


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UNIT 29351
APO AE 09014 *B. J. Miller*

UNIT HISTORY (U)

UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION
TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY

1985

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FOREWORD

USMLM's Unit History serves several important informative functions:

-It provides an annual chronology of the Mission's operational accomplishments in overt intelligence collection.

-It summarizes developmental trends within the Group of Soviet Forces Germany and East German Armed Forces.

-It is a repository of information pertaining to USMLM's role as a military liaison mission representing the Commander in Chief, US Army Europe to the Commander in Chief, Headquarters, Group of Soviet Forces Germany.

-It contributes to the military history program of the Armed Services.

USMLM's 1985 Unit History joins those from previous years to comprise an important record of trends, precedent and policy. As such it becomes a most useful reference document in the conduct of the Mission's daily affairs.

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
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UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION
UNIT HISTORY
1985

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1	GENERAL	1
2	Introduction	A
3	References	B
4	Organization	C
5	Mission	D
6	COLLECTION	1
7	Ground Collection Activities	A
8	Air Collection Activities	B
9	Restricted Areas	C
10	Operations and Incidents	D

The 1985 USMLM Unit History is dedicated to Lieutenant Colonel Arthur D. "Nick" Nicholson who was shot and killed by a Soviet guard in Ludwigslust, East Germany on 24 March 1985. Nick's supreme sacrifice on behalf of his country and in defense of our national security will never be forgotten. His courage, patriotism, and selfless commitment will remain an inspiration and example to all of us at the Mission and those who follow in our footsteps.



ROLAND LAJOIE
Colonel, GS
Chief of Mission

11	Appendix	1
12	Appendix A	A
13	Appendix B	B
14	Appendix C	C
15	Appendix D	D
16	Appendix E	E
17	Appendix F	F

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UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION
UNIT HISTORY
1985

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
PART I. GENERAL	
A. Introduction	1
B. References	1
C. Organization	1
D. Mission	2
PART II. COLLECTION	
A. Ground Collection Activities	4
B. Air Collection Activities	31
C. Restricted Areas	42
D. Detentions and Incidents	46
E. Intelligence Information Report Production	49
PART III. LIAISON AND REPRESENTATION	
A. Official Visitors	50
B. Relations with GSFG/SERB	56
PART IV. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT	
A. General	76
B. Vehicles	80
C. Photographic Laboratory	81
ANNEXES	
A. Huebner-Malinin Agreement	82
B. Touring Statistics	85
C. 1985 Personnel Roster	88
D. Dealings with SERB, Statistics	92
E. Redesignation of Air Team, USMLM	95
F. USAREUR-GSFG Negotiations on Nicholson Shooting	97

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ANNEX F NICHOLSON SHOOTING NEGOTIATIONS

NOTE: All succeeding sub-paragraphs classified CONFIDENTIAL.

The shooting death of MAJ Arthur D. "Nick" Nicholson, Jr. USA on 24 March 1985 initiated the most emotionally turbulent, politically supercharged, and operationally deleterious era in the history of USMLM. MAJ Nicholson's loss represented a tragedy which USMLM had managed to avert, sometimes slimly, over nearly 38 years of its existence. It forced the unit to share with FMLM the onerous burden of conscience which always attends the loss of a comrade in defense of his country. It consolidated the MLMs in their grief and strengthened their spiritual bonds in ways that no other event could. In a political sense, it prompted a crisis which pitted the Allies -- united to a degree rarely encountered -- against GSFG, and Washington against Moscow. In the operational realm it fettered collection for a period that even today has not ended. In short, the shooting touched every fiber of USMLM's existence.

The shooting also forced shifts in our manner of thinking and operating. The danger inherent in collection, while always a matter of latent awareness for tour personnel, came to the forefront of both national and Mission consciousness. It also became, for a protracted period, a subject of intense interest in the minds of the national and theater command authorities. Through his ingrained reaction a faceless Soviet sentry in Ludwigslust forced a superpower showdown, ushered the AMLMs from the shadows into the glare of public scrutiny, and compelled their tour personnel to fundamentally reconsider the premises of their risk-gain calculus. The sentry also catapulted USMLM willy-nilly into a complex political arena inhabited by military and diplomatic actors on a number of levels. It would be difficult to overstate the consequences of his act.

The Mission survived the Nicholson period intact and with somewhat enhanced operational capabilities. Certainly USMLM demonstrated the resiliency, breadth of ability, inner strength, and professional competence which only a hand-picked organization can muster; the policy of selectivity proved its merit. A forthcoming new PRA map, which over time became intimately linked with the Nicholson incident, promises to eliminate the most burdensome features of an earlier PRA regime and provide access to tracts closed to the Missions for decades. The Soviets have agreed to issue MLM information cards to their troops, which should improve the security of Mission personnel at the margin by sowing doubt into the mind of 19-year old Soviet sentries about their legal obligations. GSFG has also committed itself to brief its soldiers regularly about MLM tours; there is little question but that Moscow

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wants no repetition of such incidents. Still, the command will not change its procedures fundamentally regardless of circumstances. For, as we all appreciate, the security of the state enjoys essentially absolute value in the USSR.

THE CONTEXT

In the early spring of 1985 there were indications of a thaw in US-Soviet relations that could be perceived within USAREUR as well as at the national level. For the first time since the Soviets' 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, USMLM received authorization to attend the annual Soviet Army-Navy Day reception in Potsdam in force rather than with token representation; GSFSG greeted the decision with scarcely concealed glee. And in a move of consummate irony USAREUR had scheduled -- and USMLM orchestrated with SERB -- the first visit by its CINC to HQGSFG since 1977. Only last minute exigencies forced USAREUR to cancel the visit; it would have taken place a scant four days before the shooting.

Thus, as MAJ Nicholson departed the Potsdam USMLM compound with SSG Jessie G. Schatz for the northwest GDR on a sunny Sunday morning in March, one could not avoid a sense of optimism toward dealings with the Soviets. No operational grounds existed for anxiety, and the prospects for collection seemed fair. A qualified, extremely experienced crew on a routine tour reconnoitering standard targets during an off-day should have encountered nothing more menacing than boredom. Instead, tragedy struck.

THE SHOOTING AND ITS AFTERMATH

MAJ Nicholson was shot at 1545A outside tank sheds located on Ludwigslust Subcaliber Range 475 (PE675081), where he had dismounted from the tour vehicle to check for the possible presence of armored vehicles. This facility served the Independent Tank Regiment of 2 Guards Tank Army. Known to be frequently guarded under normal conditions, it had a varied history of occasionally violent reaction. Thus, the tour had entered the area with considerable caution, stopping in the forest to watch and listen at intervals as they did so. SSG Schatz, who had just visited the site a few days prior pointed out an area which had been recently occupied, but the Soviets had departed it. The tour then approached the sheds, photographed signboards displayed nearby, and positioned the vehicle to permit the tour NCO to pull security while the tour officer checked for armor.

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Unbeknownst to the tour, and despite its best efforts at observation, a sentry remained undetected, concealed in the adjacent woods. According to information obtained later, he had been walking his post on the far side of the sheds as the tour approached. Hearing the vehicle, the Soviet soldier made his way through the woods on the flank of the range to a position about 50 meters behind the tour; SSG Schatz noticed him just before he opened fire. The Soviets claim that the sentry issued a challenge in two languages (Russian and German), fired a warning shot into the air, then shot to disable. This is simply not true. SSG Schatz, a native German, heard no challenge in any language. The sentry's first shot whizzed narrowly over the heads of the tour; it was not a warning, but a miss. And one of the two remaining rounds struck MAJ Nicholson, by this time running back to the tour vehicle, near his center of mass: the upper abdomen. SSG Schatz shouted a warning as the first shot resounded -- too late to help. He then slammed the hatch shut, started the car, and threw it into reverse to reach MAJ Nicholson. Hit by one of the shots, Nicholson groaned, fell, called to Schatz, and promptly lost consciousness. The tour NCO sprang from the vehicle to administer first aid, but the sentry refused to permit him to do so. Using sign language, SSG Schatz communicated his intent to the Soviet and took a step toward the fallen officer. The sentry, who had held Schatz at gunpoint the entire time, then shouldered his AK-74, took aim at Schatz's head, and motioned him back into the vehicle. Seeing the futility of further action and the hopelessness of the situation, SSG Schatz complied. He secured and covered the tour equipment, checked to be sure the doors were locked, and waited. Shock set in quickly.

The sentry reported his action by telephone immediately, specifically mentioning "Missiya" (Mission), and a contingent of armed troops arrived within minutes. Over the next three hours many Soviet officers and soldiers arrived to secure the area, collect data, and investigate the situation; considerable confusion reigned. Yet no one, including the obvious medical personnel, rendered even rudimentary first aid. Finally at 1650A (one hour, 5 minutes after the shooting) an unidentified individual in a blue jogging suit took MAJ Nicholson's pulse, which had ceased. The protracted failure to provide or permit any medical attention at all ensured that the wound proved fatal. In the final analysis it was this culpable negligence more than any other single factor which the US Government stressed in its protests, and the charge evoked tremendous Soviet ire.

It was 1807A before MAJ V. A. Chernykh of SERB-Potsdam notified USMLM of an "accident involving USMLM vehicle 23". COL Yu. V. Pereverzev, CSERB, requested the immediate presence of CUSMLM at the site. However, the location was not stated; Chernykh apparently

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believed that the Mission had acquired that information via its own channels. An hour of frenzied inquiry ensued before he finally revealed the approximate location of the "accident".

At 1938A COL Roland Lajoie USA (CUSMLM), LtCol L. G. Kelley USMC (NavRep), and SSG R. B. Everett USA (Tour NCO) departed at high speed for Ludwigslust. Arriving two hours later, the group entered an eerie atmosphere of numbing, subdued formality. Led by a Soviet UAZ-469 for the final few kilometers of the journey, it encountered a random group of roughly 50 Soviet officers -- most of them relatively senior -- clustered under the glare of vehicle headlights on the sub-caliber range. It was only then and under the direct questioning of CUSMLM that an unidentified colonel very reluctantly revealed that MAJ Nicholson had been killed. The principals on the scene, GEN-COL G. F. Krivosheyev (C/S, GSFG) and CSERB, were absent; they returned to the range shortly afterwards.

One would have expected expressions of remorse and condolence, but despite the magnitude of the sentry's actions and their traumatic implications on the personal and political planes, C/S GSFG immediately directed an impassioned protest at CUSMLM, accusing him of personally sabotaging relations between the commands and placing all responsibility for the outcome squarely on his shoulders. Krivosheyev appeared awkward, uncertain, aggressive, and cold; he required considerable prompting from an unidentified GEN-MAJ. USMLM had noted his limited mental capacity on previous occasions, and the trend continued. C/S GSFG then transferred direction of the proceedings to the Deputy Procurator for GSFG, COL V. P. Mel'nichuk. The latter arrogantly and obstinately ordered that CUSMLM witness an inventory of Nicholson's belongings, direct SSG Schatz to submit to interrogation, and permit an interior inspection of the tour vehicle. He threatened to have Schatz incarcerated and subjected to interrogation without US presence, should COL Lajoie refuse. Further, he stated that Nicholson's body would undergo an autopsy at a Soviet medical facility the following morning, which an American observer could witness. Not surprisingly, the atmosphere quickly became acrimonious and agitated. The Soviets threatened CUSMLM and NavRep with personal consequences in response to their barbed depiction of the proceedings and refusal to acquiesce. CUSMLM insisted that Schatz be accorded the rights guaranteed under US law during questioning; Mel'nichuk refused, citing Soviet jurisdiction. Heated argumentation followed, and the hours dragged on. Ultimately, with some intercession by CSERB, CUSMLM elicited the right for Schatz to refuse to answer questions which he considered inappropriate. The Soviets then began their interrogation. Schatz invoked this right the moment the queries became substantive, which prompted a vitriolic retort from Mel'nichuk toward CUSMLM; however, the ploy had ensured Schatz's freedom. The tour car remained inviolate.

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At nearly midnight, CUSMLM struck an agreement with CSERB that the USMLM party could depart in both its vehicles. NavRep, however, would escort MAJ Nicholson's body -- in Soviet custody -- back to a medical laboratory in Potsdam, where forensic specialists planned to perform an autopsy as part of the legal investigation directed by Mel'nichuk. The US vehicles left for the nearest Autobahn, and CUSMLM informed the Potsdam House OIC MAJ J. M. Silva USA of the events while enroute home. Silva, in turn, relayed the information to Berlin, where USMLM notified the chain of command. With SSG Schatz's commentary the Mission possessed an accurate picture of what had transpired; his distraught story evoked concurrent sympathy and revulsion. But yet another traumatizing experience, the notification of next of kin, remained to be accomplished before this dismal evening could be concluded.

