

SECRET

ADDRESS

BY FIRST SECRETARY OF THE CC OF THE PUWP
AND CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PRP
CDE. WOJCIECH JARUZELSKI
AT THE MEETING OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE WARSAW PACT MEMBER-STATES

BERLIN, MAY 28, 1987

Dear Comrade Chairman,
Dear Comrades,

There are moments in history whose critical importance is recognized only from a longer-term perspective. There are others, however, whose significance is felt directly, as they come to pass. Just as the Great October Socialist Revolution opened a new epoch in the history of humanity 70 years ago, so do the essentially revolutionary changes taking place in the USSR today present new perspectives for the development of socialism and for its influence upon the future shape of international relations.

The Soviet process of *perestroika* has been accompanied by concurrent efforts initiated by other socialist states in accordance with their historical conditions. This applies to Poland as well.

At our meeting in Moscow last November, we emphasized that the fate of peace and progress in the world is linked especially strongly today with the dynamism of the socioeconomic development of the socialist world system. We also pointed to the necessity of accelerating our economic integration. It is a means for more efficient development of our socialist commonwealth. This should be accompanied by our nations' drawing closer together on an internationalist basis, broader contacts between our peoples, and a more complete understanding – free of simplifications and prejudices – about our countries' lives, problems, achievements, and difficulties.

Dear Comrades,

It may be said that after Reykjavik the world is no longer the same. Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev insightfully characterized not only the changes that are taking place

but also the current international situation in its entirety. We fully agree with his assessment and the resulting recommendations.

Today, for millions of people around the world, “*perestroika*” and “new thinking” are expressions of our deep concern about the fate of world peace. The bold, creative approach to resolving key international problems; the constant and persistent activity of the Soviet communists and of the entire socialist commonwealth to free the world from the nightmare of thermonuclear apocalypse – all this is playing into the hands of socialism and raising its moral standing.

The peace offensive of the socialist countries has activated no small segment of public opinion in the NATO and neutral countries. It has raised genuine interest also within certain – although currently less influential -- circles of the rational – and so to say – more enlightened bourgeoisie. More and more realistically-thinking politicians are realizing that it would be a mistake to squander the historic opportunity created by the Soviet peace proposals.

These are phenomena that are hard to quantify. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that an opportunity is presenting itself for positive changes in the climate of East-West relations. The dominating slogans from only a few years ago, with their chauvinistic boasts about a “crusade,” and such primitive catchphrases as the “evil empire” are beginning to lose their appeal.

It would be too early to state that the bugbear of “communist aggression,” which NATO has successfully exploited for nearly four decades, has finally disappeared. However, for the first time, a significant segment of public opinion in the West is taking a skeptical or even negative attitude toward these stereotypes. This change affirms the aptness and effectiveness of our policy.

The greatest ever peaceful “battle” for peace and the security of nations is under way. It is hard to foresee today which stance will prevail in the ruling circles of the West. Will reason, realism, and the instinct for self-preservation come out on top, or will the anticommunist fanaticism and the egotistical interests of the military-industrial complexes?

As of now, there has been no sign that the main centers of American imperialism have changed or modified their major anticommunist goals. In fact, the West does not have any positive political-military counter-proposal for the states of our commonwealth. It still maintains its antipathy toward the denuclearization of Europe – an attitude that has

led several governments to retreat, even at the price of their credibility, from the positions that they held several years ago, when NATO's strategists propounded the "zero option."

The decisions that the administration in the United States will make in the nearest future will decisively or at least substantially influence the evolution of the Western positions. Although the administration has been largely discredited, the confrontational elements in it have not yet been marginalized. Nevertheless, we agree that we should continue an open and principled dialogue with Washington instead of waiting until the end of the current president's term in office.

Another unfavorable influence upon the formulation of the West's policies has been the right-wing, nationalist wing of the bourgeois elite in the FRG government. Nor does the current stance of the leading politicians in France and Great Britain seem to give any reason to hope that these countries will play a more independent and positive role in the dialogue over disarmament in the near future.

Comrades!

We proceed from the basic conviction that in the nuclear era, security must be collective, or none can exist at all. Accordingly, over the past several years, the Soviet Union and the countries of our commonwealth have intensified efforts to strengthen peace. These have been associated mainly with the dynamic activity of Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev. Our policy has assumed greater boldness and momentum because of the openness, comprehensiveness, and specificity of our initiatives, resulting in detailed proposals.

