

TOP SECRET

TWO COPIES

Record of the talk between Prime Minister of USSR, Mr.N.S.Khrushchev and the Prime Minister of India at the latter's residence on 12th February, 1960.

COPY NO 1.

P.M.

I am happy to have the opportunity to have this talk. There have been interesting developments in world affairs in which Mr.Khrushchev has been playing a leading and outstanding part. I would be grateful if Mr.Khrushchev would kindly give me his appraisal of the international situation.

Mr.Khrushchev: The international situation is good but there is no justification for anyone to be complacent about it. The situation, one might say, is better than it was yesterday. It is an accidental coincidence that with Dulles's death, the policy of "from position of strength" has also died. It would not be right to say that Dulles took his policy away. Even if he had lived, his policy would have died in any case. This is because USSR had demonstrated its strength and vitality which United States and all concerned had to reckon with. At one time the policy of surrounding Soviet Union with military bases was being actively pursued. The main purpose of these bases was directed against the Soviet Union. The fact that we launched Sputniks, led people to realise that the policy of creating bases had failed. United States is very much concerned with the economic development of the Soviet Union and the fact that the Soviet Union is catching up with U.S.A. The Americans have begun to reconcile themselves with the fact that the Soviet Union will soon overtake them. In fact, in a number of scientific fields, we have already taken a lead. In view of this, the policy of "from position of strength" is of no use. This new element creates good conditions for the pursuit of peaceful policies. Our peaceful policies are beginning to be better understood and appreciated in the world.

Against this background, we feel that there is need for solution of concrete problems. We want to do away with all those factors which are standing in the way of Peace Treaty

with Germany and putting an end to the occupation regime there. Our partners have a rather weak position. I do not want to use the word 'opponents' which would be better understood. I have in mind our partners in the talks for the future of Germany, i.e. the Western powers.

When one talks with Eisenhower or Macmillan, it is difficult to find arguments in favour of the status quo, or for the preservation of the remnants of war. In my talks with Eisenhower, I noticed this specially. Eisenhower is very much different from Macmillan, because, as you know, Eisenhower is not Macmillan. Eisenhower is less of a diplomat and is, therefore, more natural and sincere. So he frankly admitted that the position in Berlin was not normal. In fact, he said so at a Press conference.

Now the question arises what can be expected at the Summit meeting in Paris in May? Macmillan and Eisenhower think that since the position is not normal, some ways of solving it should be found. It is Adenauer who is irreconcilable. We do not know what he is waiting for. We wonder if his obstinacy is not due to mental decay caused by old age. I say so, because his policy is not in accord with commonsense. His policy is indeed a burden on his Allies.

De Gaulle supports Adenauer, but only outwardly, because in his heart of hearts De Gaulle is more afraid of reunification of Germany. U.K. is also against reunification of Germany. U.S.A. is not against reunification but is not prepared to do anything to bring it about. The Western powers, however, want to use the situation in order not to have good relations with the Soviet Union.

I do not know what the Summit meeting at Paris will yield in regard to the German problem. Our position is strong and we will make use of it. We do not exclude the possibility that De Gaulle may be more helpful. I do not think it is necessary for me to repeat our position on Berlin. We seek no territorial acquisition there. All that we are interested is that ~~the~~ retention <sup>should</sup> of the social system in East Berlin ~~to~~ continue, with Berlin as a

Free City. The question of Germany and Berlin has become acute. We are interested in seeking a solution which will not lend itself to interpretation that any side has won and the other has lost. Therefore, we think that the possible solution would be to have an intermediary provisional settlement on the basis of the temporary status quo in Berlin. Meantime, the two German States should be recommended to find a solution. If they fail to find an agreement, then the former allies will be relieved of all obligations and will have a Peace Treaty. It is clear that not all allies will agree to sign a Peace Treaty with the German Democratic Republic. Our position is that all those who want to sign the Treaty should do so. The signing of the Peace Treaty will solve the German problem. If others are not agreeable to sign the Treaty, then as a last resort, we may have to sign a separate Peace Treaty with G.D.R. I told Eisenhower, you taught us a good lesson when we failed to sign a Peace Treaty with Japan - which for us was a foolish thing to do. U.S. had signed it in any case.

P.M.

We also did not sign it.

Mr.Khrushchev

Your position was different.

