

CHAPTER - XI

WAR DIPLOMACY, CEASE-FIRE, AND TASHKENT

UN Efforts

The time chosen for Pakistan's attack against India, first through infiltration of armed men, and subsequently by full military action on 1 September 1965, was not favourable to her diplomatically. Pakistan's case was further weakened by her collusion with China. During the middle of the Sixties, the Western powers considered China and the Soviet Union as their enemy number one, and they made every effort for the containment of Communism in the world. Military blocs, such as the SEATO and the CENTO, were brought into existence for curbing Communism in Asia. So, it was naturally an embarrassment to Western powers, particularly the US and the UK when Pakistan, a member of both the SEATO and CENTO, decided to join hands with China against India. On the other hand, in the eastern bloc (the Communist bloc) differences between the Soviet Union and China surfaced to such an extent that the former could not welcome the growth of influence of the latter in South Asia at the cost of a big non-aligned country, India, where it was developing significant economic and political stakes. So, as soon as the news of the Pakistani attack against India was flashed out, sincere efforts were made in Moscow, Washington, London, and also in the Security Council, for immediate cessation of hostilities.

Due to an unprecedented number of incidents involving the violation of the Cease-Fire Agreement and the Cease Fire Line (CFL) in Kashmir, involving an increasingly large number of armed men belonging to the Army and Air Force since August 1965, the UN Secretary-General, U. Thant, drew the attention of the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India, by addressing a cable to them on 1 September 1965, and appealed to them to take immediate steps to respect the Cease-Fire Agreement in the interest of peace in the region(1). The Secretary-General clearly emphasised in the cable that if immediate steps were not taken to defuse the situation along the Cease Fire Line, an outright military confrontation between the armed forces of India and Pakistan would be imminent and could have the gravest implications for world peace and for the lives of the peoples of India and Pakistan. In his cable, the Secretary-General also pointed out that he fully realised the complexities of the problems between India and Pakistan, but wondered if these problems could not be solved by peaceful means. He further pointed out that "resort to force in the settlement of a dispute of this kind is

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contrary to both the spirit and letter of the charter of the United Nations and the obligations undertaken by India and Pakistan as members of the Organization"(UN)(2). He called upon President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri, in the interests of peace in the sub-continent and in the world, to respect the Cease-Fire Agreement and to take the following steps immediately:

- (1) Cessation of crossings of the Cease Fire Line;
- (2) the withdrawal of armed personnel of each side that had occupied positions on the other party's side of the Line; and
- (3) a halt to all firing across the Cease Fire Line from either side of it.

Before receiving a reply from President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri, the Secretary-General, on 3 September 1965, circulated a Report on the current situation in Kashmir with particular reference to the Cease-Fire Agreement, the Cease Fire Line, and the functioning of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). The purpose of the Report was to inform the members of the UN Security Council of the grave situation that was developing in Kashmir, of Secretary-General's deep concern about it, and of the steps he had been taking in the recent past in seeking to avert further deterioration of the situation and to establish peace in the region. This Report was based on the field reports sent to him regularly from the middle of June to 2 September 1965 by Lt General R.H. Nimmo, Chief of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan. Giving the nature of violations of the Cease Fire Line in Kashmir since 5 August 1965, the Secretary-General wrote in the Report: "General Nimmo has indicated to me that the series of violations that began on 5 August were to a considerable extent in subsequent days in the form of armed men, generally not in uniform, crossing the CFL from the Pakistan side for the purpose of armed action on the Indian side. This is conclusion reached by General Nimmo on the basis of investigation by the United Nations Observers, in the light of the extensiveness and character of the raiding activities and their proximity to the CFL even though in most cases the actual identity of those engaging in the armed attacks on the Indian side of the Line and their actual crossing of it could not be verified by direct observation or evidence(3).

The UN Secretary-General's Report also indicated that he made a few attempts to defuse the situation

along the Cease Fire Line in Kashmir by conveying his serious concern about it to the Governments of India and Pakistan through their permanent representatives in the UN. But it seems that he was not successful in his endeavour as Pakistan refused to co-operate with him. On 9 August 1965, the UN Secretary-General met the permanent UN representatives of India and Pakistan in the United Nations and, on the basis of General Nimmo's report on the violations of the Cease Fire Line in Kashmir, requested them to convey to their respective governments his very serious concern about the deteriorating situation along the Cease Fire Line in Kashmir. The UN Secretary-General wrote in the Report: "I have not obtained from the Government of Pakistan any assurance that the Cease-fire and CFL will be respected henceforth or that efforts would be exerted to restore conditions to normal along that Line. I did receive assurance from the Government of India, conveyed orally by their Representative at the United Nations, that India would act with restraint with regard to any retaliatory acts and will respect the Cease-Fire Agreement and the CFL if Pakistan does likewise"(4). He further reported that "in the meantime reports from UNMOGIP as of 30 August indicate a continuation of violations of the Cease-fire and the CFL from both sides"(5).

Giving details of Pakistani attack in the Chhamb and Jaurian areas, the Report of the UN Secretary-General said that military situation in Jammu and Kashmir had further aggravated due to massive Pakistani attack launched at 0230 hours on 1 September 1965 by two regiments of tanks and aircraft supported by Pakistani troops in brigade strength in the Chhamb area of the Jammu-Bhimber Sector of the Cease Fire Line(6). According to the Report, Pakistan had admitted the crossing of the Cease Fire Line in the Chhamb area on 1 September to thwart Indian action in this sector(7). However, for restoration of the Cease-fire and return of normal conditions along the Cease Fire Line, the Secretary-General suggested the following five conditions(8):

- (a) "A willingness of both parties to respect the Agreement they have entered into.
- (b) "A readiness on the part of the Government of Pakistan to take effective steps to prevent crossings of the CFL from the Pakistan side by armed men, whether or not in uniform.
- (c) "Evacuation by each party of positions of the other party now occupied and withdrawal

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of all armed personnel of each party to its own side of the line, which would include the withdrawal once more of Indian troops from Pakistan positions in the Kargil area.

- (d) "A halt by both parties to the firing across the CFL, that has been occurring from both sides in some sectors with artillery and smaller guns.
- (e) "Allowing full freedom of movement and access to United Nations Observers by both parties on both sides of the line".

