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REPORT

on official trip abroad of chief investigator,
the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic's KGB's active reserve

In accordance with the plan for human intelligence gathering devised by the deputy head of the KGB in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic, Major General V.V.Z., this investigator was on an official trip abroad to the Swedish port of Gothenburg from 4 December 1982 until 10 April 1983 as a crew member on the supply ship "Rybatskaya Slava". This ship belonged to the merchant fleet's base at Klaipeda, and the investigator operated under the guise of a maintenance engineer for the onboard electrical equipment and the engine

Before the vessel left the harbour, all the planned preparations were carried out, including increasing the ship's operational posts. Agents "V", "V" and "M" were added to the crew, along with trusted citizens who had been vetted.

The period during which the vessel was in Swedish waters was characterised by operational conditions becoming much more difficult. This was because, on 22 December 1982, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs sent a protest note, via the Soviet ambassador, to the Soviet government, which accused the assistant defence attaché in Stockholm, one member of the consular staff, and the representative for the Soviet register of shipping in Gothenburg of being spies and declared them *persona non grata*. This incident, which coincided with the USSR's

60th anniversary celebrations, was accompanied by extensive anti-Soviet articles in the bourgeois press and other media outlets. Because of all this, this investigator lost contact for a while with the members of the Swedish residency for the First Main Directorate, which was only re-established when later, quite by chance, one of them travelled down from Stockholm to Gothenburg. Every Saturday, the city was the venue for anti-Soviet demonstrations, which called for support for the demands of “Solidarity” in Poland, Afghan counter-revolutionaries, and Zionists. In February 1983, the cook (*S*) working on the cargo ship “Priboj”, which belonged to the merchant navy base in Kaliningrad, was arrested by the police on suspicion of theft from one of the shops in the city. Active intervention on the part of the embassy in Stockholm as well as the Consulate General in Gothenburg were required to secure his release, as well as a major protest directed at the port director from “Sudoimports” representative Ye.S.I., who mentioned the possibility that the company’s contract with the port authority could be rescinded. In March 1983, court proceedings took place in the matter of the Simakov affair, and he received a two-year suspended prison sentence.

On the recommendation of the Consulate General, extra checks were carried out on all crew members of the “Rybatkaya Slava” because of the changed operational situation in which this investigator was operating. The crew’s shore leave twice a week was cancelled. When various groups went into town and subsequently returned, those responsible for entry checkpoints at the port usually made telephone calls to somewhere. It cannot be excluded that the authorities carrying out the monitoring of our seamen were receiving intelligence in this way.

The whole of the port area is monitored via secret cameras, strategically placed in areas which are permanently illuminated by halogen lamps.

Vodka and cigarettes continued to be in high demand among workers and officials at the port.

On 2 January 1983, a second, increased customs inspection was carried out with the aim of finding spirits and cigarettes that had not been declared. This

painstaking search even included the captain's cabin. Customs officials justified this second inspection by claiming that there were irregularities in the documents drawn up when the vessel docked in Gothenburg. The inspection found nothing that had not been accounted for onboard the vessel. On 12 February 1983, attempts were made to run checks on crew members from the "Rybatskaya Slava" who were travelling on a bus through the port area to the "Rosenhill" seaman's centre. An important factor relating to the operational situation, and which requires continuous attention, is a group of people (both within the port area and in the city itself) who speak Russian and are involved in hostile activities against our sailors. According to staff working at the USSR's Consulate General, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of Russian-speaking people involved in hostile activities against our sailors; this is in conjunction with an influx of foreigners, especially emigrants from the People's Republic of Poland.

From now on, all this must be clearly taken into account when preparing and formulating counter-espionage measures for ships' crews calling at Gothenburg.

In accordance with the plan for human intelligence gathering, with the help of our agents and trusted citizens, the following employees at "Götaverken" docks were studied during the time that the "Rybatskaya Slava" was berthed in Gothenburg for repairs:

1. *K.A.*, introduces himself as "O", born 1923, a native of Gruzlivets in the Baranivskiy district of the Zhytomyr oblast (province), Polish, lives at xxxx, telephone number xxxx, speaks Swedish, German, Finnish, Russian, and poor Estonian. Has previously attempted to involve Russian sailors in small-scale currency smuggling operations. His attempts to manipulate some of them ideologically and to disseminate anti-Soviet literature have been logged. Has contacts among port security staff and customs officials.

In 1982, *K* was compromised by the KGB leadership in Kaliningrad using an article in "Vodnyj transport" magazine, which exposed his activities. Following

this, the port authority was forced to remove him from all work on Soviet vessels. [...]