The comprehensive Soviet plan for reductions in strategic weapons, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and a comprehensive nuclear test ban is of major strategic importance.

No less significant is the new, open approach of the socialist states to the issues of control and verification. It gives us an advantage that is difficult for the West to take away.

The achievement of concrete disarmament agreements, however, is a complex and arduous process. The main argument that the opponents to nuclear disarmament in the West constantly bandy about is the size of the Warsaw Treaty's conventional forces. This does not take into account the natural differences arising from the particular

character of every country's armed forces. Our proposals for deep, mutually-agreed reductions of conventional forces have not yet found the response they deserve.

As we know, even when there is an overall approximate balance of forces, asymmetries have historically arisen because of the various types of armaments on each side. We share completely the standpoint of the Soviet Union that the imbalances should be eliminated not by increasing the armaments of the side that is lagging behind, but exclusively by reducing those of the side that is ahead.

In the current discussion regarding disarmament, it is particularly important to unmask the West's attempts to close one "disarmament channel," even as it amplifies this concession in their propaganda, while it simultaneously opens the next, potentially just as ominous "channel," which nullifies the results that have been achieved through no little effort. Another such danger is the plan for the so-called European Defense Initiative. Such developments as the closer military cooperation between the FRG and France and the *Bundeswehr*'s finger drawing closer to the nuclear trigger have awakened justified fears.

The innovative document presented by the Soviet comrades regarding the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member-states is of great significance, as is the general review of all the military doctrines that are binding on both politico-military groupings. We perceive in the Soviet thinking on this topic a bold, topical, and eminently humanistic vision for a better understanding of the defensive capabilities corresponding to the military and political realities of our time.

One of the supreme tasks of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of Poland is to actively support the Soviet – as well as our common – efforts to curtail the arms race and to constantly improve the international atmosphere. This applies particularly to the platform presented in the Budapest Appeal, along with the initiatives of our friends, such as the proposal of the GDR and Czechoslovakia regarding the establishment in Central Europe of a corridor free of chemical and nuclear weapons, or the efforts of Bulgaria and Romania to create a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans.

At our November meeting in Moscow, I signaled our desire to proclaim a new Polish initiative. Not long ago, after first informing our allies, we announced – to supplement and support the other disarmament proposals by the states of our socialist coalition – a comprehensive plan for a reduction of armaments and for confidence-building measures in Central Europe.

The plan includes operational and tactical measures, along with stages for their implementation. It contains, for example, a proposal for the mutual verification of military doctrines. It links this with the possibility of further confidence-building and verification measures. The idea is to bring about a mutually-agreed and verifiable reduction in nuclear and conventional weapons that will result in a general reduction in the level of military confrontation in Central Europe, from the Danish Straits to the Hungarian Plain. At the same time, in the central, relatively narrow corridor on both sides of the Elbe, it may be possible to undertake even more radical “pilot” projects.

If the political and military results of this reduction of armaments and confidence-building measures in this zone of nine states in Central Europe prove effective in consolidating security on both sides, the opportunity will arise for including in this process the entire European continent, from the western extremities of Greenland to the Ural Mountains.

In keeping with the Budapest Appeal, the Polish plan amounts to a long-term program of goals and activities. It is a comprehensive initiative, but its components may also be considered separately. Overall, the plan creates a comprehensive, systematic framework for a flexible, common approach and a joining together of the various items to be negotiated.

I want to sincerely thank the leaders, parties, and governments of our commonwealth for the support they have extended to the Polish initiative. We are counting on continued support in the spirit of alliance solidarity.

The West’s initial reactions have been varied and cautious, even encouraging in some quarters. Mistrust and suspicion have been intertwined with genuine interest.

At the end of June and the beginning of July, after consultations with the allies, we plan to send to the CSCE participating states an aide-mémoire about our plan, which we consider an integral part of the post-Helsinki process. After a series of bilateral contacts and consultations, we should be able to determine where and how to negotiate about our plan multilaterally. We are making this dependent upon the course and results of the “Group of 23” talks at the all-European disarmament forum, as well as the negotiations at the Vienna meeting of the CSCE.

Dear Comrades!

The construction of the infrastructure for security and cooperation in Europe has gone through various stages over the years that have passed since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act -- a quick start, but also unexpected hindrances, and even regression. We have not always succeeded in gathering sufficient arguments and acting aggressively enough.