After the Secretary-General's Report on the deteriorating situation in Jammu and Kashmir was circulated among the members of the Security Council, the President of the Security Council for September 1965, Arthur J. Goldberg of the US realising gravity of the problem, announced a meeting of the Security Council to consider the Secretary-General's appeal for cease-fire in Jammu and Kashmir.

During the course of debate on the resolution, the Pakistani representative, Amjad Ali, made strong plea to include references in the preamble of the resolution to earlier UN resolutions and a plebiscite in Kashmir. But his plea was rejected by the sponsors of the resolution saying that they were dealing with the immediate issues of peace and restoration of cease-fire agreement and the cease-fire. The resolution "does no more that call a halt to the escalation" of the conflict in Kashmir, observed Malaysian delegate, Radha Krishna Ramani. Similarly, other supporters of the resolution also emphasised the need for immediate cessation of hostilities and establishment of peace in the region on the basis of five points suggested by the UN Secretary-General in his report of 3 September 1965 to the Security Council.

Indian representative, G. Parthasarathi, putting forward India's point of view on the situation in Jammu and Kashmir, informed the Security Council before the resolution was put to vote that since Pakistan was responsible for the then conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan should be declared aggressor and it should not be allowed to get away with the aggression. He made it clear before the Council that India being a peace-loving country was desirous of peace being restored in Jammu and Kashmir, but it could not agree to accept a one-sided cease-fire. Parthasarathi argued that since Pakistan had not accepted the responsibility for massive infiltration in Jammu and Kashmir, it would be

premature for the Council to issue an appeal for cease-fire. However, he pointed out that cease-fire was to be enforced on the following conditions:

- (1) Acceptable guarantees by Pakistan that infiltration would be stopped and that its troops would be withdrawn.
- (2) Acceptable guarantees that there would be no recurrence of the same events again.

Pakistani representative, however, could not make any comment on the cease-fire proposal as he had no instructions on the issue from his government. The Malaysian representative said that the main thrust of the appeal was immediate cease-fire by both India and Pakistan, and it did not intend to pass any judgement on who was responsible for the conflict. But France, Jordan and, to some extent, Britain, took a different stand saying that while the immediate issue was armed conflict in Kashmir, at a later date the Security Council should revert to the more "basic political issues". On her part, the United States pointed out that one of the essential pre-requisites of the cease-fire should be withdrawal of all armed personnel of India and Pakistan who had crossed the cease fire line. However, the Soviet Union, while supporting the cease-fire appeal, took a neutral stand by neither criticising nor upholding the Indian or Pakistani version of the situation in Jammu and Kashmir.

On 4 September 1965, the Security Council, adopted a resolution jointly sponsored by the six non-permanent members of the Council - Bolivia, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, the Netherlands and Uruguay - calling for an immediate cease-fire in Kashmir(9). All the eleven members of the Council voted for the resolution. The Council requested the Secretary-General to report to it on the implementation of the resolution within three days. The resolution called upon the Governments of India and Pakistan:

- (1) "to take forthwith all steps for an immediate cease-fire,
- (2) "to respect the cease fire line and have all armed personnel of each party withdrawn to own side of the line; and
- (3) "to co-operate fully with the United Nations Military observer group in India and Pakistan in its task of supervising the observance of the cease-fire".

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On 4 September 1965, the Prime Minister of India, in his reply to the UN Secretary-General's appeal of 1 September 1965, clearly held Pakistan responsible for the dangerous developments in Jammu and Kashmir. He pointed out that the real cause of present tension along the border was massive infiltration of armed personnel including members of Pakistani armed force from the Pakistan side, and Indian action along the Cease Fire Line was forced upon her by Pakistani aggression in Jammu and Kashmir and was defensive in nature(10).

The Indian Prime Minister, narrated the facts which led to the grave situation along the Cease Fire Line, and demanded that Pakistan should "stop infiltration across the Cease Fire Line and withdraw the infiltrators and its armed forces from the Indian side of the Cease Fire Line and the international frontier between Jammu and Kashmir and West Pakistan" and also give an assurance that "there will be no recurrence of such a situation" in future(11).

On the other hand, the President of Pakistan, Mohammad Ayub Khan, in reply to the UN Secretary-General's cable of 1 September 1965, sent a lengthy and controversial letter on 5 September 1965 where he put all the blame for the unprecedented acts of violence along the Cease Fire Line in Jammu and Kashmir on India. According to him, the source and origin of the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir was the "so-called integration measures" of India, and the denial of the right of self-determination to the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, who "have taken to arms against Indian tyranny". Under these circumstances, "the Azad Kashmir Force backed by Pakistan Army, were forced in the exercise of the inherent right of self-defence to cross the Cease Fire Line in the Bhimber Sector for the first time since the cease-fire agreement was reached 17 years ago, and after repeated Indian armed attacks and occupation of Azad Kashmir territories by the Indian army"(12). As a resolution of the conflict between India and Pakistan he suggested that the people of Jammu and Kashmir "must be permitted freely to decide the question of accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan"(13).

By the time the UN Secretary-General received reply to his cable of 1 September 1965, from the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India, situation along the Cease Fire Line became very turbulent due to heavy fighting between the armies of India and Pakistan. Pakistani Army had reached Jaurian, and was advancing towards Akhnur to occupy the strategic road connecting Srinagar with Punjab

through Jammu. Apart from that, Pakistani aircraft heavily bombed Ranbirsinghpura, and heavy concentration of Pak forces took place at a number of places along the India-West Pakistan border. It seemed that Pakistan was poised for a big offensive against India, and a situation was created in which action restricted to Jammu and Kashmir could no longer meet the threat to India's security and sovereignty. Realising this critical situation, India, in the hope of minimising Pakistani military pressure in Chhamb sector, opened on 6 September 1965 a new front towards Lahore. Justifying the Indian Army's move in the Lahore sector, India's Minister for External Affairs, Swaran Singh, observed on 7 September: "Since the UN has throughout accepted that the security of Jammu and Kashmir is the responsibility of India, the Government of India had no alternative but to give active assistance by moving across the Wagah border to stop Pakistan at the bases from which attacks in Jammu and Kashmir were being mounted and supported"(14).

