

Statement Made By  
Under Secretary Eugene Rostow.

FUTURE TASKS OF THE ALLIANCE

I would like also to renew our appreciation to M. Harmel for his thoughtful and perceptive leadership in this effort to reexamine the political aspects of the work of our Alliance.

It is useful I think to recall the elements in the mandate we received from the Ministers. I should stress four for purposes of the work we are assembled to undertake today.

We are required to consider changes in conditions since 1949; and the basic purpose of the Alliance--as a factor for a durable peace.

Then in the light of these two consideration, we are required to make recommendations to our Ministers as to the tasks of the Alliance in the period before us; and as to the procedures for carrying out those tasks.

We are here today to exchange views about the content of our report to the Ministers. That report is our own

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responsibility. Governments have received the reports of the Rapporteurs and the useful summary of those reports that was prepared. They are valuable and provocative documents, and I want to express our government's appreciation for their value. They were always intended to be documents prepared on the individual responsibility of the Rapporteurs' working groups. The purpose of the Council was to obtain the advice of strong-minded men, with all the advantages of freedom, freshness and perspective that was available under such an instruction.

In considering our report, I agree with all those who spoke this morning. We should concentrate today and tomorrow on the substance we should like to see in the report. Then, in our view, the Secretary General, as Chairman of the Special Group and as Secretary General should prepare a draft, in consultation with us, for consideration at our next meeting. On the other hand, we cannot ignore the fact that we are talking about a report on a series of sensitive and important political problems. Considerations of form, of language cannot be altogether excluded. We wish to take into account each others views and special interests. Our concern is to strengthen our solidarity and to fortify our alliance. A positive result from this work is of high political importance to all of us, and we hope it will also have a constructive impact on the course of events.

I suggest we do put aside for now the question of what will or will not become public in the end. That is important and indispensable and we shall have to consider it in December. As several of our colleagues have remarked, the illumination of public opinion about our work is indispensable in a free society. But first we must decide what we wish to recommend on the basis of a year's intensive work.

My Government's approach to the problem was defined by President Johnson on October 7, 1966. He called, you will remember, for "a new thrust" for the Alliance.

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The Atlantic Alliance, he said, is a living organism. It must adapt to changing conditions. He urged that the Alliance become a forum for increasingly close consultations. These should cover the full range of our joint concerns, from East-West relations to crisis management.

We agree with the general theme stated by M. Harmel and others: at this stage in the evolution of our relationships with the Communist countries, the political energy of the Alliance has become primary. This stress does not qualify the equal importance of maintaining adequate and stable deterrent strength. But we can hope at least that conditions permit political initiatives to the problem of conciliation. We also agree with the statement of the Danish representative that the way to detente is not to dissolve alliances, but to use them positively.

Our Alliance is a defensive one. Therefore, political policy and political initiatives are an integral part of our responsibility. Our Mission is not to conquer, but to persuade--to help each other work separately and together to dissolve the divisions of Europe. We all agree, I think, that tensions in Europe can only be lowered in a context of military stability. On that footing, we can work for mutual force reductions and arms control arrangements. And with that security, we can work for detente, on many fronts, realizing that

- there can be no detente while Germany and Europe are divided
- and that our peaceful purposes cannot be achieved, that Germany and Europe cannot be united, unless there is detente.

The general goal, then, of our twin policy of detente and defense is to improve our political relations with the Communist countries in order to find and build a more stable basis for co-existence. We recognize that tensions exist--and will continue to exist--beyond even those implicit in a military threat. Our only response can be to work steadily and patiently over

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a long period of time to achieve a new political environment based on the ideas of mutual respect and mutual acceptance of the first articles of the UN Charter. Our goal, then, is conciliation in peace.

