance to regroup and strengthen the offensive.

On 1 September, the Indians brought in their Air Force, but their old Vampires and Mysteres could not achieve much. Moreover, they attacked some of their own armour, ammunition depots and troops. This was due to lack of proper wireless network and lack of adequate Army - IAF coordination. Overall the Indian troops fought well in this sector. However, at some places the raw and inexperienced Indian troops showed lack of determination to fight. Ultimately, the Indian offensive in the Punjab on 6 September forced the Pak Army to withdraw the bulk of their forces from the Chhamb Sector.

In the Punjab theatre, India's XI Corps mounted the offensive against Pakistan. Although it succeeded in blunting the enemy armour offensive in Khem Karan, and winning the battles of Dograi and Barki, it failed in its aim of capturing intact the bridges on the Ichhogil Canal and all the Pak territory up to that canal. Of course, there was no plan to capture Lahore.

There was not only lack of good generalship, but also absence of spirited infantry offensive in some areas. Adequate defences were not organised in the Khem Karan Sector, and the initial success in Dograi

was not vigorously followed up. With imagination and proper preparation an important military thrust could have been mounted through Dera Baba Nanak, which unfortunately witnessed a stalemate. Although the Corps captured 360 sq km of Pak territory as compared to meagre 50 sq km of Indian territory lost to Pakistan, the net result of the military action in its sector was an indecisive deadlock.

In the Jammu-Sialkot Sector, the Indian Army massed the largest chunk of its might, i.e. I Corps consisting of one Armd Division (one Armour Brigade and one Lorried Bde), two Inf Divisions and one Mountain Division. However, I Corps did not achieve proportionate results. Although it had captured about 500 sq km of Pak territory in this sector and taken a heavy toll of the enemy armour, especially at Phillora, it could neither achieve a clear break-through, nor destroy the Pak war machine in this area. Here again, bad generalship at the Corps and the Division levels, and lack of cooperation among the formations, were responsible for their poor showing.

As planned by the Chief of Army Staff, the Rajasthan Operation was only a diversionary move to tie down the maximum Pak forces in the Sind area and prevent Pak capture of Indian territory in this Sector. Due to the difficulty of the terrain and logistical problems, the Indian troops could not achieve much except the capture of about 390 sq km of Pak territory, including Gadra City, as compared to the Pak capture of a small Indian outpost at Munabao.

It needs to be mentioned here that although India had mustered some of her forces on the Indo-East Pakistan border in September 1965 for defensive purpose, Indian political leadership was not in favour of mounting any offensive here on land or sea, or in the Air. There was only some limited exchange of air actions between the IAF and PAF in this sector, in which India suffered heavily at her Kalaikunda Air Force base, on 7 September.

On the Western front, the story of the air effort was different. Although on 6 September, the Indian Army initiated the war in the Punjab, it did not launch the IAF in a pre-emptive strike against the enemy's air bases. This appears an unpardonable mistake on the part of the Indian military! There was lack of joint planning between the Indian Army and the Air Force, and it appears that the Indian Army top brass ignored the potentiality of a modern air force like the IAF to destroy the bulk of the PAF on the ground on 6 September itself. Pak cooperation between her army and air force was better than India's, and

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the PAF did not lose the opportunity of launching a pre-emptive attack against the Indian air bases on 6th evening, causing a lot of destruction and damage. Had the IAF struck first, it could have destroyed or damaged a large number of Pak aircraft, thus considerably weakening the air effort of the smaller PAF, denying close PAF support to the Pak ground forces, and preventing the PAF's pre-emptive attack of 6 September against the IAF air bases.

There were no strategic air bombardment missions, no airlifts, nor any air-bridge supply operations. Attacks on enemy air bases were few, and not very effective. Both the combat air forces mainly provided low-level support for their ground forces. In ground attack role, Pak F-104 C and F-86 proved less efficient than the slower and less sophisticated Mysteres, Hunters and Gnats operated by the Indians. While Pak napalm bombs were reportedly less effective against Indian tanks and artillery, Indian rockets and armour-piercing bombs proved comparatively more effective. French-made 5" rockets, and 20mm and 30mm aircraft cannon fire was also effective. Initially, the PAF fared better than its Indian counterpart, but towards the last stage of the war, the numerically superior Indian air power started prevailing over the smaller but more modern Pak air force. Had the war continued, the smaller PAF would have felt the pinch of its losses more than the larger IAF. On balance, the IAF did fairly well against superior types of Pak aircraft. With low level of professionalism, lack of proper planning and cooperation with the army, and the aircraft of old vintage, the IAF could not be expected to perform much better. Interestingly, both sides tried to conserve their precious equipment, especially tanks and aircraft, to enable them to continue to fight if the war was prolonged.

Pakistan paradropped a substantial number of commandos during the war. However, in the absence of air-borne formations, helicopter forces and well-trained commando squadrons, very little was achieved. With proper resources, training and planning they could have made a decisive contribution to the effort.

Anti-aircraft defences were far from satisfactory on both sides. The main Indian cities and air bases were protected by obsolescent 3.7" guns and 40mm Bofors; and on Pak side, by the 90mm US guns. But frontline formations had to bank upon 50-caliber Browning machine guns and 20mm cannons mounted on trucks and weapon carriers. Their fire proved ineffective against modern jets. Thus, both sides lacked modern radar-controlled anti-aircraft guns and

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motorised anti-aircraft batteries for protection of convoys and armoured forces.

The Pakistanis also erred in their tank deployment. They sent their Pattons across the Indian defences in Chhamb without proper flank protection. Similarly, in the Khem Karan Sector of Punjab, when the Pak Patton brigade streamrolled through the rain-soaked muddy ground, covered by tall grass and sugarcanes, without screening its advance with jeeps and motorised patrols, they found it difficult to manoeuvre freely. The Pakistani tanks had to operate blindly, and to direct their fire, their commanders had to climb up on the turrets and scan the field with binoculars, thus falling prey to Indian sniping, and mortar bursts. The Pak Pattons failed to breach the Indian defensive lines of dug-in tanks, mine fields and tank traps.

The reason for the better performance of the Indian tanks was the good training and confidence of the tank crew in their machines as well as their tactical ability. Especially, the Indian Centurion Regiments carried out hard and prolonged training for war for nearly eight years, while the Pakistani tank crew reportedly saved their practice ammunition and tank mileage in order to conserve their precious equipment and ammunition for use in the actual battle(5). The Pak armour was reportedly used in an anti-tank role, partly because of the shortage of infantry, but largely because of unimaginative and timid leadership(6). The launching of the Pak armour in the Khem Karan area suffered from bad timing and inadequate preparation. The cutting of the Madhopur Canal by the Indians resulted in the waterlogging of the area, unknown to the Pak GHQ, that led to the defeat of the Pak armour. "This is how Khem Karan became a grave-yard of Pakistani tanks"(7). The less sophisticated Centurions and Shermans were better handled by the Indians than the highly sophisticated, computerised Pattons by the Pakistanis. Pak tank crew reportedly fed misleading information into the Patton's electronic brains, the heavy guns were operated manually, and the crew were confused with the modern tank gadgetry(8).

In the deployment of artillery, both countries followed the old British pattern. The lack of self-propelled artillery and armoured assault guns, mobile mortars, and motorised rocket launchers was felt, as the day of conventional towed guns was over. The Pakistanis made an attempt to mount heavy mortars on trucks, but the latter broke down under the impact of recoil.

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The bulk of both armies consisted of infantry formations. However, compared to Pak infantry, Indian infantry was deployed more extensively, and in some cases their defensive positions slowed down Pak armour drives, inflicting considerable losses.

Following old British patterns, both the armies were deployed with two coys up in front and two in reserve; two battalions up in front, and one in reserve; and two brigades up in front and one in reserve, thus rendering the bulk of a Division, i.e. 28 reserve rifle companies, idle, while only 8 rifle companies had to bear the brunt of the enemy's attacks(9).

As regards the Indian Navy, it played the role of an almost silent spectator. This was not the choice of the naval Commanders, but due to the decision of the Indian political leadership and perhaps apathy of the Indian Army, which considered the naval role as not that important. Although naval officers and seamen were itching for a fight, they were, it is claimed, not allowed to undertake any offensive role against the Pak ports and installations, and were engaged only on defensive patrolling of the seas. However, the Pak Navy showed more initiative and bombarded Dwarka off the Gujarat Coast, although causing little damage. It is unfortunate that during a war, the Indian Navy was not allowed to play its role, for which it was trained. This demoralised the naval personnel to some extent.

Indian para-military forces stood their ground well in Kutch, Punjab, Rajasthan, and Jammu and Kashmir, and provided worthwhile support to the regular forces. They played their part well in detecting and capturing the Pak para commandos, who were airdropped during the war.

It will be unpardonable if no mention is made of the great support and succour given by all sections of the civilian population to the Indian armed forces during this war. In Punjab, it appeared that India was fighting really a people's war, such was the drive, enthusiasm and sacrifice of the common people every where.

On the diplomatic front Indian leaders performed well. They kept the Soviet Union on Indian side and stood up to the Chinese threats and ultimatum. Some arms and equipment were supplied to Pakistan during the war by Indonesia, Iran, Turkey and China. However, USA and UK banned arms supplies to both India and Pakistan. But according to a recent publication, even during this arms embargo, Pakistan received

90 F-86 sabre jets, exported by West Germany ostensibly to Iran, but in fact for the use of Pakistan. The deal went through Gerhard Martins, credited with connections with US Intelligence agencies and the Pentagon(10).

The role of the Soviet Union in establishing peace between the two major powers of the sub-continent was very important. While the US and UK exerted their political pressure, through UNO and otherwise, to bring the warring parties to the negotiating table, the Soviet Union invited the leaders of India and Pakistan to Tashkent to resolve their dispute, and a peace agreement was signed there on 10 January 1966, on the basis of restitution of all territories captured by both sides during the 1965 war. While India got back lost territories in Khem Karan and Chhamb, she had to return Tithwal, Haji Pir and Kargil which had been captured by the Indian troops at a great cost of human lives. The Agreement created mixed reaction in India and Pakistan. It was difficult for the Pak leaders to explain to their people, who were fed with the myth that Pakistan had won the war, why Pakistan had agreed to moth-eaten peace, which failed to solve the Kashmir problem. In India, the Army was not happy with the return of hard-earned Haji Pir and Kargil, through which the Pak infiltrators could come again.

When the balance-sheet is drawn, it is seen that both sides lost comparably in both men and equipment, except in armour. India's tank casualties were 128(11), as against Pakistan's 200 approximately(12). Although after the Tashkent Agreement, Z.A. Bhutto started an agitation against President Ayub Khan on the ground of failure to take Kashmir, it was a political move to oust Ayub Khan from power. Both countries must have learnt some lessons from the war, and it was not possible to resume the hostilities soon. Few people outside the Pak "armed forces realise how close Pakistan came to disaster in the 1965 War due to inadequate preparation, facile assumptions and criminal Foreign Office advice"(13). On the other hand, "when Ayub Khan visited East Pakistan soon after the Tashkent Agreement, the people there were reported to have welcomed the Agreement and to have said that since there would now be no war with India, Ayub Khan should give them autonomy(14).

It is interesting to note that towards the end of the war, the Indian Prime Minister enquired from Gen J.N. Chaudhuri whether India could win a spectacular victory if the war was prolonged for some days. The General replied that most of India's frontline ammunition had been used up and there had

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been considerable tank losses also. But later it was found that by 22 September only about 14% of India's frontline ammunition had been fired, and the number of tanks still held by India was twice the number Pakistan had"(15). Indeed, Gen Chaudhuri was a cautious General, and perhaps initially he was afraid of the much touted, ultra modern Patton tanks.

However, full credit is deserved by Gen Chaudhuri for expanding the armed forces, both qualitatively and quantitatively, after 1962. As many of the formations were new and hardly battleworthy, the power of these formations was not reflected in the war proportionate with their numerical strength(16).

Analysing the Indo-Pak War 1965, certain reflections are unavoidable. The war was essentially a limited one, geographically, Service-wise and in time frame. East Pakistan remained almost untouched; the engagements came to an end in 22 days; and the Navies were not really involved. Neither strategic planning nor strategic struggle was made, and no strategic decision was reached. Neither side appeared to be concerned with grand strategy in which military moves are dictated by politico- psychological-economic considerations. The Field Commanders were not very clear about their goals. Was it an all-out general war, a limited war for certain objectives, a war of conquest to annex territories, or a war of attrition to weaken the enemy's striking power?. The Field Commanders did not know, although at the later stage of the war Gen Chaudhuri spelt out that it was a war of attrition. The result was that, in the absence of a clear-cut objective, they slugged it out, without much advantage accruing to either side at the end of the war.

Both sides were trained in standard British war tactics, and blindly followed orthodox British methods of fighting, and never deviated from them. Although British military system was undergoing drastic changes, both the countries deployed their infantry and armour in the Second World War style. Again, both used armoured cars, and Pakistan suffered heavy losses. In their place, jeeps with bazookas or machine guns were more effective as recce vehicles and light screening forces.

The September 1965 war confirmed the old theory that it was not the machine but the man behind it which finally decided the fate of the battle. The Pak Army and the Pak Air Force were equipped with sophisticated equipments, such as tanks, aircraft, etc., but the latter were not matched with the

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training and skill of their users. Thus, instead of being assets, they proved to be a liability sometimes. Compared to them, the Indians with their less sophisticated equipment performed better. Most modern Pakistani armour met with debacles on the fields of Asal Uttar and Phillora. Although the Pak army used its armour and artillery lavishly in initial stages of the war, following the US doctrine of applying massive fire power to save manpower, but without the close support of the infantry their armour thrusts failed to be effective.