At approximately 0230A on Monday morning, 25 March, CUSMLM, accompanied by Nicholson's close friends MAJ J. E. Eschrich (Ground Operations Officer), MAJ T. G. Wyckoff (Tour Officer), their wives, and LTC (Rev) W. A. McAllister, presented the sorrowful news to Nicholson's wife Karen and daughter Jenny. This exercise in consolation marked the beginning of a long and comprehensive effort by USMLM, US Army Berlin, and the entire Army chain of command to ensure the welfare of the Nicholson family; Majors Eschrich, Wyckoff, P. A. Nelson, and T. R. Milton, Jr made tireless contributions in this regard. The provision of a support network assumed the utmost importance to officers at every level, and through their generosity and active benevolence the Nicholson family weathered the gale of loss with considerably less pain. These efforts continue today, a full year after the shooting.

In Potsdam the disorder which had characterized the scene at Ludwigslust continued unabated. Extensive waiting, unexpected arrivals, and uncertain planning became the norm. CUSMLM issued and relayed to NavRep the order -- reflecting the Nicholson family's wishes and USAREUR's instructions -- not to permit an autopsy. By battling the GSFG procurator and interceding with others on the Soviet side he succeeded in preventing one, although Mel'nichuk attempted on multiple occasions to exclude NavRep and win US acquiescence via pressure. Finally, in mid-afternoon the procurator conceded that GSFG would insist only on X-rays and an external examination of the body and uniform. MAJ (Dr) M. A. Morgenstern USA, the Berlin MEDDAC physician designated to officially observe the forensic proceedings, had encountered a four-hour delay on the Glienicke Bridge before the Soviets would authorize him to cross. Once he arrived at the laboratory, Mel'nichuk deprived him of his tape recorder, thus further hindering the performance of his

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professional duties. However, despite his far from benign reception by Soviet officials, the somewhat primitive and insensitive medical procedures employed, and brazen retention of pieces of Nicholson's uniform in defiance of repeatedly articulated US demands, Dr. Morgenstern and NavRep compelled the Soviets to respect the dignity of the body. SERB returned the missing uniform articles later that night.

The US party (NavRep, Dr. Morgenstern, MAJ R. A. Wise, SSG Everett) escorted MAJ Nicholson on his final crossing of the Glienicke Bridge at 1715A. Under the attentive gaze and before whirring cameras of a legion of media correspondents, and in the center of the Allied section of the bridge, CUSMLM draped MAJ Nicholson's body with the Stars and Stripes. The Berlin Brigade Honor Guard, dispatched at the personal direction of Brigade Commander BG(P) Thomas A. Griffin USA, rendered a final salute to the fallen tour officer, and the short motorcade sped off.

By this time word of the shooting had flashed across the world, and the media focused attention on the AMLMs, their activities, reputation, and the detail of the shooting. Inevitably, they reported many inaccuracies as truth. The MLMs, which had long flourished in the grey half-light of obscurity, became objects of stylish notoriety and far too fixed attention; they suffered for it. Expressions of indignation accompanied the reporting, and the country lived through a wave of patriotic zeal and sense of wronged innocence that exceeded even our own; the emotion often belied the facts.

On the evening of 25 March the three AMLMs, US Army-Berlin, and the major commands in the American military community bid MAJ Nicholson farewell at Tempelhof Central airport. To the accompaniment of the Berlin Brigade Band's subdued "Abide with Me" the Honor Guard placed his casket on a waiting aircraft and dispatched it through the somber night to Frankfurt, where a USAREUR honor guard headed by MAJ GEN C. J. Faila, Chief of Staff USAREUR, waited. As with the ceremonies on the Brigade, the media dutifully recorded both ends of MAJ Nicholson's journey toward his final resting place. The scene deeply touched a mourning country.

As more and more information came to light, CUSMLM filled in its picture of the events, reported it, and plotted a course of action. USAREUR dispatched a senior officer to conduct the command's formal investigation of the shooting, and he solicited detailed statements from those involved. Throughout this trying period HQ US Army Berlin and HQ USAREUR remained totally supportive of USMLM's positions and ready to provide assistance whenever asked. LTC M. P. Peters USA (Chief of Ground) interrupted a trip to CONUS and

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stationed himself in Heidelberg to provide firsthand knowledge of USMLM's procedures/operations; his assistance proved invaluable. And MAJ R. D. Lyons, USA (Tour Officer), who had escorted MAJ Nicholson's body to Frankfurt, remained in place to perform a variety of personal and professional services attendant to the situation. HQUSAREUR composed a sharply worded protest letter which GEN Glenn K. Otis, CINCUSAREUR, signed and sent via USMLM to CINCGSFG. Additionally, MG C. J. Fiala summoned COL Pankratov (acting Chief of SMLM/F) to lodge a similar formal protest. The news seemed to take the SMLM/F representative by surprise; incredibly, he appeared not to have been fully informed! On 28 March the Berlin community paid tribute to MAJ Nicholson in a moving multinational service at the American Community Chapel. The memorialization integrated British and French military honors with American themes to symbolically express the solidarity always felt by the three Missions.

On 29 March, in an effort coordinated among the Allied headquarters, the three chiefs of mission all demanded appointments with General of the Army Mikhail M. Zaytsev, CINCGSFG, to deliver official protests. Claiming that circumstances beyond his control prevented his attendance, he sent his Chief of Staff to receive them in Potsdam. Thus, Krivosheyev, who had displayed such callous insensitivity at Ludwigslust, became the target of a planned and purposeful barrage. All of the chiefs carried caustic letters from their CINCs condemning the shooting ("a wanton act of violence", "uncivilized behavior") and stressing the aspects of it which angered the Soviets most, in particular GSFG's refusal to permit or administer first aid.

USMLM had the first appointment of the morning, followed by FMLM and BRIXMIS. The session, attended by CUSMLM and NavRep, quickly became intense and heated, as expected. Anticipating preemption, countercharge, and obfuscation -- which so typify Soviet behavior on the defensive -- USMLM had developed a plan by which to avert them. Krivosheyev attempted to dominate the conversation, but CUSMLM repeatedly interrupted him to take command. In a near rage at the telling points which had been made, Krivosheyev -- who speaks no English -- refused to let his translator translate, replying haphazardly to points perceived but not made. CUSMLM alternated between English and Russian, parrying Soviet blows immediately, while Krivosheyev lashed out disconcertedly at what he thought might have been charged. The performance was less than convincing, to which the shaken expression on CSERB's face quickly attested. Having given Krivosheyev several opportunities to express regret for the actions of his sentry, each time without effect, CUSMLM asked him point blank whether GSFG felt any remorse at all over the incident. The latter replied emphatically in the negative. At this, CUSMLM

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and NavRep rose and, cutting Krivosheyev off in mid-sentence, left. The insult shocked the Soviets. When the Chiefs of FMLM and BRIXMIS arrived at their respective times to deliver protests, they found C/S GSFG unavailable. It was said meekly that he had left in haste for Wuensdorf, and they were compelled to leave their letters with the translator -- the only SERB officer who could be found!

Immediately following delivery of the protest CUSMLM and NavRep boarded a helicopter which was standing by at Glienicke Bridge for the brief flight to TCA, where a C-12 was waiting to take them to Frankfurt. In Frankfurt they joined the Nicholson family and a 14-man USMLM contingent reinforced by BRIXMIS and FMLM representation and departed for Washington, accompanying MAJ Nicholson's body for burial. The nine-hour C-141 flight from Rhein-Main AB terminated on the tarmac of Andrews AFB, where Vice President George Bush, Deputy Secretary of Defense William H. Taft IV, Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force Generals John A. Wickham and Charles A. Gabriel, and a variety of other dignitaries met the party. The Vice President made brief but blunt remarks which sent an unambiguous message of disapproval to the Kremlin. An unofficial organization of USMLM alumni and friends congregated to provide massed attendance; their support at the activities of the following days and enduring loyalty impressed all concerned.

The nation laid its fallen son to rest with full military honors and conspicuous dignity on Saturday, 30 March. As the networks watched vigilantly, a horse-drawn caisson from the Old Guard bore MAJ Nicholson on this overcast morning from the chapel at Fort Myer along verdant, tree-lined pathways to his final posting in Arlington National Cemetery. With the band playing muted strains from "The Navy Hymn" and "America the Beautiful", his family, friends, and USMLM alumni -- those who had shared his successes and danger -- bade MAJ Nicholson a final farewell. A grateful country awarded him the Legion of Merit and Purple Heart before laying him to rest. One chapter in the Nicholson saga had come to a close, but another was about to begin.

IN THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

In the wake of the Nicholson shooting USMLM curtailed operations; it continued showing the flag in the GDR but risked little more. This virtual moratorium on collection remained in place for about two weeks, then gave way to circumscribed touring with extensive restrictions, as authorities grappled with the problem of how best to reenter the environment. The answer to that question became

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inextricably linked to a larger one: how to respond to the shooting at all?

The positions of the two governments on the shooting took shape within a week. President Reagan's characterization of the incident as "murder" found its echo in most official pronouncements. Secretary Weinberger released a public statement demanding that Moscow render apology and pay compensation to the Nicholson family. Advised repeatedly that the Soviets would not accede to such demands -- they had made no such gestures after the KAL shutdown -- the Secretary nonetheless remained adamant and pressed his case at every opportunity.

The Soviets, for their part, immediately took to the offensive. News of the shooting had hardly arrived in Washington before Oleg M. Sokolov, DCM at the Soviet Embassy, delivered a "resolute protest" even the "illegal actions of members of USMLM". It alleged espionage, the clandestine penetration of a restricted facility, and "gross violation of...the Huebner-Malinin Agreement". Several days later Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin met with Secretary of State George Shultz on the incident. They agreed that CINCSFG and CINCUSAREUR should meet for a joint discussion of relevant issues. TASS clarified Soviet positions in an article on 28 March ("On the Incident Involving the American Serviceman"): "The tragic outcome of the 24 March incident is regrettable; however, responsibility for it lies entirely with the American side, which is currently spreading a patently false version of events." Thus, notwithstanding the expressed desire of the two governments "not to unnecessarily complicate relations", their respective positions put them at loggerheads.

The body charged with developing an appropriate response to the Nicholson shooting was the Interagency Group (IG). Chaired by the State Department, the IG has representation from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), and other foreign policy principals. CUSMLM was given an opportunity to participate in the initial meeting of this group and also briefed its various representatives individually. The IG authorized an early CINC-to-CINC meeting and endorsed the need to prevent such incidents while not crippling USMLM's intelligence capability.

The two Congressional intelligence oversight committees expressed particular interest in the Nicholson incident, and they too requested briefings. On 2 April CUSMLM, supported by former tour officer LTG William Odom (then ACSI DA) and MG Julius Parker USA (DIA), testified before the House Permanent Select Committee on

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Intelligence. The following day NavRep performed similar service before the staff of the Senate Committee on Intelligence. The presentations generally evoked staunch support and kindled indignation in the audience, although some few Congressmen also expressed concern about Mission activities.

The USMLM contingent returned to Europe in early April on an inspired note. In the first of a series of memorial dedications in MAJ Nicholson's honor Army Secretary Marsh presided over a tree planting ceremony at Fort Belvoir. The lush, placid countryside of Nicholson's first duty station served as a fitting backdrop for the eloquent remarks delivered by the Secretary and LTG Odom. But in the years to come those who were present will recall not the elegance of their crafted prose but rather the simplicity of Karen's widely quoted summation: "Nick did not want to die, and we did not want to lose him. But I know that he would lay down his life again for America."

CINC-TO-CINC

Both sides agreed on the need for the respective commanders-in-chief to meet, but each had its own reasons for doing so, and they did not coincide. GSFG desired the meeting "to completely close the incident" and follow through on the governmental decision relayed by Dobrynin. In Moscow's view conduct of the meeting would, ipso facto, indicate closure of the matter, regardless of outcome. USAREUR, on the other hand, needed the encounter to deliver a broadside. Far from closing the incident, the US desired to hold it open and force sweeping changes in the operating procedures of GSFG. It hoped to win Western-style guarantees of safety from a reluctant Soviet commander and, as directed by the Secretary of Defense, solicit a pledge of apology and compensation.

On 6 April CSERB summoned CUSMLM to present a non-paper proposing that the CINCs meet to implement their governments' decision. He suggested Wuensdorf or the Potsdam Officers' Club as the venue. CUSMLM replied that General Otis preferred either Frankfurt or the USMLM Potsdam House and outlined US expectations from such a session: a prominent expression of Soviet regret over the incident (not one buried on a back page of Pravda) and a prohibition on the use of deadly force against the Missions under any circumstances (duplicating an analogous guarantee repeatedly made by CINCUSAREUR). CSERB objected, stating that US guard regulations prescribe exactly the same actions as Soviet ones. CUSMLM then presented him highlighted copies of the SMLM sighting card, which contradicted that point. These cards took CSERB by surprise; he

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evidently knew nothing about them and withheld comment, pending further study.

