Stockholm 11 November 1949

Boheman

My Honoured Brother

Conditions regarding the budding military cooperation between the A-pact countries perhaps warrant my providing an outline to you.

I assume that you have been told through the foreign office that the Swedish cabinet (having consulted the advisory council on foreign affairs ) has tasked the supreme commander (the defence staff), in cooperation with the military leaderships in Norway and Denmark, to work out certain plans which would facilitate military cooperation, in case such cooperation would become needed in one situation or the other. The planning, which naturally shall be conducted entirely without public disclosure, shall encompass: communications by telephone and radio between different civilian and military authorities, coordination of air surveillance, fighter control, weather services and air rescue, and concerning Norway also convoying Skagerrak – the North Sea. Plans for the coordination of the defence of the Sound and certain areas in the north shall be on hold for the time being.

Thus nothing great or important, but still valuable, not least because it gives us a measure of information on the Danes' and the Norwegians' A-pact cooperation (supplies of equipment, strategic tasks etc).

It is rather self-evident that something will soon come out concerning this planning effort, although I have naturally highlighted the importance of secrecy to Danes and Norwegians. But we cannot expect the Americans to feel particularly bound by this. Nonetheless, UD [the Swedish foreign office] does not seem to be worried about how to handle a possible exposure to the public: it is about routine and self-evident matters!

In connection with the coming negotiations in the newly started A-pact staffs, the strategic importance and role of Sweden will naturally be assessed. As a matter of course, the Danish and Norwegian sides will emphasise that Scandinavia cannot be defended without Sweden being in. (The Dane Koesens private demarche to you is symptomatic). There is, as I see it, a risk that an A-pact proposal is made to the Swedish cabinet concerning cooperation in one form or another. The reply must then be negative, I think, and might also entail that we will be ordered to immediately break off the work on our small plans for cooperation.

On my part, I shall try to make clear to my Danish and Norwegian colleagues before they travel to Washington, the importance of not bringing forward the big American cannons against us, but that one should try to handle the matter under hand and step-by-step, when there is something real to talk about. At this point in time there is not much more than has been started according to the account above.

If you accept my reasoning on this matter, I suggest that you might do something along the same lines on your side, i.e. with Kaufmann. Morningstar is probably not worth inflating more? I have wanted to give you some information privately on these, as it appears, rather important and sensitive issues, and about how I see them, with the aim of having your advice and – I hope – your support. My high superiors probably do not know much about what they have engaged in.

Yours affectionately,

Swed

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