The UN Secretary-General received reports of these serious developments along the Indo-Pakistan border from General Nimmo on 6 September 1965. The same day the Security Council in an emergency session discussed the situation of the Indo-Pak conflict with a declaration by the Secretary-General that neither India nor Pakistan had responded to its call of 4 September for an immediate cease-fire. Under these circumstances, the Security Council, in unanimous resolution, requested the UN Secretary-General to visit India and Pakistan in an effort to bring about a cease-fire in the war. The Security Council also unanimously passed a resolution calling upon India and Pakistan "to cease hostilities in the entire area of conflict immediately, and promptly withdraw all armed personnel back to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965"(15).

India did not participate in the deliberations of the Security Council meeting. Her conditions for accepting the cease-fire proposal was made clear by her Foreign Secretary, C.S. Jha, just before the meeting started by reading out a letter from India's Minister for External Affairs, Swaran Singh, addressed to the UN Secretary-General in response to the Security Council's resolution of 4 September 1965. Jha said that, as the primary cause of the present conflict was Pakistani infiltration in Jammu and Kashmir, India would accept the cease-fire proposal if (1) Pakistan admitted sending infiltrators in Jammu and Kashmir, and (2) Pakistan would give an assurance that it would withdraw all the infiltrators from the Indian side of the Cease Fire Line(16).

Armed with the resolution of the Security Council, U. Thant reached Rawalpindi on 9 September 1965. After having "useful talks" in Rawalpindi but without any positive result on the question of cease-fire in Kashmir, the UN Secretary-General reached Delhi on 12 September to seek India's co-operation on the issue. The Indian Prime Minister, told the UN Secretary-General that India would, under no circumstances, accept a military solution of the Kashmir problem, and it was equally opposed to the idea of a plebiscite in the State, as Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of India. India would go for cease-fire when Pakistan would undertake to withdraw all her infiltrators from the Indian territory. But as the Secretary-General could not give any such assurance to Shastri, the cease-fire talks between them remained inconclusive.

In the evening of 12 September 1965, U. Thant sent letters to Shastri and Ayub Khan urging immediate and unconditional cessation of hostilities in the entire area of the conflict, on the line of the resolutions passed in the Security Council on 4 and 6 September 1965, as a prelude to further measures towards the restoration of lasting peace. But as both Shastri and Ayub Khan in their replies to his request for an unconditional cease-fire had added conditions and qualifications, upon which he had no right under the Security Council resolution to give such undertakings, he referred them to the Security Council for its urgent consideration.

Making a statement in Parliament, on 16 September 1965, Shastri put the blame on Pakistan as it did not agree to the UN cease-fire proposal, unless India agreed to accept Pakistan's "Peace-Plan" - involving the withdrawal of the armed forces of India and Pakistan from the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir, induction of an UN Afro-Asian Force, and plebiscite within three months thereafter. According to Shastri, India could not accept any of those conditions(17).

China's Role

Since the conflict of October-November 1962, China kept the border issue with India alive by occasionally issuing notes to the Indian Embassy in China on the alleged violation of India-China boundary by the Indian troops. On its part, the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, always denied the alleged charges of border violation by the Indian troops and termed them as "baseless". A Sino-Pak axis against India emerged very clearly with the progress of the war between India and Pakistan.

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To show her sympathy with Pakistan, China issued notes to the Indian Embassy alleging border violations by the Indian troops. Her press also carried out extensive propaganda against the role of India in the Indo-Pak conflict. On 7 and 8 September, the Pakistani Ambassador to China, Maj Gen Raza, conferred with the Chinese Head of State, Liu Shao Chi, and received a letter which was a reply to Pakistani President Ayub Khan's request for China's assistance. On 8 September China's active support to Pakistan was displayed by issuing a warning note to India which read:

"China cannot but pay serious attention to the Indian Government's expansionist action against its neighbours and strengthen China's defences and heighten her alertness along her borders. The Chinese Government once again solemnly warns the Indian Government: India must dismantle all the aggressive military structures it has illegally built beyond or on the China-Sikkim boundary, withdraw its aggressive armed forces and stop all its acts of aggression and provocation against China in the Western, Middle and Eastern sectors of the Sino-Indian border. Otherwise India must bear responsibility for all the consequences arising therefrom"(18).

The Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, on 12 September, in its reply to the Chinese Note of 8 September, turned down the alleged Chinese charges as: "adding some more baseless allegations to the old charges and issuing unwarranted warnings and threats to the Government of India"(19).

China issued another ultimatum to India on 16 September regarding the same old charges and reiterated the support to Pakistan on Kashmir(20).

On 17 September, Shastri, in reply to China's ultimatum, agreed to a joint inspection of the points on the Sikkim-Tibet border where India was alleged to have set up military structures. He further agreed: "If any structures" (alleged to have been built by Indian personnel)" are found on the Tibet side of the border, there can be no objection to their being demolished"(21).

As the Government of India considered the Chinese ultimatum a Sino-Pakistani collusion against the security and integrity of India, she without losing any time, launched a diplomatic offensive against this joint move, and informed all powers - big and small - and also members of the UN Security Council about it. India's Ambassador in Moscow,

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T.N. Kaul, on 17 September, met the Soviet Prime Minister, Alexei Kosygin, and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko separately and discussed the Chinese ultimatum with them. Gromyko assured Kaul that there was no change in Soviet Union's Kashmir policy and the Soviet Union would try to solve this problem peacefully through the Security Council(22). The Soviet President, appealed to the friends of the peoples of India and Pakistan "to prevent those who would like to add fuel to the flames", and do their utmost to see that the conflict was immediately extinguished(23).

On 17 September, the British Foreign Secretary, Michael Steward, described China's ultimatum to India as a serious and dangerous development(24).

The US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, publicly advised China not to intervene in the India-Pakistan conflict and let the Security Council settle the matter(25). B.K. Nehru, the Indian Ambassador to USA, on 17 September, requested Dean Rusk that the United States in conjunction with the Soviet Union and Great Britain should make a joint declaration warning China to keep its hands off India and in the event of non-compliance resume arms aid to India, suspended since 8 September 1965(26). The US strategy on the question of Chinese support to Pakistan in the Indo-Pak conflict was to break the Pakistan-China axis without any embarrassment to Pakistan and to bring a cease-fire agreement through negotiations under the auspices of the UN Security Council. So, at this stage, the US preferred to watch further developments along the India-China border.

