

NATO CONFIDENTIEL  
AC/261-R

Le REPRESENTANT du CANADA déclare que les positions de son Gouvernement sont extrêmement proches de celles qui ont été exposées par les deux orateurs précédents. Se référant à la résolution prise par les Ministres en décembre 1966, il relève <sup>/plus</sup> particulièrement le souci marqué par le Conseil "d'atteindre les objectifs fondamentaux du <sup>Traité</sup> Comité dans un esprit de cohésion et de solidarité" afin "de renforcer l'Alliance en tant qu'élément d'une paix durable". Pour son Gouvernement, les objectifs à atteindre sont, d'une part, d'adapter l'Alliance sur le plan politique et militaire, à ce que sera la situation dans le monde dans les années 1970, de manière à lui donner une nouvelle justification aux yeux de l'opinion publique qui, a quelquefois tendance à mettre en doute la nécessité de contribuer à créer <sup>une</sup> l'unité de vue et d'action entre ses membres.

Après avoir rendu hommage au travail des 5 <sup>rapporteur</sup> rapporteur

et du Secrétaire Général, il précise que pour le Gouvernement canadien, la rédaction du rapport final suppose un accord de base sur la nécessité d'améliorer les rapports Est-ouest et de parvenir à un règlement pacifique du problème <sup>actuel</sup> actuel.

Speaking brief  
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Ceci étant dit, il souhaiterait que l'introduction fasse apparaître deux idées essentielles:

- le dispositif militaire défensif reste nécessaire puisque, malgré un relâchement évident de la tension, l'URSS ne cesse de perfectionner ses moyens militaires;
- le rôle de l'Alliance dans le domaine militaire n'est pas incompatible avec une action politique constructive en vue d'aboutir à un relâchement de la tension qui est le prélude indispensable à un règlement européen et ce rôle politique prend de plus en plus d'importance au fur et à mesure que la détente s'accroît et que s'affirment les perspectives d'une solution politique des problèmes européens. ] Passant aux têtes de chapitres qui ont été mentionnées par les orateurs précédents, il précise que le Canada attache une particulière importance à la sécurité européenne et à la réunification de l'Allemagne puisque <sup>évident</sup> la menace soviétique et la division de l'Allemagne ~~qui~~ ont suscité l'Alliance et que celle-ci ne peut disparaître tant que ces problèmes ne seront pas résolus. Son Gouvernement considère qu'à l'heure actuelle l'Alliance est le seul cadre et d'ailleurs le cadre idéal pour échanger des vues et harmoniser

la politique de détente que chacun des Etats pratique dans ses échanges bilatéraux avec l'Est, Et que c'est ainsi qu'elle peut contribuer au règlement des problèmes en question. Il reconnaît que l'Alliance n'a jamais été et ne sera probablement jamais un organisme de direction qui puisse orienter les politiques nationales, <sup>Il</sup> il ne reste pas moins, à son avis, que si l'on en vient au point où des négociations s'engageront avec le Bloc Soviétique, il sera préférable <sup>que</sup> ~~pour~~ chacun agisse en fonction de positions communes mises au point au cours d'échanges de vues à l'intérieur de l'OTAN.

Pour le chapitre qui serait consacré au contrôle des armements, au désarmement et à une réduction proportionnelle et équilibrée des forces armées, il est d'accord avec M. MULLEY pour estimer que ces problèmes méritent une étude plus approfondie. Il ajoute que, d'une manière générale, <sup>son</sup> le Gouvernement n'a pas de position particulière sur les diverses <sup>par</sup> positions qui ont été faites pour créer de nouveaux organismes spécialisés chargés d'effectuer <sup>ces</sup> les études. Il estime personnellement qu'il n'est pas indispensable de donner des précisions qui pourraient être

être rendues publiques sur la manière dont l'Alliance entend poursuivre son travail.

Quant aux problèmes qui sortent du cadre géographique de l'Alliance, il reconnaît que les points sur lesquels l'Est et l'Ouest sont en contact ne sont pas limités à l'Europe, et que les membres de l'Alliance ont reconnu depuis longtemps la nécessité d'échanger des vues sur tous les problèmes d'importance mondiale. De ce point de vue, il admet qu'enn raison de la pression militaire accrue de l'Union Soviétique, <sup>la péninsule</sup> cette région peut être considérée comme l'un des points où les contacts avec l'Est sont les plus difficiles. Mais, quant à <sup>envisager</sup> considérer la situation en Méditerranée ~~sous l'angle~~ du point de vue de la menace <sup>qui pourrait y peser</sup> qui s'exerce sur le flanc sud de l'Alliance, il est d'avis que si cet aspect peut être abordé en privé, il convient d'éviter que ces échanges de vues soient rendus publics. Son Gouvernement attache une grande importance à ce que des consultations se poursuivent sur les problèmes qui se posent dans des régions extérieures à la zone du <sup>et</sup> Traité afin d'harmoniser ce point de vue pour permettre une meilleure compréhension de la position de chacun, étant entendu que les conclusions ne peuvent, en aucun cas