P.M.

We did not agree to certain clauses. So we signed a separate Peace Treaty with Japan two years later.

Mr.Khrushchev

The San Francisco Treaty with Japan had decided things in our favour and we should have signed it. Perhaps, our reason for not signing it was that Molotov dealt with these matters at that time and did not think them out straight.

Lately, Eisenhower has threatened us on Berlin, but the tone and manner of his threat is not as serious or categorical as before. Besides, I cannot see how anyone can threaten another country for signing a Peace Treaty. In fact, there is no alternative to solve this question. The Peace Treaty would be a blow to revenge seekers headed by Adenauer. It is they who will lose more. The rest will retain what they have.

Japan: Our relations with Japan are neither hot nor cold.

We do not like the Treaty recently signed by Japan with USA. We think that it is directed against us and China. The main purpose of this Treaty is to retain a certain level of tension. While signing this Treaty, the Americans had in mind internal fears in Japan. Afraid of the internal situation, USA wants to continue occupation regime in Japan.

In general, the international situation now is much better than it was a year ago. Our proposals on disarmament are very effective. People in all countries understand our unilateral reduction of armed forces. The latest launching of rockets at a distance of 12,000 kilometers is an additional argument for disarmament. It is now clear that Americans can no longer seek shelter behind the Atlantic Ocean. Therefore, there is still greater need to come to an agreement on disarmament.

Since we met last, the present situation, therefore, has changed considerably for the better.

P.M.

I take it that at the Summit, the two major problems will be Germany and disarmament.

Mr.Khrushchev:

The order of discussion will be different. We think the German problem is a particular problem, whereas disarmament is a general problem, embracing everybody and, therefore, will come up for discussion first. Adenauer wants the two problems to be tied together, but even he agrees with the order of discussion.

P.M.

Behind both these problems, perhaps in the ultimate analysis, there lies the fear that disarmament will be unfavourable to one side, in so far as it would weaken it. This fear would also affect the solution of the German problem.

Mr.Khrushchev:

U.S., France and U.K. agree that these two questions are separate. Only Adenauer wants to consider them jointly.

P.M.

Would you consider it possible to make progress on disarmament without making progress in regard to the German problem?

Mr.Khrushchev:

It is very difficult to answer this question.

P.M.

In the mind of the people, both the problems are linked by fear which is common to both of them.

Mr. Khrushchev:

We quite realise that if we sign a Peace Treaty with Germany, it will aggravate the situation and will lead to certain difficulties which, when solved, will lead to stability. This may be a painful process. We are preparing for it, in case no agreement is reached. I consider this matter as psychological. I do not think that they will start a war in case we signed a Peace Treaty with Germany.

P.M.

This may not lead to a war but will probably be an obstacle towards disarmament.

Mr. Khrushchev:

This will be a psychological shock which will wear itself out. Life compels people to go back to normal. We are reducing armed forces. If others attack us, our General Staff thinks that we will need about 100 rockets to destroy U.K., France and Germany; about 300 rockets would be needed to destroy U.S.A. No one doubts that material resources and facilities for making rockets in sufficient numbers are available. This seriously alters the correlation of forces, and indeed influences American thinking. I recollect that when Macmillan was criticised for going to the Soviet Union, he had said that the alternatives before him were either to go to Moscow for talks or evacuate women and children from U.K. to Canada. Therefore, there is no alternative to taking a sane attitude and putting an end to arms race. If we agree with the view that arms race, which will result in piling up dangerous weapons, would itself put an end to the race, then we will be living with our hands on trigger. There will be a constant danger that some mad man may fire the first shot which may result in war. Eisenhower understands this, so does Macmillan. It is more difficult to say this of De Gaulle. Eisenhower has only a few months left as President. Vice President Nixon does not understand anything at all. So the problem becomes difficult. When in America, I told Lodge that Nixon may be President, and that makes us feel concerned. When I met Nixon he told me that he was in trade with his father. His tragedy is that in politics he has the same attitude as in trade. Lodge said that this was not so.

I only hope that I am wrong in this assessment of Nixon.

P.M.

The German problem does not directly concern us, but it interests us, as it is a part of the overall problem of war and peace. On the other hand, disarmament is a problem which concerns everybody. My fear is that if the German problem is not settled by some kind of agreement, it will affect the solution of the problem of disarmament also. The two appear to be connected. I cannot get this apprehension out of my head.