India's strategic concept of attacking the enemy at many places along the border did not prove to be sound. Excepting the offensives in Haji Pir and Kargil, no other Indian thrust proved to be entirely successful. Instead of delivering a large number of inconsequential jabs, the Indian army could perhaps have gone for a few selected, powerful thrusts to unbalance the Pakistanis. Faulty strategy led to stalemate, with no strategic decisions whatsoever.

Likewise, the rigid application of the old tactical doctrine led to failures to win at different places. Instead of fighting against well-defended enemy positions, the formations could have bypassed, to encircle, and finish them later. This would have conserved both men and material.

At many places, such as Mirpur, Dograi and Dera Baba Nanak, whole-hearted offensives were not undertaken out of defensive mentality on the part of the commanders. The Mirpur offensive was given up on the excuse that artillery ammunition needed to be conserved for subsequent actions. Almost everywhere, forces were held in unnecessary reserve. In the Sialkot Sector, many Indian armour thrusts failed for want of concentration of all available resources at the critical time and place, while large forces stood idle in futile reserve.

In the area of command and control on the part of the Indian commanders from battalion to Corps level, deficiency was seen in many cases. Commanders of I Corps and 1 Armd Division did not show appropriate initiative to control the battles or monitor the attacks effectively. The result was Indian reverses in places like Chawinda. Similarly, GOC 15 Infantry Division failed to support the initial thrust across the Ichhogil Canal at Dograi, due to the failure of control through wireless communication and the will to exploit the initial success. Commander 29 Inf Bde also faltered at Dera Baba Nanak in the initial stage. In the XI Corps Sector, although the

early reverses suffered by the Indians at Khem Karan, were turned into victory by 4 Mountain Division later, the disintegration of Col Anand Singh's tough 4 Sikh was a dark spot in the otherwise good record of this formation. However, the responsibility was not solely Col Anand Singh's, but that of the Corps Commander and even the Army Commander, who had selected a tired battalion for a difficult task against an underestimated enemy formation supported by tanks.

The failure on the part of officers in actual war indicated flaws in selection and training. The qualities which stand officers in good stead during war, such as courage, both moral and physical, aggressiveness and initiative, needed to be sharpened in peace-time exercises and manoeuvres. Officers at higher levels of command had not conditioned themselves psychologically not to accept defeat, however adverse the battle situation might be. They did not dominate the situation by bold action. When the Commander showed weakness and diffidence, and appeared adversely influenced by dark apprehensions, this pessimistic outlook percolated down to the rank and file, leading to chain reaction of demoralisation. Commanders of battalions and brigades often failed to influence their battles with their personal presence. The Divisional and Corps Commanders did not visit the frontline whenever possible, in order to properly control the situations and course of battles. Instances were many in this war when due to lack of aggressive spirit, favourable situations were not exploited, attacks tapered out, and defences collapsed.

Although Intelligence about the enemy's intention and capability is never fool-proof in any war, in the September War it proved to be very inadequate and sometimes inaccurate. During the war, as the IB's sources dried up, the most important source of information on the enemy was air photography. But this was centralised at Army HQ and Air HQ, causing unnecessary delays in its availability at the lower levels. The developed copies of air photographs mostly arrived too late to be of any tactical use. A definite need was felt of decentralising the facilities for air photo cover to at least Corps and Joint Operations Centre level. Besides, the Intelligence staff needed better training in the collation and interpretation of intelligence on the enemy under realistic conditions.

Enemy artillery barrages, especially in cooperation with close air support during day time, played havoc with Indian troop movements and actions in day light. This emphasised the need for proper training for night operations.

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One mistake noticed during this war was of bringing troops to a new area and launching them immediately against the enemy without proper briefing or reconnaissance of the ground, in order to surprise the enemy. Even the best plans failed because the commanders at lower levels were not thoroughly conversant with the terrain, nor the rank and file fully briefed and properly launched into battle. The advantage of surprise did not offset these severe handicaps.

Another important need for victory in war is battle inoculation. In the September War, some of the Indian units, especially those with a large proportion of greenhorns, were visibly shaken when subjected to tank and artillery fire and air strafing. Battle inoculation exercises organised in peace-time, catering for air, artillery and tank fire in addition to the fire by normal infantry weapons, proved their value again.

Some units were found tired after fighting for two or three days. A formation or unit needed to be trained to develop stamina to fight continuously for at least a week without loss of efficiency. Similarly the importance of digging in was again highlighted as the best means for the infantry to survive in war. During the September conflict, 75 per cent of Indian battle casualties were caused by shelling(17). At places the Indian infantry arrived without digging tools, and the result was a hasty retreat. Units which could not dig-in well or early could not withstand enemy counter attacks, launched with speed and supported by air, armour and artillery.

Helicopters proved to be specially useful in Jammu and Kashmir for the following tasks:

- i. Transportation of urgently required defence stores, arms, ammunition and other equipment during critical moments or operations.
- ii. Evacuation of serious casualties from difficult areas, with consequent good effect on morale.
- iii. Speedily reconnaissance over large areas, especially in sectors where other means of transport were not available.
- iv. Tracking and hunting of enemy infiltrators in terrain almost inaccessible to regular columns.
- v. Use as Air Observation Posts.

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However, an acute shortage of helicopters was experienced during this war.

As regards the employment of para military forces, experience showed that they could be suitably posted on pickets, especially in the hills. For example, Jammu and Kashmir Militia could be put on many pickets in Jammu and Kashmir, so as to release regular troops for deployment in battalion groups at strategic points, to serve as mobile striking force against any seriously threatend sector. This resulted in economy in the supply of regular troops, mental conditioning of these troops for aggressive action, and the ability to train them up to battalion or brigade level. However, properly trained and well-equipped para military forces were necessary to guard the Cease Fire Line as well as the International Border.

With proper planning, preparation, strategic and tactical execution of the war, the Indians could have crippled the Pak forces, instead of just mauling them. However, that does not detract from the glory achieved by the younger group of the officer cadre. The astounding Indian Officer casualty ratio of 1 to 14, against a rank structure of 1 to 60 Other Ranks, proved their valour(18). This went a long way to restore the honour lost on the battle field of NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh) in 1962. It is reported that, in comparison, the Junior Commissioned Officers, once the backbone of the Indian Army, did not fare so well.

Many lessons were learnt by the Indian Armed Forces from the Indo-Pak War 1965, as could be seen later during the Bangladesh War of 1971. Many of the earlier deficiencies were by then taken care of. While the September 1965 War redeemed the honour of the Indian Army and raised the morale of the Indian Defence personnel, in the December 1971 War all the three Services acquitted themselves well and gave India a decisive victory. But no army, navy or air force can rest on its oars. Their preparations, training, and equipping with the latest weaponry must continue, so that in any future contingency they are not found wanting, in any way.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. According to a recent Pakistani research study, while, as a result of the award of the international Kutch Tribunal, Pakistan got about 350 sq miles of northern Kutch, which included some crucial elevated points; India's share, though much larger, consisted of "mostly sea-marsh, often under water" - Mahtab Akbar Rashdi, p.20.
2. Ibid., p.21.
3. Rashid, I, Lt Col, Strategic Digest, IDSA, New Delhi, p.734.
4. Rashdi, M.A., p. 22.
5. Sandhu Gurcharan Singh , Maj Gen (Retd), p.409.
6. Asghar Khan, M., Air Marshall (Retd), p.xiii.
7. Ibid.
8. Leo Heiman, Military Review, February 1966, p.24.
9. Ibid.
10. George Thayer, p.173.
According to Prof J.K. Galbraith, had the US not supplied arms to Pakistan, the latter would not have sought military solution to the Kashmir problem - S. Anthony, p.181.
11. Statement of the Defence Minister of India on 25 September 1965, Keesing's Archives, 4-11 December 1965, p.21108.
12. Estimated. According to Pak Defence Minister's statement of 4 December 1965, (Dawn, 5 Dec 1965), Pak tank losses were 165 only.
13. Asghar Khan, M., Air Marshal (Retd), p.xiv.
14. As told by President Ayub Khan to Shri L.P. Singh, I.C.S., Home Secretary, Govt. of Indian in 1965-66, when the latter visited Pakistan after the war - Interview with Shri L.P. Singh (Retd), dated 13 April 1988.
15. Ibid. Confirmed by Shri L.P. Singh. Similar point is made by Shri K. Subrahmanyam in his letter dated 12 April 1990. From Official Records.
16. Raising dates of the new formations were:
(a) 1 Corps 14 Inf Div & 10 Inf Div - 1 April 1965, (b) 6 Mtn Div - 26 March 1963, (c) 15 Inf Div - 1 October 1965, (d) 68 Inf Bde - 1 January 1963, (e) 67 Inf Bde - 17 July 1961, (f) 23 Mtn Div - 1 September 1959, and (g) 41 Mtn Bde - 1 July 1963. From Official Records.
17. From Official Records.
18. Ibid.

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AGREEMENT ON KUTCH

AGREEMENT DATED 30TH JUNE, 1965

BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN

WHEREAS both the Government of India and Pakistan have agreed to a ceasefire and to restoration of the status quo as at 1st January 1965, in the area of Gujarat/West Pakistan border, in the confidence that this will also contribute to a reduction of the present tension along the entire Indo/Pakistan border;

WHEREAS it is necessary that after the status quo has been established in the aforesaid Gujarat/West Pakistan border area, arrangements should be made for determination and demarcation of the border in that area;

NOW therefore, the two Governments agree that the following action shall be taken in regard to the said area;

Article 1

There shall be an immediate cease-fire with effect from 0030 hrs GMT 1 July 1965.

Articel 2.

On the cease-fire:

(i) All troops on both sides will immediately begin to withdraw;

(ii) This process will be completed within seven days;

(iii) Indian police may then re-occupy the post at Chhad Bet in strength no greater than that employed at the post on 31 December 1964;

(iv) Indian and Pakistan police may patrol on the tracks on which they were patrolling prior to 1 January 1965, provided that their patrolling will not exceed in intensity that which they were doing prior to 1 January 1965 and during the monsoon period will not exceed in intensity that done during the monsoon period of 1964;

(v) If patrols of Indian and Pakistan police should come into contact they will not interfere with

each other, and in particular will act in accordance with West Pakistan/India border ground rules agreed to in January 1960;

(vi) Officials of the two Governments will meet immediately after the cease-fire and from time to time thereafter as may prove desirable in order to consider whether any problems arise in the implementation of the provisions of paragraphs (iii) and (v) above and to agree on the settlement of any problem.

Article 3.

(i) In view of the fact that:

(A) India claims that there is no territorial dispute as there is a well established boundary running roughly along the northern edge of the Rann of Kutch as shown in the pre-partition maps, which needs to be demarcated on the ground;

(B) Pakistan claims that the border between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch runs roughly along the 24th Parallel as is clear from several pre-partition and post-partition documents and therefore the dispute involves some 3,500 square miles of territory;

(C) At discussions in January 1960, it was agreed by Ministers of the two Governments that they would each collect further data, regarding the Kutch-Sind boundary and that further discussions would be held later with a view to arriving at a settlement of this dispute;

(D) As soon as officials have finished the task referred to in Article 2 (vi), which in any case will not be later than one month after the cease-fire, Ministers of the two Governments will meet in order to agree on the determination of the border in the light of their respective claims, and the arrangements for its demarcation. At this meeting and at any proceeding before the tribunal referred to in Article 3(ii) and (iv) below, each Government will be free to present and develop their case in full.

(ii) In the event of no agreement between the Ministers of the two Governments on the determination of the border being reached within two months of the cease-fire, the two Governments shall, as contemplated in the joint communique of 24th October, 1959, have recourse to the Tribunal referred to in (iii) below for determination of the border in the light of their respective claims and evidence produced before it and the decision of the Tribunal shall be final and binding on both parties.

(iii) For this purpose there will be constituted, within four months of the cease-fire, a Tribunal consisting of three persons, none of whom would be a national of either India or Pakistan. One member shall be nominated by each Government and the third member, who will be the Chairman shall be jointly selected by the two Governments. In the event of the two Government failing to agree on the selection of the Chairman within three months of the cease-fire they shall request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to nominate the Chairman.

(iv) The decision of the Tribunal referred to in (iii) above shall be binding on both Governments, and shall not be questioned on any ground whatsoever. Both Governments undertake to implement the findings of the Tribunal in full as quickly as possible and shall refer to the Tribunal for decision any difficulties which may arise between them in the implementation of these findings. For that purpose the Tribunal shall remain in being until its findings have been implemented in full.

In witness whereof the undersigned have signed the present Agreement.

Done in duplicate at New Delhi this thirtieth day of June 1965 in the English language.

For the Government of India.

For the Government of Pakistan.

PROCLAMATION
OF
WAR OF LIBERATION

The Revolutionary Council of Kashmir proclaims:

Brave Kashmiris,

ARISE, for now is the time.

We have suffered long enough under the oppressive and trecherous rule of imposters and enemy agents.

Long enough have we allowed the traitors to further the enemy designs.

REMEMBER that a Hindu despot who ruled over us, in utter disregard of the wishes of the people, sold us to India in 1947. This was the second sale of our land through a fraudulent and ignoble deed which brought the might of the cursed Indian Army into our beautiful and peaceful land.

BETRAYED though we were we fought the enemy on every inch of our sacred soil. And we should have won but for the intervention of the United Nations who obtained an undertaking from India that we will exercise our inalienable right of self-determination under a free and fair plebiscite.

The United Nations was duped and so was the whole world. India dishonoured her international pledge shamelessly and with utter contempt for world opinion.