This period now belongs to the past. We have regained the initiative. We have posed to the West the principle that the CSCE process be treated more comprehensively, that it be more balanced and dynamic with regard to all aspects, with regard to all three "baskets." The last meeting of the Committee of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of our states devoted much attention to this issue.

Nevertheless, we should expect the selective and highly distorted interpretation of the CSCE Final Act to continue. The demagogical exploitation of aspects of the so-called "Basket III" will continue in order to conceal the West's inaction or opposition regarding the other parts of the CSCE process.

The Helsinki "transaction" must be objective and equally distributed. There can be no toleration of diversionary attempts to undermine the solidarity of the socialist commonwealth or its individual members under the pretext of "increasing trust and security."

The past year fully confirmed the correctness of the new, aggressive stance of the socialist states regarding the issue of human rights, broadly understood. Currently, the realization of the Soviet initiative to convene in Moscow a representative conference regarding cooperation among the CSCE states in the humanitarian field is of particular importance in this regard.

We should devote particular attention to economic cooperation, which had been of significant interest to the socialist countries in the period preceding the signing of the CSCE Final Act. The past years have shown that the Western signatories have not only failed to carry out in practice the provisions of the so-called second basket but also -- beginning at the end of the seventies -- intentionally brought about a crisis in all-European economic cooperation. All the countries of our commonwealth have felt this to various degrees. None of the announced projects in transportation, communications, energy or tariffs even began. We should ask all the CSCE signatories whether they are truly still thinking about restoring the unity of the economic infrastructure of all of Europe.

Poland is one of the countries that suffered the most severely from the cynical policy of its Western partners, especially the USA. In recent years, this has taken the form of illegal and severe economic restrictions. Moreover, despite the fact that they have recently been formally lifted, the essence of the matter has not yet changed. Economic discrimination, aggressive propaganda, and various forms of subversion against socialist Poland have continued.

Despite the overall negative balance that may be drawn from many aspects of the CSCE process, there still exists significant potential for collaboration. We should give it higher priority than we have up to now.

That is why we unequivocally support the proposal for holding a special meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of the CSCE states to assess all the problems to be discussed at the Vienna CSCE meeting, including the decision to begin negotiations on disarmament in Europe.

We also consider it expedient to institutionalize cooperation among the CSCE states in areas where the existing problems can be effectively solved only through collective or coordinated effort. This applies especially to stopping the deterioration of the natural environment. We propose the creation of a European council for environmental protection as a forum for discussion and the adoption of collective measures in this area of great importance to all the inhabitants of our continent.

The establishment at the appropriate political level of a broad dialogue with the institutions and organs of the European Community, especially with the European Commission and the West European Parliament, would help deepen all-European cooperation and contribute to the resolution of important problems of the entire continent. Giving an all-European dimension to the Council of Europe, for example, might also help.

In assessing the situation on our continent, one should mention yet another, potentially dangerous factor destabilizing the postwar order in Europe. I am thinking about the gradual, but ever clearer, evolution of views that has been occurring lately in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Unlike the early seventies, when both the West German bourgeoisie and the SPD's strategists tried to adapt the FRG's great-power aspirations to the realities of the postwar world, today the FRG's ruling elites have become committed to invalidating the results of World War II. They have oddly sought to "bypass" Yalta and Potsdam in

reviving Greater German pretensions to power in Europe. A new form of nationalism is growing that draws on the country's undeniable economic and technological achievements and its key position in NATO's European military structure. The celebrations of Berlin's 750th anniversary in West Berlin have been symptomatic in this regard. The refusal to acknowledge the finality of the European borders and insistence on the allegedly "open" nature of the "German question" are being presented ever more openly to the international community. They have even been recently elevated to a precondition for stability and peace in Europe.

We are sincerely striving to normalize and develop good overall relations with the Federal Republic of Germany. We know its position in the West's system. We want that country to play a fully positive role in talks and in European cooperation. We share Comrade Gorbachev's opinion about this.

We strongly support the principled initiatives of the fraternal German Democratic Republic. We support a closer coordination of our entire commonwealth's dealings with the FRG and West Berlin. The tangible results of our steadfast and unified stance toward the FRG over the past decades should serve as a model for both today and tomorrow. The main test of the sincerity of Bonn's intentions must not be declarations, but facts. I propose that we broadly discuss West Germany's policy at the next meeting of our countries' Committee of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

[Translation from the Polish by Douglas Selvage]