In his second report to the Security Council on 17 September 1965, U. Thant said that infiltrators from Pakistan were increasingly involving in the conflict on the Indian side of the Cease Fire Line; the Cease Fire Line had been crossed by the Indian forces at Kargil, in the Tithwal area, and the Uri-Poonch bulge upto the Haji Pir Pass; further south, Indian forces had crossed the Jammu border in force towards Sialkot and the India-Pakistan border, about 56 km south-east of Sialkot, and from Amritsar and Ferozepur in the general direction to Lahore; and Pakistani forces in strength had crossed the Cease Fire Line in the direction of Akhnur(27).

In reply to UN Secretary-General's report to the Security Council, the Indian Education Minister, M.C. Chagla, told the Security Council that as Kashmir was an integral part of India, as Texas or

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Alaska was part of the US, India could not accept Pakistani proposal of a plebiscite in Kashmir for the cessation of the Indo-Pak hostilities. Chagla branding Pakistan as aggressor requested the members of the security Council to call upon Pakistan to desist from carrying out hostilities against India so that peace could be established in the subcontinent(28). On the question of Chinese warning and ultimatum to India, Chagla charged that it was a deep conspiracy against India by Pakistan as it wanted India to fight on two fronts. He also brought it to the notice of the Security Council that President Ayub Khan had full knowledge of China's ultimatum to India, which was nothing but a threat of invasion by China(29). He made an appeal to the US to stop supply of arms to Pakistan as President Eisenhower, had assured India that if Pakistan used US-supplied arms against India, the United States would stop all such aid.

Pakistan, in the hope of settling the Kashmir problem by force with Chinese military pressure on India from the north, objected to the need for enforcement action by the Security Council to impose a cease-fire. Pakistan's Law Minister, S.M. Zafar, addressing the Security Council on 18 September, expressed doubt whether the Security Council's resolution threatening UN "coercive action" would lead to the end of the Indo-Pak War. He said: "I venture to doubt the necessity for such action"(30). He cautioned that to adopt such a procedure "would be a momentous decision, and its implications would have to be carefully weighted before the Security Council proceeds further in this matter"(31). Zafar pleaded to accept the conditions for a cease-fire as elaborated by President Ayub Khan.

When members of the Security Council put their heads together in search of a peaceful solution of the Indo-Pak conflict, China again tried to un-nerve India by moving troops on her side of the Sikkim-Tibet border and north of Demchok area in Ladakh(32). On 18 September, Chinese troops kept on moving around Nathu La, and the following day moved forward to near the track-junction, south of Daulat Beg Oldi(33). Along the sikkim-Tibet border, the Chinese troops were seen placing heavy field guns on mountain tops and digging trenches and holes near Nathu La and Jelep La(34). China had deployed 15 divisions of troops in Tibet, including two armoured divisions. At least three divisions supported by armoured regiments were deployed around Sikkim. Besides the land forces, China deployed about 300 aircraft, including transport planes, in Tibet(35).

On 19 September, China issued another Note to India, reiterating its allegations, and putting off the time-limit, set in its Note of 16 September, - 'before midnight of 22 September 1965'. On this Note, China extended "all-out support to Pakistan in her just struggle against Indian aggression"(36).

Before India could study and send a reply to China's Note of 19 September 1965, China, sent another Note on 20 September 1965, alleging intrusion by the Indian troops into "Chinese territory of Dumchele"(37). The Note demanded immediate stop to all such intrusions and provocations and a guarantee by India that it "will not again invade and occupy Dumchele....otherwise, India must bear full responsibility for all the consequences that may arise therefrom"(38).

India replied that the Chinese "distorted the facts and accused India of intrusion into Dumchele in order to cover up their own intrusion and firing on Indian civilian personnel in undisputed Indian territory near Tsaskur"(39). After this action three Indian personnel were reported missing.

Besides Tsaskur, the Chinese troops also intruded all along India's northern border and started firing at Indian border posts in Ladakh and Sikkim. In the Western Sector, on 19 September 1965, the Chinese troops intruded into Indian territory near the Indian check-post at the track-junction between Daulat Beg Oldi and Murgo and took up position approximately about 3 km inside Indian territory(40). They also entrenched themselves in strength on the Indian side of the line of actual control at several points opposite the Indian Hot Spring check-post. Again, the Chinese forces moved forward in strength in the eastern part of Demchok right up to the Charding Nullah and assumed a threatening posture at the Indian civilian post on the western side of the Nullah. In the Middle Sector, the Chinese troops were seen on the Indian side of the international boundary at Barahoti on 19 September 1965. In the Sikkim Sector, the situation became very tense, as on 20 September 1965, the Chinese troops moved over the Dongchui La Pass in Sikkim and occupied an Indian border(41).

Though Chinese troop movements and firings on the Indian border-posts appeared provoking in real sense she had neither any intention nor any capacity to strike against India in favour of Pakistan, as Pakistan was basically an ally of the US, which considered China as her enemy number one. China also knew it well that Pakistan had extended her hand of friendship to her against India, as they both

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considered India as their common enemy. Perhaps, she thought that with the improvement of US-Indian relations, the US might put pressure on Pakistan to normalise her relations with India which would ultimately bring about a rupture in Pakistan-China relations.

Moreover, China and the Soviet Union were supplying a considerable amount of military assistance to Vietnam to assist the latter in her struggle against the US intervention in that country. It was difficult for China to open a new front against India, while keeping her supply of military assistance to Vietnam intact.

The Cease-Fire

The Super Powers and other members of the Security Council were keenly watching China. Their strategy was to persuade India and Pakistan to accept a cease-fire proposal before China's second ultimatum expired on 22 September 1965, so that China could not get any chance of intervention in the Indo-Pakistan conflict.

In the resumed debate in the Security Council, the US delegate, Arthur Goldberg, made a forceful plea on 18 September for immediate cease-fire before this conflict spread to other nations. He accused China of trying to "spread the conflict and exploit what was already a tragedy"(42). The Soviet delegate, Nikolai Foderenko said the conflict would profit only those who followed a "criminal policy of dividing the world's peoples to serve their own imperialist and expansionist aims"(43).

