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Tel. 153-243

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EMBASSY

OF INDIA,
BUZAVIRAG UTCA 14,
BUDAPEST

31st July 1960.

Sub: "New Trends" in Soviet Policy.

My dear Subimal.

You will have read my political report for the month of June, 1960. In the light of after events you must be thinking that I had taken too optimistic a view of the international situation and, in particular, of the Soviet Government's outlook. Yet there were some grounds for optimism at the beginning of July. The tensions, raised by the U-2 incident, seemed to be subsiding and the personal vendetta against President Bisenhower had all but ceased. Cultural exchanges with the West went on as usual: there was the usual brisk influx of summer tourists, including even a top executive of the Voice of America, and no less than 4 British exhibitions were held in Moscow. The 4th July reception in the U.J. Embassy was marked by great cordiality and a tended by the highest leaders then present in moscow, namely, Mr.Mikoyan, Mr.Mozlov and a larger calaxy of Soviet dienitaries than usual. As a restern observer put it, it almost looked as if the descent from the Summit had halted helfway.

- 2. An event of greater, and more lasting, significance, was the Communist Congress in Bucharest, where the Soviet Government reasserted its ideological leadership. Fr.Khrushchev reaffirmed his policy of co-existence and his pet theories regarding the non-inevitability of war and the possibility of peaceful transition to Socialism, and poured scorn on those who, quoting here and Lenin parrot-like, took the opposite view. All the Communist delegations in Bucharest supported him vis-a-vis China, which, without mentioning him by name, had been carrying on an insidious propaganda against his attempts to make Marxism more uptodate and sensible.
- 3. These were hopeful signs. Yet, in July, the cold war returned with a vengeance. Another American plane was shot down on the frontier, if not within the international limits, of the U.S.S.R. Clouds appeared on the African and South American horizons and three tened to spread over the whole international sky. The return of Delaian troops to Congo was regarded by Hoscow as a pre-conceived plot, hatched by the imperialist Powers, to strangle the

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new Republic and to strip it of its richest Province; and they declared that they would not hesitate to intervene, if necessary. To the Cuban Rovernment the Roviet Government gave support against the USA's economic blockade and offer of support against military intervention. Ir. Ehrushchev observed that "figuratively speaking" the Soviet Union had rockets which could reach the Jestern hemisphere.

- The apprehensions roused in the West by such Soviet postures and statements found expression in Archaemillan's letter to Mr. Khrushchev. "I simply do not know what your purpose is at present", said Mr. Macmillan, and he expressed his bewilderment at what seemed to be "new trends in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy". It seems worthwhile examining what these trends are and how far they are new.
- Since Stalin's death, Soviet foreign policy may be said to have had two principal features a new striving for peaceful co-existence and the old crusade against imperialism. At some stares, the former element was predominant; at other times, the latter. Broadly speaking, co-existence was the keynote of Soviet policy from the middle of 1953 to the middle of 1956; it reached its height at the Geneva Conference and the 20th Congress. The Poznan riots The Poznan riots and the Revolution in Hungary in the autumn of 1956 caused a serious setback and the Suez emisode showed that imperialism was still imperialism. Prom that time upto the end of 1958 the Soviet Government followed a harder line against the West and took credit for foiling importalist designs not merely in the Suez but in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. In 1959, co-existence again become the order of the day. A number of factors contributed to it - hr. Macmillan's visit to Moscow, the death of Br.Dulles, the technological lead attained by the Soviet Union in the field of missiles and rockets, her consequent ability to speak to the U.S.A. from a position of equal strength, and above all the conviction that war would be disastrous not only - as had hitherto been thought - for Capitalism but for civilization, including its Communist sector. There followed Ir. Ehrushchev's visits to America, South East Asia and France, which confirmed his conviction that co-existence sas indispensable in a nuclear age and his hope that it was attainable. The Summit Conference in Paris



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in May 1960 was to have translated this hope into some kind of reality, but the U-2 incident came in the way and a period of criticism and self-criticism becan.

Fortunetely, this process did not result in the abandonment of Mr. Khrushchev's policy of peaceful co-existence but rather confirmed it. The very confirmation of his policy, however, made it necessary for him to appear as the champion of anti-imperialism. Imperialism, according to Marx was the last and most detestable phase of Capitalism; and for ir. Whrushchev to have been lukewarm about it would have been to lend himself to the charge of being, if not deviationist, at least dilettante. China had been preening herself not only as the guardian of ideological purity but as the spearhead of anti-imperialist fervour. Mr. Khrushchev had managed to steel China's ideological thunder; it was necessary for him to steal also her antiimperialist thunder, especially as it was having sympathetic reverbarations elsewhere. Over Algerian independence, China had been more forthright than the U.S.S.R.; she had recognised the free government of Algeria, which the Soviet Government had not out of deference to the sensibilities of France. Er. Khrushchev must have felt that at the present time there was no need to pay much attention to Western sentiments as, in any case, there was no hope of any accommodation with the West until the elections in America were over. There was therefore no reason for him to mince words about the developments in Cube and the Congo. In any case, Mark was not a believer in mineing words, and his followers have always been experts in the art of vituperation. Once the propagenda machine is set in one direction, it is difficult to switch it back; and men are often the victims of their own propaganda. The Soviet Government, having dilated day in and day out on the diabolical conduct of the West in relation to the Congo, has come to believe in it implicitly, despite the welcome signs of restraint shown by some western Powers in the Security Council and elsewhere. Moreover, Er.Khrushchev must be thinking - and who can say that he is altogether wrong? - that but for the Soviet Government's firmmess the U.S.A. would not have let Castro rule Cuba, nor would Western Europe let Lumumbe rule a unified Congo.

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Whatever the motives of Soviet conduct there is little doubt that the present international situation is wholly deplorable. Tensions have risen; the prospects of a detente, for which risen; the prospects of a detente, for which Er. Ahrushchev had been earnest striving, have receded; and the hast and the west have drifted apart, or, rather, are flying towards each other with rockets in their arms. The danger is that in such an explosive situation an accident may happen and this may set the whole world ablaze. Ar. Khrushchev is well aware of this danger. It was he who, referring to Mr. Dulles's policy of brinkmanship, once seid that it was dangerous for a statesman to behave os a political acrobat. If an acrobat walked on a tight rope and fell and died, it would be a misfortune, but for him only; but if a political aerobat fell down, he might drag the world with him. The sonity underlying this attitude, the moderation shown in countries like Great Britain, and the initiative and the importiality displayed by the Secretary-General of the United Mations, should prevent a further deterioration of the international situation. Nevertheless the next session of the General Assembly is bound to be a stormy one. Many men and nations of wood will must be counting on India more than ever before to exert a moderating influence, and to bring her disinterested (but not uninterested serenity to beer on the Great Powers and thus to assuage the passions which have been roused by a chain of unfortunate events, beginning with the illfated flight of a U-2 plane on the morning of May Day into the heart of the Soviet Union.

Yours sincerely,

JA Maria

Shri S. Dutt, Poreign Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi.

> संस्थानिकान् **मान्ति**का श्रीतिकाश्चारमा १८८८ - १८५८ - १८५५ - १८५५ - १८५५ - १८५५