The means we propose to achieve that goal as Mr. Mulley, Ambassador Campbell and others have said is consultation--more intensified and sustained consultation than we have had in the past on many subjects. Consultation addressed to responsible action. Such consultation does not mean a political high command. It does not always presuppose common action. It qualifies no country's sovereignty or freedom. But it is bound to result in much more concert and cooperation than has sometimes prevailed in the past--or at least a clarification of differences, a better understanding of each other's motives and goals. I agree with Mr. Mulley--such consultations should come earlier in the process of action. We should have an early warning system, perhaps arising from an improvement of the work of our planners. If crises develop, we should be ready to move our consultative methods to a crisis basis.

I want to thank Ambassador Campbell for quoting from my Luxembourg speech. On many subjects, we need multilateral approaches (arms control is a good example as Mr. Mulley said) and on others, these should be parallel. Separate approaches often run the risk of being weak. They are easily played off against each other. Of course, there will inevitably be bilateral contacts as well, such as the US-USSR discussions on the NPT.

We are right to stress that political consultation has been among our activities from the beginning. This was contemplated by the North Atlantic Treaty and stressed in the Wise Men's report. I agree with Mr. de Ranitz that no change is needed in the Treaty. But often our consultation has been informative only. Now we are talking about consultation in contemplation of action.

If then, our general goal is improved political relations and our method is more sustained and responsible

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consultation, we turn then to the question of tasks. We cannot undertake all tasks. But we can see those which now seem most appropriate, taking into account present and prospective conditions affecting the Alliance as a factor for a durable peace.

There was general agreement among speakers this morning on a series of tasks--tasks--not solutions. There was also some differences in wording, order and mandate. However, such differences are not beyond the reach of reconciliation by the Secretary General.

These tasks are:

- (1) Arms control and limitation. We are gratified at the generally positive reception awarded the report prepared by Mr. Kohler. We agree with Ambassador Grewe that we need a permanent group with open-ended membership to work on these problems. How it should be set up and its relationship to existing groups should be left open.
- (2) European security and the problem of Germany. We do not want to qualify in any way the primary responsibility of the four powers with regard to the German question. But European security extends beyond the German question, central as it is. We think it desirable that Allies which wish to participate be given a forum in which their views can be considered and their assistance brought to bear. We already have a valuable report on these subjects prepared by Messrs. Schuetz and Watson.
- (3) Flanks of NATO. There has been special concern over developments in the Mediterranean and their implications for the security of the Alliance. We share that concern. The defense of the Southern Region which includes the Mediterranean is the responsibility of

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the Alliance. But this concern cannot be narrowly confined by lawyers' lines. Ambassador Grewe is right--this is a "gray" area. Threats can and do arise from outside the area--as they do indeed in central Europe.

- (4) Methods for consultation about problems affecting security, but arising in part or in whole outside the NATO area. Here I support Ambassador Grewe's formulation: these are matters of common concern but perhaps not common action. The Danish representative was correct this morning when he said each subject would set its own limits. We should consider which bodies should call our attention to possible dangers before they become acute and advise us on political counter measures to prevent conflict. For example, better use might be made of APAG and POLADS and better consultation among our delegations at the UN.

Procedures

No fundamental reorganization is needed. NAC has all the necessary powers to adapt the Alliance's structure to new tasks. There is a need for specialized sub-bodies and for a greater flow of political officers and officials from capitals. NAC should be more vital--it should be an integral part of the main stream of governmental decision-making.

In summary, I agree with Ambassador Grewe on the need for three sub-bodies on:

- (a) European security and the German question;
- (b) Arms control and disarmament; and
- (c) An ad hoc body on the Mediterranean problem.

If we look back on our history we have much to be proud of in the success of NATO. We also have much to be humble about. There have been failures as well as successes. They arose largely from a failure of the consultative process, or the failure of governments, to consult in time. This is the reason why not all of the Wise Men's proposals have been implemented.

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That is the weakness of NATO to which M. Harmel's initiative was addressed. That is the essence of the proposals for practical work we have before us. They have special pertinence in view of the problems ahead of us.

There are the arms race, the technological spiral, ABM's and new satellites with their implication for the Alliance. There are changing conditions in many parts of the third world and in Europe itself. The United States government thoroughly supports the idea of this exercise and the proposals for work we have been examining.

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