After a long debate, on 20 September 1965, the Security Council adopted a resolution calling upon India and Pakistan to cease-fire on Wednesday, 22 September 1965, at 07.00 hrs GMT (12.30 hours IST). The resolution directed "both Governments to issue orders for a cease-fire at that moment and a subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel back to the positions held by them before August 5, 1965"(44). The resolution requested the Secretary-General "to provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the cease-fire and withdrawal of all armed personnel", and "to exert every possible effort to give effect to the Resolution, to seek a peaceful solution, and to report to the Security Council". It warned all the States not to "aggravate the situation in the area".

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Neither India nor Pakistan was happy with the resolution of the Security Council as it did not fulfil the demands of either country. India wanted a cease-fire on two conditions, i.e., (1) Pakistan should be declared aggressor and (2) Pakistan should give an assurance that in future she would in no way interfere in the affairs of Kashmir. Pakistan wanted a cease-fire linked with plebiscite in Kashmir. However, India accepted the cease-fire proposal without any conditions, and its decision was conveyed to the UN Secretary-General on 20 September. India said that if the Secretary General could convey Pakistan's acceptance of the cease-fire to her on 21 September before 4.30 p.m (IST), appropriate instructions would be passed on to the army commanders to cease fire from 12.30 p.m. on 22 September 1965. But as no communication was received, there was no cease-fire on 22 September 1965(45).

The UN resolution on cease-fire did not satisfy Pakistan either. Pakistan had probably thought that with the active help of China she would be able to defeat the Indian Army. When this did not happen she pinned her hope on the Security Council, which was expected to force a resolution upon India for a plebiscite in Kashmir. As even that did not happen, on 21 September, a huge crowd burnt the United States Information Service Library in Karachi and pulled down the UN flag from the UN building(46). A general strike was observed in the city to protest against the UN resolution. Similar demonstrations took place in Lahore also, where the mob stoned the United States Consulate and tore down the US flag. The mob raised anti-US, anti-UN and anti-India slogans and demanded from the Pakistan government to quit CENTO and SEATO. Life-size portraits of the rulers of China, Indonesia, Turkey, Jordan and Iran, who helped Pakistan in its war with India, were displayed by the crowd.

When demonstrators were busy in raising anti-
cease-fire slogans in different parts of Pakistan, —
Z.A. Bhutto, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, quietly dashed to New York, probably to seek some clarifications on certain points on the cease-fire, particularly on the steps: "to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict".

Addressing an emergency session of the Security Council on 22 September, Bhutto made an impassioned speech on the Kashmir issue. He then read out a message from President Ayub Khan describing the Security Council's resolution on cease-fire as "unsatisfactory", but "in the interest of peace", Pakistan had decided to "honour it", and ordered its

troops to cease fire at 12.05 p.m (West Pakistan Time), on 22 September, provided India had given similar orders to its troops. Bhutto also threatened that Pakistan would leave the UN and "wage a war of one thousand years" if the Security Council failed in its "last chance" to solve the Kashmir problem which was pending before the Security Council since 1947(47). It no doubt sky-rocketed Bhutto's popularity in Pakistan.

After Pakistan's acceptance of the cease-fire was announced, India's Permanent Representative at the UN, G. Parthasarathi said that India had already conveyed its acceptance of the cease-fire to the Secretary-General on 20 September 1965, a new time might be fixed for the implementation of the cease-fire. The Security Council fixed 3.30 a.m (IST) of 23 September, as the new deadline for the cease-fire(48). Accordingly, guns went silent on both sides, and peace returned to the sub-continent.

Soviet Role

The Indo-Pak war on its south flank predominantly inhabited by Muslims did not serve the political objectives of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the Soviet Union, since the beginning of the Indo-Pak conflict of September 1965, made sincere efforts to restore peace in the sub-continent. The Soviet press maintained strict neutrality in reporting news about Indo-Pak war, and the Soviet delegate in the Security Council also maintained a neutral stand throughout the Council's deliberations and advised both India and Pakistan to accept cease-fire without any delay.

Thus, desirous of a peaceful and quick settlement of the Indo-Pak War, Soviet Premier, A.N. Kosygin, wrote letters to Indian Prime Minister, Shastri, and Pakistani President, Ayub Khan on 20 August, 4, 11 and 17 September 1965, urging them for a speedy and peaceful solution of the conflict, as it was not only affecting two major Asian states but also aggravating tension in South Asia, South-East Asia and even the Soviet Union, as the war-torn region was "immediately adjacent to the frontiers of the Soviet Union"(49). Kosygin made it clear that "any disputes, including the questions connected with Kashmir can best be settled by peaceful means. The military way cannot lead to their solution"(50). He suggested that "the main efforts should be concentrated on immediately halting military operations, stopping the tanks and silencing the guns", and it was no time to trace out "what caused the conflict and to find out who is right and who is wrong"(51). In the opinion of the Soviet leader, "the

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first step after immediate cessation of hostilities could be reciprocal withdrawal of troops beyond the cease-fire line established by the Agreement between India and Pakistan in July 1949"(52). To achieve peace between India and Pakistan, the Soviet leader suggested that "both sides should enter negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the differences", and to achieve this end both India and Pakistan could count on Soviet Union's "good co-operation" or "good offices" provided "both sides consider this useful"(53).

Finally, Kosygin through his letter of 17 September 1965 invited the Prime Minister of India and President of Pakistan to hold peace talks in Tashkent or any other part of the Soviet Union so that a direct contact could be established between them to achieve an agreement on peace. Kosygin also expressed his desire to take part in the meeting, if the leaders of both India and Pakistan desired so(54).

India accepted the proposal on 22 September 1965(55). However, Pakistan did not accept the Soviet proposal for a meeting immediately and waited for the outcome of China's ultimatum to India. As the Chinese threat to India did not materialise, Pakistan approached the West, particularly the US, for a negotiated settlement of the issue(56). It appears that the West advised her, to go for a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir problem under the auspices of the Soviet leader at Tashkent. Pakistan, being dependant on huge American economic and military aid, could not go against the US advice. Thus, when Pakistan realised that there was no room left for any manoeuvre, in early November 1965, she accepted the Soviet good offices for a meeting with the Indian Prime Minister. On 16 November - 1965, Lal Bahadur Shastri expressed his willingness to meet President Ayub Khan in Tashkent.