Discussions of the forthcoming meeting occurred with almost daily frequency over the next several days. Both the technical detail and substance of the agenda caused disagreement. On 10 April CSERB delivered his CINC's response to the USAREUR protest over the shooting. General Zaytsev categorically denied responsibility for Nicholson's death, restated and amplified the official Soviet version of events, and laid all blame squarely on US shoulders. He emphatically dismissed the charges of medical negligence, a particularly sensitive point for Moscow. In the most egregious falsehood of the document Zaytsev stated unequivocally: "GSFG servicemen, once they ascertain that trespassers (on a facility) are members of USMLM, have not used, do not use, and in the future have no intention of using weapons to detain or evict them from restricted areas." Further, he accused CUSMLM of failing to present an objective report on the incident, despite GSFG's magnanimity in allowing him "to acquaint himself with the circumstances at the scene." However, CINCGSFG did express his official regret over the incident, repeated the proposal to meet with General Otis, and appointed a deputy chief of staff to handle preparations for it.

The issue of sequencing struck the US as important. CINCUSAREUR's plan called for the CINCs to confer promptly, discuss urgent matters, and provide impetus to the staffs to develop effective solutions. This initial encounter would address the glaring discrepancies between the respective versions of events and the need for an unconditional guarantee of personal safety for MLM personnel. Staff meetings could then take up such topics as PRA reductions and other confidence building measure.

GSFG insisted on preliminary discussions to determine both the technical detail (venue, time, length, etc.) and range of specific issues to be covered at the sessions; the Soviet predilection for set-piece actions and aversion to improvisation shone clearly through. CSERB searched meticulously for historical precedent and found one in the 1962 encounter between two predecessors: the 1962 encounter between General Bruce Clarke and Marshall Ivan S. Kovev. He copied it wherever possible. Disagreements on many topics continued, and pace of action became frantic. On 11 April CINCUSAREUR replied to General Zaytsev's 9 April letter accepting the invitation and proposing to meet with 30 hours! On the afternoon of 12 April, with that time almost expired, CINCGSFG consented to do so: four hours hence. A compromise dictated that the meeting be held in Potsdam at the Soviet Officer's Club and USMLM Potsdam House. USMLM conscripted all its available personnel to support the plan. General Otis and his party arrived by plane at 1700 for the

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1800 meeting.

The meeting was conducted in a businesslike atmosphere, occasionally tough but always polite and restrained. It gave the respective CINCs the opportunity for extensive dialogue; virtually no one else participated in the formal discussion. By the end of the evening the generals had come to understand clearly each other's views, but neither convinced the other of their correctness or made any concessions. GEN Otis argued the American position that MAJ Nicholson was in an open area and well within his rights when he was shot without warning or provocation. He disagreed in principle with CINCGSFG on a wide variety of matters pertaining to this and previous incidents involving USMLM. GEN Zaytsev proved patient, annoyingly repetitious, and sometimes preposterous in his assertions. CINCGSFG reiterated the standard points in official Soviet pronouncements on the incident and added a litany of USMLM's past sins. Among the outrageous assertions which he dispensed without flinching: GSFG Military personnel have never employed force or weapons against members of the AMLMs; Nicholson's actions constituted an attack on a sentry guarding his post; and the sentry fired, in part, because it is common knowledge that the Missions employ their vehicles as lethal weapons!

General Otis received the anticipated rebuff on apology and compensation, with Zaytsev characterizing the demands as groundless. GSFG, he stated, bears no guilt with regard to the incident. Similarly, CINCUSAREUR's proposal to radically rethink the very premises of the PRAs, reduce their area, and recognize complete freedom of movement outside their borders met with a cool reception, although not outright rejection.

On balance the discussions provided only a reaffirmation of the status quo with minor embellishments at the margin. No real surprises occurred. Both CINCs committed themselves to support the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, confirm the principle of non-use of force against MLM members, direct their personnel to refrain from "provocations" (left undefined), and study further measures to prevent the recurrence of violent incidents. The US achieved two stated goals: a prominent statement of regret over MAJ Nicholson's death and at least a conditional guarantee of personal safety. However, CINCGSFG made an explicit distinction between Soviet guard regulations -- which enjoy the status of a national law and he is powerless to change -- and his 1983 directive on the detention of MLM members; his recitation of the latter gave USAREUR for the first time the text of GSFG's position.

USAREUR's summation of the meeting noted the Soviets' refusal to accept blame, render apology, or pay compensation, acknowledged

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Zaytsev's expression of regret and presented and reported his command policy prohibiting the use of force during detentions. Interpretation of this report prompted misunderstanding in Washington and recrimination in Moscow. Although many US principals believed doggedly that he had done so, Zaytsev had granted no absolute guarantee of physical safety for MLM personnel.

As preparations began on both sides for negotiations on the prevention of violent incidents, consternation mounted. The misunderstanding on Zaytsev's guarantee of safety quickly found its way into print. Administration spokesmen asserted the unconditional nature of the promise, while Soviet statements disputed it. On 30 April Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt summoned Soviet Embassy DCM Sokolov to formally lodge a claim for compensation on behalf of the Nicholson family and express Washington's dissatisfaction on the continuing lack of an apology. Sokolov refused to accept the State Department note on the subject and complained of Burt's exclusive reference to the US version of events. That same day CINCUSAREUR dispatched a letter to CINCGSFG attempting to clarify the results of their 12 April meeting and requested that Zaytsev reconfirm, inter alia, that the GSFG instruction "prohibited the use of force against members of the Military Liaison Missions, whatever the reason." He proposed another face-fo-face meeting to resolve the issue.

The Kremlin's official response to these moves appeared two days later in the TASS article "Wouldn't a Responsible Approach Be Better?", published jointly by Pravda and Red Star. The article, while offering nothing new of substance, did contain an expanded expression of regret that mentioned, for the first time, the suffering of the Nicholson family. It also gave a misleading account of the "non-use of force" discussion conducted on 12 April. According to TASS, "both sides reiterated that weapons have not been used, are not used, and will not be used during detentions...of Military Liaison Mission personnel." The statement both left the impression of agreement where none existed and ignored the contradiction between Soviet guard regulations and GSFG's detention policy. Finally, the article charged "certain parties" with disseminating false versions of both the shooting and the CINC-to-CINC meeting so as to poison the atmosphere and distract attention from certain steps taken lately by Washington." Such attitudes, it said, would prevent the improvement in relations desired by the sides.

Zaytsev's personal reply arrived on 13 May, and it addressed General Otis' request for clarification even more bluntly. Reminding CINCUSAREUR that "the Soviet position was presented to you with extreme clarity at our last meeting" and "it was not the Soviet

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side that initiated new assertions and formulations on the actual circumstances of the incident," CINCGSFG recapitulated his understanding of the agreements reached on 12 April. MLM personnel, he said, must strictly observe the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, refrain from provocative actions, observe host nation laws, and avoid the places of disposition of military units. He asserted the dual validity of restricted areas and "places of disposition," noted the essential correspondence of US and Soviet detention procedures, and claimed that his forces "have not, do not, and will continue not to employ physical force or weapons" during detentions. However, he continued, "I want to stress that (the non-use of force) provision differs from the procedures applicable to a sentry on his post." This statement dispersed all doubt. Zaytsev also politely declined General Otis' invitation to meet prior to the staff discussions.

CINCUSAREUR responded on 16 May, concurring in the need for the staff solutions prior to a further meeting at high level. He also defined his expectations: the development of measures to unconditionally insure the safety of MLM personnel and a mutually accepted interpretation of movement restrictions. The Soviets later took this simple expression to be a definitive agenda which served their interests well. The CINCs had met and, as CSERB never tired of asserting, closed the incident completely. The resurrection of discrepancies, he stated, would achieve nothing while derailing the staffs' real work: the development of practical measures to prevent incidents. Thus, progress dictated movement, in the Soviet view; and the more rapid the movement away from the past, the better.

With permission to negotiate, USAREUR began planning. An ODCSI counterintelligence specialist and OJAG international lawyer were designated as participants, and General Otis personally appointed his Deputy for Resource Management BG(P) R. J. Price to lead it. Shortly, this body with the addition of CUSMLM, NavRep, and a liaison officer, became the "negotiating team".

In a 14 May cable USMLM predicted the nature of the forthcoming negotiations:

Just as Zaytsev conceded no points on 12 April and reaffirmed all his positions..., so too we can expect intransigence at the staff discussion. The Soviets' clear and annoyingly consistent prescription for measures to prevent recurrence shines through all their pronouncements: scrupulous adherence by the Missions to the Soviet interpretation of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, avoidance of any conduct considered by GSFG to be illegal or provocative, adherence to

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GDR regulations, and whenever in doubt, immediate and total submission to any command of a Soviet soldier. Thus, whatever corrective action is required, it relates only to the Allied side. The key to solving the problem lies simply in accepting the Soviet position. This neatly shifts responsibility for the Nicholson shooting and all violent incidents involving the Missions squarely onto Allied shoulders. In such a framework "confidence building measures" can only equate to acquiescence. Thus, we must expect the negotiations...to be extremely difficult and frustrating.

The cable also reiterated as proper USAREUR goals for the talks: resolution of the accounts of the incident, reduction of PRAs, toleration of MLM presence outside PRAs, achievement of an absolute prohibition on the use of force by Soviet or NVA forces against Mission personnel, and official recognition of USMLM's observer status as an offshoot of liaison duties.

On 15 May USMLM dispatched another cable to USAREUR on topics and goals. The message also listed considerations which should guide or characterize conduct of the talks:

1. The goals must be well-defined, simple, and accepted by all levels in advance.
2. All proposals must enhance the Missions' safety without degrading their collection.
3. The precedents established in over a decade of arms control negotiations with the USSR would be applicable.
4. Intransigence, repetition, caution, and inflexibility would characterize the Soviet negotiating style.
5. The negotiations would be bilateral in form but multilateral in essence, since the interests of BRIXMIS and FMLM would inevitably be affected. It would be essential to communicate and coordinate with the Allies during the talks.

From the outset both USAREUR and USMLM made a concerted effort to keep the Allies informed and solicited their opinions on a wide variety of topics. At the headquarters level communication occurred frequently at Tripartite Rapid Reaction Committee meetings. In Berlin coordination was effected more informally, among the Chiefs of Mission.

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Allied coordination had begun at a very early date and included an attempt to put teeth into the common anger. Although it became quickly apparent that none of the Allies possessed significant leverage over the respective SMLMs, the three headquarters, after reviewing the limited options, decided to implement certain measures to penalize GSFG, however slightly, for the shooting. First, they confined all SMLM personnel to their respective compounds on 28, 30, and 31 March -- the dates of the memorial services and burial -- "for their own protection". Second, they instituted increased overt surveillance of all SMLM tours, which continued until July. Third, they declared a boycott of social functions attended by GSFG and NSWP representatives for an indefinite period. Fourth, they denied the SMLMs the right to interzonal travel, since the basic agreements did not specifically authorize it; henceforth, the SMLMs could not visit each other's zones of operation. And fifth, they terminated provision of the additional supplies/privileges which had been routinely granted in a public relations effort and began supplying only the required commodities.

At the end of May, arrangements for the negotiations became a virtual preoccupation. USMLM maintained daily contact with SERB and USAREUR in an effort to devise acceptable solutions to rather straightforward problems, but Soviet inflexibility thwarted progress. GSFG's refusal to compromise either on the agenda or the technical details of the sessions prompted the frustration forecast earlier. Its pettifoggery duplicated the accounts of Soviet negotiating behavior at multiple international forums. GSFG attempted to dictate both the setting and the discussion. Via resourceful argumentation and inexhaustible patience, CSERB gave substance to the oft-quoted adage that, for the Soviets, "What's mine is mine; what's yours is negotiable."

Technical details included the composition of the delegations, border crossing procedures, venue, rotation, dates, the schedule of discussions, interval between sessions, and translation/recording support. On 24 May CUSMLM and NavRep met with CSERB to discuss them. Consensus emerged on some issues, including translation: NavRep and MAJ S. D. Savchenko would perform these functions. GSFG rejected the US proposal to employ a tape recorder rather than scribes, claiming that it would inhibit discussion; thus, the sides settled on note taking. However, the venue, particular rotation, and agenda caused major dissension. GSFG desired to host all the sessions, or at least the first one, so as to have the initial word. Arguing for the spaciousness and relative comfort of the Potsdam Officer's Club, CSERB applied pressure. CUSMLM countered by suggesting an analogous facility for the US-sponsored sessions: the Wannsee Guest Residence of the US Commander of Berlin. (The Potsdam House had recently entered overhaul, a process which would last over

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a year). CSERB rejected the idea, citing the special quadripartite status of the city. Likewise, he rejected all other alternatives which might deprive the Soviet side of the "home-court advantage." On this point the discussion reached an impasse. As agenda topics CUSMLM proposed the discrepancies in the sides' accounts of the shooting, procedures to ensure safety, and freedom of movement as guaranteed under the Huebner-Malinin Agreement. Curiously CSERB, who had urged the submission of an agenda, failed entirely to devise his own. However, he recoiled at discussion of the shooting - this had already been settled by the CINC's he argued. The meeting adjourned without a meeting of the minds.

