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AMBASSADOR 6519-55W/

[Redacted] OF INDIA, Moscow
BUZAVIRAG..ULCA..14
(Now in BUDAPEST)

24th July 1960.

My dear Subimal,

I paid a visit to Poland from the 17th to 23rd July 1960. I attended the Polish National Day Celebration on the 22nd July and also said farewell to Sunil Roy, who is leaving Warsaw for New York next week. Rapacki, the Foreign Minister, and his wife came to dinner with us on the 19th, breaking his attendance at a session of the Politburo, which he addressed at midnight soon after the dinner. He received me at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 21st, and we had a long talk.

2. Rapacki's main concern was to impress on me the increasing gravity of the German situation. He said that all the checks on German militarism had been disappearing one after another. The Social Democratic Party was now hardly distinguishable from the ruling Party in its foreign policy. German intellectuals, who used to raise their voice against certain disturbing symptoms in their land, had now relapsed into silence. Dr. Adenauer, while professing to be a brake on the chauvinistic elements in Germany, was in fact encouraging them. A few weeks ago, he delivered a speech at Dusseldorf to a mammoth gathering of German refugees from East Prussia, endorsing their territorial claims and encouraging their hopes of going back to their lands, now included in Poland. In the course of his speech Dr. Adenauer deplored the lack of nationalist fervour among Germans. If only they would keep this spirit alive and burning, their friends would stand by them, and the lost territories of Germany would be theirs. The Polish Government took a serious view of this statement and had sent notes to all NATO Powers enquiring whether they had given any undertaking like the one to which Dr. Adenauer referred and what their attitude was. Rapacki said that he was anxious that the Government of India should be apprised of the situation in Germany, because India occupied a unique position, and enjoyed great prestige, in world affairs.

3. I thanked Rapacki for his exposition. I said that we had some problems, nearer home, which touched us more intimately, but we realised that the German problem was the most important and potentially the most dangerous of all. Rapacki said that he knew which were "the problems nearer home" which I had in mind. He felt that the trouble between India and China should not have been allowed to reach even such proportions as they had done, and he hoped that the two countries would be able to solve it in the spirit of their immemorial friendship. I explained how,

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Shankar. I would suggest that he should also

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despite our earnest efforts to preserve and develop our ancient friendship with China, a difficult frontier problem had been forced on us by the Chinese, who were not always quite straightforward with us in this matter. Rapacki asked me to remember the factors which constituted the present Chinese psychology — her exclusion from the U.N., her isolation from international life, the occupation of part of her territory by an American puppet and the indignities which the Chinese had suffered and which they could never forget. Rapacki went on to say that there were some persons who wanted to capitalise on our frontier trouble with China for reasons of their own. He spologetically added that there were such persons even in India. I said that there might be some such persons in India, where people were at liberty to air their political views, ranging from the extreme right to the extreme left, but, I said, our Prime Minister's policy of non-alignment had the firm backing of Indian public opinion, and the Prime Minister had clearly shown that nothing would cause him to swerve from that policy. Rapacki said that his government had complete confidence in our Prime Minister's wisdom.

4. We also talked about economic affairs, including our Third Five Year Plan. When I said that one of the principal goals of our next Plan was to make India self-sufficient in the matter of food, Rapacki said that he envied us, for we were in the happy position of being able to profit from other people's mistakes. Doubless Rapacki was thinking of Stalin's concentration on break-neck industrialisation, to the detriment of agriculture — a policy which he had forced on the neighbouring countries and which was one of the causes of the revolution in Hungary in 1956 and the revolution which nearly broke out in Poland the same year.

Yours sincerely,


(K.P.S. Menon)

Shri S. Dutt
Foreign Secretary
Ministry of External Affairs
New Delhi.