Nonetheless, President Ayub Khan thanked China for her help to Pakistan during the conflict, and Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto even said that the inclusion of the proposal on steps "to assist towards a settlement of political problem underlying the present conflict" in the resolution of the Security Council, dated 20 September 1965, was due to the Chinese ultimatum to India.

Meanwhile, Pakistan tried to grab as much Indian territory as possible before the actual cease-fire. Within a few hours of the Pak Foreign Minister's solemn assurance to the Security Council that Pak armed forces would stop fighting at 1205 hrs (West Pakistan Time) on 22 September 1965, five Pak B-57

bombers with top fighter cover bombed Chheratta, a suburb of Amritsar, at 1610 hrs (Indian Standard Time), killing over fifty-five civilians and wounding about the same number. The bombing raid also destroyed about fifteen houses(57). The Pak Permanent Representative to the United Nations said that it was just "to relieve the mounting pressure of Indian ground forces" in the Wagah Sector where "fighting continued right up to the time of the cease-fire".

Fighting after Cease-fire

There was a resumption of fighting as a result of violation of cease-fire by Pakistan, "to capture the maximum possible territory of India"(58). The Pakistani troops supported by the irregulars (Mujahids) renewed infiltration into India and occupied Indian territories wherever possible, in violation of the cease-fire. In this way, in Rajasthan Sector, Pakistani troops occupied the villages of Ghotaru, Longanwala, Buily, Bhuttewala and Achchri Toba on 23 September, Dharmi Khu on 25 September, and Sarkari Tara, Churanwala and Kishangarh on 26 September(59). However, Pakistani attacks were repulsed at the Rajasthan armed constabulary posts of Asutar on 23 September, Sachu and Tanot on 26 September, and Karora on 27 September(60). On 23 September, the Pakistani troops, advanced over the Cease Fire Line and occupied a position half a mile inside India, near Naushera in Kashmir. On 24 September, Pakistani troops fired with rifles and LMG towards the Uri-Punch road from dominating positions west of the road(61).

Pakistan's attitude towards the cease-fire becomes further clear from a letter of her Permanent Representative dated 26 September 1965 addressed to the UN Secretray-General regarding the schedule for withdrawal of troops. The Pakistani Representative said: "In our judgement.... military disengagement should proceed concurrently with an honourable political settlement. In other words, it is imperative that we should evolve a self-executing arrangement and procedures that would ensure an honourable settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute which is the basic cause of the present conflict. Without such an arrangement it is hard to envisage an effective programme for the withdrawal of forces. Moreover, if immediate steps are not taken to bring about an honourable settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, we would be faced with the real danger of resumption of hostilities which may well lead to a conflict of much greater dimensions(62).

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The UN Secretary-General reported the violation of cease-fire by India and Pakistan to the Security Council. Realising the serious nature of the resumption of conflict by India and Pakistan, the Security Council, on 27 September 1965, passed another resolution re-expressing its "grave concern" over the non-implementation of the cease-fire by India and Pakistan, called upon them to observe the cease-fire and "promptly to withdraw all armed personnel as necessary steps in full implementation of the resolution of 20 September 1965(63).

But, the Security Council's resolution of 27 September 1965, had little impact on Pakistan, as the latter did not "visualise the cease-fire as providing an opportunity for reduction of tensions and establishment of peace and good neighbourly relations with India"(64). On the contrary, she wanted to utilise the cease-fire period to occupy Indian territory through clandestine military operations. In the meantime, Pakistan accelerated the training activities of her irregulars in different camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and trained new recruits for sabotage and similar activities in India. According to the information of the Government of India, 14,000 raiders from the North-West Frontier were recruited and dispatched to different parts of Pak-occupied Kashmir for guerilla activities in Kashmir(65). On 2 October 1965, 150 recruits were sent to Shinkiarri from the Afzalpur Training Centre in Mirpur Tehsil, and on 7 October, 400 guerillas completed their training at Durigi(66). Pakistan Government also planned to recruit 1,000 additional men under the age of twenty-five from Poonch district for training at Shinkiarri Training School, and also trained a large number of irregulars in different camps along the border in Sind for guerilla activities in Rajasthan.

In Rajasthan, Pakistan occupied the villages of Shahgarh and Murar on 30 September and 3 October respectively. But Pak attacks on Rajasthan armed-constabulary posts at Khara (2 October), Tanot and Asutar (3 October), Bakhri Toba (5 October), Karnewala (7 October), Tanot (11 October) and Bandah were repulsed. The last post in Jaisalmer district, over 57 km deep inside Indian territory, was strafed by Pakistani aircraft on 13 October(67). Pakistan took similar aggressive steps in Kashmir and Punjab and made serious attempts to grab as much Indian territory as possible. On their part, the Government of India took defensive steps to prevent Pak intrusions into India. As a consequence of these developments, the cease-fire violations were committed frequently by both India and Pakistan.

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Realising the grave situation along the Indo-Pak border, the UN Secretary-General, in a message to the Governments of India and Pakistan, on 14 October 1965, requested them to take the necessary steps to bring about the quick withdrawal of their troops as per the Security Council's resolution. The Indian Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, in his reply of 14 October to U. Thant wondered how the Security Council's resolution on cease-fire and troops withdrawal could be properly implemented if Pakistan continued to have "scant regard for the cease-fire"(68). In the same letter the Indian Prime Minister stated that India had "accepted the cease-fire without any pre-conditions or reservations" but "since a cease-fire has not yet been effectively established, the stage for a planned schedule of withdrawal over the entire area of conflict has not yet arrived. The local Commanders in particular areas should first meet under the auspices of the observers and enter into discussions with a view to reaching agreement on the stabilization of the cease-fire. Thereafter, we are agreeable to appropriate representatives of India and Pakistan meeting in the sub-continent to consider the question of withdrawals, together with the Chief Military Observer of the UNMOGIP whom you have entrusted with overseeing the operations"(69).