In view of the fact that *K*, despite being compromised, has not ceased his hostile activities, we should continue to study him with the help of our personnel and trusted citizens, and the ships' commands should ensure that contact between Russian sailors and him is prevented when they call at Gothenburg for repair work.

2. Engineer N.J.A., born 1929, Finn. Speaks fluent Russian and is friendly.

During the time that the "Rybatskaya Slava" was docked in Gothenburg for repairs, *N* never appeared on the vessel. Nor did he visit any of the other Russian ships which were in dry dock for repairs at that time. During impromptu conversations between our agents and workers and port officials, the latter spoke positively about *N* and described him as a compassionate and meticulous type of person. His absence onboard the Russian ships was accounted for by *N* having a real soft spot for the Soviets, but that this was not appreciated by everybody, and that he had clearly been recommended to only board the Russian ships in extreme emergencies. At the end of March, the tanker "Jachroma", which belongs to the Soviet Ministry of Defence, called at the port for repairs. On its arrival, it was said that the ship belonged to the Soviet Ministry of the Maritime Fleet. In his capacity as an interpreter and as part of his regular duties, *N* began to make frequent visits to this vessel and establish extensive contact with crew members. This investigator informed the colleague from the Special Department who was part of the crew about *N*.

2 It was also proposed that the company's interpreter (*W*) be studied while repairs were being carried out. Our staff had first caught sight of him in 1980, when the supply ship "Boevaya Slava" was in Gothenburg for repairs. This foreign national immediately appeared onboard the ship after it had moored at the port and then worked constantly onboard as an interpreter, at the same time as he served as a fireman. *W.J.*, born 1929, hails from the Leningrad oblast (province), but is a Finn by birth, lives at the following address: xxxx, and is suspected of having contacts with the police and customs.

During *W*'s time on the ship, he came across as a likeable person and

established a large number of contacts with crew members. He is well acquainted with the routines on our vessels, and knows the ranking system for all officers onboard. He speaks very good Russian, but is, however, not a technically-minded person; this caused some difficulties when work-related problems that arose were to be solved. In his dealings with other workers, he is remote and haughty and they, in turn, do not like him and claim that he is a bad person, but do not say in what way. On several occasions, *W* approached various crew members to ask to be allowed to buy vodka from them, without feeling fearful or embarrassed. He himself likes to drink and on occasions has asked crew members to invite him in, whilst clearly aware that this would contravene the current instruction prohibiting the consumption of alcohol within the port. By nature tight-fisted, he always tries at the earliest opportunity to eat onboard the ship, or brings his own food with him. Happy with his salary level and standard of living. After having acted as a go-between for three crew members when they bought second hand “Zhiguli” cars, he then firmly requested spirits and cigarettes by way of thanks. At the behest of this investigator, *W* was invited to a birthday party for chief cooling engineer L. Here, and whilst in a state of inebriation, he was asked to guess the ages of all those present. *W* was able to state with absolute accuracy the date of birth of everybody who was at the party. He could only have obtained these details from the ship’s crew list, which had been given to the border control authorities. In his position, he does not have access to this crew list. During a relaxed conversation with trusted citizen “V.V.P.”, *W* criticised the above-mentioned *K*’s activities and, in this connection, said that he himself would never go in for such things. On the same occasion, he said, on the question of the whereabouts of *B.L.* (who had previously been involved in hostile activities against Russian sailors), that he did not know, despite the fact that this is at odds with the truth.

[...]

The possibility of contact with people in the city who speak Russian and who can be used by the enemy’s special services for hostile manipulation must be taken into account when counter-espionage measures aimed at protecting ships’ crews on

vessels calling at Gothenburg are being organised.

For example, in January 1983, a group of crew members from the “Rybatskaya Slava” (of which agent “V” was one) met *I.H.* in the city. Born c.1930, Jew, lives in Gothenburg, speaks seven languages, including excellent Russian, address xxxx, telephone number xxxx. The instigator of the acquaintanceship was *I.* The meeting took place in one of the city’s shops and, on the face of it, appeared to be a coincidence. He was particularly interested in P.A.P. and agent “V”. He gave conflicting details about himself. He said that he had been to the Soviet Union on several occasions in order to negotiate to be allowed to purchase manufacturing equipment for spectacles, but that his own opinion was that the Soviets had been unduly cautious. At the moment, his company is on the brink of bankruptcy, but the state has granted him a long-term loan, which should see him back on his feet again within a few years. In spite of all this, *I* sold merchandise to the Russian sailors at prices a lot lower than normal. He owns an expensive “Volvo” car, which is one of the most recent models. He was married to a woman from Kiev. Today he is divorced from his wife. He has a daughter and a granddaughter. At the behest of this investigator, the KGB residency obtained intelligence on *I* and reported that both he and his wife had been refused entry to the *USSR* and recommended that crew members terminate all contact with him, which is what then happened under the, ostensibly, nicest of excuses. This investigator got the impression that *I* was being used by the enemy’s special services in order to study agent “V”. When, in future, our vessels visit Gothenburg, our agents, trusted citizens, and the ship’s command must be informed as to the decision to prevent Russian sailors from fraternising with *I*.