Mr.Khrushchev:

I think those countries who are afraid, should be more keen on disarmament.

P.M.

Many Western countries themselves do not like the rearming of Western Germany.

Mr.Khrushchev:

I can say that Poland and Czechoslovakia are also concerned about this matter seriously. Even in 1956 when feelings against Soviet Union were high in Poland, the Poles were afraid of losing their western provinces. We could withdraw our forces from Poland, but the Poles felt more secure, while our troops were there.

P.M.

Does Mr.Khrushchev think that at some future date there was a possibility of East and West Germany uniting?

Mr.Khrushchev:

I do not think so.

P.M.

At present I do not think it is a possibility at all. I do not think that anybody desires it either, but if there is disarmament, would you consider it possible that at a later stage there may be a some sort of Federation or Confederation?

Mr.Khrushchev:

G.D.R. proposed Confederation but Adenauer rejected it. I personally think that Confederation may be a possibility. The differences of social systems will remain as they are which will make unification difficult. AS a Communist I believe -- you may not agree with me -- that ultimately the two will come together.

P.M.

The world is changing, and if I may say so, the differences are tending to get less and less, thereby bringing the countries closer.

Mr.Khrushchev:

The Germans are having a sort of competition. On one hand, Adenauer is trying to maintain the capitalist order, whereas the G.D.R. is striving to demonstrate the superiority of the socialist system. As a Communist I think that in the long run, the Germans will be convinced of the superiority of the socialist system.

P.M.

When Mr.Khrushchev put forward his great proposals for complete disarmament, phased over four years, did he expect that such logical and far-reaching proposals will be accepted? Perhaps, people's minds were not yet conditioned for it. Secondly, the implementation of such a proposal would create a lot of dislocation and confusion in America, as it will throw a good part of economy out of gear. What does Mr.Khrushchev consider as practical steps, which might be feasible at the present stage?

Mr.Khrushchev:

We proposed both the maximum and the minimum. The maximum was complete disarmament; minimum was the reduction of armed forces. So far as we are concerned, the minimum has been exhausted. I agree that the problem of disarmament is a difficult problem, but the programme which I set out was a programme for a struggle over the years. We are now actively carrying on the struggle in the economic field. In 1965, we will have absolute superiority over USA in overall production. We will have a higher standard of living and the shortest working day. As you are aware, we are already ahead of USA in providing spiritual requirements for our people. These problems cannot be settled by war.

P.M.

It is quite true that in economy the competition is going on. In the field of war, however, is not the Soviet Union making reduction in conventional forces only? What, if I may ask, is the position in regard to reduction by the Soviet Union of non-conventional arms?

Mr.Khrushchev:

What you say is right. While we cut down conventional arms, we also propose the banning of the atomic weapons. USA thought

that they had a very strong air force, and they wanted to retain their superiority by refusing to ban bombers which were to be used to deliver atomic weapons. At that time they had said that the Soviet Union wanted to make itself stronger by banning non-conventional arms. Then they wanted us to cut down our conventional arms. So now we have met the arguments of our opponents by cutting down conventional weapons. Frankly speaking, we are stronger than America, because we have better rockets which cannot be intercepted. The military experts estimate that one out of four bombers may get through, but even this may be wrong. What can USA do now when we have met their arguments. If they suggest that we revert to our original proposal, i.e. destruction of rockets and bases, we will gladly agree to it.

P.M. Disarmament should concern both these aspects of conventional and non-conventional arms.

Mr.K. We fully agree.

P.M. In our view, disarmament is a world question, because it concerns all States - big or small.

Mr.K. That is why I said that the German problem was a particular problem, whereas disarmament was a general problem.

P.M. While since the disarmament is a general problem, what can be done in our view to associate other countries with it? To begin with, perhaps the Summit Conference should be narrow. The fewer people are there, the more fruitful discussions are likely to be. But what <sup>do</sup> you envisage regarding the increase of membership for the Summit Conference in future?

Mr.K. If this problem registers progress at the Summit Conference, then the composition of the Conference itself can be reconsidered. It should be possible also to enlarge the Commission of ten, which is at present concerned with the disarmament problem.