The sides reconvened on 29 May but again made limited progress. CSERB continued to display inflexibility on all three thorny issues. CUSMLM tried yet another rotation alternative: Wuensdorf and Heidelberg/Frankfurt. COL Pereverzev rejected this idea as too time-consuming. Ultimately, and by default, the sides agreed to let sovereignty rule. The Potsdam Soviet Officers' Club would serve for the GSFG-hosted sessions, while the much more modest USMLM small villa would suffice for those held under USAREUR auspices. Discussion of the rotation though, returned the participants to deadlock, and deliberations on the agenda degenerated into a rehash of past objections. Discussion of the actual incident, CSERB said, would prompt recrimination without promoting progress. Such discussion had been concluded on 12 April, was no longer within the authority of the staffs, would detract from more important issues, and indicated a lack of American seriousness in pursuing real negotiations. CUSMLM replied that: Only an accurate understanding of events could underpin the development of appropriate preventive measures, the CINC's had not closed the incident but only agreed that their versions diverge, dictation of the agenda represented an unacceptable attempt by GSFG to censor discussion in advance, and the "discrepancies" represented the crux of the matter to the US. However, to make such a discussion more palatable to SERB he suggested including it in USAREUR's opening statement. This last idea at last struck a relatively responsive chord in Pereverzev, who had acknowledged the appropriateness of introductory remarks and argued against making them public. This alternative became the implicit solution.

Yet an additional session with SERB on 31 May saw no movement on the remaining contentious issue: rotation. GSFG even rejected USMLM's offer to let a flip of the coin determine the first host! CUSMLM recommended to USAREUR that it show principled adamance, stressing that the point at stake was not the petty specifics of any single consideration, but the known Soviet technique, predicted with accuracy, of dictating aggregate procedural detail and, thus, creating a habit of US concession. As CUSMLM reported: "We have to

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resist conceding on this...point. Too often in such negotiations we allow the Soviets to dictate procedural details which we consider too insignificant to argue about. This habit can creep over into substantive matters as well."

With time running out, General Price and the two negotiating team members from Heidelberg flew to Berlin, allowing USMLM to brief them on Soviet behavior, positions, personalities, and goals. General Price brought with him CINCUSAREUR's guidance and approved strategy. On 4 June, literally the eve of the planned first negotiating session, and in the midst of one such strategy conclave, SERB urgently summoned CUSMLM and NavRep to Potsdam.

CSERB opened the meeting by soliciting possible new USAREUR proposals, a clear ploy to determine whether USAREUR was prepared to concede the rotation issue. It was not, and CUSMLM had even brought a note from General Otis urging Zaytsev to overrule his negotiators; he opted not to present it yet. COL Pereverzev continued by declaring that "recent developments," which he was not wont to identify, had rendered the USMLM small villa totally unacceptable as a negotiating site. "Recent developments" referred to the 30 May dedication of the small house as Villa Nicholson, of which he had been unaware when he assented to its selection under the sovereignty principle. Not only did the villa bear MAJ Nicholson's name, but it also displayed his portrait prominently. GSFG refused to negotiate under his haunting gaze. The venue issue reopened, CSERB made several new proposals, all of which continued the attempt to secure home advantage. CUSMLM countered with the Frankfurt/Potsdam rotation, and Pereverzev for the first time seriously entertained the suggestion.

General Price also recommended to CINCUSAREUR that he send his counterpart a letter complaining about Soviet intransigence and proposing a solution. General Otis penned his own communication, which he dispatched as a memorandum to General Zaytsev, and USMLM delivered it to SERB on 6 June. CINCUSAREUR formally proposed the Frankfurt-Potsdam rotation, with USAREUR hosting the first session on 13 June. CINCGSFG accepted the offer but requested a one-day delay in starting. And thus, the stage was set.

NEGOTIATIONS: SESSION I

The USAREUR delegation led by BG(P) Price and the GSFG delegation under GEN-LT V. A. Semyonov (First Deputy Chief of Staff, GSFG) met for five hours at the Terrace Officers' Club in Frankfurt on 14 June. The arrangements for the session reflected understandings reached earlier, although the Soviets introduced one

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unexpected variation: the proposal to translate from native into foreign language, which reverses normal practice. The procedure however, caused no difficulty and set the standard for the remaining sessions: LTCOL Kelley translated into Russian, and MAJ Savchenko -- into English.

The discussions, while sometimes blunt, were conducted in a businesslike atmosphere with a limited degree of personal cordiality and considerable reticence. They produced no surprises or shifts in position and resulted in agreement only on secondary matters. General Price opened the session with a long statement that enumerated the discrepancies in the Soviets' account of the incident, pointed the finger accusingly, and restated the US position on apology and compensation. When offered a copy of the opening remarks, Semyonov retorted that he had no authority to exchange documents; one of his translators did, however, meticulously copy it longhand for retention, leaving the typed version behind.

General Semyonov responded with a much shorter statement, asserting that GSFG considered the purpose of the talks to be the development of practical measures to ensure personal safety and the improvement of relations between the commands. He termed the shooting tragic, regrettable, atypical, and closed. He also rejected the call for apology and compensation as groundless and placed all blame for the incident on the US generally and MAJ Nicholson specifically.

USAREUR argued for greater freedom and security for its personnel, while GSFG pressed for stricter adherence to restrictions; the approaches reflected the asymmetries of their Missions. Occasionally the sides discovered areas of mutual interest -- for example, the right to stop on Autobahns within PRA -- but normally for different reasons. The aggressive collection of military intelligence in a closed society usually mandates different conditions from those required for the recording of electronic signals or support of agent networks.

After much give and take the delegations reached agreement on the following points. The MLMs would observe/continue to observe the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, respect the laws of the host country, and refrain from provocative actions. Both sides expressed keen interest in substantial PRA reductions and in the right to stop on Autobahns which penetrate PRA; GSFG agreed to consider the issue of transit along PRA border roads, long the bane of the AMLM's existence. The parties remained divided on appropriate tour uniforms but consented to defer the issue. However, cardinal disagreement arose on the crucial questions: CINCUSAREUR's proposal to revise

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the premises underlying the PRAs, "places of disposition of military units" as a concept differing from PRA/TRA, the validity of Mission Restriction Signs (MRS), and the conditions under which Mission safety could be guaranteed. The last of these represented the negotiators' central concern.

On the one hand, USAREUR solicited an unconditional guarantee of safety for Mission personnel. On the other, GSFG argued that strict compliance with the Soviet understanding of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement coupled with unequivocal submission by MLM personnel to the orders given by a sentry already achieved that end. The GSFG instruction on detentions, Semyonov said, prohibited the use of force against MLM personnel (recognized as such) in unguarded areas, while Soviet national regulations provided for their safety (assuming submission) in guarded ones. In other words, the safe detention policy stopped at the limits of a sentry's post, at which point personal security became contingent on surrender. Even discounting the empty promise of the "safe" detention policy, the contradiction with USAREUR's position and with the needs of collection could hardly have been more vivid.

NEGOTIATIONS: SESSION II

On 20 June CUSMLM and NavRep met with CSERB in Potsdam. After coordinating the routine arrangements for Session II, to be held on 1 July, they discussed substantive issues at stake. Pereverzev reacted very pessimistically to General Otis' PRA revision plan but then presented an alternative approach which, while raising some problems, offered the possibility of major reductions. Personal safety, he continued, was the responsibility of Mission members; USAREUR would underwrite their safety, if it would ban their presence in Soviet training areas and require submission to detention. SMLM/F, he contended somewhat facetiously, already operated under such guidelines. He assured CUSMLM that his headquarters had instituted unilateral "practical steps" to prevent the recurrence of violent incidents and indicated, for the first time, serious interest in a Mission information card. Looking ahead, CUSMLM and CSERB also speculated on means by which to conclude the negotiations. Finally, Pereverzev reiterated that the "discriminatory measures" imposed on the SMLMs in the wake of the Nicholson incident must be lifted, if USAREUR desired to avoid reciprocity.

Session II was held on 1 July from 1000-1500A in the Potsdam Officers' Club. The discussion saw significant progress made on some topics, but at day's end most cardinal issues remained unresolved. General Semyonov, in reviewing the results of Session

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I, attempted to surreptitiously claim certain victories which his side had failed to win, but he also confirmed his headquarters' acceptance of the first session's positive achievements. He then announced the major policy shift foreshadowed by CSERB: HQGSFG intended to issue MLM information cards. But in other respects the Soviet position remained unchanged. GSFG rejected US calls for personal immunity, citing the rationale given before, and insisted that Mission personnel avoid the "places of disposition of military units" and guardposts; should they trespass accidentally, they must unequivocally obey the sentry's commands. The litany had become agonizingly familiar. However, Soviet charges regarding USMLM's wear of allegedly provocative BDU uniforms became more muted at Session II, perhaps indicating their insubstantial nature; USAREUR's accusations concerning the black leather jackets worn by SMLM/F members to permit disappearance into a crowd probably neutralized the issue.

GSFG also described its PRA reduction mechanism at the session and the means by which it might open additional cities. If, Semyonov stated, his command could effectively restrict the immediate vicinity of its kasernes, it could then afford to leave other urban areas accessible, including major transit routes. The idea, however, was predicated on USAREUR's acceptance of special restriction signs, and this principle caused considerable dismay. GSFG also expanded the scope of the discussions by introducing complaints about the "discriminatory measures," the procedures employed by USAREUR to process and release detained SMLM/F personnel (The Allied Contact Section-Frankfurt often escorted them back to their compound.), and the USMLM practice of pass rotation.

The US side repeated its standard call for apology and compensation and pressed for personal immunity; GSFG budged on neither. The discussion of personal immunity, though, raised the sensitive issue of military facilities in outlying areas. General Price acknowledged the danger of trespassing on ranges and impact areas and this was interpreted as acceptance of the use of certain warning signs. This drew the lines along which further battles would be fought.

Finally, the issue of possible further sessions arose. GEN-LT Semyonov demurred at the prospect, having obviously already tired of the negotiations. Considering his duty discharged, he deftly suggested assigning CSERB and CUSMLM the responsibility for fleshing out the principles to which the sides had assented; General Price accepted. The two generals also agreed to delegate production of a summary document to COLs Lajoie and Pereverzev; the solution satisfied all.

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Session II concluded with a typically lavish Soviet formal meal. In the best tradition of Soviet senior officers, COL Pereverzev mobilized his eloquence to offer an appropriate toast. The two delegations, he suggested, could report in good faith to their superiors that they had done yeoman's service to move their sides closer to a resolution of the issues. As the next few weeks demonstrated, however, the reality of that movement had yet to be gauged.

WORDS, WORDS, WORDS -- AND A RAMMING

Soviet assurances on personal security notwithstanding, an incident occurred on 13 July which revealed the continued fragility of the Mission's status. That GSFG's promises represented incremental rather than fundamental gains, had been clear, at least to USMLM. There were no delusions about radical transformation; change at the margin constituted the greatest hope. However, GSFG proved the hollowness of its pronouncements in an incident which, coming on the heels of the negotiations, threatened to scuttle the limited progress made to date and rekindle superpower confrontation.

In the period following the shooting CUSMLM had personally refrained from touring so as to prevent any possible high-level incidents that might jeopardize US interests. With the formal negotiations apparently concluded, he broke his fast, joining MAJ R. D. Lyons USA and SSG Schatz on the local. While covering a return to garrison of 35 MRD, the tour encountered a VAI ZIL-130 on the Fahrland Road. The vehicle gave chase, tailgated dangerously, and ultimately rammed the tour car from the rear as it rounded a corner in Satzkorn. Although more likely the consequence of recklessness than premeditation the collision inflicted facial injuries on CUSMLM and, by rupturing the gas tank, could easily have resulted in a lethal conflagration.

NavRep, acting as the Chief of Mission, protested to CSERB, and C/S USAREUR MG C. J. Fiala USA summoned CSMLM/F to do likewise. The tremors from Washington no doubt reached the Kremlin; word reached Berlin that Secretary Weinberger was considering the termination of the negotiations and institution of certain other measures.

Several days later GSFG responded via the same channels. Its investigation indicated the culpability of the VAI crew -- a warrant officer and his driver -- who had engaged in an unwarranted chase and impacted the tour vehicle, albeit unintentionally. HQGSFG stated that it viewed the incident very seriously. According to CSMLM/F the servicemen involved were severely punished and dismissed from the Army; their actions had violated the command's policy. CSERB underscored that this decision demonstrated GSFG's willingness

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to discipline its own. The Pentagon, which had initially assumed both premeditation and lack of contrition, accepted the response as a tacit apology, although the Soviets carefully avoided use of the word. It backed off the sharp rhetoric which had accompanied publicity of the incident and, to GSFG's chagrin, made the outcome public. Upon CUSMLM's resumption of his duties on 24 July, CSERB quickly expressed displeasure at the publication of his words, attributing it to the indiscretion of the NavRep. In actuality, the Pentagon had made that decision, overriding the opposite recommendation of all lower echelons in the chain of command.