The situation along the Indo-West Pakistan border became so tense, that the Security Council passed another resolution on 5 November 1965. It requested the Governments of India and Pakistan for full implementation of cease-fire and withdrawal of all armed personnel back to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965, as called for in its resolutions of 4, 6, 20 and 27 September 1965(70). The resolution also called upon them to co-operate with the United Nations to end the violations of the cease-fire, and prepare a plan and schedule for the withdrawals by both parties with a time limit on its implementation(71).

However, Security Council's resolution of 5 November 1965 could not bring peace. Attacks and counter-attacks by the troops of India and Pakistan continued. At last, on 26 November 1965, the UN Secretary-General announced that India and Pakistan had agreed to work with Brigadier General T. Morambio of Chile for the withdrawal of their troops to pre-5 August 1965, positions.

TASHKENT DECLARATION

After accepting the Soviet offer to hold bilateral talks with the Indian Prime Minister at Tashkent, on 23 November 1965, Pak Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto dashed to Moscow on a four-day visit to discuss with the Soviet leaders the whole gamut of Pakistan-Soviet relations and the issues to be discussed during the Tashkent Summit. In New Delhi, on 2 December 1965, the Soviet ambassador I.A. Benediktov, met Prime Minister Shastri and discussed the prospects of the forthcoming Indo-Pak conference at Tashkent with him. On 8 December 1965, a simultaneous release in New Delhi, Karachi and Moscow said that the Indo-Pakistan summit at Tashkent would commence on 4 January 1966.

However, before going to Tashkent, India and Pakistan made their respective stands very clear on the subject to be discussed in the meeting. India's stand was that since Kashmir was an integral part of India, it could not be an issue for discussion at Tashkent. Moreover, India was not willing to withdraw her troops from Haji Pir, Tithwal and Kargil, occupied during the conflict. But Pakistan made it clear that it would not sign any no war pact or pledge with India, unless Kashmir problem was solved on the basis of the stand taken by her(72).

Welcoming the Indian and Pakistani leaders in the opening session of their conference at Tashkent on 4 January 1966, Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin did not refer to the "Kashmir problem", but strongly advocated friendly relations between India and Pakistan. In reply, Shastri expressed the hope that if an agreement could emerge for renouncing the use of force for settling the differences between India and Pakistan, it would be remarkable achievement of the meeting at Tashkent.

On the other hand, Ayub Khan, said that to establish firm and lasting basis of peace in the sub-continent he was ready to sign a "No-War Agreement" with India after solving the "basic problem". The "basic problem" i.e. the Kashmir issue, thus indirectly, influenced the Tashkent conference, and in spite of several meetings no solution could be arrived at.

Seeing the conference turning into a deadlock, on 9 January, the Soviet Prime Minister made herculean efforts to save the conference from collapse. He undertook long discussions with the Indian Prime Minister and the Pak President since morning to late night, and succeeded in persuading the two Asian

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leaders to agree to a Joint Declaration. In the morning of 10 January, Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub Khan again met and a final agreement was reached on the text of the Joint Declaration at around 1.30 p.m. At about 4.30 p.m the Joint Declaration was signed by both in the presence of Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin, and it came to be known as Tashkent Declaration(73). A few hours after the signing of the Tashkent Declaration, Shastri, died of heart attack at about 1.30 a.m on 11 January.

The Tashkent Declaration may be considered a unique and very significant agreement for the improvement of Indo-Pakistan relations. In this agreement, it was not only resolved by both India and Pakistan "to restore normal and peaceful relations" between them and "to promote understanding and friendly relations between their peoples", but they also agreed to reaffirm their obligation under the UN Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means. Both resolved that all their armed personnel "shall be withdrawn not later than 25 February 1966, to the position they held prior to 5 August 1965, and both sides shall observe the cease-fire terms on the cease fire line".

The Prime Minister of India and President of Pakistan agreed, inter alia, not to interfere in the internal affairs of each other, discourage hostile propaganda, restore normal functioning of diplomatic missions, consider measures for the restoration of economic and trade relations and communications, promote cultural exchanges, repatriate the prisoners of war and create conditions to prevent the exodus of people and return of the property and assets taken over by either side during the conflict.

The Tashkent Declaration not only paved the way to remove differences in Indo-Pak relations, but also satisfied the leaders of both countries to some extent. Shastri was happy that the conference did not take any decision on Kashmir, and Ayub was satisfied that he got back from India the lost areas of Tithwal, Haji Pir and Kargil, and Kashmir was at least discussed in the conference. President Ayub said on 1 February 1966, that "the Tashkent Declaration not only strengthens the integrity of Pakistan but also provides a possibility for the peaceful settlement of the dispute of Jammu and Kashmir"(74). However, the Tashkent Declaration created mixed reactions in India and Pakistan, and the hawks in both countries expressed unhappiness over it.

Casualties and Loss of Territory

The total number of casualties of Indian personnel during the Indo-Pak War 1965 and in the subsequent cease-fire violations had been 11,479, out of which 2,862 were killed and 8,617 wounded(75). The details of the wounded are: from 5 August to 23 September 1965: 6,684; and from 24 September 1965 to 25 February 1966: 1,933. The break-up of the 8,617 persons wounded was: Officers - 436, JCOs - 347, ORs - 7,768 and NCsE - 66. The ratio of killed to wounded was:

Officers 1:2.6; JCOs 1:3, ORs 1:3.8 and NCsE 1: 5.1.

According to a statement of the Defence Minister of Pakistan, dated 4 December 1965, 1,033 Pakistanis were killed during the Indo-Pak War(76). The Indian official sources, however, go to prove that about 5,800 Pakistanis were killed in the war(77).