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avoir un caractère d'obligation et que l'on ne recherche pas  
un accord unanime, <sup>u</sup>mais réalisable. Telles sont les idées que  
son Gouvernement souhaiterait voir apparaître dans le rapport.  
Il fait observer qu'aucun des points essentiels qu'il vient  
de mentionner, la sécurité européenne et le développement de  
la détente, les échanges de vues sur la Méditerranée, ont déjà  
été évoqués au cours de Sessions ministérielles. Il les a  
abordés tels que son Gouvernement souhaiterait les voir traiter  
dans le rapport sur les tâches futures de l'Alliance. Il souligne  
que la forme dans laquelle <sup>ces</sup> ses idées essentielles seront expri-  
mées, a une grande importance en raison des répercussions sur  
l'opinion publique et ~~du message que~~ <sup>du message que</sup> le monde occidental  
entend adresser à l'Union Soviétique.

Statement at Sp. Rep. mtg Nov 17

I am happy to say that there is a high degree of identity between the views which I am about to express and those which have been expressed by Messrs. Harmel and Mulley. Like Foreign Minister Harmel I should like to refer to the starting point of the study, ~~which is~~ the Council resolution of December 16, 1966. I should like to draw particular attention to the words in the preamble "desirous of achieving the fundamental purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty in a spirit of cohesion and solidarity between the signatories of the Treaty", and also <sup>the</sup> words in the substantive part "accordingly, the Council undertakes to study the future tasks which face the Alliance, and its procedures for fulfilling them, in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor for a durable peace." In short, in the circumstances of unfolding détente which have arisen some 18 years after the treaty was signed, Ministers clearly wanted to reaffirm the peaceful intent of the member states-- not just the passive acceptance of the status quo but actual promotion of detente, and to do so in a way which would preserve the solidarity of the alliance. By calling for a review of developments since 1949 inside and outside the Alliance, Ministers were indicating why they called for the study at this particular time, for there is here a tacit assumption that circumstances had changed enough to warrant a review of talk

governments have since interpreted the common purposes this study was meant to achieve in various ways, to suit their national purposes. ]

[The Canadian Government, for instance, has put its objectives in the following way:

- (1) To provide an up-to-date rationale for the Alliance, politically and militarily, for the 1970's — a sort of public rejustification of the Alliance to meet a certain amount of natural and healthy questioning about its purposes among young and old alike. / <sup>This is akin to</sup> The "expectations" mentioned by Mr. Harmel.
- (2) To promote unity of purpose within the alliance. We have been guided by these two objectives in all our statements and activities in connection with this study and shall continue to be as our work progresses. ¶ The study commissioned by Ministers has since provided us with a wealth of material developed through working methods approved by the Special Group in February and March, 1967.
- (a) We have the personal contributions from 5 distinguished individuals which in one form or another have touched on all the main issues and which will be useful stimulants to discussion here and a helpful source of ideas.
- (b) We have a constructive paper produced by the Secretary General listing the main issues in the form of questions for further study, and a covering outline to permit an orderly approach.

In turning to the task of drawing up a report for Ministerial consideration, the Canadian Government assumes that there is basic agreement on the necessity for improving East-West relations and on the final achievement through negotiations of a peaceful settlement in Europe. We therefore <sup>see</sup> ~~saw~~ the immediate task as one of reaching agreement among ourselves on a statement of desiderata affecting those aims and of guidelines which could permit their attainment.

The Canadian Government feels that the approach to future tasks should spring from two main premises:

- (1) There is a continuing need for defensive military arrangements. Despite welcome evidence of reduced tensions in Europe, the hard fact is that the Soviet Union continues to improve its offensive capability, e.g. the fractional orbital bomb<sup>ARDMENT SYSTEM</sup> announced by Mr. Brejnev on November 4. It is quite clear therefore that our defences are still needed as insurance against a sharp recurrence of hostilities and to act as a stabilizing force in Europe while political solutions are sought to the problems of security and German reunification; <sup>we must always remember</sup> problems, which remain unresolved.
- (2) That this military task is not incompatible with a constructive political role in relation



to the further relaxation of tension which is recognized as a necessary prelude to the settlement of European problems and that the political role has assumed greater importance as the detente has developed bringing for the first time within the bounds of possibility the prospects of some political solutions.