With the situation thus defused, USMLM returned to the matter at hand: production of the summary document. On 10 July CSERB had presented his first version of the understandings, and it became clear that the struggle over the document would emulate battles fought during the negotiations themselves. His summary took a very hard line on all the issues and asserted the interests of GSFG almost exclusively. In attempting to give substance to the term "provocation," for instance, CSERB offered the following definition: "Insulting a military administration or police representative, deliberately causing a situation that endangers personnel or inflicts physical damage/injury on them, or physically resisting or failing to submit to the orders of those effecting a detention of Mission personnel." Other features of his draft included a prohibition on the entering of firing ranges/training facilities located in open areas, respect for various kinds of signs, scrupulous submission to the orders of a sentry, and the right to -- in effect -- create restricted sectors within open areas. The remaining proposals ranged from the tolerable to the desirable; however, CSERB described his most unacceptable formulations as "cardinal issues" on which the headquarters would brook no compromise.

On 24 July, at a meeting with CSERB, CUSMLM replied to the proposed GSFG summary document by pointing out the provisions which USAREUR viewed as unacceptable. As no doubt anticipated, they included the four "cardinal issues". However, in light of developments at Session II USMLM had to address GSFG's concerns about signs and "places of disposition". Thus, CUSMLM and NavRep developed the following rather nebulous catch-all formulation: "Each side recognizes the authority of the other to take such steps as may be required to implement the provisions of Article 10 of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement." This purposely vague language adequately covered the issues without specifically enumerating them. It had the advantage of diluting precision and perpetuating the kind of "grey area" upon which intelligence collection depends. Each side could interpret the formulation unilaterally and argue for its own position. Actually USMLM would have preferred not to engage

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in such casuistry at all, but the issues of signs had been put on the table and could no longer be ignored. The catch-all formulation represented a calculated ploy by which to thwart GSFG's efforts. Ultimately, the gamble paid even greater dividends than those which USMLM hoped to attain, but in the short run the formulation prompted consternation both among the Allies and in the US chain of command.

CSERB also announced an unexpected change relating to the map exchange. Whereas earlier GSFG had argued against a negotiated PRA map exchange, preferring to simply present a map to which the Allies would then respond, it now insisted on one: a simultaneous exchange incorporating the provisions to which both sides assented. He specified these provisions as: the inclusion of no more than 25% of the respective territory in PRA, total opening of the seats of mission (except for military facilities), the opening of other major cities, and no creation of de facto PRAs. But it was evident that room for movement still existed.

The next version of GSFG's summary document, dated 29 July, addressed some of USAREUR's concerns. In compiling this document, CSERB made three important concessions. First, he deleted all mention of signs of any sort, reluctantly accepting instead the catch-all provision devised by USMLM. Second, he eliminated reference to scrupulous obedience to a sentry's commands, in its place exempting sentries from the GSFG instruction on detentions. And third, he acknowledged that the detaining side could also act provocatively, an assertion which he had consistently denied until then. In a moment of disarming candor he also opined that, while the commands could minimize incidents, it seemed unlikely that they could eliminate them altogether.

HQUSAREUR, which now anticipated the imminent conclusion of deliberations, reviewed the bidding in detail and responded in detail. At the same time the debate continued on the appropriate means by which to end the negotiations. Should the document be signed, initialed, exchanged, or read aloud? USMLM recommended taking the least formal approach, since it implied the least constraint. CSERB also seemed interested in informality, since it preserved the Huebner-Malinin Agreement. However, CINCUSAREUR had received instructions to develop a formal product for review by the Interagency Group, which superceded all other desires. That group would then weigh the results of the negotiations and determine an appropriate US response.

On 2 August CUSMLM and NavRep presented the HQUSAREUR proposals. Many of the amendments made cosmetic or insubstantial changes, but several points led to emotional objections from CSERB. First, he categorically rejected the US headquarters' removal of the

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sentence concerning a sentry on his post, arguing that GSFG had already diluted its wording in consideration of USAREUR's desires. Second, he strenuously objected to a US refusal to allow local military police to investigate detentions of SMLM personnel and release them. He then articulated two threats which were to surface on more than one occasion later. Should USAREUR not release detained SMLM tours locally, SERB would institute similar procedures for handling detentions of USMLM, to include an escort back to Potsdam. And should the new PRA map fail to completely open Frankfurt, he would close the area stretching from Potsdam to the Dallgow-Doeberitz complex to a similar extent. However, CSERB's opposition to wear of the BDU uniform waned substantially. GSFG had just witnessed a change of command in which General of the Army Pyotr G. Lushev replaced Mikhail M. Zaytsev as CINC. Lushev, it was hinted, might view the issue differently; CSERB stopped just short of identifying Zaytsev as the impetus behind that provision.

The leave season coincided with recognition by both sides that their work was nearing an end. As the 2 August session adjourned, both CSERB and CUSMLM expected a slow month during which the headquarters would reconsider their positions and evaluate the document. Surprisingly, two meetings in the next two weeks -- during which time CSERB was away -- showed that maneuver room still remained. On 8 August CUSMLM met with DCSERB COL V. Ye. Medved' and learned that GSFG had accepted some of the less momentous USAREUR changes, although it continued to insist on inclusion of the provision addressing a sentry on his post. The Soviets backed even further away from objections to the BDU uniform, now describing it simply as "inappropriate". However, they attempted to interject an additional provision into the discussions, one instituting a permanent news blackout: "Without mutual consent of the two contracting parties both sides agree not to release to the mass media any information on the results of the GSFG/USAREUR staff negotiations or other activities of the MLMs." Whether this unexpected suggestion was an unsanctioned probe or had some other basis, could not be determined; CUSMLM dismissed it as unnecessary, and discussion of the topic abated. However, SERB also announced that GSFG had rethought its position on the formality of the concluding document and now favored signing it. In all likelihood, the new position reflected Lushev's preference, if not his instructions.

On 13 August USAREUR developed what it termed the "final US position" on the negotiations, but the title quickly became a misnomer as DCSERB summoned CUSMLM for another unanticipated meeting on 14 August. Without inquiring about a possible USAREUR reaction to the last set of Soviet proposals, he introduced new ones. These, he said, represented a compromise that blended the positions of the

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sides. Many of the changes reflected semantic rather than substantive differences, but some were fundamental. For instance, GSFG transformed the sentry formulation into a requirement to obey the demands of those effecting detentions. The commands were to institute "identical procedures" for the investigation and release of detained MLM personnel, rather than entrusting US military police with that function. And the BDU issue disappeared altogether.

HQUSAREUR reviewed this latest Soviet proposal, drafted a reply, and dispatched it for delivery. CUSMLM relayed it to SERB on 29 August and, responding to a US-imposed deadline, suggested 6 September as a date for possible signature of the document. GSFG's answer arrived precisely then, but it did not entail a signature. Instead, CSERB said that his headquarters found the draft both inconsistent with previous US positions and deficient in certain important respects. Accordingly, he had prepared a counter-proposal. Pereverzev's version limited the MLM guarantee of safety to "during detentions", reinserted the requirement for identical detention investigation procedures, added back the catch-all provision, and reintroduced the formulation concerning a sentry on his post, but now with a twist. Instead of demanding submission to the sentry's commands, the formulation simply required that MLM personnel be briefed on his special procedures. This point, while not entirely satisfying USAREUR's concerns, represented a major concession by GSFG. As distasteful as it might be, the wording reflected a practice employed by USMLM for many years. The Mission found it objectionable because of the possible implication that Nicholson might have survived, had he only been briefed. In actuality, all Mission personnel know full well the procedures used by a sentry. Knowledge is not the problem.

USAREUR responded with its actual "final position" on 11 September. On that date CUSMLM and NavRep presented a document which made the following substantive changes: It dropped the caveat "during detentions" from the MLM safety guarantee, deleted reference to briefings on a sentry's procedures, and called for "similar" vice identical detention investigation procedures (The last point reflected only the absence of a komendatura system in USAREUR, precluding identical procedures.). CSERB promised to study the document.

The 11 September meeting marked the beginning of a three-month hiatus in the discussions. In the face of frequent prodding by CUSMLM about a response, CSERB asked forbearance, claiming that the matter was out of his hands. All suspected that the document had been sent to Moscow, although SERB never confirmed so.

A stillness descended on the negotiating front, lasting until

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December. In the interim the time passed quietly, save for two events: the 19 September posthumous promotion of MAJ Nicholson to Lieutenant Colonel and the November summit conference between Reagan and Gorbachev. The promotion was announced by the White House. Secretary Weinberger personally conducted the ceremony in his office and addressed harsh words toward Moscow: "(T)his outrageous murder testifies to the ruthlessness of the adversaries we face... There can be no rationalization of this act -- no justification. There can be no adequate compensation." But his rhetoric remained out of reach of the press, and the promotion, which under some circumstances might have affected the negotiations, did not. The Summit, however, fundamentally influenced the climate of Soviet-American relations and probably explained the protracted delay in GSFG's response. Its import became apparent later.

On 15 December NavRep requested from DC SERB a copy of the latest GSFG summary proposal, which he received the following day. The document contained several administrative errors, confusing the situation, but in essence it repeated the 6 September position of GSFG with one change: deletion of the phrase "without surveillance or escort" from the provision on detention investigation procedures. The recognition that no movement had occurred prompted USAREUR to call for a third formal negotiating session, which after some shuffling was slated for 30 December in Potsdam. At a 27 December preparatory meeting CSERB complicated matters by announcing yet another change in the GSFG proposal: a rewrite of the USMLM catch-all provision. The subterfuge of veiled language had evidently dawned on HQGSFG, and CSERB tightened the US verbiage considerably: "To recognize the right of each headquarters to take the particular steps deemed essential to prevent members of the Military Liaison Missions from inadvertently intruding onto the places of disposition of military units or military facilities." CUSMLM complained about this last-minute change, and CSERB responded by claiming that GSFG had made a series of concessions to accommodate USAREUR's desires, but without reciprocity. He also questioned the good faith of the US side. At the conclusion of the meeting the colonels both realized that, even with general officers present at the next session, agreement might prove elusive.

NEGOTIATIONS: SESSION III

Session III occurred with a new head of the Soviet delegation, GEN-MAJ L. K. Bugrov, who replaced Semyonov as First Deputy Chief of Staff, GSFG. More dynamic than his predecessor and more familiar with the considerations despite his newness on the scene, Bugrov appeared to enjoy greater authority as well, perhaps reflecting General Lushev's desire to conclude the negotiations expeditiously.

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He gave the impression of a problem-solver willing to make decisions and not just refer to matters back to the headquarters for resolution. Much of the progress made at the session attested to his performance.

The talks led to tentative agreement on the text of the summary document. It contained compromises on several contentious points which had long separated the sides. GSFG quickly accepted all of the less significant changes which USAREUR proposed; most reflected superficial touches. Point 3, the crux of the document, resulted in a split. The US ultimately accepted the sentry briefing requirement, while GSFG agreed to delete the restricting caveat "during detentions" from its version of the personal safety clause. A real surprise occurred with regard to the "catch-all", and it came as a direct consequence of CUSMLM's persistent prodding. Not only did GSFG acquiesce on this score; it eventually agreed to scrap the provision entirely! One could read the consternation on CSERB's face, but fatigued, he accepted Bugrov's judgment, adding: "But we will still detain COL Lajoie, when he goes behind signs!" Thus, USMLM attained elimination of even the veiled reference to signs which it had, itself, concocted. It was a better outcome than one could possibly have expected.

General Bugrov ended the session by announcing that, in consideration of the progress achieved, the spirit of the Geneva Summit, and the intense work done by HQGSFG since that time his command could provide the Allies with a new PRA map as early as 3 January. Of course, the offer assumed a simultaneous exchange, so the Allies' speed of preparation would determine the actual exchange date. This news took the US counterintelligence specialist LTC R. L. Gambolati quite by surprise. He hazarded a guess that the Allies could respond within three weeks, but events demonstrated the optimism of his estimate.

THE APPROVAL PROCESS

Ultimately the understandings reached on 30 December received the blessing of both the Soviet and American chains of command, but the approval process required in excess of three months. Both sides had to defend their actions and decisions in the face of skepticism from various quarters, but in the end both succeeded in doing so. Still, the fate of the document swung perilously until 10 April, and maneuvering continued until literally the hour of the signing ceremony.

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GSFG initiated the action on 3 January by resurfacing our resilient nemesis; the issue of the sentry. On that date USMLM responded to a call by CSERB for a discussion of the summary formulations. CINCSFG, it seems, had reviewed and approved the 30 December summary document -- with the exception of the sentry formulation. While Gen Lushev accepted the wording worked out at Session III, he desired to expound on it and set it off as a second paragraph in point 3. Specifically, he proposed that the following version of the sentry provision be written as paragraph two: "Mission members will be continuously briefed on the special procedures which apply to a sentry on his post; the requirements of the instruction card do not extend to his actions." (underscoring added). Since the added verbiage contributed nothing of substance to the formulation except to make it more specific and thereby complicate the approval process. CUSMLM advised rejecting this rather idiosyncratic proposal and explaining that the US side had acquiesced to the sentry formulation only with great reluctance; elaboration would only jeopardize the accords.