[...]

During the time that the “Rybatskaya Slava” was berthed in Gothenburg, Sweden, for repairs, the majority of crew members showed good moral and political qualities and the necessary standards of discipline. Some regrettable incidents did, however, take place where the behaviour of individual crew members is concerned. For example, cooling engineer

S.A.M. continually broke away from the group when on shore leave. On the vessel itself, he behaved in a rather strange way, showing signs of backwardness and quickly losing self control when consuming alcohol. Frequent conversations with the commander of the ship, A.M.V. (at the behest of this investigator), were to no avail. Under the pretext that he had kidney disease and required attentive care (in truth M had suffered from kidney problems for many years), he was paid off from the vessel and was sent to Klaipeda in February 1983 aboard the cargo vessel “O Russki”.

On 16 February 1983, three crew members – chief electrician Ju.V.J., chief cooling engineer L., and assistant electrician Ju.M.Z. – were on shore leave, and each of them bought a “*Sharp-3700*” stereo system in one of the shops. When they returned to the vessel, they stated that these goods had apparently cost less than one would have expected. With the aim of checking this information, this investigator, the commander of the ship and also the representative for Soviet shipping lines in Sweden, V.A.S., visited the shop in question, whose salesman is a good friend of V.A.S. The following information emerged during a conversation with him. On 16 February, three Russian sailors, accompanied by a Swedish interpreter, had indeed visited the “*Brodmann*” shop and acquired three such pieces of equipment at a cost of SEK 2,450 each. The purchase was made on the same receipt which, at the interpreter’s behest, was made out to “Götaverken”. The sailors had not paid anything but asked him to write out the receipts to them with the price given as SEK 1,750 per piece of equipment, which he also did. For him, these receipts thus lose their importance. Presumably, the cost of these pieces of equipment will be charged to the vessel’s repair bill. Considering the crew were abroad, this investigator examined no further the details onboard the ship itself. The very fact that the shop was visited was also kept secret. Information was received from agent “V” and a number of other trusted people about first officer P.M.P., who (taking advantage of the fact that the port authority was paying for the crew’s onshore cultural activities) was able to keep some 200 of the 400 roubles which had been set aside by the naval base for this purpose and then used this money to pay for his own personal requirements. When the vessel called at Klaipeda, the above

information was passed on by the customs authorities during a ship's inspection. These offences are, at the moment, the subject of an investigation by the party and the naval base command. At the same time, the following should be mentioned. During the repair work, three crew members acquired second hand "Zhiguli" cars. Their appearance and mechanical condition leave a lot to be desired. Similar cars were bought by crew members on other Russian ships. These purchases caused astonishment among the Swedes. As a result of this, a newspaper article – "Zhiguli makes the last journey back to its homeland" – appeared in "Göteborg Post". In the light of the fact that such purchases are damaging to the reputation of the Soviet state on the world stage, I believe it would be desirable to let the appropriate authorities examine the right of Russian sailors to buy second-hand cars abroad.

The following documents (attached to the report) were obtained operationally while repairs were being carried out in Gothenburg:

- The "Volvo" company's internal telephone directory;
- A Gothenburg residential telephone directory for 1983;
 - A business telephone directory for 1983;
 - A drawing of the harbour;

- A connection diagram for a "Pioneer" stereo unit;
- Example of postal forms.

Conclusions and recommendations

1 From the material obtained, it is clear that operational conditions in Gothenburg, and in the "Götaverken" port area, are affected by people who are involved in subversive activities among Russian sailors and who would be of interest for investigation by the KGB within the framework of counter-espionage, and people who may belong to the enemy's special services.

2 The guise of maintenance mechanic for the electrical equipment and the engine as cover for an officer in the active reserve (on a vessel such as the "R. Slava") is a satisfactory choice for the purpose of facilitating the mission.

3 It is recommended that the foreigners mentioned in the report (and noted by us for the first time) be checked against the corresponding register of the Soviet KGB, and that a decision be made as to which of these people studied by agent “V” will be closer examined.

Chief investigator, active reserve The Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic’s KGB

Major /signature/
20th May 1983

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