P.M. Every country has a claim to self-preservation, and while it is true that Poland and Czechoslovakia are vitally interested in the solution of the disarmament problem, there are countries in Asia which are big countries -- Japan, China and India. They also have to participate at some stage or the other in the



solution of the disarmament problem.

Mr.K. This is absolutely right. In fact, this is what will happen.

P.M. Any agreement on disarmament has to be world-wide if it is to be effective at all.

Mr.K. I quite agree with you that those countries of Asia that you have mentioned, should be associated with disarmament. I think Indonesia, with a large population, should also be added to them. The difficulty at the present time is that the composition of the Disarmament Commission is a result of compromise.

P.M. These countries (China, Indonesia etc.) are not in the Disarmament Commission. China is not even in the United Nations. The membership of China appears most important from the point of view of disarmament.

Mr.K. The present situation is contrary to commonsense and U.S. realises this itself. Some voices of reason are now being heard in U.S. People are now talking in terms of recognition of New China. Five years ago, these very people could not possibly have talked in favour of the recognition of China without putting themselves to trouble.

P.M. In its own interests, U.S. will not agree to disarmament unless Disarmament included China. Is it not possible to admit China to these talks on disarmament, even without admitting China to the United Nations?

Mr.K. It is difficult to answer this question, as it particularly concerns China. I do not know if China will agree to go to Disarmament Commission of U.N. without being a member <sup>of UN</sup> itself. In this matter prestige is involved. I personally think it unlikely that China will agree to it without being a member of U.N. Probably when there has been some progress in disarmament, it will lead to conditions which will enable China to be in the United Nations. This will happen before, ~~if~~ any ~~agreed~~ agreement on disarmament is reached.

P.M. I feel, if sufficient progress is made at the Summit, it will create a better atmosphere for considering the participation of

China in the United Nations.

Mr.K. This is inevitable.

P.M. I agree that it is inevitable, but I was thinking of the various stages.

Mr.K. Any progress on disarmament might make it easier for China to take its rightful place in U.N.

P.M. I have no doubt that there is now greater appreciation in U.S. of the need for China to be in U.N. As you are aware, we have always in the past been in favour of admission of New China to U.N. We shall continue to do so in future; but what comes in the way is, perhaps, prestige and the problem of what should be done with Chiang Kai-Shek. The main opposition to the admission of China is from U.S.

Mr.K. Yes, that is true, but they will have to reconcile themselves to the fact that there cannot be two Chinas. In fact, Taiwan is an island of Pe/king China. The Chinese Government will never agree to the proposition of two Chinas. Even if they were invited to U.N., they will not sit along with the representatives of Taiwan China. We also agree with this stand.

P.M. We recognise only one China. I was talking about the possible course of developments. The Americans are beginning to realise that their policy on China is creating trouble for themselves. On the other hand, having created Taiwan, it is difficult to see how they can get over Chiang Kai-Shek. My intention is to point out the conflict which the Americans have to face.

Mr.K. I agree with you that U.S. has created this problem, but as Presidents change, so can the policy change. They did not recognise us for 16 years. When I was in U.S., I was told that Alexander I did not recognise America for 23 years. In reply, I pointed out to the Americans that what Alexander <sup>I</sup> ~~fixxx~~ did was stupid. There was no reason for Americans to repeat stupidity. In fact, I was more blunt. I told them that Alexander I was a fool and the Americans should not do what he did.

P.M. I mention this point in relation to disarmament question. It seems that if China cannot go to U.N., it cannot go to Disarmament

Commission either. If disarmament does not make progress, it may be difficult for China to go to U.N. So we get a vicious circle.

Mr.K.

This is indeed a vicious chain, but if we take out one of the links, the whole chain will collapse. It may be possible for U.S. to find a way out. It can, for instance, take the stand that the majority in the United Nations has voted for China. U.S. has been trying to restrain them for long, but when U.S. agrees to the recognition of New China in U.N., it can lift this restraint, in which case the majority in U.N. can admit China. On its part, U.S. can tell Taiwan that it did whatever possible for Taiwan, but that it could not prevent U.N. from admitting New China. Thus, U.S. can appear to play a noble role by respecting the verdict of the majority in U.N.

P.M.

I will come back to <sup>this</sup> ~~the~~ matter again. May I request you to give us your appraisal of the situation in the Middle East?

Mr.K.