After deliberation GEN Otis adopted this course of action. On 9 January he dispatched a letter to his counterpart presenting two alternatives: either GSFG could eliminate all reference to the sentry on his post or it could accept the formulation as derived on 30 December. GEN Lushev responded to this letter on 17 January with yet another variation on point 3 -- one which the US side had totally rejected on 30 December! This formulation still expressed the sentry provision as a separate paragraph and, while dropping the specificity of its second clause, reintroduced the limiting phrase "during detentions" into the guarantee of MLM safety.

CINCUSAREUR dispatched yet another letter to CINCSFG, this time proposing that the CINCs meet personally to resolve the issue. No doubt his response took Lushev by surprise; on 29 January CINCSFG replied that: "For reasons beyond his control" he could not meet with GEN Otis in the near future, however, he had directed his staff to thoroughly review all the options and transcripts so as to permit a final decision on the summary document.

On 3 February CSERB was assigned the onerous task of conveying to CUSMLM GEN Lushev's decision to back down. In determining his course of action CINCSFG, Pereverzev stated, had taken into account not only GEN Otis' letters but also MG Price's statements at Session III. He concluded that the 30 December formulation, buttressed by this additional material, adequately covered the requirements of a sentry. Having transmitted this embarrassing message -- and avoided putting it in writing -- Pereverzev went on to other, less unpleasant topics, including the PRA map exchange. In response to an inquiry CSERB replied that GSFG insisted that the PRA coverage limit of

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25.1% pertain to each and all Allied sectors of the FRG; his command would not accept an overage in any of the zones, even if offset in another. Pereverzev said that GSFG was quite interested in expediting the exchange, and Pereverzev again inquired about the pace of Allied work. He was told that while the initial estimate of 2-3 weeks had proven to be very optimistic, work on the map was continuing.

Several days later, on 7 February, USAREUR reported the text of the agreed summary to Washington via the chain of command. The transmittal message contained a legal defense of the decisions taken by the US side and explained the rationale for adopting it. On 18 February CUSMLM flew to Washington to brief those involved in the Interagency review process.

In Washington the Interagency Group studied the concluding document in meticulous detail. Although nearly all agencies represented there welcomed the results of the negotiations -- particularly when acquainted with the major shifts which the US side had forced in the Soviets' initial position -- elements in OSD still interposed some objections.

Finally, on 3 April, USAREUR received the long-awaited message of approval from OJCS. In a compromise solution, OSD had consented to accept the document as written on the condition that State Department continue to pursue the issues of apology and compensation in political channels, whenever appropriate. The NSC blessed this solution, and the President accepted it, setting the stage for the final act in the negotiations' protracted history.

With approval in hand, CUSMLM approached SERB to arrange for the signing ceremony. So as to preclude possible misunderstandings, he delivered copies of both the English and Russian versions of the text for the final document, as we understood them. It was only then that both sides realized that their texts differed slightly. The Russian title was shorter and their paragraph two contained an additional (and superfluous) word. While the slight differences could be explained as linguistic accommodations and certainly not substantive it could not be denied that the respective higher authorities had not approved absolutely identical versions of the text. GSFG's penchant for secrecy and unwillingness to provide USAREUR with copies of its document underlay the textual problems. Had CUSMLM not undertaken to ascertain the correspondence of the texts, the sides would have continued laboring under the illusion of correspondence until the reality of the signing ceremony. As it was, small divergences which, if recognized in early January, could have been harmonized without great ado, now made for an awkward situation. The US side did, however, agree to use the shorter title

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and allowed the additional word in paragraph two of the Russian text. At that point the Soviets presented a final copy for inspection and yet another and potentially thornier difference was discovered: the format for point three. The US version, reflecting our understanding of the 30 December understandings, expressed the entire point as a single paragraph, while the Soviet version set off the final sentence -- the sentry formulation -- as a second paragraph within that point. At a meeting held on 7 April the two chiefs presented their arguments and tentatively agreed on a means by which to accommodate their positions. Recognizing that no differences of substance separated the two versions, the Soviets agreed to accept our version on the English text, and we would use their version on the Russian one. Admittedly, the solution begged the issue, but given the reluctance of both sides to reapproach the respective chains of command and thus reopen battles already fought and won, it represented a workable compromise. At this same meeting Pereverzev also resurrected a long-dormant notion for concluding the negotiations by simply shaking hands and agreeing to abide by the provisions of the summary document without actually signing it. Since it had been agreed and permission received to sign the document this idea was rejected.

On 8 April as the USMLM and GSFG negotiators were preparing to depart for the signing ceremony, slated to be held at the headquarters building in Heidelberg on the following day, ODCSI USAREUR passed an urgent message. There would be no haggling at the signing ceremony: Either the Soviet delegation comes prepared to sign the US version of the document without the dangling sentence in point three or it should not come at all. A series of messages flashed back and forth between the headquarters over the remainder of the day, and both delegations remained in place.

Late on 8 April CUSMLM again met with CSERB in Potsdam to review the options and discuss developments. They determined that the format of point three remained the sole contentious issue and agreed that the two generals could best thrash it out in Heidelberg. Both sides would bring texts for the alternative versions, both generals would be empowered to make the requisite decisions, and they would do verbal battle. HQUSAREUR was briefed on this proposal and it was accepted. Thus, on the strength of this understanding the sides left to conduct Session IV of the negotiations and, hopefully, to sign an agreement. The schedule had slipped one day, until 10 April.

Session IV took place in the conference room of the Keyes Building in Heidelberg. The US side had evaluated the limited range of options and expected a brief encounter, quick agreement, and signatures within about an hour; instead, the session lasted from 0930-1530. The US side read an opening statement, as it had done at

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each of the other negotiating sessions. GEN-MAJ Bugrov responded by declaring that his side clearly understood the genesis of the problem -- bureaucratic loose ends -- and did not attribute the impasse to malice on the US side. The GSFG delegation, he stressed, had come to the West intending to sign an agreement, but the delegations must first find a logical way out of the situation. A very candid series of exchanges followed, with each side presenting the merits of its own case and arguing against the other's. A range of alternatives emerged, including Pereverzev's outdated proposal to conclude the negotiations with a handshake. Both sides bargained hard, confronted the realities of common bureaucratic difficulties, and to quote GEN-MAJ Bugrov, "laid their cards on the table."

The sides ultimately decided that an imperfect but acceptable solution to the problem lay in accepting the slightly differing format for point three in Russian and English. The Soviets, however, needed additional rationale by which to justify taking this path. At length, Bugrov approached LTC Elliott, the USAREUR JAG representative and specialist in international law, and solicited his professional opinion on the legality and ramifications of such a solution. Failing initially to obtain an unequivocal answer, he asked point blank whether Elliott would confirm in writing the authenticity of the Russian and English texts on the reverse side of all the original documents. The US side expressed surprise at the curious request but agreed, for it evidently provided Bugrov with a means by which to placate his chain of command.

And thus it was that finally, at 1430 on 10 April 1986, MG Price and GEN-MAJ Bugrov affixed their signatures and exchanged copies of the "Agreed Summary of Joint US Army Europe and Group Soviet Forces Germany Staff Discussions" a document which will be known informally within USMLM as the "the Nicholson Protocol". So as to fulfill the directives imposed by the Interagency Group MG Price at the end of the session read a brief closing statement that stressed that the US Government would not consider the incident closed until apology and compensation had been received, recommended the development of further measures by which to improve the safety of MLM personnel, and expressed the fervent hope for an improvement in relations between USAREUR and GSFG.

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CONCLUSIONS

USMLM emerged from this tortuous period scarred but intact. The loss of a comrade reinforced to all concerned the vulnerability which surrounds some forms of intelligence collection; USMLM touring will never be quite the same again. The period also gave the AMLMs a degree of prominence which bordered on notoriety; public attention both jeopardized the position of the Mission and impeded collection. The consensus among tour personnel supports as expeditious a return to shadowy obscurity as circumstances will permit.

The Mission discharged its unanticipated duties with resiliency and thoroughness. Those involved can take pride in their performance. In confronting GSFG with the foreseeable results of its policies, in defending the interests of the United States and the Nicholson family in a hostile environment, in protesting Soviet repulsive behavior, in attending to the vital needs and soothing the emotional wounds of the bereaved, in paying tribute to a fallen fellow Missionary in services broadcast nationally, in articulating USAREUR strategy to national level agencies, in dealing hardheadedly with Soviet negotiators, in devising farsighted goals and pursuing them, and in myriad other ways the personnel of USMLM demonstrated their versatility and dedication. The task remains to recover from the period, reenter the operational environment in full force, and exploit the advantages which promise to accrue from the results of the negotiations.

The US team fulfilled the stated USAREUR negotiating goals, which were to:

1. Ensure no degradation of operational capabilities.
2. Clarify the details of the shooting, officially presenting the facts established by the US side and rejecting the Soviet version.
3. Stress throughout the talks that the incident will be closed only when an apology is rendered and compensation paid.
4. Establish procedures to insure the safety of all Mission personnel.
5. Review the question of freedom of movement so as to reduce Permanent Restricted Areas and improve transit throughout the GDR.

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From the perspective of USMLM the most positive aspects of the negotiations were the development of a new and reduced PRA map and the provision to GSFG servicemen of an MLM information card. The former promises access to hitherto closed areas by dramatically reducing PRAs and lifting certain restrictions on movement; the latter will codify and bring to the attention of the Soviet soldier in the ranks the legal status of the MLMs and conditional guarantee of safety which his command has granted. Both provisions will improve operating conditions for the Missions.

Certain observers have pointed out potential pitfalls in the summary document, but USMLM believes their concern unjustified. Their objections relate to:

1. Respect for the law and order of the host nation. Respect, however, differs from obedience, as CSERB freely acknowledged using the example of diplomats. This apt analogy demonstrates the approach which USMLM will take when touring. Before deciding on a particular course of action personnel will "consider" local law and precedents, but not necessarily obey them.
2. Avoidance of provocative acts. Inevitably the sides will define "provocation" in the manner which best serves their interests, and USMLM successfully rejected CSERB's attempt to unilaterally impose his interpretation. Loose language suits USMLM in this case. The charge of provocation can always be rejected as a difference of opinion.
3. Regular briefings on the procedures employed by a sentry on his post. Admittedly, this provision causes consternation in light of its implications, but it reflects consistent USMLM practice anyway. The formulation more closely touches on perception than substance. GSFG will not change its guard regulations, regardless of pressure from the Allies. This very diluted wording will force no operational change in USMLM's approach to the environment. It is a provision which USMLM can accept, albeit with reluctance.

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In a broader sense the negotiations provided certain unique insights into the position of the SMLMs and the behavior of the Soviets. Most often, speculation rather than real information has shaped our image of the SMLMs' role in the FRG; USMLM's experiences shed light on the SMLMs' needs and value.

First, the negotiations upended the commonly held myth of the AMLMs' institutional vulnerability. According to long unquestioned views, the Soviets believe that the Western Allies' need for the Missions exceeds their own. Accordingly, some Allied officials act in ways that actively limit MLM activities and options, imposing a form of self-censorship. Daring change, they contend, could upset the situation sufficiently that the USSR would abrogate the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, thus depriving the US of a most valuable collection asset. Such views vastly underestimate the strength of Soviet attachment to the SMLMs. Throughout the course of negotiations, the USSR, both in political and military channels, expressed consistent and unwavering dedication to its Missions. Whatever the rationale, Moscow would not put them at even tentative risk. Whether this stance reflected the lingering political benefits of occupation rights, desire for ELINT collection platforms, support of agent networks, gathering of military intelligence, or some other purpose(s) could not be judged. However, Moscow's unwillingness to jeopardize the status of its Missions and outspoken insistence that the Huebner-Malinin Agreement remain sacrosanct suggest a degree of value which we ignore only to our own detriment.

Second, GSFG showed unusual sensitivity to publicity, either about the shooting itself or its Missions in general. Indeed, publicity became Moscow's Achilles' heel. Multiple statements by DCM Sokolov in Washington and by Semyonov, Bugrov and Pereverzev in Potsdam evidenced an acute aversion to the disclosure of even seemingly inoffensive information; the desire for discretion cannot fully explain Soviet reactions. However, such secretiveness does track with the needs of an organization engaged in true clandestine activity.

Third, the SMLMs require access to medium and large-sized urban areas to do their work, whatever its nature. Further, they maintain some vital link with the Soviet Embassy in Bonn which the need for "new movies", as CSMLM/F once put it, cannot adequately explain. The 1984 PRA map issued by the Allies in response to GSFG's version nearly doubled the amount of restricted territory, often achieving this end by closing heretofore open cities. With time, and by analyzing GSFG's proposals for new PRA guidelines, a visceral Soviet attachment to both the seats of mission (Frankfurt, Baden-Baden, Buende) and other major cities became apparent. The likely use of embassy facilities for the exfiltration of acquired material,

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replenishment of stocks, and receipt of instructions also cannot be discounted. Thus, a substantial -- but still circumstantial -- case can be built around the suspicion that the SMLMs support clandestine operations in some unspecified manner.

