Sweden's Secret Ties to the West Edited by Robert Dalsjö

The result of conversation with Holterman and [illegible]

Everything, except the last paragraph, are matters which Montgomery asked to be conveyed to the Swedish military leadership.

16/6 1955

NATO plans – using German troops as the core – to create a defence grouping in northern Germany, sufficiently strong to defend Schleswig-Holstein against an attack from the East.

It is underscored that everything is relative, and that nothing in war is certain, but the group's strength shall be set at a level calculated to hold, and it shall have the task of stopping a penetration into Schleswig-Holstein.

It is discussed within NATO, how to set up the command arrangements for this. The north German defence group shall, in any case, be subordinated to the Central command. The Northern command's (and the Danish forces) southern limit shall be moved north, from the Kiel canal to the Danish-German border. But it is also considered to remove Denmark from the Northern command and transfer it to the Central command. If so, there may be a Baltic command set up for the naval forces (German and Danish naval forces) under the Central command. Even if Denmark were to remain in the Northern command, there might still be a Baltic command, as there will be great difficulties in coordinating naval forces in the Baltic if the German forces are under the Central command and the Danish under the Northern command. No final decision has been reached on these issues of demarcation.

NATO (primarily through Gruenther and Montgomery) has strongly asserted that during the first weeks (possibly the first week) following the outbreak of a war, all air assets must be focussed on strategic bombing and on air defence. It will not be possible to set aside any tactical air assets for direct cooperation with other forces, as even the tactical air must be used for the main task. Particularly army forces have to make do without direct air support during this period. All NATO air assets will be led centrally (i.e. by Norstad).

The consequences for Denmark will be that larger forces and a larger share of other parts of the armed forces than hitherto can be assigned for the defence of Zeeland.

The consequences for Norway will be that the armed forces, more than before, can be concentrated to northern Norway. Naval forces are already concentrated there, but more air- and ground forces can be assigned to that front. The standing, but not yet organised brigade in *southern* Norway (only a battalion presently exists) will decrease in

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importance. This is also reflected in Boyesen's study, which was submitted a few days ago, and is a posture statement in miniature. Despite the increase of forces in the north, it will become more difficult and less possible to defend northernmost Norway, north of the Lyngen position, because one cannot count on tactical air support there. It is thought that the Soviet Union will, immediately on the outbreak of war, start an offensive with the forces available in the Murmansk and Petsamo areas, as these cannot be used for anything else. According to Norwegian opinion, the fact that the Soviet Union will find it increasingly difficult to make headway in Denmark, will entail increasing pressure on Sweden, as well as on northern Norway.