I think the situation in the Middle East is getting more and more normal. U.K. and France have reconciled themselves to the fact that Suez belongs to U.A.R. Nasser is also beginning to take up a stand appropriate to his age and position vis-a-vis Iraq. Nasser now realises that the policy of either ignoring or swallowing up ~~of~~ Iraq will not work.

The trouble in Middle East is that a lot of unexpected things are happening. There are too many reactionary governments. Take Iran, for instance. There the Shah is pursuing a very reactionary policy. He is afraid of United States, us and, more than anybody, his own people. When our delegation was in Tehran, the Shah invited them to his bed room as he was unwell at that time. When our representatives went to his bed room, they found ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> by his bed side ~~that~~ he had an automatic revolver. When the King of Iraq died, the Shah simply lost his nerves. He immediately signed an agreement providing for American help. This agreement mentions help against direct and indirect aggression. Now I ask you what <sup>is</sup> indirect aggression. It is nothing but revolt of the people.

P.M.

Perhaps, Shah has <sup>now</sup> a new wife who will cheer him up!

Mr.K.

That may be so, but she will not <sup>add</sup> get to his brains. We have told the Shah that we do not threaten him in any way, but will expose his reactionary policies. During a reception in Moscow for the Italian President, the Iranian Ambassador, whom we respect, came and asked me to end propaganda against Iran. We told him that we will make sure that there are no personal attacks against Shah, but the propaganda against Iran will continue. The Ambassador also asked me why I was not going to Iran during my present trip. I replied that the conditions were not ~~xxxxxxx~~ favourable for my visit to Iran. We had made several gestures of friendship to Iran, including assistance for many projects but they were all turned down. Iran is poverty-stricken, but the Shah loves to increase the number of soldiers. I have a fear that Iran will go up in smoke and end in tragedy. The people around Shah themselves may not like the present situation to continue. We have a feeling that even U.S. might encourage a coup d'etat. Apart from big landlords, there are others who are influential and are surrounding the Shah, but they are all dissatisfied, because Shah has taken the entire power in his own hands. The landlords want to share this power. So far as U.S. is concerned, it does not trust the Shah. Once the Shah secretly proposed an agreement with us. This was done at the back of U.S. When the U.S. came to know of it from Iranian Ministers, they sat upon the Shah. The result was that he spoilt his relations with us without gaining any confidence from U.S. either. After this, U.S. wants a more stable regime there.

P.M.

But how will they achieve it?

Mr.K.

They have a lot of connections there with the army.

P.M.

But the Shah himself comes from an army family which is only two generations old.

Mr.K.

He comes from a dynasty of robbers.

P.M.

May I have your appraisal of events in Africa?

Mr.K.

In Africa, interesting developments are taking place. People there are becoming more and more insistent on their rights. This

direction of events will continue to develop. At present a great deal of trouble is going on in Congo. The conflict in Algeria has not given anything to France. This has provided encouragement to the people of Africa. In Latin America too, the position is not what it was five years ago. We are in sympathy with the aspirations of the people in Africa and Latin America. We are giving help to some African Republics and also to Kingdoms there. We will continue to do so.

P.M. As Mr. Khrushchev is aware, there is going to be a meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London in May. Originally, it was timed to take place after the Summit, but then the dates were changed. Now the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting will take place before the Summit. More and more African countries are gaining independence and are coming to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. At present there are two or three of them, but a few years later, more than half of the Prime Ministers will be from Africa.

Mr.K. The British are very able. They are certainly more adroit than the French.

P.M. No matter how able one may be, the facts cannot be ignored. Tension is growing between South Africa and U.K. When Macmillan went to South Africa recently, he did not get along well at all with the South African Govt. It is quite possible that South Africa may even go out of this Commonwealth association. There is a growing conflict between the new African States and the racial policies of South Africa. U.K. has been <sup>caught</sup> ~~cut~~ between the two.

Mr.K. We do not know the internal situation in South Africa well. We do not know what forces are at work there and what may be expected to happen. Even though we often hear that Moscow's arm is very long, yet it often happens that we do not even know the names of Communists there.