We believe both of these propositions have a place

~~the report~~ ~~discusses~~ ~~perhaps~~ ~~form~~ ~~a~~ ~~preambular~~ ~~paragraph~~ ~~or~~ ~~two~~. As to the substantive content of the report relating to the identification of specific future tasks, Both have been repeatedly stated in previous communique. Both Mr. Harmel and Mr. Mulley mentioned three main headings. We see them slightly differently but they amount to the same thing.

(1) European security and German reunification

~~the threat to European security~~ ~~in~~ ~~Germany~~, which brought the Alliance into being and which require its continuation while they remain unresolved. To us it is self-evident that the alliance provides the ideal, indeed the only existing, framework for exchanging views and harmonizing to the extent possible our individual detente policies, i.e. those governing ~~the~~ growing bilateral contacts. It is in this sense that the alliance can contribute to an improvement in East-West relations as a step on the way towards a German peace settlement and <sup>to</sup> an end to the division of Europe. In this connection, I would like to quote a statement which I read recently and which puts the

matter very well:

"We do not see the coming together of the peoples of Europe, and of the Soviet Union and the United States, as an event, but as a process. Under the best of circumstances, it is likely to be a long process. Surely it is a matter for us to pursue together as allies, for our common interests are deeply and directly involved. We need not negotiate together as an entity. But our chances for success in conducting a campaign of reconciliation will be considerably greater if we remain on parallel courses. They will surely be less if we follow conflicting paths."

These words were spoken by our <sup>American</sup> colleague Mr. Eugene Rostow at the recent Luxembourg meeting. Sept. 11

It is important to recognize that what we are dealing with at this stage is not the role of the Alliance in the attainment of final settlements. In the political sense, the Alliance has never been an executive agency and probably never will be. Three members of the alliance do have specific executive responsibilities in relation to the final peace settlement and for a fourth member, its <sup>very</sup> national integrity is at stake. What we are concerned with now is the contribution the alliance can make in its

future activities towards expanding the detente  
in turn  
which/will create a climate for final settlements.

If and when we get to the point of negotiations with the Soviet Bloc, a very high degree of co-ordination of positions would be imperative whether conducted on a four-power or wider basis.

(2) Arms control, disarmament and a balanced reduction of forces.

These are areas of Alliance activities which have all been endorsed at previous ministerial meetings as desirable objectives which contribute to our security by lessening tensions. They have already received some attention by the Council. They clearly require further study and should be an integral part of future tasks.

My Government has taken no final position on proposals which have been made for the creation of special machinery. <sup>can say on a personal basis that I</sup> At the moment/I see no special need to spell out for public consumption exactly how the alliance proposes to undertake this work.

(3) Problems outside the treaty area:

East-West contacts and therefore the process of relaxing East-West tensions are not, of course, confined to Europe. A fact we have long recognized in the Alliance in the world wide nature of the problems

on which we exchange opinions and information. The Mediterranean is an example of an area which has become a more intense point of East-West contact as a result of an apparent Soviet decision to assert a major military and political presence in a region of traditional western interest. It is already a region in which the same restraint now displayed in Europe should be exercised if detente is to be perhaps to include an agreed arms limitation arrangement. furthered,<sup>1</sup> It is something to which the Alliance can usefully devote attention in private, while confining ourselves \_\_\_\_\_ publicly/<sup>to</sup> urging restraint even though no binding conclusions may be reached.

In other areas of the world the degree of interest varies widely and correspondingly, the utility of consultation varies as well. Often there is not even an approximate consensus of approach. Nevertheless, my government believes that at best timely consultation about problems in Non-NATO areas results in some harmonization; and at a minimum leads to a better understanding of each others actions and motives. We believe the habit should be preserved without striving for an unrealistic and unrealizable consensus and that it would be useful to present some thoughts along these lines to Ministers in December.

I have two foot notes to my remarks:

- (a) I have not mentioned one idea that has not in recent years appeared in one form or another in Ministerial communique;

(b) If I have related questions of substance more directly to the report we are to prepare than Mr. Harmel or Mr. Mulley thought we should today, it is because I see the relationship of form and substance in a slightly different light. In my judgement, we have indeed already begun dealing with the main tasks we see for the future. For instance, arms control, ~~xxx~~ the analysis of the possibilities of extending ~~changes~~ ~~view~~ the Middle East

are repeatedly on the Council's Agenda. What is new is that we propose to intensify this process and to make some part of it public. Hence, the form assumes a special importance first for purposes of our public opinion secondly for the message we wish to convey to the Soviet Union.