She played for time to occupy our land. Since then every day that has passed has been a day of misery and every night a night of crime. You know that acts of cruelty, sacrilege and barbarity the enemy has been perpetrating under the shadow of guns and bayonets.

For years our great leaders Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Beg have been languishing in Indian prisons but their determination to throw off the yoke of Indian imperialism remains unflagging.

We have seen our children butchered but every drop of their blood has illuminated the path of our struggle.

Our women were dishonoured but in their agony they sanctified the course of our freedom.

Our brave fighters lost their lives but their dying-calls stirred the hearts of their compatriots.

The will of our people remains unbroken; their united might unshaken.

The enemy is on the run. We will not rest content till we have chased him out of our land.

The time has come for us to deliver the final blow and hereby we take a solemn pledge to take up arms once again and continue the fight till -

- (a) the usurpers are expelled out of our land;
- (b) our leaders now in jail are freed; and
- (c) the will of the people is allowed to determine the future of our land.

The Revolutionary Council which consists of patriots of unimpeachable integrity and men of unswerving faith, has set up today the National Government of the people of Jammu and Kashmir which decrees as here-under:

From Today -

- (a) all alleged treaties and agreements between the imperialist Government of India and Kashmir stand annulled and are no longer binding on us;
- (b) the National Government of Jammu and Kashmir formed by the Revolutionary Council of Kashmir is the sole lawful authority in our land;
- (c) only the National Government will be legally competent to receive taxes and public dues from the people of the state;
- (d) any Kashmiri national who willfully cooperates with the Indian Government or their puppet administration in occupied Kashmir will be treated as traitor and dealt with as such;
- (e) every national of the state of Jammu and Kashmir who may be employed either by the Imperialist Indian Government or its puppet administration, in civil or military capacity, shall support the freedom movement of the Revolutionary Council in every possible way;

- (f) the National Government will issue orders and decrees on the Kashmir National Radio representing the "Voice of Kashmir";
- (g) any national of Kashmir who impedes the freedom movement or disobeys any order or decree of the National Government will be dealt with as a traitor.

The Revolutionary Council appeals to the world to support this freedom movement.

Now is the time for countries who have pledged themselves to help all freedom movements against imperialism to come to our assistance.

We have nothing against the people of India but their Government have established a record of treachery and dishonesty in the world. We expect all sane and freedom-loving elements in India and particularly the brave Sikhs, the South Indians and the Rajputs who have always given us moral support to lend us active assistance.

The people of Pakistan have stood by us in our fight. To our regret they have not done as much as we expected of them. Now is the time for them too to join us in our struggle for life and liberty.

Let the nations of the world remember that if we go down the light of freedom will be extinguished for ever.

And above all, you the people of Kashmir, you are the ones who are on trial. You are the ones who must win this war for the sake of coming generations, for the sake of freedom and for the sake of the glory of your motherland.

Arise: Now or there will be no tomorrow:

Issued by the Revolutionary Council of Kashmir.

Sadi Kashmir Press, Srinagar.

TOP SEC

(No change from VOs)

Copy No.3
HQ 4 ARMD BDE
G 3548
08 Sep 65

OO No.1

Maps:- 1 in to 0.789 miles Sheets 44 I 7, 8,11,12,15 and 16 44 M 3 and 4.

1 SIT

a. En Forces. A bde gp sp by tks each in KHEM KARAN 8256 and BEDIAN 7576 area.

b. Friendly Forces

- (1) 3 Armd Bde gp moving astride KASUR Branch to secure JANDIALA GURU.
- (2) 12 CAV will move ahead of 3 Bde on Div CL.
- (3) 5 Armd Bde after having secured br H at KASUR 7153 in 11 Div op, will revert to parant fmn and will, move on axis WEST of KASUR Branch.

c. Atts and Dets

- (1) Under Comd ACT
Two ADS ex 48 Fd Amb
Lt Wksp pl 72 EME Bn
Det Pro
- (2) In DS 15 (SP) Fd Regt
- (3) In Sp Div Arty when in range

2

MSN 4 Armd Bde gp will adv on axis KASUR - KHEM KARAN - VALTOHA 9064 - X rds 0872 - NABIPUR 1868 - astride SOBRAON BRANCH on orders and secure BEAS br on main GT Rd.

3

XEC

a. Gen Out-line The op will be in three phases:-

- (1) Phase 1 Move into br H area.
- (2) Phase 2 Secure gen line TARAN TARAN 1896 - FATEHABAD 3789. Completion nickname KHANJAR.
- (3) Phase 3 Secure BEAS Br. Completion nicknames TALWAR.

b. 5 H

(1) Grouping

- (a) Under Comd 'A' Coy 10 FF
- (b) In DS (P) Bty 15 (SP) Fd Regt
- (c) In Sp 15 (SP) Fd Regt less (P) Bty.

(2) Task

- (a) Phase 1 Orders later.
- (b) Phase 2 Cont as adv gd and secure gen line FATEHABAD.
- (c) Phase 3 Be prep to assist in the cutting of the on L of C at BEAS Br.

c. 4 CAV

(1) Grouping

- (a) Under Comd One Coy 10 FF (in phase 3 only)
- (b) In DS 'Q' Bty 15 (SP) Fd Regt
- (c) In Sp 15 (SP) Fd Regt less 'Q' Bty.

(2) Tasks

- (a) Phase 1 Orders later.

(b) Phase 2 Fol in order of march. Be prep to assist in the securing of phase 2 line.

(c) Phase 3 Act as adv gd and secure BEAS Br.

d. 10 FF

(1) Grouping

(a) In DS 'R' Bty 15 (SP) Fd Regt

(b) In Sp 15 (SP) Fd Regt less 'R' Bty.

(2) Tasks

(a) Phase 1 Orders later

(b) Phase 2 Be prep to assist 5 H in securing gen line FATEHABAD

(c) Phase 3 Be prep to assist 4 CAV in securing BEAS Br.

e. 15(SP)

(1) Allotment As given above

(2) Tasks Provide max aval sp in all phases.

f. Coord Instrs

(1) Timings ST for phase 1 and H Hr for phase 2 later.

(2) SP Later.

(3) Bdrys Incl to 4 Armd Bde line SIRHALI KALAN 2175 NAUSHA HRA 2080 - RANWAN 2282 - DHOTAN 2788 - VRING 3495 - DHOTA 3800 - RAYA KALAN.

(4) Order of March

(a) 5 H Gp

(b) 15 (SP) Fd Regt

- (c) 10 FF
- (d) Bde
- (e) 4 CAV
- (f) Adm Gp
- (5) Bounds

	<u>Place</u>	<u>Nickname</u>
(a)	Line SIRHALI KALAN - CHOHLA	TOM-CAT
(b)	Line DHOTAN - JAMERA 3283	KING CROW
(c)	Line DHOTAN 3603 - KIRI SHAH 4494	BULL PUP
(6)	Con pts, List Att.	
(7)	<u>Bde CL.</u> NABIPUR - KHARA Disty - SOBRAON BRANCH.	

4

AIM AND LOG

a. Gen

- (1) Normal main will cont.
- (2) DAA will be in present loc at BHAI
PHERU will move to NANGA on orders.
- (3) SRP at OKARA.

b. Rats

- (1) Normal maint.
- (2) 7 days res will be carried.

c. Ammo

- (1) First line ammo in unit tpt.
- (2) Second line with 21 S & T Bn.

d. POL

- (1) All veh tks full.
- (2) Jettison eqpt full.
- (3) 50 miles res in unit tpt.
- (4) Sec line lift with 21 S & T Bn.
- (5) All issues on container to container basis.

e. Tps

- (1) AI ech under unit con.
- (2) A2 ech will be brigaded in present loc and move as Bde ADM Gp in order of march.
- (3) B ech, if any, will remain with unit A2 echs.

f. Repair and Rec

- (1) LADs auth to carry out fd repairs within their scope.
- (2) Lt Wksp Pl will move with Bde Adm Gp in order of march.
- (3) All vehs will be recovered to the Bde CL under unit arrangements.
- (4) Fd Wksp Coy in DAA

g. Med

- (1) Evac. Normal chain of evac.
- (2) ADS Will move with Bde Adm Gp. One XDS will function and the other remain on vehs at all times.
- (3) XDS In DAA.
- (4) CCS Loc OKARA.

h. Pers

- (1) Reports and returns will be submitted as per Bde Standing Ordes for War.
- (2) PW Cage in DAA.
- (3) Pro - To estb TP as ordered.

5. COMD AND SIG


- a. Bde Tac HQ To move behind adv gd.
- b. Main Bde In order of march.
- c. Sig Instrs Already issued.

ACK

DISTRIBUTION LIST - Att

Sd/ xxxxxxxx Maj
for Comd
(RAJA SAROOP KHAN)

WRIS DIAGRAM OF CoMD VOICE



F1 - 2385

F2 - 4242.5

TOP SEC

DISTR LIST

	<u>Copy Nos</u>
1 5 H	1
2 4 CAV	2
3 10 FF	3
4 15 SP Fd Regt	4
5 48 Fd Amb	5
6 Lt Wksp Pl 72 EME Bn	6
7 Det Pro	7
8 Arty I Armd Div	8
9 3 Armd Bde	9
10 5 Armd Bde	10
11 12 CAV	11
12 HQ I Armd Div	12
13 Comd	13
14 BM	14
15 GSO 3 (O)	15
16 DAA & QMG	16
17 SC (AQ)	17
18 4 Armd Bde Sig Coy	18
19 File	19
20 War Diary	20 - 21
21 Spare	22 - 23

.....

TOP SEC

Ser No	Date and time	Freq	Extract	Remarks
1	101430	-	Imman Baz speaking here. Come and see me immediately. Where do I come to. I do not know. Move straight on and turn right. Do you know where I am. If I turn left, the Indians get me, if I turn right their arty gets me. Where do I come to and how. Turn right till you hit the road. Follow it and and you will find me at 38.	
2	101600	-	Hellow 31 for IOB. Tell Imman 6 that Imman Baz is proud of what he has achieved today and would like to tell him that this was his finest hour for PAKISTAN. He must hold on to this strong hold of Indians under all circumstances. Reinforcement, however, have been requested for, for which Imman 6 should come back on the main road and do the needful.	
3	101800	-	29A for Imman Baz. It is not possible to adv any further due to stiff resistance. Hy enemy shelling has completely pinned us down. 1B for 29A. It is most important that the advance is continued. Therefore, in the name of the Islam, PAK and Nishane Jurat I command you to get up and go fwd. 29A for IB. I will try my best. As things are I do not knew how the hell I am going to do that. This bloody enemy arty is knocking hell out of us and I am afraid at the moment I cannot do any thing better than this.	

Note: These intercept are not verbatim. In some cases words to that effect were spoken

Copy No.19
No. 0011/3/GS(OPS)
6 Sep 65

I CORPS OO No 1/65

(No change from verbal orders)

References:- (a) Map Sheets One in to 4 miles -

39H,39L,39P,40C,40D,40E,40F,
40G,40H,43E,43F,43G,43H,43J,
43K,43L,43M,43N,43O,43P,44C,
44D,44E,44F,44G,44H,44I,44J,
44K,44L,44M,44N,44O,44P,45E,
45F,45I,45L,45P,54A.

(b) Map Sheets One in to 1 mile -

43 L6 to L 16, 43 P1 to P 16,
44 I6, 44 I9, 44 I 10, 44 I 13,
44 I 14, 44 MI, 44 M2, 44 M5,
44 M6, 44 M9, 44 M 10

(c) Trace 'T'

(d) I Corps Operation Instruction
No.1.

INFORMATION

Enemy

1 Overall disposition, likely intentions and action by the PAKISTAN Army have been given in 1 Corps Operation Instruction No.1.

2. Against the JAMMU Sector the enemy is likely to have -

(a) 15 Inf Div deployed as follows:-

- i. One Inf bde defending SIALKOT.
- ii. One Inf bde deployed on the International Border between SUCHETGARH - the BASANTAR R.
- iii. One Inf bde deployed on the International Border between the BASANTAR R - SHAKARGARH.

(b) 6 Armd Div in depth in area PASRUR.

3. The enemy may attempt to occupy some of own police posts on D minus 1 or D Day prior to launching of own attack.

OWN TROOPS

4. XI Corps is attacking across the International Border on D minus 1 and is securing the line of the ICHHOGIL Canal from Pt 701221 to 798439.

5. Orbat 1 Corps is given in Appendix A attached.

INTENTION

6. I Corps will secure area Pt 896 (8128), Pt 857 (8227), PAGOWAL (8413), PHILLORA (9007), CHAWINDA (8902) and Cross Roads (9703) with a view to advancing towards the MARALA-RAVI Link Canal and eventually to the line of DHALLEWALLI (6438) WUHILAM (5010) - DASKA (5399) - MANDHALI (7845).

METHOD

Gen outline

7 The Corps task will be carried out in three phases.

PHASE 1

8 Securing bridge head bounded by Pt 896 (8128), Pt 857 (8227), BAJRAGARHI (8618), MAHARAJKE (9417), CHARWA (0320) and exploiting to line GULBAHAR WADI (7527) - SAIDANWALLI (7618) - AHMADPUR (9415) - NAINI (0317).

Grouping

9 RIGHT 26 Inf Div with -
under command -

18 CAV

One bty 44 Lt Regt on arrival

1 Bn PAP

Bn RAC

2 Tcls

in support -

24 Med Regt

6 Mtn Arty Bde (within range)

2 TAC

10 LEFT 6 Mtn Div less one bde with -
under command -

35 Inf Bde

Two sqns 62 CAV

166 Fd Regt

3 tcls

in support -

1 Arty Bde

24 Med Regt

2 TAC

11 Reserve - 1 Armd Div.

Special instructions

12. Prior to D Day there will be no patrolling across the Border. Patrolling will be restricted to 500 yards own side of the Border; Patrols will occupy the area of the Police Posts if the police prematurely withdraw. The three divisions will be responsible for their own sectors.