The territories occupied by India in Pakistan and by Pakistan in India totalled approximately 1,920 sq km and 540 sq km respectively as shown below(78):-

Approximate areas occupied by India in Pakistan and Pak-Occupied Kashmir on cease-fire:

Area around Gadra in Rajasthan	- 390 sq km
Bedian, Barki, Padri, Dograi, Bhasin and Ichhogil Uttar along the eastern bank of the Ichhogil Canal	- 360 sq km
Some areas of Narowal opposite Dera Baba Nanak of India; and Chawinda, Phillora, Deoli, Pagowal, Bajra Garhi, Suchet Garh and Chaprar on the south-east and north-east of Sialkot	- 470 sq km
Haji Pir Pass, Tithwal and Mirpur area	- 650 sq km
Kargil area	- 50 sq km
Total =	<u>1,920 sq km</u>

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Approximate areas occupied by Pakistan in India on cease-fire:

Khem Karan area	-	50 sq km
Chhamb area	-	490 sq km

Total	=	540 sq km

To implement the Tashkent Declaration, the Pak Army Chief, General M. Musa, arrived in New Delhi on 21 January 1966, and signed an agreement on the withdrawal of troops with his Indian counterpart, General J.N. Chaudhuri, the following day. In this agreement, plans were approved for disengagement of troops and reduction of tension along the Indo-Pak border by withdrawing forces from the line of actual control and removing and nullifying all defences. It was further agreed that Lt Gen Bakhtiar Rana of Pakistan and Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh of India under the Chairmanship of UN representative Maj Gen T. Morambio would formulate ground rules to implement the withdrawal agreement in the Western Sector. This agreement came into effect from 0600 hours IST (0630 hours WPT) on 25 January 1966.

On 25 January Lt Gen Bakhtiar Rana and Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh met in Amritsar in the presence of Maj Gen T. Morambio and discussed the withdrawal plans. The final agreement for the withdrawal of troops was signed by them in Lahore on 29 January 1966. By 30 January, the first phase of the withdrawal of the Indian and Pakistani forces was completed. Gen J.N. Chaudhuri paid a two-day visit to Pakistan on 9-10 February 1966 and discussed with Gen M. Musa, further troops withdrawal and exchange of PsOW(79). On 16 February 1966, India and Pakistan agreed to reduce their overall military strength in Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with the 1949 cease-fire agreement by 1 April 1966. The impact of these measures was such that on 18 February 1966, the UN Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that "there has been no confirmed incidents involving breaches of the cease-fire"(80).

Meanwhile, the Indian Parliament approved the Tashkent Declaration on 22 February. Withdrawal of troops by India and Pakistan went on satisfactorily in the Eastern Sector also. On 22 February 1966, Lt Gen Manekshaw of India and Maj Gen Fazal Muqueem Khan of Pakistan, expressed satisfaction in Dhaka over the "Operation Pullout" in the Eastern Sector, in accordance with the 1959 Agreement.

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As per the schedule of the Indo-Pak Agreement signed on 22 January 1966, the withdrawal of troops to pre-5 August 1965 position was completed by India and Pakistan on 25 February 1966. On 26 February 1966, the Indian troops and civilian authorities reoccupied the areas vacated by Pakistan. On the same date, the UN Secretary-General U. Thant, reported to the Security Council that India and Pakistan had implemented the Security Council's resolutions of 27 September and 5 November 1965(81).

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2. Ibid., p.81.
3. Report by the Secretary-General on the Current situation in Kashmir with particular reference to the Cease-Fire Agreement, the Cease-Fire Line and the Functioning of the UNMOGIP. pp.73-79.
4. Ibid., p.77.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p.76.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. The Hindu, 6 September 1965.
10. Dev Sharma, pp.82-85. Cable S/6672.
11. Ibid.
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13. Ibid., p.91.
14. The Hindu, 8 September 1965.
15. Dev Sharma, pp.92-93. UN Security Council Resolution (No.220) of 6 September 1965.
16. The Hindu, 8 September 1965.
17. Ibid., 17 September 1965.
18. White Paper No.XII, p.39.
19. Ibid., pp.40-41.
20. Ibid., pp.43-44.
21. Ibid., p.45. Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 17 September 1965.
22. The Hindu, 18 September 1965.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., 19 September 1965.
27. Ibid., 18 September 1965.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid. In his letter of 16 September to Mr U. Thant, President Ayub Khan rejected the UN Secretary General's suggestion for immediate cessation of hostilities and face-to-face meeting between the leaders of India and Pakistan.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., 20 September 1965.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. White Paper, No.XII, p.48.
37. Ibid., p.49.
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39. Ibid., p.52.
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44. Dev Sharma, pp.93-94. UN Security Council Resolution No.211.
45. The Hindu, 22 September 1965.
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47. Ibid., 23 September 1965.
48. Ibid.
49. Dev Sharma, p.105. Letter of 4 September 1965, from Soviet Prime Minister, A.N. Kosygin, to Lal Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister of India and Mohammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan.
50. Ibid., p.106.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid., pp.107-108. Letter dated 17 September 1965, from Mr. A.N. Kosygin to Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri and Mohammad Ayub Khan.
55. Ibid., p.7. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri's statement in the Lok Sabha on 22 September 1965.
56. According to The Washington Post (Washington) of 11 October 1965, Pakistan had sought Anglo-American initiative for a solution of the Kashmir problem.
57. Letter dated 26 October 1965, from Swaran Singh, Minister for External Affairs, Govt of India, addressed to the President of the Security Council. Government of India publication, Indo-Pakistan Conflict: Security Council Documents, October 1965, (External Publicity Division, New Delhi), p.70.
58. Ibid.
59. Some of the training centres of the irregulars were run by Pakistan opposite the Indian border posts of Harbhaj-Ki Dhani, Halwa Head, Mandi Siddique Ganj, Nagarparkar and Chachro. - Ibid., p.71.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid., p.72.
62. Government of India publication, p.63.
63. Dev Sharma, p.94.
64. Govt of India publication, p.74.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Dev Sharma, p.99.
69. Ibid., p.100.
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72. International Studies Quarterly, The Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi, Vol.8, July 1966-April 1967, p.6, M.S. Rajan, "Tashkent Declaration: Retrospect and Prospect".
73. Appendix VII - Text of Tashkent Declaration.
74. Dev Sharma, p.114.

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75. Report on the Health of the Armed Forces, 1965, pp.37-39. According to the Ministry of Defence, Govt of India, Report 1965-66, p.4, However, India's total casualties were 12,714, with 2,763 killed, 8,444 wounded and 1,507 missing.
76. Dawn (Karachi), 5 December 1965.
77. Statement made by India's Defence Minister, Y.B. Chavan, in the Rajya Sabha, on 23 November 1966, as quoted by Hari Ram Gupta, p.368.
78. Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Annual Report 1965-66, Map, facing p.6.
79. Dev Sharma, p.161.
80. Ibid., p.164.
81. Ibid., p.168.

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