Soviet negotiating tactics provided a virtual casebook study of the lessons learned in arms control dealings with the Soviets over the past 15 years. CSERB initially attempted to define the technical arrangements for the talks, so as to determine the negotiating environment. Next, he tried to shape the agenda by vetoing disagreeable topics. Then he selectively marshalled precedent to indicate how things "must" be. He refused to concede even secondary points or to leave any decision to chance; CUSMLM's frustrated proposal to decide the initial rotation by flip of the coin was anathema. Pereverzev displayed nearly inexhaustible stamina in repeating old formulations and official government positions; his patience rarely faltered. Reiteration never embarrassed him, nor did deadlines constrain him. He reacted to the ultimatums which USAREUR occasionally announced with alternating scorn and indifference. CSERB attempted to gain real US concessions today in return for the promise of possible Soviet consideration tomorrow; reciprocity never proved an operative principle. On one occasion he attempted to claim via sleight of hand and deft summarization points which his side had actually failed to win during the negotiations! Pereverzev prepared for meetings with exemplary thoroughness, briefed his generals well, and could always muster ample documentation or cite historical antecedents. The reverse side of his trait, however, was noticeable inflexibility. CSERB disdained improvisation, and the unanticipated left him nonplussed. In short, he proved tough, clever, capable, and resourceful, but he also had failings. Fortunately, USMLM expected as much, warned the command, and prepared to deal with his efforts. History will inevitably judge the results.

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Appendix 1: Chronology

CHRONOLOGY

- 1545A/24 March 85 MAJ A. D. Nicholson, Jr. shot and killed at Ludwigslust Subcaliber Range 475
- 1715A/25 March 85 USMLM returns MAJ Nicholson's body to Berlin
- 28 March 85 O. M. Sokolov, DCM of Soviet Embassy- Washington, protest USMLM actions to Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Burt
- 29 March 85 USMLM delivers protest letter from CINCUSAREUR to GEN-COL G. F. Krivosheyev, C/S GSFG
- 29 March 85 USMLM escorts MAJ Nicholson's body to Washington. Vice President George Bush meets aircraft, makes statement sharply critical of Moscow
- 30 March 85 Interment of MAJ Nicholson in Arlington National Cemetery
- 30 March 85 Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin meets with Secretary of State George Shultz to discuss shooting, consequences
- 30 March 85 Secretary of State Caspar Weinberger calls for apology, compensation
- 12 April 85 Meeting between General Glenn K. Otis, CINCUSAREUR, and General of the Army Mikhail M. Zaytsev, CINCGSFG
- 30 May 85 Dedication of Villa Nicholson at USMLM Potsdam compound
- 14 June 85 Session I of USAREUR-GSFG Staff Negotiations held in Frankfurt
- 01 July 85 Session II of USAREUR-GSFG Negotiations held in Potsdam
- 10 July 85 CSERB presents initial GSFG proposal for negotiations summary document

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- 13 July 85 CUSMLM injured during Soviet ramming of USMLM local tour
- 11 September 85 CUSMLM presents final USAREUR counterproposal for negotiations summary document
- 19 September 85 Secretary of Defense posthumously promotes MAJ Nicholson to lieutenant colonel
- 16 December 85 SERB provides copy of final GSFG proposal, with no essential change in position
- 30 December 85 Session III of USAREUR-GSFG Staff Negotiations
- 10 April 86 Session IV/Signing Ceremony for Summary Document concluding USAREUR-GSFG Staff Negotiations

30 March 85 USM escorts MAJ Nicholson's body to Washington. Vice President George Bush meets with Secretary of State Schultz to discuss situation, makes statement sharply critical of Moscow

30 March 85 Inquest of MAJ Nicholson in Arlington National Cemetery

30 March 85 Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin meets with Secretary of State George Shultz to discuss shooting, consequences

30 March 85 Secretary of State Casper Weinberger calls for apology, cooperation

12 April 85 Meeting between General Stan K. Ditz, CINCUSARPAC, and General of the Army Howard M. Taylor, CINCUSPAC

30 May 85 Dedication of Villa Nicholson at USMA, Fort Benning

14 June 85 Session I of USAREUR-GSFG Staff Negotiations held in Frankfurt

01 July 85 Session II of USAREUR-GSFG negotiations held in Potsdam

10 July 85 GSFG presents initial GSFG proposal for negotiations summary document

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Appendix 2: CINCUSAREUR Protest Letter on Shooting

March 26, 1985

General Mikhail M. Zaytsev
Commander in Chief
Group of Soviet Forces in Germany

General Zaytsev:

With this letter, I am lodging an official protest of the gravest nature.

At approximately 1545 hours, 24 March 1985, one of your soldiers deliberately shot and murdered an unarmed member of my military liaison mission, Major Arthur D. Nicholson, Jr., in the vicinity of Ludwigslust, East Germany. Following the shooting, your Soviet soldier also prohibited the administering of emergency lifesaving measures by Major Nicholson's driver, Sergeant Jessie G. Schatz. This wanton act of violence is the most serious in the 38 year history of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement.

You are aware that the Huebner-Malinin Agreement provides that the members of our liaison missions are to be permitted complete freedom of travel wherever and whenever desired over the territory and roads in both zones. The only exceptions to this free travel guarantee have been the permanent and temporary restricted areas periodically established by our sides. Major Nicholson was not within one of your restricted areas; he was exercising his legitimate right of free travel. The fact that the sentry clearly recognized the mission vehicle and mission personnel and still opened fire indicates that this action had the tacit approval of Headquarters, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG). It is also unconscionable that your soldier and his superiors did not allow Sergeant Schatz to administer first aid to Major Nicholson.

On 19 March 1985, personnel from your Soviet Military Liaison Mission-Frankfurt, were detected violating a permanent restricted area in the U.S. Army, Europe zone near Hof. When they were detained by our forces on 20 March for that violation, they were treated, as always, in a civil, safe, and professional manner. No one was harmed. Conversely, the actions by your soldier in this latest incident were completely uncalled for and show a total disregard for human life.

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I strongly protest this violent action by your soldier which has resulted in the needless and unjustified death of one of my officers, who, like your liaison officers, was unarmed. I demand a full investigation and explanation of this incident, that measures be taken to insure that the personnel responsible are punished, and that measures be implemented to insure that an incident such as this will not recur.

General Mikhail M. Japarov
Commander in Chief
Group of Soviet Forces in Germany

Glenn K. Otis
General, U. S. Army
Commander in Chief

with this letter, I am lodging an official protest of the
gravest nature.

At approximately 1500 hours, 24 March 1985, one of your soldiers
deliberately shot and killed an unarmed member of my liaison
officer's staff, Major Arthur B. Nicholson, Jr., in the vicinity of
Ludwigsdorf, East Germany. Following the shooting, your Soviet
soldier also prohibited the administering of emergency lifesaving
measures by Major Nicholson's driver, Sergeant James G. Smith.
This action of violence is the most serious in the 35 year
history of the Moscow-Washington Agreement.

You are aware that the Moscow-Washington Agreement provides that
the members of our liaison missions are to be permitted complete
freedom of travel wherever and whenever desired over the territory
and roads in both zones. The only exceptions to this free travel
guaranteed have been the permanent and temporary restricted areas
periodically established by our side. Major Nicholson was not
within one of your restricted areas; he was exercising his legiti-
mate right of free travel. The fact that the route clearly tang-
led the liaison vehicle and mission personnel and still caused
fire indicates that this action had the tacit approval of head-
quarters, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG). It is also un-
acceptable that your soldiers did not allow Major Nicholson
contact in order to administer first aid to Major Nicholson.

On 19 March 1985, personnel from your Soviet Military Liaison
Mission (Soviet Liaison) were detected violating a permanent restricted
area in the U.S. Army Europe zone near Hof. When they were
detained by our forces on 20 March for that violation, they were
treated, as always, in a civil, safe, and professional manner. No
one was harmed. Conversely, the action by your soldier in this
latest incident was completely uncalculated for and took a total disre-
gard for human life.



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Appendix 3: CINCSFG Reply to Protest

Commander in Chief
Group of Soviet Forces, Germany

9 April 1985

No. 157

General:

As Commander in Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany I note with regret that your letter on the 24 March 1985 incident, involving personnel in the American Military Liaison Mission, contains no acceptance of responsibility by the American side.

A thorough and complete examination irrefutably attests to the fact that the incident occurred because representatives of USMLM flagrantly violated paragraph 10 of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, dtd 3 April 1947, which states: "Each member of the mission will be given identical travel facilities, to include identical permanent passes in the Russian and English languages, permitting complete freedom of travel wherever and whenever it will be desired over territory and roads in both zones, except for places of disposition of military units, without escort or supervision."

On Sunday, 24 March, violators in camouflaged uniforms riding in a vehicle with licence plates smeared with dirt trespassed on a closed military facility and penetrated onto a military equipment guardpost. One of them broke open a metal window shutter and entered a storage shed.

In this situation the sentry had no opportunity to identify the vehicle and assumed that the trespassers had sabotage in mind. Acting in strict accordance with military regulations (which are approximately the same in all armies), he demanded in Russian and in German that the trespassers halt, then fired a warning shot upwards. Had Major Nicholson complied with the legal demands of the sentry, his life would not have been endangered, but he failed to submit to them. Instead, he attempted to reach his vehicle at any cost so as to hide there with his acquired intelligence, thus compelling the sentry to use his weapon.

I want to call your attention to the fact that, having complied with the demands of the sentry, SSG Schatz was not subjected to forceful action of any kind.



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There is also no basis for accusing the Soviet side of allegedly prohibiting SSG Schatz from aiding Major Nicholson. SSG Schatz not only made no attempt to do so, but even categorically refused to leave his vehicle, making reference to an order not to abandon it.

It was specifically on the initiative of Soviet soldiers that a doctor was immediately summoned; he pronounced Major Nicholson's death to have been practically instantaneous.

The totality of the actions by USMLM personnel bore the clear stamp of intelligence collection, as confirmed by the developed film from the camera. The penetration of a military equipment post guarded by a sentry was an especially dangerous act.

The eviction of liaison mission personnel from restricted areas is an altogether different issue. GSFG personnel, when confident that trespassers are members of USMLM, have not, do not, and in the future have no intention of using weapons to detain or evict them from restricted areas.

This was the case even in such a critical situation as when members of USMLM, having been detained for collecting intelligence in a restricted area near Rohrbeck, district of Potsdam, intentionally ran over a Soviet officer, inflicting severe bodily injury on him.

In the 24 March incident the Soviet side displayed consideration and self-control by inviting the Chief of USMLM, Colonel Lajoie, to the scene of the incident. At that site and together with the Chief of Staff of GSFG, he had the opportunity to acquaint himself with the circumstances surrounding the incident and to report to his headquarters just what had occurred with Major Nicholson and who was at fault in the matter. We are now convinced that Colonel Lajoie failed to present an objective report on the occurrence. In light of this (COL Lajoie's report) an attempt is currently being made (by the US) to substitute a totally different issue - the eviction of trespassers from restricted areas - for the actions of a sentry in the performance of his duties.

I, as the Commander in Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, regret the tragic outcome of the 24 March 1985 incident, however, the responsibility for it lies entirely with the American side.

In this connection I reject your protest and all charges directed against HQ GSFG and the Soviet sentry and request that you take effective steps to ensure strict compliance by the American side with the 1947 (Huebner-Malinin) Agreement.

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General, in accordance with an understanding reached between the Soviet and American sides, I agree to meet personally with you so as to conclude our review of this incident.

With your concurrence, I propose that the meeting take place in Wuensdorf or Potsdam (Officer's Club).

So as to prepare for the meeting, I believe it advisable to direct that a Deputy Chief of Staff of GSFG meet with Chief, USMLM in Potsdam to clarify the issues subject to discussion and examine possible measures by which to prevent similar incidents involving members of military missions in the future.