13. There will be no retaliatory artillery fire. DFs will be used only in the event of being heavily attacked by enemy ground forces.

14. Before H hour, LAA will not engage enemy aircraft operating singly or in pairs which are not causing damage to own AFVs and guns.

15. On D Day the Border Police posts will be relieved by own troops immediately after last lt on D Day.

16. 62 CAV less two sqns will be under command 1 Armd Div for the protection of their LEFT flank in Phase 2.

PHASE 2

17. Break out by 1 Armd Div and capture PHILLORA.

GROUPING

18 1 Armd Div with
under command -
62 CAV less one sqn

4 tcls

in support

6 Mtn Arty Bde

26 Arty Bde

24 Med Regt

on priority call

2 TAC

19 Reserve - 14 Inf Div.

Special instructions

20 1 Armd Div will break out through 6 Mtn Div at first light.

21 As opportunity develops, 1 Armd Div will exploit towards the RAVI-MARALA Link Canal.

PHASE 3

22 Capture ZAFARWAL and secure area Cross Roads (9703) - CHAWINDA.

Grouping

23 14 Inf Div with -

3 tcls

in support -

1 Arty Bde

6 Mtn Arty Bde

24 Med Regt

24 Reserve - 6 Mtn Div.

Boundaries, Junction Points, limit of exploitation

25. See Trace T attached.

Bomb lines

25. BLUE

(Sic) SIALKOT-BADIANA (7905) - PASRUR

26. GREEN

Line of the MARALA-RAVI Link Canal.

Artillery

27. See 1 Corps Arty Bde Operation Order No.1

Engineers

28. See 1 Corps Engineer Technical Instruction No.1.

Air

29. 2 TAC will be in support of 1 Corps.

30. Allotment of ACT and tcls:-

- (a) 1 Armd Div - 4
- 6 Mtn Div - 3 (already with the Div)
- 14 Inf Div - 3
- 26 Inf Div - 2 (already with the Div)

31. Bomb line

BLUE - SIALKOT-BADIAN-PASRUR-NAROWAL thereafter
on orders this HQ.
of MARALA-RAVI.

GREEN - Line of MARALA-RAVI Link Canal.

D Day

32. 7 Sep 65.

H hr

2300 hrs.

ADMINISTRATION

Defence Bricks Type I

34. Allotment -

- 1 Armd Div - 2
- 6 Mtn Div - 3
- 14 Inf Div - 3
- 26 Inf Div - 3

RESTRICTED

Supplies and Petrol, Oil and Lubricants.

35. Three days reserve of supplies will be carried by all units.
36. CMA present loc SOUTH OF PATHANKOT.
37. Separate Administrative Orders are being issued.

INTERCOMMUNICATION

38. Main HQ I Corps - KALU CHAK.
Rear HQ I Corps - Mile 59 Rd JULLUNDUR-PATHANKOT
39. Signals
See I Corps Signal Instruction No 2/65
40. Code Names
 - (a) Own territory at Appendix 'B'
 - (b) Enemy territory at Appendix 'C'

ACKNOWLEDGE

Time of Signature 1845 hrs

Delivery Instructions -

Sd/- Brig
BGS

Copy Nos 1-4 LO
5-8 OP IMMEDIATE
9-15 By hand

IAF ORBAT : 1 September 1965

The exact number of aircraft at the commencement of hostilities in the squadrons are not available. However, based on unit establishment of squadrons, the ORBAT of the IAF on 01 September 1965 consisted of the following:-

1. a) 5 Mystere Sqns i.e. 1,3,8,31 and 32 Sqn (all in the Western Sector).
- b) 6 Hunter Sqns i.e. Nos 7,14,17,20,27 and 37 Sqn (No. 7,20,27 Sqns in the West and Nos. 14, 17 and 37 Sqn in the East).
- c) 5 Gnat Sqns i.e. Nos. 2,9,18,23 and 15 Sqn (Nos 2,9,18 and 23 Sqn in the West).
- d) 3 Toofani (Ouragon) Sqns i.e. NO. 4,29 and 47 Sqns (All in the East).
- e) 6 Vampire Sqns i.e. Nos 24,45,101,108,220 and 221 Sqns (No.45 Sqn in the West)
- f) 4½ Canberra Sqns i.e. No.5,16,35 JBCU and 106 Sqn in the West.

2. The Unit Establishment of Mystere, Hunter and Gnat Sqns was 16 ac each. The Toofani Sqns also had a UE of 16 ac each, the Vampire Sqns (Nos 24,45,220 and 221) had 16 ac UE, while 101 and 108 were specialist FR Sqns with UE of 8 Trainer ac modified for FR role. The 4 Canberra Sqns i.e. Nos 5,35,16 & JBCU had 16 ac UE each, while 106 SR Sqn had 8 ac modified for SR role on the UE.

3. Thus, the ORBAT of combat aircraft of the IAF would be as follows (if all these Sqns had full complement of aircraft):-

a) Mysteres	5 Sqns x 16	=	80 aircraft
b) Hunters	6 Sqns x 16	=	96 "
c) Gnat	5 Sqns x 16	=	80 "
d) Toofani	3 Sqns x 16	=	48 "
e) Vampire	i 4 Sqns x 16	=	64 "
	ii 2 Sqns x 8	=	16 "

RESTRICTED

f)	Canberra i	4 Sqns x 16	=	64	"
	ii	$\frac{1}{2}$ Sqn x 16	=	8	"
g)	MiGs	1 Sqn . x 10	=	10	"
				<hr/>	
				466	"
				<hr/>	

4. It has been confirmed from JD Stats Air HQ that the figure of 572 combat ac was the total assets of the IAF including those aircraft held in storage as War wastage reserve in depots and HAL for major servicings etc. Therefore, the figure of 466 aircraft as ORBAT facing both West and East PAK would be a closer figure though this could be less by 5-6 ac. Thus, a figure of 460 combat aircraft would be a realistic figure.

Sd/-
(C.S. Doraiswami)
Air Cmde
AF Member
ISST
28 Sep 89

AIR RAIDS ON AIRFIELDS

ENEMY AIR RAIDS ON INDIAN AIRFIELDS AND S.Us.

<u>Units Raided</u> <u>No. of raids</u> <u>in brackets</u>	<u>Units Raided</u> <u>No. of Raids</u> <u>in brackets</u>
1. Adampur (15)	8. Jamnagar (11)
2. Ambala (3)	9. Jammu (3)
3. Amritsar (9)	10. Jodhpur (21)
4. Agartala (1)	11. Kalaikunda (2)
5. Bagdogra (1)	12. Pathankot (8)
6. Barrackpore (1)	13. Patiala (1)
7. Halwara (17)	14. Srinagar (5)
	(<u>Total Raids = 98</u>)

.....

RAIDS ON ENEMY AIRFIELDS & S.Us.

<u>Airfields attacked</u> <u>No. of raids in brackets</u>	<u>Airfields attacked</u> <u>No. of raids in brackets</u>
1. Akwal (3)	12. Kohat (1)
2. Bhagtanwala (1)	13. Lal Munirhat (1)
3. Badin (1)	14. Mianwali (2)
4. Chaklala (1)	15. Multan (1)
5. Chak Jhumra (9)	16. Murid (1)
6. Chanderi (1)	17. Nawabshah (2)
7. Chittagong (1)	18. Pasrur (1)
8. Chota Sargodha (2)	19. Peshawar (2)
9. Dab (1)	20. Risalwala (3)
10. Gujrat (2)	21. Sargodha (17)
11. Jessore (2)	22. Wagowal (6)
	(<u>Total Raids = 61</u>)

Source: From Official Records.

TASHKENT DECLARATION*

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan having met at Tashkent and having discussed the existing relations between India and Pakistan, hereby declare their firm resolve to restore normal and peaceful relations between their peoples. They consider the attainment of these objectives of vital importance for the welfare of the 600 million people of India and Pakistan.

I

The Prime Minister of India and President of Pakistan agree that both sides will exert all efforts to create good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan in accordance with the United Nations Charter. They reaffirm their obligation under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means. They considered that the interest of peace in their region and particularly in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent and, indeed, the interests of the peoples of India and Pakistan were not served by the continuance of tension between the two countries. It was against this background that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed, and each of the sides set forth its respective position.

II

The Prime Minister of India and President of Pakistan have agreed that all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than 25 February 1966, to the position they held prior to 5 August 1965, and both sides shall observe the cease-fire terms on the cease fire line.

III

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that relations between India and Pakistan shall be based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other.

* Tashkent Declaration (Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi)

IV

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that both sides will discourage any propaganda directed against the other country, and will encourage propaganda which promotes the development of friendly relations between the two countries.

V

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the High Commissioner of India to Pakistan and the High Commissioner of Pakistan to India will return to their posts and that the normal functioning of diplomatic missions of both countries will be restored. Both Governments shall observe the Vienna Convention of 1961 on diplomatic intercourse.

VI

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed to consider measures towards the restoration of economic and trade relations, communications, as well as cultural exchanges between India and Pakistan, and to take measures to implement the existing agreements between India and Pakistan.

VII

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that they give instructions to their respective authorities to carry out the repatriation of the prisoners of war.

VIII

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the two sides will continue the discussions of questions relating to the problems of refugees and evictions/illegal immigrations. They also agreed that both sides will create conditions which will prevent the exodus of people. They further agreed to discuss the return of the property and assets taken over by either side in connection with the conflict.

IX

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agreed that the sides will continue meetings both at the highest and at other levels on the matters of direct concern to both countries. Both sides have recognized the need to set up joint Indian-Pakistani bodies which will report to their Governments in order to decide what further steps should be taken.

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan record their feelings of deep appreciation and gratitude to the leaders of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government and personally to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. for their constructive, friendly and noble part in bringing about the present meeting which has resulted in mutually satisfactory results. They also express to the Government and friendly people of Uzbekistan their sincere thankfulness for their overwhelming reception and generous hospitality.

They invite the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to witness this declaration.

Prime Minister of India

President of Pakistan

LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI

MOHAMMED AYUB KHAN

Tashkent, January 10, 1966

AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS

THE TEXT OF INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

ON WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS*

Introduction

This agreement is in four parts:

- Part I - Procedure concerning the immediate disengagement of troops and reduction of tension;
- Part II - Procedure concerning the withdrawal of troops from the occupied areas;
- Part III - Procedure concerning reduction of tension in the Eastern Sector;
- Part IV - General Points.

PART I

Disengagement of Troops and Reduction of Tension

PHASE I

Both forces will withdraw 1,000 yards from the line of actual control in sectors as specified below:-

- (a) Rajasthan/Sind
- (b) Amritsar/Lahore
- (c) Jammu/Sialkot
- (d) Akhnur/Chhamb (from River Chenab NW 8061 to Mawa Walikhad NW 7770)

In all other sectors including sectors divided by the 1949 Cease-Fire Line, troops will continue to hold their respective picquets as by so doing they will be automatically separated from each other. The only exception to this will be where, in hilly terrain, opposing forces are at present considered to be too close to each other, each side will withdraw to a distance to be mutually agreed upon by the local commanders not below the rank of Brigadier.

* Ministry of External Affairs (Government of India), Foreign Affairs Record (External Publicity Division, New Delhi), XII (January 1966) pp.4-7.

(Note - In the Amritsar-Lahore sector, this 1000 yards withdrawal will be modified so that Pakistani troops who are actually on the West bank of the BRB Canal and Indian troops who are on the east bank of the BRB Canal facing each other will withdraw all armed personnel off the embankment to a distance of 200 yards on each side. Unarmed personnel may, however, live, move and work in this area.

The same principle will apply in Sulaimanki-Fazilka Sector, Hussainiwala Sector and Khem Karan Sector.)

After the withdrawal in this phase no new defences of any kind will be prepared in occupied territory.

There will be no movement of armed military, para-military or police personnel either armed or unarmed within the demilitarised zone and no civilian personnel will be permitted within it by either side.

The period for completion of this phase will be five days.

PHASE II

In this phase both sides will remove and nullify all defences which will include the:

- (a) lifting of mines; and
- (b) dismantling of all other defence works, less permanent defence structures constructed of steel and cement.

The period for completing this phase will be twenty-one days which will commence immediately after the five-day period mentioned in para 5.

Working parties for this purpose will be formed by unarmed military personnel in uniform. No civilian or civil labour will be used for these tasks.

While every effort will be made to dismantle all defence works within the specified period, where owing to weather and other conditions it is not possible to complete this, the uncleared area so left will be clearly marked and a sketch of these given to the other side.

There will be no firing of weapons or use of explosives within 10,000 metres of the line of actual control. Where explosives have to be used to dismantle defence works, this will only be done under supervision as specified later and after due intimation to the other side.

The present agreement affecting restriction on flights of aircraft will continue to apply.

To ensure that the action agreed to in Part I above is being implemented in letter and in spirit, the good offices of UNMOGIP and UNIPOM will be utilised. In the event of a disagreement, their decision will be final and binding on both sides.

PART II

Withdrawal of Troops from Occupied Areas

After the dismantling of defences has taken place, all troops, para-military forces and armed police who are now on the other side of the international border and Cease-Fire Line, will be withdrawn. This withdrawal will be completed by 25 February 1966. If in any particular sector or part of a sector, the dismantling of defences has been completed earlier than the last date specified, withdrawal may be sector wise if mutually agreed to.

During this withdrawal, there will be no follow up by civilians, armed military, para-military or police personnel until 25 February 1966. Only unarmed military personnel at a strength mutually agreed upon at the sector level may move into these unoccupied areas for normal police duties (see paragraph 16 below).