P.M. In South Africa there is no legal Communist Party. Anyone whom they dislike is dubbed as a Communist and put behind bars. We have no diplomatic relations with South Africa, but as there are a large number of people of Indian descent there, we continue to

get news from them. We have fairly close contacts with other parts of Africa. We often get into trouble in Central Africa. Some times, our representative is not allowed to stay in a hotel or eat in a restaurant. When we protest, the Government apologises, but says that the hotels and restaurants were private institutions and so nothing could be done about it.

Mr.K.

This is, indeed, a wild thing to take place in our time.

P.M.

Some people even ask us to withdraw our representative from there, but the local Indians ask us to continue him there as it offered them some protection.

Mr.K.

I suppose patience is the only answer.

P.M.

May I refer to a matter which is of great interest and embarrassing <sup>ment</sup> to us? This is our present relationship with China. Mr.Khrushchev has friendly relations with both India and China and personally he is a man of great wisdom and experience. So I refer to this matter, because I feel that he will well realise and appreciate that this matter is not only embarrassing for us but for him also. I would like to thank him for his various speeches and tell him that both as a matter of policy and best relations with China, we want to solve the present dispute in a peaceful and friendly way. But I must confess that our respective positions are so different that at present there is no bridge between us.

Recently our Government has sent a reply to China. This is an argumentative sort of reply, answering China point by point. Apart from that, I have sent a personal letter to Chou En-Lai, suggesting that we might meet in the second half of March in Delhi. He had suggested a meeting in Rangoon. Although for the moment there is no basis for negotiations, a personal meeting will be generally helpful. China and India are neighbours with a long friendship. It will be unfortunate if tensions were to continue indefinitely.

I am not going into the merits of these matters. These are complicated matters involving the border. All kinds of things such as history, custom, tradition are involved, but I will be glad to supply any material which you may like to have.

Mr.K.

May I say something? You are quite right. It is a most embarrassing question which you have hurled at me. The difficulty is that we think that you and China both are friendly and peace-loving countries. We made a statement, the significance of which you have rightly and correctly appreciated. We took no definite stand and will do our best to hold that line. We would not like our relations with either of our two friends to cool off. It is possible for two wise men to agree among themselves. If the third man appears on the scene, he will only make matters worse, no matter how intelligent or stupid he may be. Even if the two sides requested mediation, it will be very difficult for a third person to mediate. You and China are right in not asking for mediation. Our warmest wishes are that this conflict may come to an end as soon as possible and in a manner which will be to the satisfaction of all concerned. This conflict is a sop to aggressive forces and is against the interest of the forces working for peace.

I am happy at the prospect of your meeting with Chou En-Lai. I am certain that when two reasonable people meet, they can find arguments to settle the conflict. The date and time for a meeting is a delicate question for you, China and for us. I know I have not been able to satisfy <sup>you,</sup> but I cannot do anything more than express my warm wishes for an early settlement of this matter.

P.M.

I appreciate your position. I raised this <sup>matter</sup> ~~specially~~ with great hesitation. I thought that it would be improper not to mention a subject of importance at a time when you were having a frank and friendly discussion covering a broad range of problems.

Mr.K.

I value frankness. I request you to understand me right. I wanted you to appreciate my difficulties and my position. If you send me the material on your dispute with China, I will certainly study the papers, but it will be difficult for me to take the position on merits, involving two friends. All we want is that India and China should re-establish their

old friendship.

P.M. I fully understand Mr.Khrushchev's position. The object of sending material to Mr.Khrushchev was not to expect a judgement but only that Mr.Khrushchev and his friends may have familiarity with our position.

It will soon be time for lunch. I am infinitely grateful to Mr.Khrushchev for spending so much time and for listening to me with patience.

Mr.K. I am grateful to you for a useful talk.

P.M. Is there any particular matter which you would like to discuss?

Mr.K. I cannot think of any.

P.M. I will see you off and on and will be happy to see you on return journey in Calcutta. I wanted to accompany you to Suratgarh but previous commitments make it difficult for me to do so.


Mr.K. I know how busy you are and <sup>am</sup> sorry that you cannot come to Suratgarh.

P.M. I intend to go there before I meet you again. I also wanted to accompany you to Bhilai, but day-after-tomorrow the Prime Minister of Finland is coming.

Mr.K. India has truly become a Mecca.

P.M. Finland is very different from India climatically and otherwise.

Mr.K. But people there are very nice.

  
(P.N.Kaul)  
Deputy Secretary,  
13-2-60.