(SIGNED)
M. ZAYTSEV
General of the Army

To General Glenn K. Otis
Commander in Chief
US Army, Europe

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[REDACTED]

Appendix 4: Composition of the Delegations for USAREUR-GSFG Staff Negotiations

USAREUR Delegation:

BG (Later MG) Roger J. Price	Deputy Chief of Staff, USAREUR
COL Roland Lajoie	CUSMLM
LTCOL (USMC) Lawrence G. Kelley	DCUSMLM (Naval Representative)
LTC Ronald L. Gambolati	Counterintelligence Representative, HQUSAREUR
MAJ (Later LTC) H. Wayne Elliot	Legal Representative, HQUSAREUR
CAPT (USAF) Werner S. Hindrichs (Sessions 1-3)	Liaison Officer, USMLM

GSFG Delegation:

GEN-LT Viktor A. Semyonov (Sessions 1 & 2)	First Deputy Chief of Staff, GSFG
GEN-MAJ Leonid K. Bugrov (Session 3 & 4)	
GEN-MAJ Sergey S. Shevtsov	CSMLM/F
COL (SAF) Yuriy V. Pereverzev	CSERB
LTC Yuriy I. Tetyakov	Senior Officer, SERB
MAJ Sergey D. Savchenko (Sessions 1-3)	Translator, SERB
MAJ (SAF) Yevgeniy V. Zyurin (Session 4)	Translator, SMLM/F
SR. LT. Mikhail I. Styopkin (Sessions 1 & 2)	Translator, SERB
SR. LT. Dmitriy V. Naumenko (Session 3)	Translator, SERB

[REDACTED]

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Appendix 5: Initial GSFG Proposal for Summary Document
(10 July 1985)

SUMMARY OF THE WORK

done by Representatives of the Staffs of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the US Army in Europe.

In the course of their joint work the staff representatives of GSFG and USAREUR have studied issues attendant to ensuring the safety and freedom of movement of personnel in the Military Liaison Missions, and have agreed as follows:

On the issue of ensuring the safety of personnel in the Military Liaison Missions

1. Strictly observe the Huebner-Malinin Agreement of 1947.
2. Ensure that Mission personnel respect the law and order of the host nation.
3. Prohibit Mission personnel from taking any kind of provocative actions.

The following are considered provocative actions: Insulting a representative on the military administration or police; deliberately creating a situation which endangers the personnel surrounding it or causes them material damage; physically resisting or failure to submit to the orders of those effecting a detention of mission personnel.

4. Categorically forbid Mission personnel from trespassing on training areas or firing ranges located in open areas, the borders of which are enclosed by signs reading "Halt-firing in progress!" or "Passage [by vehicle or on foot] forbidden!"

5. Explain to Mission personnel that, should any of them through unforeseen circumstances find themselves on a guarded military facility, their safety can be guaranteed only via scrupulous compliance with the commands/orders of the sentry.

6. Ensure that all soldiers are regularly briefed on and strictly observe the "Instructions on Actions to be Taken When Detaining Military Liaison Mission Personnel". The instructions must specify the rights of MLM personnel and give orders which ban the use of physical force or weapons against them or the commission of other acts which threaten their safety.

[REDACTED]

7. Permit Military Liaison Mission personnel touring the GDR or FRG to wear any uniform -- other than a camouflaged one -- authorized by their respective armed forces, with distinctive military rank insignia.

On the issue of observing the principle of freedom of movement for Military Liaison Mission personnel.

1. Significantly reduce the coverage of the permanent restricted areas in the GDR and FRG on the basis of reciprocity and parity.

2. Open the cities where the Military Liaison Missions are quartered and all roads providing entrance to or exit from these cities for unrestricted travel by Mission personnel.

3. With the introduction of new permanent restricted area maps, open the permanent and temporary restricted area border roads for unrestricted travel by Military Liaison Mission personnel. Mission personnel will also be allowed to stop at rest stops and gas stations located on autobahns which pass through restricted areas.

4. So as to ensure that the demands of point 1 are met, each side has the right to impose restrictions on the travel of Military Liaison Mission personnel along roads/streets adjacent or leading to some military facilities located in open areas. This will be accomplished by erecting special signs. Such signs may not be used to close off main or transit roads/streets.

5. Authorize military police officers (military commandants of GSFG) to investigate the circumstances surrounding a detention of Military Liaison Mission personnel right at the site of the detention. After the investigation has been completed mission personnel may continue along their chosen route without surveillance or escort.

6. Strictly adhere to the provision in Article 10 of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement which authorizes Military Liaison Personnel to travel freely, "without escort or surveillance."

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Appendix 6: Final Summary Document From Session 3
(30 December 1985)

AGREED SUMMARY OF JOINT USAREUR AND GSFG STAFF DISCUSSIONS
CONCERNING THE MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS ACCREDITED TO
THE SOVIET AND UNITED STATES COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF
IN GERMANY

WITH THE GOAL OF PREVENTING INCIDENTS INVOLVING MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS ACCREDITED TO CINCSFG AND CINCUSAREUR, STAFF REPRESENTATIVES HAVE HELD JOINT DISCUSSIONS ON ENSURING THE SAFETY AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF SUCH MISSION MEMBERS. AS A RESULT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS THE PARTIES HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

1. TO CONFIRM THAT THE 1947 HUEBNER-MALININ AGREEMENT REMAINS VALID AND UNCHANGED AND ENSURE THAT ALL ITS PROVISIONS ARE STRICTLY OBSERVED.
2. THAT MILITARY LIAISON MISSION MEMBERS ENJOY SPECIAL STATUS AS A RESULT OF BEING ACCREDITED TO THE RESPECTIVE COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF. THEY WILL RESPECT THE LAW AND ORDER OF THE COUNTRY WITHIN WHICH THEY ARE LOCATED AND WILL NOT COMMIT PROVOCATIVE ACTS.
3. THAT ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL WILL BE INSTRUCTED ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF MISSION MEMBERS AND RECEIVE INSTRUCTION CARDS WHICH ADDRESS THE PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED WITH REGARD TO THEM. AT A MINIMUM, THE CARDS WILL STIPULATE THAT THE USE OF FORCE OR WEAPONS AGAINST MISSION MEMBERS OR THE COMMISSION OF OTHER ACTS WHICH COULD THREATEN THEIR SAFETY IS CATEGORICALLY PROHIBITED. THE SEARCH OF MISSION MEMBERS OR THEIR VEHICLES IS ALSO PROHIBITED. MISSION MEMBERS WILL BE CONTINUOUSLY BRIEFED ON THE SPECIAL PROCEDURES WHICH APPLY TO A SENTRY ON HIS POST.
4. TO ESTABLISH SIMILAR PROCEDURES FOR INVESTIGATING DETENTIONS OF MISSION MEMBERS. UPON THE COMPLETION OF AN INVESTIGATION THE DETAINED MISSION MEMBERS WILL BE PERMITTED TO CONTINUE THEIR TRAVEL.
5. TO REDUCE ON A MUTUAL BASIS THE PERMANENT RESTRICTED AREAS (PRA) AND OPEN FOR FREE MOVEMENT BY MISSION MEMBERS THE CITIES WHERE THE MISSIONS ARE LOCATED AND THE ROADS WHICH PROVIDE ENTRANCE TO OR EXIT FROM THEM. WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW PRA MAPS ABOLISH THE EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT BY MISSION MEMBERS ALONG AUTOBAHNS AND ROADS WHICH BORDER RESTRICTED AREAS.

THIS SUMMARY IS WRITTEN IN ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN, BOTH TEXTS BEING AUTHENTIC.

ROGER J. PRICE
MAJOR GENERAL, GENERAL STAFF
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY EUROPE AND
SEVENTH ARMY

LEONID K. BUGROV
GENERAL-MAJOR
FIRST DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES
IN GERMANY



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СОГЛАСОВАННЫЕ ИТОГИ ПЕРЕГОВОРОВ
ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЕЙ ШТАБОВ ГСВГ И СВ США В ЕВРОПЕ

С ЦЕЛЮ ПРЕДОТВРАЩЕНИЯ ИНЦИДЕНТОВ С ЧЛЕНАМИ ВОЕННЫХ МИССИЙ СВЯЗИ, АККРЕДИТОВАННЫХ ПРИ ГК ГСВГ И ГК СВ США В ЕВРОПЕ, ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЯМИ ШТАБОВ БЫЛИ ПРОВЕДЕНЫ ПЕРЕГОВОРЫ ПО ВОПРОСАМ ОБЕСПЕЧЕНИЯ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ И СВОБОДЫ ПЕРЕДВИЖЕНИЯ ЧЛЕНОВ ЭТИХ МИССИЙ. В РЕЗУЛЬТАТЕ ЭТИХ ПЕРЕГОВОРОВ СТОРОНЫ ДОГОВОРИЛИСЬ О СЛЕДУЮЩЕМ:

1. ПОДТВЕРДИТЬ ДЕЙСТВЕННОСТЬ И НЕИЗМЕННОСТЬ СОГЛАШЕНИЯ "ХЮБНЕР-МАЛИНИН" 1947 ГОДА, ОБЕСПЕЧИТЬ СТРОГОЕ СОБЛЮДЕНИЕ ВСЕХ ЕГО ПОЛОЖЕНИЙ.

2. ЧЛЕНЫ МИССИЙ ИМЕЮТ ОСОБЫЙ СТАТУС, ПОСКОЛЬКУ ОНИ АККРЕДИТОВАНЫ ПРИ СООТВЕТСТВУЮЩИХ ГЛАВНОКОМАНДУЮЩИХ. ОНИ БУДУТ УВАЖАТЬ ЗАКОНЫ И ПОРЯДКИ СТРАНЫ ПРЕБЫВАНИЯ, В КОТОРОЙ ОНИ НАХОДЯТСЯ, И НЕ БУДУТ СОВЕРШАТЬ ПРОВОКАЦИОННЫХ ДЕЙСТВИЙ.


3. ВСЕ ВОЕННОСЛУЖАЩИЕ БУДУТ ПРОИНФОРМИРОВАНЫ О ПРАВОВОМ ПОЛОЖЕНИИ ЧЛЕНОВ МИССИЙ И ПОЛУЧАТ ПАМЯТКИ-ИНСТРУКЦИИ О ПОРЯДКЕ ДЕЙСТВИЙ ПО ОТНОШЕНИЮ К НИМ. КАК МИНИМУМ, В ЭТИХ ПАМЯТКАХ ДОЛЖНО БЫТЬ УКАЗАНО, ЧТО ПРОТИВ ЧЛЕНОВ МИССИЙ КАТЕГОРИЧЕСКИ ЗАПРЕЩАЕТСЯ ПРИМЕНЯТЬ СИЛУ, ОРУЖИЕ ИЛИ СОВЕРШАТЬ ИНЫЕ ДЕЙСТВИЯ, КОТОРЫЕ МОГУТ УГРОЖАТЬ ИХ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ, А ТАКЖЕ ОБЫСКИВАТЬ ЧЛЕНОВ ВМС И ИХ АВТОМАШИНЫ.

ЧЛЕНАМ МИССИЙ БУДЕТ ПОСТОЯННО ДОВОДИТЬСЯ ОСОБЫЙ ПОРЯДОК ДЕЙСТВИЙ ЧАСОВОГО НА ПОСТУ.


4. УСТАНОВИТЬ СХОДНЫЙ ПОРЯДОК РАЗБОРА ЗАДЕРЖАНИЙ ЧЛЕНОВ ВМС. ПОСЛЕ ЗАВЕРШЕНИЯ РАЗБОРА ЗАДЕРЖАННЫМ ЧЛЕНАМ МИССИИ БУДЕТ РАЗРЕШАТЬСЯ ПРОДОЛЖАТЬ ДАЛЬНЕЙШЕЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ.

5. НА ВЗАИМНОЙ ОСНОВЕ СОКРАТИТЬ ПЛОЩАДЬ ПОСТОЯННЫХ ЗАПРЕТНЫХ РАЙОНОВ (ПЗР), ОТКРЫТЬ ДЛЯ СВОБОДНОГО ПЕРЕДВИЖЕНИЯ ЧЛЕНОВ МИССИЙ ГОРОДА, В КОТОРЫХ РАЗМЕШЕНЫ МИССИИ, И ДОРОГИ, ПО КОТОРЫМ ОСУЩЕСТВЛЯЕТСЯ ВЪЕЗД В ЭТИ ГОРОДА И ВЫЕЗД ИЗ НИХ. С ВВЕДЕНИЕМ НОВЫХ КАРТ ПЗР ОТМЕНИТЬ СУЩЕСТВУЮЩИЕ В НАСТОЯЩЕЕ ВРЕМЯ ОГРАНИЧЕНИЯ НА ПЕРЕДВИЖЕНИЕ ЧЛЕНОВ МИССИЙ ПО АВТОБАНАМ И ДОРОГАМ, ЯВЛЯЮЩИМСЯ ГРАНИЦАМИ ЗАПРЕТНЫХ РАЙОНОВ.

ДАННЫЙ ИТГОВЫЙ ДОКУМЕНТ НАПИСАН НА РУССКОМ И АНГЛИЙСКОМ ЯЗЫКАХ, ПРИ ЭТОМ ОБА ТЕКСТА ЯВЛЯЮТСЯ АУТЕНТИЧНЫМИ.


10.4.86

ЛЕОНИД К. БУТРОВ
ГЕНЕРАЛ-МАЙОР
ПЕРВЫЙ ЗАМЕСТИТЕЛЬ НАЧАЛЬНИКА
ШТАБА ГРУППЫ СОВЕТСКИХ ВОЙСК
В ГЕРМАНИИ


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ЗАМЕСТИТЕЛЬ НАЧАЛЬНИКА ШТАБА
СВ США В ЕВРОПЕ И 7-ОЙ АРМИИ
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