After troops of both sides have crossed into their own territory the procedure which was being followed by Pakistan and India before 5 August 1965, for the security of the international border and Cease Fire Line, will apply. Attention is drawn to Ground Rules 1961 for West Pakistan/Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat (India).

It is essential that under all circumstances troops must move out of occupied areas by 25 February 1966, even if the dismantling of defence and lifting of mines have not been completed.

For immediate settlement of any points of dispute that may arise, sector commanders not below the rank of Major General will be designated by name and appointment both by India and Pakistan who will

meet to settle the differences. Telephone or R/T communication will be established between these designated sector commanders and will be permanently manned.

Any matter on which there is disagreement will be referred to the C-in-C, Pakistan Army, and COAS, India, for their joint decision. If the issue, is still not resolved by them the good offices of Major General T. Morambio will be utilised and his decision will be final and binding on both sides.

PART III

Reduction of Tension in the Eastern Sector

The limit of withdrawal in the Eastern Sector will be left to local commanders not below the rank of Major General to mutually decide where necessary, in consultation with the civil authorities concerned. Both sides will arrive at a working agreement as soon as possible.

Border Security Forces consisting of armed para-military units, police or any other irregular forces of both sides, will not open fire across the border under any circumstances.

Any encroachments across the border will be dealt with through apprehension of personnel concerned and thereafter handing them over to civil authorities.

In any case where firing takes place across the border it will be investigated on the spot by a joint team consisting of border personnel from both sides within 24 hrs of occurrence. Brigade Commanders/DIsG responsible for this investigation will be designated by name and appointment sectorwise for West Bengal, Assam and Tripura by India and for the adjoining areas of East Pakistan by Pakistan.

Liaison between commanders and telephone communications at various level will be established as given in paras 12 and 13 of the Ground Rules for Indo-East Pakistan border.

To ensure that the above agreement is fully implemented, quarterly meetings will take place between Army and Police authorities of India and Pakistan, alternately in India and Pakistan, to assess the extent to which the agreement is working in practice.

These are a supplement to the Ground Rules formulated by the Military Sub-Committee of the Indian and Pakistani delegations on 20 October 1959.

PART IV

General Points

In order to resolve any problems that may arise in the implementation of this agreement and to further maintain friendly relations between the two countries the C-in-C Pakistan and the COAS India will meet from time to time. The meetings will be held alternately in India and Pakistan and will be initiated by the respective Government concerned.

Ground rules to implement this withdrawal agreement in Western Sector will be formulated by Lt General Bakhtiar Rana - Pakistan, and Lt General Harbaksh Singh - India, under the Chairmanship of Major General T. Morambio as early as possible.

This agreement comes into effect as from 0600 hours IST/0630 hrs WPT 25 January 1966.

ROLE OF PARA-MILITARY FORCES AND CIVILIANS

PARA-MILITARY ORGANISATIONS

Some para-military forces e.g. Border Security Force, the Punjab Armed Police (PAP), the Rajasthan Armed Constabulary (RAC) and the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) were deployed on active duty and took part in the operations during the Indo-Pak conflict of 1965. Officers and men of these para-military units did a great job in the wake of Pakistani aggression on Indian soil. Some men of these forces performed deeds of valour and contributed their best to the cause of the war.

These para-military forces posted on the borders were placed under the operational command of the army, and they gave close support to the armed forces. At many places they fought shoulder to shoulder with the Army. Brief details of the assignments carried out by various battalions of these forces are given below:-

(a) PAP & BSF

33 PAP Bn embodied as 26 Bn BSF

This battalion which was located at Amritsar during 1965 participated in the war along with some army units i.e. 3 Jat, 4 Sikh and the Kumaon Regiment. The unit personnel performed mainly the roles of guides/scouts.

25 Bn BSF

The battalion was located at Ferozpur and was designated as 29 PAP Bn. The jurisdiction of this battalion was from Ferozpur to Fazilka. This battalion had to face the first onslaught of the Pakistan Army in September 1965 in area Hussainiwala, and gave a good account of itself. Four of its jawans laid down their lives for the country. The good work done by the men of this battalion had been recognised by awarding seven gallantry awards to them, including one posthumously.

30 Bn BSF

In 1965, 30 Bn BSF was deployed in area Kargil under the Army and allotted role for guard duties. On 10 August 1965, while guarding the

bridge Shamsa on Dras-Kargil highway two unit personnel were killed due to firing by Pak forces.

20 Bn BSF

During the 1965 conflict with Pakistan, this battalion of the Punjab Armed Police did extremely well and captured approximately 50 sq km of Pak area across river Ravi before the cease-fire was declared. However, disregarding the cease-fire, the enemy counter-attacked to re-occupy their captured post Kot Doaba. The men of this battalion stood their ground against heavy attack of the enemy, and repulsed it.

48 Bn BSF

During this war, the men of this battalion were deployed on active duty in R.S.Pura (Jammu Range) as well as on the vital installations there. They acquitted themselves extremely well and earned high appreciation of higher formations. Two officials of the battalion got President's Medal for acts of gallantry.

21 Bn BSF

This battalion was deployed in the posts on both sides of the river Ravi in the Dera Baba Nanak sector during the 1965 Indo-Pak conflict. The battalion fighting along with the Army occupied two Pakistani posts and took in possession important enemy documents, besides inflicting considerable casualties on the enemy. They also captured the Ravi bridge. When the Pakistanis counter-attacked the bridge, the para-military forces along with the Indian troops faced the attack bravely and compelled the Pak troops to retreat. The Pakistanis were left with no alternative but to damage the bridge, while retreating.

A few more PAP battalions i.e. 11 Bn BSF, 23 Bn BSF and 24 Bn BSF also participated in the conflict in association with the army units.

The PAP was also primarily responsible for rounding up the bulk of para-troopers dropped by Pakistan in Punjab for sabotaging vital installations. Though the saboteurs were armed with the most sophisticated automatic weapons, they met the challenge successfully. In addition, they maintained the supply lines to the front without the least delay, and guarded a number of bridges on strategic

roads, railway lines and airports. They were mainly responsible for the high morale of the border population.

The Prime Minister in a broadcast to the nation, on 23 September 1965, said: "I would also like to refer to the men of the armed police force who have had to meet the challenge of Pakistani infiltrators and paratroopers. At many places they had to stand shoulder to shoulder with our Armed forces to fight the invaders. In this task many of them laid down their lives. But they have succeeded in adding a glorious chapter to the history of Indian police"(1).

(b) CRPF

3rd Battalion

The battalion gallantly resisted and repelled the attack of 50 to 60 Pak raiders on the Wayil Bridge on the Srinagar-Leh Road and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy in dead and wounded. The battle lasted from 0330 hours to 0500 hours on 18 August 1965. In the encounter, the battalion captured two Bren guns, one sten gun and some explosives and ammunition from the enemy, and won four medals for gallantry.

6th Battalion

D Coy of the battalion was deployed under 121 Inf Bde during OP Riddle. One of its platoons along with two platoons of 7 Sikh were sent to defend the Gali post against a Pakistani attack. The combined force (Army and CRPF), despite being surrounded by Pak army from all sides, and its road and air links having been cut off, defended the post displaying brave resistance and determination. Consequently, the Pak Army could not capture the Gali post for seven days. The unit won two gallantry medals for this action.

13th Battalion

The battalion was deployed in Yusmarg area in the Kashmir Valley in August 1965 to protect Government property and important installations against acts of sabotage by Pak guerillas. The

battalion displayed extra-ordinary vigilance and determination in defending the Yusmarg bridge against a Pakistani attack in August 1965. The attack was repulsed, and the raiders, while retreating, left-behind many casualties. The battalion casualty was one dead and a few injured, and four men of the battalion were awarded gallantry medals.

14th Battalion

During the 1965 Indo-Pak war the battalion gave good account of itself by capturing many Pakistani infiltrators, who were handed over to the army. The battalion also did the convoy duty from Srinagar to Ladakh.

16th Battalion

The battalion moved to Jalandhar for law and order duties in the first week of September 1965. After a brief spell of duty in Punjab, three of its companies were moved to Jammu and Kashmir and placed under the operational control of the army.

2nd Battalion

The 2nd Bn CRPF which was deployed in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965 stoutly defended their posts against Pak aggression in the area and earned a place of pride for CRPF in the annals of the country's war history.

A few more CRPF battalions were associated with the Army during the 1965 Indo-Pak conflict. The 20th Bn was first placed under 10 Inf Div, and it later came under 26 Inf Div, while the 22nd Bn was deployed in Punch/Rajouri sector under the operational control of the army.

Most of these CRPF battalions were assigned mainly the task of dealing with Pak raiders and for guarding military installations and vulnerable points. The battalions acquitted themselves creditably.

(c) Rajasthan Armed Constabulary (RAC)

2nd Bn RAC embodied as 11th Bn BSF

In 1965 this battalion was stationed at Shri Ganga Nagar on the western boundary of Rajasthan. Six companies of this battalion were posted at various border posts as noted below:-

RESTRICTED

- i) A Coy at border post Naggi.
- ii) B Coy at border post Sweeper Head.
- iii) A Coy at border post Hindumal Kot, Naya Camp.
- iv) D Coy at border post Hindumal Kot, Purana Camp Gurudwara.
- v) E Coy at border post Q Head, Madira.
- vi) F Coy at border post S.P.

Some of the border posts, held by these companies during the 1965 war, i.e. Hindumal Kot, Renuka, Madira and Naggi, etc., were attacked by the Pak forces, but the companies held on to these positions bravely and gave a befitting reply to the enemy. All the attacks of the enemy were repulsed, and the Pakistanis had to suffer heavy losses in men and material in these encounters.

5th and 6th Bn RAC

These battalions were placed under the operational control of the army and were allotted defensive roles. The 6th Bn RAC was deployed along the border, with HQ at Barmer.

7th Bn RAC

During the 1965 Indo-Pak war, this battalion remained under the operational command of 11 Inf Div and took part in various operations under 11 Inf Div and Bdes connected with it. Two companies of the battalion fought along with the army in occupying Gadra city. Two platoons of the battalion, which were stationed at Munabao, continued to fight the enemy at this post for 20 hours, but had to fall back later in the face of heavy Pak shelling. One company of this battalion was posted at Panchla post. When the Pakistanis attacked the post and occupied it on 13 September 1965, the company had put up a good fight, but failed due to enemy superiority in strength. Ten of its personnel were killed and 34 captured by the Pakistani Army. One platoon of this battalion advanced along with the army from Khadin base in Sakardu. These troops were, however, forced to withdraw in the face of an assault by Pak troops supported by heavy guns on 16 September 1965. But the Indian troops supported by RAC personnel re-occupied

the posts of Khadin and Sakarbu on 17 September 1965 with the help of reinforcements. The unit took part in operations after the cease-fire also. For displaying exemplary courage, devotion to duty and distinguished leadership, four officers of this unit were decorated with gallantry awards.

THE CIVILIAN CONTRIBUTION

The civilians played a magnificent role in the September conflict. The emotional backing provided by the country as a whole, and Punjab in particular, was most inspiring. Everyone was anxious to contribute his or her mite in whatever form possible. The demands of the time created an inner rejuvenation which completely changed the tone and tenor of the society.

The people of Punjab took the news of Pakistani aggression with a dignified calm. The war hysteria, the panic and the jitters normally associated with front-line states was conspicuously absent. There was a pleasing air of confidence about them. Men, women and children stuck to their posts. They displayed martial valour and patriotic fervour of the highest order. The morale of the people was exceptionally high. And as the days rolled by and the war assumed greater intensity, it only served to fortify their resolution to stick it out, come what may.

In the rest of India, the ennui, the inertia and listlessness vanished; political wranglings and social distinctions disappeared - in fact all differences were sunk in the one common resolve to crush the invader. Gift parcels of utility articles and numerous other contributions flowed in from all over the country. The defence fund swelled to an unexpected figure within the first week and continued to maintain its upward spiral throughout the period of the conflict and even thereafter. People from all walks of life came forward to contribute what they were capable of giving.

There were long queues of blood donors, patiently awaiting to make their contribution at the various blood banks. Scores of civilian doctors volunteered their services and some of them worked round the clock losing all sense of time and fatigue until they collapsed through sheer exhaustion. The women of India too played a glorious part. Volunteer organisations sprang up like mushrooms overnight to serve the cause in a variety of ways - knitting of woollens, collection of funds, service in hastily organised canteens on railway stations, and so on.

Nurses and telephone operators stood gallantly by their posts, defying all danger.

To cite an example of this voluntary social service, the invaluable work done by a lady Member of the Legislative Assembly of Punjab, Mrs. Sarla Sharma, may be mentioned. She had entered India's freedom struggle at the age of 18, and was jailed by the British at the age of 20. At the out-break of the war, leaving behind her two young daughters, aged 18 and 12 years, at Chandigarh, Mrs. Sharma went to Pathankot alone to serve the wounded officers and men at the Army Hospital there. It is claimed that she organised a team of 40 students and three teachers of the S.D. College, Pathankot, and rendered medical and other necessary aid to the wounded army personnel daily from 9 A.M. to 6 P.M. Later, some women of Pathankot also joined her. When the wounded jawans arrived, the volunteers used to quickly transfer them on stretchers to Hospital Wards.

Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Dr. Sushila Nayyar visited the Army Hospital, Pathankot, and greatly appreciated the noble work done by Mrs. Sharma and her team(1).

In the Press and over the Radio, there flowed a continuous stream of inspiring news items extolling the deeds of the officers and men in the front-line.

