#### THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

During the chief of the defence staff's trip to the USA in November 1959, the cabinet ordered a briefing on the military cooperation with D[enmark] and N[orway]. The briefing was conducted by C Sect II navy captain Henning. The draft is here.

The chief of the defence staff had made some preparations for the briefing before departing on his trip. A draft in pencil is enclosed [translators note: not in this facsimile].

The reason for the cabinet bringing up the matter was the discussion going on between Erlander and Hjalmarson concerning Sweden's foreign policy.

C Gn [Curt Göransson]

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Sweden's Secret Ties to the West Edited by Robert Dalsjö

The defence staff
Section II
The head

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H Henning

## Cabinet briefing 21/11 1959

I have been entrusted with the task of giving a short account of the preparations for possible military cooperation, taking place with N. and D.

For reasons of secrecy, only the chief of the defence staff and the supreme commander have a total overview over this cooperation. Beyond this, I have been kept informed, but not to the degree that I can talk about details.

The cooperation is based on the cabinet's decisions, having received military briefings on the subject.

Present:
The primeand
foreign
ministers.
Cabinetmembers
Sträng,
Andersson,
Lindell,
Lindström,

Lindholm.

and Kling.

A memo on the matter was handed to the prime minister and the defence minister in February 1949. A briefing to the cabinet was made in May, but no immediate decision was taken.

A slightly reworked memo was briefed to the foreign minister on 5 September and a new cabinet-briefing took place 6 September. I will give a short account of this second memo, which came to provide the basis for the cabinet's decision.

Initially, it was stressed that it is of great importance that certain measures can be taken already in peacetime, to facilitate a possible cooperation in case of war, without too much friction. Improvisation takes long time and entails losses of personnel and equipment. It was furthermore highlighted that any possible cooperation should be undertaken in forms, which did not entail any political sidetaking or were politically binding.

The issue-areas which could be concerned are divided into three groups, namely:

- 1. Preparations of a purely technical nature, such as investigations of how land-line and radio communications should arranged, and how the exchange of messages should take place. In this group are also preparations for, should the need arise, the coordination of air surveillance and fighter control (by the way, certain arrangements had been made in this field already before the second world war). Coordination of air rescue services and military weather services ought to be possible, already with an eye to peacetime conditions.
- 2. Preparations for military land activities in certain border areas, in which common arrangements for surveillance might be necessary, already in a

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situation before any of the countries are at war. As an example was mentioned the area around Treriksröset [Translator's note: T. is where Sweden's, Norway's and Finland's borders meet, approx. 69° N, 25° E].

3. Certain preparations concerning naval activities regarding conditions in the Sound, and regarding the protection of shipping in the Skagerrak. Knowledge about the Danish side's plans for the Sound becomes necessary, if we on the Swedish side are to assess which measures should be undertaken in a neutrality situation and in a war. Preparations for some coordination thus appears as highly desirable. One probably thought foremost of mining activities. The protection of shipping in the Skagerrak pertained to certain planning for convoys along the Norwegian coast.

In the memo it is underscored that the very limited preparations suggested can be undertaken strictly confidentially and will only call for short meetings between single officers.

The cabinet's decision was conveyed by the foreign minister 19 September 1949. According to notes, the matter had previously been brought up in the advisory council on foreign policy.

The decision meant that the cabinet assented to preparations within group 1. Issues belonging to group 2 would be deferred. Regarding the issues in group 3, assent was given to the protection of shipping in the Skagerrak, while no measures should be taken concerning the Sound, until further notice.

On 28 March 1950, the cabinet renewed its assent and it was decided that the defence staff would be allowed to keep in contact with D[enmark] regarding mining of the area of the Sound.

Work has since proceeded with a special eye to secrecy. It has been led by the respective chiefs of the defence staffs, which are responsible for the matter, and which are the only individuals with full insight into its different parts. The work itself has been conducted in small study-groups, one for each specific task. They have worked directly under the chief of the defence staff, and without contact with each other.

Work has the whole time been conducted on a bilateral basis. An exception is the cooperation on flight safety, where all three states have cooperated. No NATO matters have been touched upon.

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The plans which are the result of this work are kept in the respective defence staffs, separate from other documents, and are not passed on to subordinated agencies.

Currently, the following plans exist:

### Sweden-Norway

- 1. Plan for possible cooperation between air surveillance in Sweden and in Norway (Plan Asurv SN), signed 16 June 1955.
- 2. Plan for possible cooperation between Sweden and Norway regarding weather services (Plan Weather SN), signed 8 September 1953.
- 3. Plan for possible cooperation between Sweden and Norway concerning signals and cipher services (Plan Signals SN), signed 15 June 1955. Revision is under way after a meeting 25-26 February 1959. Annexes are revised step by step.
- 4. Plan for possible cooperation between Sweden and Norway as concerns the combined protection of shipping (Plan Shipping SN), signed 26 January 1951.

Latest revision during 1959.

Plan for possible cooperation between Sweden and Norway over the Skagerrak (Plan Skagerrak SN) signed 27 January. Rescinded at meeting 25-26 February 1959 (according to protocol from meeting)

## Sweden-Denmark

- 2. Plan for possible cooperation between Denmark and Sweden concerning signals and cipher services (Plan Signals DS), signed 1 June 1955. Revision under way after meeting 1959.
- 1. Plan for possible cooperation between air surveillance in Denmark and in Sweden (Plan Asurv DS), signed 1 April 1955

Naval departement The Sound

There is no authorised plan for possible naval cooperation between Sweden and Denmark. There is, however, a report on the matter.

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Finally, I would like to emphasise that the preparations for certain cooperation with N[orway] and D[enmark] in case of war, which I have now described, are in no way connected to the plan for cooperation concerning air safety, which will be briefed to you later.

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Colonel Myhrman Head, Section I Present: Captain Henning (A+B) Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons (B)

# Notes from briefing to the cabinet 21 November 1959

## A. Captain Henning's briefing

- 1. The foreign minister asked about the extent of authorised preparations. H[enning] clarified.
- 2. The prime minister asked whether the 'treaties' were binding. H answered in the negative. Only preparations to be used when needed. Also the defence minister clarified.
- 3. The prime minister suggested that a greater circle knew about something being in existence than suggested by H:s briefing. H pointed out that the advisory council on foreign policy had been 'consulted' in Sept. 1949.

## B. Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons briefing

- 1. The foreign minister asked about the frequency of the emergency landing exercises. S[immons] alluded to planned extent, which was foreseen as being reciprocal.
- 2. Cabinet-member Kling asked about earlier regulations and rules. S described the trial activities.
- 3. The prime minister asked about requirements for secrecy and about the amount of borrowed radio equipment. S explained that there were no obstacles to public disclosure, and described certain issues concerning equipment, customs etc.

## Questions after cabinet-briefing 21 November 1959

<u>Undén</u> Which preparations are authorised under group 1?

Henning repeated mainly what had been said during the briefing, with a

few small additions.

<u>Erlander</u> The treaties are not binding, are they?

Henning No. These are pure preparations, which need a special decision

to put them into force.

Andersson Underlined that it was only about preparations and added that a

decision about entry into force was to be made by the cabinet.

<u>Erlander</u> It appears as if more persons know about this than one would

believe after having heard the briefing.

Henning According to notes available to us, the advisory council on

foreign affairs was consulted before the cabinet made its decision