And the civil service, especially in Punjab, rose to the occasion with commendable zeal to assist the Army in every conceivable way. On the very first day of the conflict, as many as 600 vehicles were commandeered for Army use. This fleet swelled to a fantastic figure of 4000 vehicles within the next five days. The civil vehicle fleet continued to ply in the service of the Army throughout the period of the conflict, with their drivers sharing the hazards of the fighting soldier. It was a symbol of the highest courage and patriotism. Normally their duty should have been to keep open the lines of communication in the rear. However, they shared with armed forces all the hazards and dangers of the battle zone. Their convoys moved swiftly forward, carrying vital army supplies, even into the enemy territory. There was enormous demand for civil labour which was promptly met on most occasions, however short the notice. And above all, there was a firm grip on the civil front which enabled the Army to concentrate exclusively on its primary role of fighting the invader.

1. Mrs. Sarla Sharma's Letter No. HPSSIEC: PS - Chairman/89, dated Shimla, 2 November 1989.

The local police also played a prominent part during this period. They had to maintain law and order, keep the roads clear for military traffic, protect vital installations, watch the activities of Pakistani agents, patrol at night, and enforce curfew and black-out. The police performed all these duties creditably in the midst of heavy shelling and bombing by the enemy.

In dealing with enemy paratroopers, the civilians took a major part in overpowering these armed groups and handing them over to the military authorities. With the spread of enemy para operations in Punjab, a threat was anticipated to the railway and road communications. The Punjab Government was, therefore, requested to put into operation the Internal Security Scheme. The civil authorities responded immediately. All NCC cadets in the Punjab were mobilised and they did an excellent job of imposing black-outs and carrying out other civil defence duties. The boy cadets took up traffic control and the guarding of vulnerable areas and vulnerable points in all the major towns, while the girls manned telephone exchanges and worked in hospitals.

The village population rose to the occasion, and, apart from helping the army in the capture of the parachutists, patrolled the railway lines and manned a number of vital bridges.

Inhabitants of the border villages stuck to their posts, facing the dangers of cross-fire, bombing and strafing from enemy planes, and guided the Indian Army units through local paths and tracks. They helped the Army in their tasks through miscellaneous services and went out on recce trips on their own and brought information of enemy movements. They also kept round the clock vigil to prevent any possible mischief by enemy agents. In several Punjab villages people voluntarily came forward to cut down their standing crops in order to help eliminate the possible hideout for paratroopers. In all the villages in Punjab, night patrol squads were organised by the village Panchayats.

In the early days of fighting, when the Army was continuously on the move, the jawans did not have to do any cooking for themselves, as the villages from miles around brought to them chapatis, tea, milk, parched gram, cigarettes, sweets and other snacks and eats. There was no need for appeals to the people and

exhortations from leaders or the government. The villagers did it spontaneously. On their own initiative, they pooled their resources and organised production and distribution of various items in the forward areas(1).

Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh, GOC-in-C, Western Command, who was directly responsible for the conduct of the War in the entire Western theatre, paid a glowing tribute to the civilian war efforts when he stated: "Much of the gallantry and self-sacrifice of the Indian jawan was due to their confidence that the whole country was behind him." The General added: "The enthusiasm of the civilian population of the area and the emotional backing which they gave to the advancing troops was to be seen to be believed."

The railways too did a grand job. The railway system was a vital link in the country's defence. The railway staff maintained the supply line with exemplary zeal, devotion and dedication. They kept the wheels moving at the risk of their lives. The Railway Special Emergency Force displayed remarkable gallantry on the border areas during the Pak aggression. Under severe bombardment and shelling by the enemy at various forward positions in Punjab and Rajasthan, the force patrolled railway tracks, escorted trains and guarded vulnerable railway installations.

The Indian Red Cross Society also did not lag behind to serve in the national cause. Immediately on the outbreak of the conflict, the IRCS formulated its emergency services to provide relief to the civilian population affected by the conflict. A large civilian population, estimated over 260,000, residing in the border areas of Jammu, Amritsar, Ferozpur, and Gurdaspur (Punjab), and Barmer (Rajasthan) were displaced(2). Most of them were accommodated in camps specially set up for them. The Indian Red Cross Society provided relief to them directly. Besides other relief measures, the Society sent large quantities of milk-powder, blankets, garments, quilts, medicines, etc., valued at over Rs. 5.5 lakhs. It also sent blankets for distribution among Indian internees in Pakistan who were disembarked at Bombay.

Several thousand packets/parcels containing woollen garments and other articles of daily use were sent to Service hospitals in Base and forward areas

1. Mankekar, D.R., p. 149.
2. Indian Red Cross Society's Letter No.100/ADM/90 358/ dated 23 Feb., 1990

for the sick and wounded armed forces personnel, undergoing treatment there. Relief supplies were also sent for Border Security personnel. The officers of the Society visited the camps in the affected areas in Punjab and some of the Military hospitals, and presented gift packets to the sick and the needy personally.

Voluntary Hospital Service

The Chairman of the Red Cross Society instituted the "Indian Red Cross Voluntary Hospital Service", the volunteers of which visited the sick and wounded jawans in Service hospitals at regular intervals and assisted them in solving their problems. Nearly 100 volunteers enrolled themselves in Delhi and divided themselves in groups of 24 each. They rendered service in the hospital at Delhi Cantt. in one or two shifts on 6 days a week for about two months. During their visits, they also presented fruits, sweets etc., to the sick and wounded. Similar groups of lady volunteers visited hospitals frequently at Ambala, Amritsar, Jalandhar and Chandigarh. The lady volunteers also knitted and stitched garments for the jawans and also helped in the preparation of gift packets for the jawans and PsOW.

Over 2,000 persons were imparted training in First Aid and Home Nursing at 125 centres, set up in Delhi by the Indian Red Cross Society.

The Society also collected blood from over 1,800 donors and handed over 2,400 bottles of blood to the Director General of the Armed Forces Medical Services for the treatment of the sick and wounded of the Armed Forces(1).

The Society also set up an Information Bureau to handle enquiries from the next of kin of the PsOW, civilian internees, including crews of captured merchant ships and trains, in both India and Pakistan. Hundreds of messages/letters received from the next of kin of the PsOW and civilian internees in both countries were transmitted through the good offices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, set up in India and Pakistan.

Exchange of PsOW

The first batch of 549 Indian PsOW was received by the Indian Red Cross Society and the delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross at

1. Ibid.

Hussainiwala near Firozpur on 2 February 1966. Later, 543 more Indian PsOW were received in three batches on 8, 22 and 25 February 1966. The Indian trains' and ships' crew personnel numbering 398, held by Pakistan, were also repatriated along with the PsOW(1).

POLITICAL SUPPORT

Internecine quarrels suddenly ended when Pakistan threatened India's freedom. National unity and discipline were immediately forged and maintained. The entire Indian nation, irrespective of caste, creed or religion, resented the treacherous attack and opposed it tooth and nail. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri enjoyed exceptional and universal esteem and affection, even of his political opponents. All the leaders of various political parties gave full support to the Government in resisting the Pakistani aggression. The opposition leaders who had consistently advocated conciliation, vociferously pleaded for retaliatory action against Pakistan. They demanded that India should answer the threat posed by Pakistani infiltrators by bombing the guerilla bases even at the risk of war between the two countries. Sarvodaya leader Jayaprakash Narayan, President of the Indo-Pakistan Conciliation Group, issued a statement on 19 August 1965, in which he said: "It is the plain duty of the Government of India under these conditions to eliminate this threat from Pakistan by all means at their command and I fully support the measures that have been taken to this end." Addressing a public meeting on 4 September 1965, he said, "the first thing to do at the present moment was to drive out all Pakistani infiltrators from Kashmir and to plug all the vulnerable points through which they were coming."

The Samyukta Socialist Party supported the Government action on 26 August 1965, in crossing of the cease-fire line in Kashmir by our armed forces. The same day, Deen Dayal Upadhyaya, General Secretary of All India Jan Sangh, demanded that the Indian Army should be allowed a free hand in putting an end to Pakistani invasion. Both the Communist parties condemned the Pakistani aggression and assured the Government of their full support against foreign attack. The Praja Socialist Party leaders also assured their full support to the Prime Minister in the task of safeguarding the nation's frontiers.

At a conference called by the Prime Minister on 6 September 1965, the leaders of DMK, Akali Dal and

1. Ibid.

the Muslim League, along with the leaders of other parties, promised all support to the Government in the struggle with Pakistan. The DMK leader, C.N. Annadurai, declared that there should be a moratorium on all controversies and said, "No party would betray the valour and heroism of our soldiers."

During the Pakistani invasion it was proved that the Indian secularism was deep-rooted and strong. All the minority communities - the Muslims, the Sikhs, Christians, Parsis and Buddhists - condemned the Pakistani aggression. The Muslim League President, Mohammed Ismail, said that the "People will make all sacrifices in fighting the enemy." Many other Muslim leaders, organisations and institutions in India expressed concern at the serious situation created by the Pakistani aggression. On 8 September 1965, thirty-six Muslim members of Parliament belonging to all parties condemned Pakistan's "naked aggression on India."

The Sikh leaders all over the country sharply reacted to the mischievous propaganda broadcast from POK Radio station which tried to incite the Sikhs. The POK Radio made frequent appeals from the 'Revolutionary Council' to Sant Fateh Singh in particular and the Sikhs in general to start a 'similar fight' to gain a separate state for themselves. Several Sikh members of Parliament on 8 September 1965 denounced Pakistan's "pernicious radio propaganda" and declared that "the Sikhs will fight to a man along with other sons of India" to repel aggression and protect the honour and integrity of their mother country. Sant Fateh Singh who was to go on fast on 10 September 1965, to be followed by self-immolation on 25 September 1965, to press the Government to concede the demand of Punjabi Suba, announced on 9 September 1965, that he would not start his proposed fast because of national emergency. By putting the country above his vow, the Sant doomed the Pakistani ambition to sow seeds of hatred between the Sikhs and Hindus in Punjab. Prominent Sikh leaders of Punjab described Pakistan's attempt to exploit the patriotic sentiments of the Sikhs as nothing but "crude self-deception on its part."

Thirteen Christian members of Parliament in a joint statement on 6 September 1965, called upon all Christians in India to "make every sacrifice to drive out the aggressor from the sacred soil of our motherland." A similar statement was issued by Buddhist leaders calling upon the members of their community to extend their fullest support to the Government of India and to pledge their services for the defence of the motherland.

Numerous other organisations and bodies in the country offered their services in the national cause. Pakistan had invaded India in the hope that the edifice of Indian secularism would fall at the first stroke of violence. But she was disappointed to find the situation quite contrary to her expectations.

INDO-PAK WAR 1965

GALLANTRY AWARDS

<u>Sl No.</u>	<u>Rank, Name & No.</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Sector</u>	<u>Effective Date</u>
<u>PVC</u>				
1.	QMH Abdul Hamid, 2639985	4 Grenadiers	Lahore	10-9-65
2.	Lt Col A.B.Tarapore, IC-5565 (Posthumous)	Poona Horse	Sialkot Sector	11-9-65
<u>MVC</u>				
1.	Maj S.K.Mathur, IC-6622	Arty	Kutch	15-4-65
2.	Maj B.S.Randhawa, IC-11212 (Posthumous)	Rajput	Kargil	17-5-65
3.	Lt Col Gurbans Singh Sangha, IC-2990	3 Mahar	Chhamb	15-8-65
4.	Maj Ranjit Singh Dayal IC-4004	1 Para	Uri	25-8-65
5.	Maj Bhaskar Roy IC-8119	20 Lancers	Chhamb	1-9-65
6.	Capt Chander Narain Singh IC-12701 Posthumous)	2 Garh Rif	J&K	5-8-65
7.	Lt Col Salim Caleb IC-881	3 Cav	Lahore	10-9-65
8.	Lt Col H.L.Mehta IC-4282 (Posthumous)	4 Madras	Sialkot	8-9-65
9.	Lt Col Desmond Hayde IC-4036	3 Jat	Lahore	6-9-65
10.	Sub Ajit Singh JC-18340 (Posthumous)	4 Sikh	Lahore	6-9-65
11.	Lt Col N.N.Khanna IC-4018 (Posthumous)	2 Sikh	Poonch	6-9-65
12.	Maj Bhupinder Singh IC-4466 (Posthumous)	4 Horse	Sialkot	11-9-65

RESTRICTED

1	2	3	4	5
13.	Maj A.R.Tyagi IC-13056 (Posthumous)	3 Jat	Lahore	21-9-65
14.	Maj Gen Rajindar Singh IC-144	AC	Sialkot	6-9-65
15.	Maj Gen Gurbakhsh Singh IC-324	8 GR	Punjab	6-9-65
16.	Maj Gen H.K.Sibal IC-254	GR	Punjab	6-9-65
17.	Maj Gen S.S.Kalaen	Raj Rif	J&K	5-8-65
18.	Brig R.D.Hira IC-2531	11 GR	Sialkot	5-8-65
19.	Brig K.K.Singh IC-2014	16 Cav	Sialkot	6-9-65
20.	Brig T.K.Theograj IC-4321	62 Cav	Khem Karan Lahore	8-9-65
21.	Brig Z.C.Bakshi IC-1510	5 GR	J&K	5-8-65
22.	Lt Col M.M.S.Bakshi IC-1697	4 Horse	Phillora Sialkot	11-9-65
23.	Lt Col Raghbir Singh IC-6596	18 Raj Rif	Asal Uttar Punjab	7-9-65
24.	Lt Col A.S.Vaidya IC-1701	9 Horse	Punjab	6-9-65
25.	Lt Col P.K. Nandgopal IC-5499	6 Sikh LI	J&K Kalidhar	28-9-65
26.	Capt Gautam Mubayi IC-1568 (Posthumous)	2 Dogra	J&K	2-11-65
27.	L/Hav Naubat Ram 3940154	6 Dogra	J&K Haji Pir Pass	8-9-65
28.	NK Darshan Singh 2025630	5 Sikh	J&K	2-11-65
29.	Maj Gen Mohinder Singh IC-524	Arty	Lahore	9-9-65

1	2	3	4	5
30.	Lt Col Sampuran Singh, Vrc IC-8041	19 Punjab	Haji Pir Pass	9-9-65
31.	Capt Kapil Sing Thapa IC-14682 (Posthumous)	Jat	Lahore	21-9-65
32.	Sub Tikabahadur Thapa JC-7526 (Posthumous)	4/8 GR	J&K	30-9-65
33.	Lt Col Sant Singh IC-5479	6 Sikh	Indo-Pak Conflict	2-11-65

VIR CHAKRA

1.	Maj R.K. Bali IC-11178	Sikh LI	Kutch	9-4-65
2.	Hav Gopinath Bhingardive 4534259	Mahar	Kutch	20-4-65
3.	2/Lt Arjun Singh Khanna IC-15511	Arty	Kutch	25-4-65
4.	Sep Budh Singh 2951032	Rajput	Kargil	16-5-65
5.	Capt Ranbir Singh EC-50739	Rajput	Kargil	17-5-65
6.	Lt Col Sampuran Singh IC-8041	19 Punjab	Uri	26-8-65
7.	L/Hav Gurdev Singh 3342155	1 Sikh	Tithwal J&K	24-8-65
8.	Nk Chand Singh 3341107	2 Sikh	Poonch	6-9-65
9.	Nk Prem Singh 3946403	3 Dogra	Poonch	6-9-65
10.	Sub Man Bahadur Gurung JC-13166	3/8 GR	J&K	3-9-65
11.	L/Nk Raj Bahadur Gurung 5735805	3/8 GR	J&K	3-9-65
12.	Hav C. Perumal 1142832	27 AD Regt	J&K	3-9-65
13.	Hav Tata Pothuraja 1155700	27 AD Regt	J&K	5-9-65

RESTRICTED

1	2	3	4	5
14.	Lt Col Chhajju Ram IC-1351	Arty	Lahore	6-9-65
15.	Maj M.A.R.Sheikh IC-6850 (Posthumous)	16 Cav	Sialkot	8-9-65
16.	Maj Megh Singh IC-5682	Guards	Poonch	1-9-65
17.	Maj Jitinder Kumar IC-8519	15 Dogra	Lahore	8-9-65
18.	Maj Surish Chander Vadera IC-4776	3 Cav	Lahore	10-9-65
19.	Capt R.C.Bakshi IC-12831 (Posthumous)	6/8GR	Lahore	6-9-65
20.	2/Lt Surinderpal Singh Sekhon, IC-13986 (Posthumous)	2 Raj Rif	Lahore	5-9-65
21.	Lt Teja Singh IC-13651	9 J&K Rif	Lahore	6-9-65
22.	2/Lt H.I.S.Dhaliwal EC-55672	17 Horse	Sialkot	8-9-65
23.	2/Lt B.K.Vaid EC-55428	2 Fd Regt Arty	Sialkot	8-9-65
23.	Sub C.A.Madhavan Nambiar JC-13310 posthumous)	4 Madras	Sialkot	7-9-65
25.	Ris Achhar Singh JC-5234	9 Hourse	Lahore	7-9-65
26.	Naib Ris Jagdish Singh JC-29007	CIH	Lahore	10-9-65
27.	Hav. Ajmer Singh 3339173	4 Sikh	Lahore	10-9-65
28.	L/Hav Fidoo Ram 9065621	94 Mtn Comp Regt	Sialkot	7-9-65
29.	L/Hav K.G.George 6263784	Signals	Lahore	6-9-65
30.	Nk Ganesh Datt 1419977	9 Kumaon	Sialkot	7-9-65

RESTRICTED

1	2	3	4	5
31.	L/Nk Pritam Singh 3348906 (Posthumous)	4 Sikh	Lahore	10-9-65
32.	Rfn Mahilal 2853735 (Posthumous)	4 Raj Rif	Sialkot	7-9-65
33.	Rfn Mathan Singh 2851209 (Posthumous)	2 Raj Rif	Lahore	6-9-65
34.	Hav A.B.Jesudasam 1155809	45 AD Regt	Halwara Airfield	7-9-65
35.	Sep Balam Ram 2452001	16 Punjab	Lahore	10-9-65
36.	Maj S.M.Sharma IC-10082 (Posthumous)	8 J&K Rif	Sialkot	13-9-65
37.	Maj M.A.Zaki IC-7613	19 Maratha	Lahore	20-9-65
38.	Maj S.S.Ratra IC-6725	Arty	Lahore	15-9-65
39.	Maj Somesh Kapoor IC-7015	1 Sikh	J&K	22-8-65
40.	Lt Bhikham Singh IC-14602	7 Punjab	Lahore	9-9-65
41.	2/Lt R.S.Bedi IC-14376	14 Horse	Lahore	17-9-65
42.	Nb Ris Mohd Ayyub Khan JC-32607	18 Cav	Sialkot	9-9-65
43.	L/Hav Umrao 4139235 (Posthumous)	1 Para	Uri Sector	30-8-65
44.	NK Debi Bahadur Gurung 5032131 (Posthumous)	2/1 GR	Sialkot	14-9-65
45.	Rfn Dhan Bahadur Gurung 5438003	2/5 GR	Sialkot	7-9-65
46.	Maj P.S.Deshpande IC-3990	Arty	Barmer (Raj)	10-10-65
47.	Major Bhagat Singh IC-13154 (Posthumous)	6 Guards	J&K	14-9-65

RESTRICTED

1	2	3	4	5
48.	Maj K.T.M.Pillai IC-5300	Arty	J&K	28-9-65
49.	Maj A.T.Ganapathy IC-12621	6 Sikh	J&K	4-10-65
50.	Capt Sansar Singh IC-14605	7 Sikh	J&K	2-11-65
51.	Capt Surendra Shah IC-13687	4 Kumaon	J&K	21-9-65
52.	Capt Arjan Singh Narula IC-12180	6/5 GR	J&K	12-8-65
53.	Sub Piara Singh IC-18170 (Posthumous)	5 Sikh LI	J&K	2-11-65
54.	Ris Kartar Singh JC-18114 (Posthumous)	17 Horse	Phillora, Sialkot	11-9-65
55.	Hav (GD) Ram Ujagar 1135608	Arty	Sialkot	8-9-65
56.	Hav Girdhari Lal 2942593 (Posthumous)	4 Rajput	Kargil J&K	16-5-65
57.	Nk Bachittar Singh 2846968 (Posthumous)	1 Guard	Kargil	5-6-65
58.	Nk Jagdish Singh 2846968 (Posthumous)	18 Raj Rif	Khem Karan Lahore	21-9-65
59.	Nk Chander Singh 4144564	4 Kumaon	J&K	21-9-65
60.	L/Nk Dev Raj 2444453	19 Punjab	Uri J&K	14-9-65
61.	L/Nk Madalai Muthu 2537049	Arty	IAF Base Kalaikunda	7-9-65
62.	Sep Dharam Singh 4443729	6 Sikh LI	J&K	4-10-65
63.	Lt Col Satish Chander Joshi VrC (Bar to VrC) IC-5054 (Posthumous)	CIH	Khalra- Lahore Road	10-9-65

RESTRICTED

1	2	3	4	5
64.	PA/Nk Ram Kumar 4144088 (Posthumous)	Kumaon	Karalpur Bridge	7-8-65
65.	Maj Ranbir Singh IC-11072 (Posthumous)	Punjab	Uri	9-8-65
66.	Lt Col R.N.Mishra IC-2489	Punjab	Kalidhar Area	23-8-65
67.	Sep Gurmel Singh 3353717	Sikh	J&K	25-8-65
68.	A/Capt Murthy Durendra Naidu EC-51623	Arty	J&K	26-8-65
69.	Lt Col Madan Lal Chadha IC-2303 (Posthumous)	1 Para	J&K	31-8-65
70.	Capt Chitoor Subramaniam Krishnan IC-8590	Arty	Chhamb	1-9-65
71.	Nb Sub Damar Bahadur Khattri JC-16959	2/9GR	J&K	1-9-65
72.	Hav Debi Prakash Singh 4141048 (Posthumous)	Kumaon	Chhamb	1-9-65
73.	Rfn Ghan Bahadur Sahi 5834480	GR	J&K	1-9-65
74.	A/Maj Sat Parkash Varma IC-14015 (Posthumous)	GR	J&K	3-9-65
75.	A/Maj Jagdish Singh IC-6703	Arty	Poonch	5-9-65
76.	Maj Greesh Chandra Varma IC-12453 (Posthumous)	Dogra	Poonch	6-9-65
77.	Capt Prabhu Singh IC-13317	Raj Rif	Khem Karan	6-9-65
78.	2/Lt Chandra Sekhran Nair EC-58730	Engineers	Lahore	6-9-65
79.	2/Lt Shashindra Singh EC-58105 (Posthumous)	GR	J&K	6-9-65
80.	Sub Khazan Singh JC-8199	Jat	Lahore	6-9-65

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1	2	3	4	5
81.	Nb Sub Rajbir Singh 3938013	Rajput	Bedian Area	6-9-65
82.	Hav Indra Bahadur Gurung 5429011 (Posthumous)	GR	Lahore	6-9-65
83.	Nk Kunwar Singh 4140565	Guards	Lahore	6-9-65
84.	Sep Sukh Ram 3951343 (Posthumous)	Dogra	Poonch	6-9-65
85.	Guardsman Dambar Bahadur Chhetri, 13657947 (Posthumous)	Guards	Lahore	6-9-65
86.	2/Lt Virendra Pratap Singh EC-56107	Sikh LI	Vill Kundanpur	7-9-65
87.	Sub Gregory JC-25564	4 Madras	Sialkot	7-9-65
88.	A/L Dfr Tarlok Singh 1021059	Deccan Horse	Khem Karan	7-9-65
89.	Sep Kannan 2553212 (Posthumous)	Madras	Sialkot	7-9-65
90.	Hav Jassa Singh 2510685	Punjab	Fazilka	9-9-65
91.	Maj Shansher Singh Manhas IC-4898	Sikh	Lahore	10-9-65
92.	Capt Sushil Chandra Sabharwal IC-11026	Arty	Lahore	11-9-65
93.	A/Hav Raghunath Singh 3943797	1 Dogra	Chhamb	11-9-65
94.	Maj Adarsh Kumar Kochhar IC-8488	Arty	Sialkot	16-9-65
95.	Lt Bonala Vijaya Raghunandan Rao IC-14289(Posthumous)	GR	Chhamb	16-9-65
96.	Maj Abdul Rafey Khan IC-5823	Garh Rif	Sialkot	17-9-65
97.	Nb Sub Bhiwasan Ambhore JC-32564	2 Mahar	Khem Karan	17-9-65

1.	2	3	4	5
98.	A/Lt Col Russi Hormusji Bajina IC-2826	10 Mahar	Sialkot	18-9-65
99.	Maj D.N.Singh IC-13042	3 Kumaon	Keri	18-9-65
100.	Sub Laxuman Salunke JC-6355	10 Maratha	Jhama	18-9-65
101.	Nb Sub Ram Prashad JC-25538	1/1 GR	J&K	18-9-65
102.	Maj Man Mohan Chopra IC-2314 (Posthumous)	7 Cav	Chatanwala	19-9-65
103.	A/Maj Vijay Kumar IC-12464	Maratha	Chatanwala	19-9-65
104.	Lt Ravinder Singh Samiyal IC-13685	J&K Rif	Sialkot	19-9-65
105.	Maj Darshan Singh Lalli IC-9725 (Posthumous)	Dogra	Haji Pir Pass	20-9-65
106.	Hav Kanshi Ram 3930517 (Posthumous)	Dogra	Haji Pir Pass	20-9-65
107.	Hav Kedar Singh 2838710	9 Raj Rif	Sialkot	20-9-65
108.	Maj Ram Swarup Sharma IC-10025	18 Raj Rif	Khem Karan	21-9-65
109.	A/Maj Surender Prashad IC-13057 (Posthumous)	19 Maratha	Khem Karan	21-9-65
110.	Lt M.S. Buttar IC-13620	Punjab	Lahore	21-9-65
111.	Sub Pale Ram JC-6026	Jat	Lahore	21-9-65
112.	Nb Sub Chhotu Ram JC-24430	Jat	Lahore	21-9-65
113.	L/Nk Bharwar Singh 2848775	Raj Rif	Khem Karan	21-9-65
114.	L/Nk Lakha Singh 2439708 (Posthumous)	Punjab	J&K	21-9-65

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1	2	3	4	5
115.	Sep Lehna Singh 3150340	Jat	Lahore	21-9-65
116.	Lt Col Krishna Prasad Lahiri IC-2645	Garh Rif	Gadra City	22-9-65
117.	Capt Diwakar Anant Pranjape IC-12416	Mahar	Sialkot	22-9-65
118.	2/Lt Reet Mohinder Paul Singh EC-56709	8 Cav	Lahore	22-9-65
119.	L/Dfr Udhan Shing 1011043 (Posthumous)	4 Horse	Jasoran	22-9-65
120.	Sep S Bhaskaran Nair 2551118 (Posthumous)	9 Madras	Lahore	24-9-65
121.	Sub Nand Kishor JC-2431 (Posthumous)	4 Kumaon	Lahore	11-10-65
122.	Maj Puran Singh IC-6391 (Posthumous)	13 Grenadiers	Rajasthan	31-10-65
123.	Maj Parnjit singh Grewal IC-12007	3 Grenadiers	Rajasthan	15-11-65
124.	Sub Dina Nath JC-9950 (Posthumous)	3 Grenadiers	Rajasthan	15-11-65
125.	Lt Jasbir Singh IC-14790	1 Garhwal Rif	Barmer	17-11-65
126.	2/Lt Gopal Krishan IC-14541	4 MLI	Rajasthan	17-11-65
127.	Hav Shanta Ram Shinde 2744148 (Posthumous)	4 MLI	Rajasthan	17-11-65
128.	L/Hav Deb Singh Bhandari 4036250 (Posthumous)	1 Garh Rif	Rajasthan	17-11-65

INDIAN AIR FORCE

Mahavir chakra

1.	Wg Cdr William MacDonald Goodman, 3571	GD(P)IAF	1-9-65
2.	Wg Cdr Prem Lal Singh 3871	GD(P)IAF	6-9-65

1	2	3	4
3.	Sqn Ldr Padamanabha Gautam 4482	GD(P)IAF	6-9-65
4.	Sqn Ldr A.B.Devayya 4810 (Posthumous)	GD(P)IAF	7-9-65
<u>Vir Chakra</u>			
1.	Flg Offr Utpal Barbara 7229	GD(P)IAF	26-4-65
2.	Sqn Ldr Trevor Keelor	GD(P)IAF	3-9-65
3.	Flt Lt Virender Singh 5198 (Posthumous)	GD(P)IAF	4-9-65
4.	Flt Lt Trilochan Singh	GD(P)IAF	1-9-65
5.	Flt Lt Dev Nath Rathore 5780	GD(P)IAF	6-9-65
6.	Flg Offr Vinod Kumar Neb 8189	GD(P)IAF	6-9-65
7.	Sqn Ldr Sudarshan Handa 4819	GD(P)IAF	7-9-65
8.	Flt Lt Alfred Tyrone Cooke 6336	GD(P)IAF	7-9-65
9.	Flg Offr Subodh Chandra Mangain, 6760	GD(P)IAF	7-9-65
10.	Flg Offr Adi Rustomji Ghandi, 7722	GD(P)IAF	6-9-65
11.	Flt Lt Hamir Singh Mangat 5226	GD(N)IAF	6-9-65
12.	Wg Cdr Bharat Singh 3582	GD(P)IAF	14-9-65
13.	Flt Lt Parkash Pingale 6755	GD(P)IAF	16-9-65
14.	Sqn Ldr Amar Jit Singh Sandhu, 4075	GD(P)IAF	18-9-65
15.	Sqn Ldr Denzil Keelor 4805	GD(P)IAF	19-9-65

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1	2	3	4
16.	Flt Lt Vinoy Kapila 5596	GD(P)IAF	19-9-65
17.	Flt Lt Ajoy Kumar Majumdar 5071	GD(P)IAF	20-9-65
18.	Sqn Ldr Anthony Louis Mousinho, 4418	GD(P)IAF	1-9-65
19.	Sqn Ldr Sudesh Kumar Dahar 4425	GD(P)IAF	1-9-65
20.	Sqn Ldr Sube Singh Malik 4663	GD(P)IAF	1-9-65
21.	Sqn Ldr Ajit Singh Lamba 4877	GD(P)IAF	1-9-65
22.	Flt Lt Sharadchandra Naresh Deshpande, 5425	GD(N)IAF	1-9-65
23.	Flt Lt Chander Sekhar Doraiswamy, 5601	GD(P)IAF	1-9-65
24.	Sqn Ldr Johnny William Greene 4093	GD(P)IAF	3-9-65
25.	Wg Cdr Om Parkash Taneja 3843	GD(P)IAF	6-9-65
26.	Sqn Ldr Shri Krishan Singh 3996	Accounts/IAF	6-9-65
27.	Sqn Ldr Bhupindra Kumar Bishnoi, 5494	GD(P)IAF	7-9-65
28.	Flt Lt Dil Mohan Singh Kahai 5272	GD(P)IAF	7-9-65
29.	Flt Lt Chandra Krishna Kumar Menon, 5699	GD(P)IAF	7-9-65
30.	Flt Lt Amarjeet Singh Khullar 5854	GD(P)IAF	7-9-65
31.	Sqn Ldr Jasbeer Singh 4476 (Posthumous)	GD(P)IAF	7-9-65
32.	Flt Lt Vinod Kumar Bhatia 6497	GD(P)IAF	8-9-65

1	2	3	4
33.	Flt Lt Pramod chandra Chopra 5194	GD(P)IAF	11-9-65
34.	Wg Cdr Surapati Bhattacharya 3974	GD(P)IAF	12-9-65
35.	Flt Lt Vinod Patney 6125	GD(P)IAF	13-9-65
36.	Sqn Ldr Satish Nandan Bansal 4014	GD(N)IAF	14-9-65
37.	Sqn Ldr Chitranjan Mehta 4615	GD(P)IAF	14-9-65
38.	Flt Lt Pradyot Dastidar 5456	GD(N)IAF	15-9-65
39.	Sqn Ldr Tej Prakash Singh 4755	GD(P)IAF	19-9-65
40.	Wg Cdr Peter Maynard Wilson 3590	GD(P)IAF	21-9-65
41.	Sqn Ldr Inder Jeet Singh Parmar, 4835	GD(P)IAF	14-9-65
42.	Flt Lt Gopal Krishan Garud 6327	GD(N)IAF	22-9-65
43.	Flt Lt Gangadhar Rangnath Railkar, 5928	GD(N)IAF	22-9-65

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LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Civilians

	<u>Name of the Interviewee</u>	<u>Appointment held in 1965</u>
1.	Rao, Shri P.V.R., I.C.S. (Retd)	Defence Secretary
2.	Sarin, Shri H.C., I.C.S. (Retd)	Secretary Defence Production
3.	Sharma, Smt Sarla	M.L.A., Legislative Assembly, Punjab
4.	Singh, Shri L.P., I.C.S. (Retd)	Home Secretary
5.	Singh, Sardar Mangal	Villager, Khem Karan
6.	Singh, Sardar Tek	Villager, Khem Karan

Army

1.	Kumaramangalam, Gen P.P. (Retd)	VCOAS - Lt Gen
2.	Sharma, Gen V.N.	Dy M.A. to COAS - Major
3.	Sunderji, Gen K	CO, 1 Mahar - Lt Col
4.	Dhillon, Lt Gen J.S.(Retd)	GOC, XI Corps
5.	Rawley, Lt Gen N.C.(Retd)	GOC, 11 Inf Div - Maj Gen
6.	Sagar, Lt Gen Moti, PVSM, (Retd)	GOC-in-C Southern Command
7.	Sibal, Lt Gen H.K.,MVC, (Retd)	GOC 7 Inf Div - Maj Gen
8.	Singh, Lt Gen Harbakhsh (Retd)	GOC-in-C Western Command
9.	Singh, Lt Gen K.K. (Retd)	Cdr 1 Armd Bde - Brig
10.	Thapan, Lt Gen M.L. (Retd)	GOC 26 Div - Maj Gen
11.	Vas, Lt Gen E.A. (Retd)	Cdr 69 Mtn Bde - Brig
12.	Antia, Maj Gen (Retd)	Cdr 268 Inf Bde - Brig
13.	Gahlaut, Maj Gen H.C. (Retd)	Cdr 62 Mtn Bde - Brig

- | | | |
|-----|---|--|
| 14. | Kalan, Maj Gen S.S.,MVC,
(Retd) | GOC 19 Inf Div |
| 15. | Palit, Maj Gen D.K., VrC,
(Retd) | Cdr 23 Mtn Div |
| 16. | Prasad, Maj Gen Nirranjan
(Retd) | GOC 15 Inf Div |
| 17. | Rajwade, Maj Gen M.R., MC,
(Retd) | Cdr 41 Mtn Bde - Brig |
| 18. | Rawat, Maj Gen L.S. | Brig Major 161 Inf Bde |
| 19. | Singh, Maj Gen Gurbakhsh,
MVC, (Retd) | GOC 4 Mtn Div |
| 20. | Singh, Maj Gen Nirranjan,
MC (Retd) | Cdr 54 Inf Bde - Brig |
| 21. | Sparrow, Maj Gen R.S.,MVC
& Bar (Retd) | GOC 1 Armd Div |
| 22. | Bhullar, Brig J.S. | Coy Cdr, 8 Garhwal Rif under
43 Lor Bde - Captain |
| 23. | Dhillon, Brig H.S. (Retd) | Cdr HQ 43 Lr Inf Bde |
| 24. | Ferris, Brig L.E.R.B.,
AVSM (Retd) | Cdr 65 Inf Bde |
| 25. | Hayde, Brig D.E., MVC,
(Retd) | CO 3 Jat - Lt Col |
| 26. | Lahiri, Brig K.P.,VrC
(Retd) | CO 1 Garhwal Rif - Lt Col |
| 27. | Mandher, Brig J.S.(Retd) | Cdr 58 Inf Bde |
| 28. | Nambiar, Brig A.M.M.(Retd) | Cdr 50 Para Bde |
| 29. | Sidhu, Brig D.S. (Retd) | Cdr B Coy 4 Sikh - Major |
| 30. | Singh, Brig Arvinder (Retd) | Cdr D Coy 1 Para |
| 31. | Singh, Brig Manmohan (Retd) | Cdr 191 Inf Bde |
| 32. | Singh, Brig Sant, MVC & Bar
(Retd) | CO 5 Sikh LI - Lt Col |
| 33. | Singh, Brig Verinder | Cdr C Sqn Poona Horse |
| 34. | Singh, Col Girdhar (Retd) | CO Poona Horse - Lt Col |

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|-----|--------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 35. | Singh, Col Khajan (Retd) | GSO-1, 15 Inf Div - Lt Col |
| 36. | Chandra, Lt Col Naresh (Retd) | Bde Maj 29 Inf Bde - Major |
| 37. | Yadav, Lt Col Ram Singh (Retd) | CO 2 Para - Lt Col |

Navy

- | | | |
|-----|---|---|
| 1. | Kohli, Admiral S.N.(Retd) | Rear Adm DCNS |
| 2. | Tahiliani, Admiral R.K.,
PVSM, AVSM, ADC | Lt Cdr FOO |
| 3. | Awati, Vice Adm M.P.,
PVSM, VrC (Retd) | CO INS Tir |
| 4. | Barboza, Vice Admiral (Retd) | Naval Attache in Indonesia |
| 5. | Roy, Vice Adm M.K., PVSM,
AVSM (Retd) | Cdr INS Godavari &
Capt D-22 Sqn |
| 6. | Samson, Vice Adm B.A.,PVSM,
(Retd) | Flag Officer Commanding
Indian Fleet |
| 7. | Soman, Vice Adm B.S.(Retd) | CNS |
| 8. | Gupta, Rear Adm S.K.,MVC | Sr Pilot INAS 310 |
| 9. | Paintal, Rear Adm D.S.,
(Retd) | Cdr INS Kirpan - Lt Cdr |
| 10. | Singh, Rear Adm R.V., Flag
Offr Commanding, Goa Area | Lt Cdr CO INS 300 |
| 11. | Dang, Cmde B.K. (Retd) | Dir of N Plans - Capt |
| 12. | Mehta, Cmde DR,PVSM (Retd) | CO INS Mysore - Capt |
| 13. | Sharma, Cmde P.D. | Pilot Sea Hawk IAAS 300 Sqn
Lt |
| 14. | Chatterjee, Cmde J.,AVSM,
(Retd) | COS to FOB - Cdr |
| 15. | Nagarkar, Cdr W.S., VSM,
(Retd) | Dy Dir, Naval OPS - Cdr |

Air Force

- | | | |
|----|-------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1. | ACM Fontaine, Da La | 14 Sqn Hunter
Wg Cdr |
| 2. | ACM Singh, Arjan (Retd) | Chief of Air Staff
Air Marshal |

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|-----|---|--|
| 3. | AM Jog, VrC | OC 27 Sqn Hunter
Wg Cdr |
| 4. | AM Singh, Shiv Dev (Retd) | AOC-in-C, CAC, AVM |
| 5. | AM Wollen, MSD, PVSM, AVSM,
VM, (Retd) | OC 28 Sqn MiG-21
Wg Cdr |
| 6. | AVM Banerji, M | Commander 24 Sqn Vampire
Sqn Ldr |
| 7. | AVM Keelor, D, VrC | 9 Sqn Gnat
Sqn Ldr |
| 8. | AVM Naik, MB (Retd) | OC IAF Station, Kalaikunda
Gp Capt |
| 9. | Air Cmde Banerji, S (Retd) | OC, IAF TAC in I Corps HQ
Wg Cdr |
| 10. | Air Cmde Patney | 8 Sqn Mystere
Flt Lt |
| 11. | Air Cmde Rathore | 27 Sqn Hunter
Flt Lt |
| 12. | Air Cmde Singh, NB (Retd) | Station Commander, IAF Station
Bagdogra
Wg Cdr |
| 13. | Air Cmde Singh, T, VrC | No.1 Sqn,
Sqn Ldr |
| 14. | Gp Capt Bhatia, VrC & Bar | 8 Sqn Mystere
Fg Officer |
| 15. | Gp Capt Taneja, OP, VrC
(Retd) | OC, 1 Sqn
Wg Cdr |
| 16. | Wg Cdr Mangain | 14 Sqn Hunter
Flying Officer |
| 17. | Wg Cdr Shankaran, O | Navigator, 16 Sqn Canberra
Sqn Ldr |

*** *** ***

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(Lahore, 1966) |
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