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Some comments of personal character
in relation with the paper of the Rapporteurs of Sub-Group I
on "Political aims of the Alliance"

1. If "détente" means "relaxation of tension between East and West which resulted in the establishment of wider diplomatic and other bilateral relations and which has made possible a number of bilateral contacts", there would be a great extent of truth in it. But it seems that the word "détente" is more and more used to imply that hostility and suspicion between East and West have disappeared significantly. This is not true.
 2. Indeed the East does neither intend to disarm or even to renounce increasing its armaments nor does it consent to solve major political problems which are at the root of its antagonism with the West.
 3. This contradiction between the facts and such a definition of "détente" lead to a peculiar way of reasoning which consists of admitting the possibility of having "détente" without succeeding to iradecate the very causes of hostility and suspicion between East and West (Theory of the Détente for the sake of Détente).
- This I fear shows a dangerous state of mind.
4. That is why it seems to me that it would be wise to practice, so to speak, a "cure of desintoxication" by making less and less use of the word "détente" in our speeches, and concentrate our attention on the search for ways and means for consolidating Peace and Security.

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5. In view of the persistent refusal of the East to begin to solve major problems as logic dictates it, pragmatism seems to be the sole possible method to be applied in this search.

6. Pragmatism would mean dividing or even sub-dividing the problems in order to solve or to try to solve them gradually or at least to sound the intentions of the East.

7. From a strictly/^{logical}point of view, it is difficult to explain how a problem, on the very basis of which there are basic differences of views between East and West, could be solved by dividing it into bits and pieces; since each piece-meal attempt would provoke the opposition of the East to the extent it would carry in itself a portion of the solution of the whole of the problem on which it does not seem to be prepared to accept a compromise. However, we seem to count on the magic of pragmatism and especially on the pressure of a number of **predictable** and unpredictable events which would make the adverse party less intransigent in time....

8. This means that we accept to take the risks of making some gestures of "détente" in the manner of a Central Bank which would issue notes without possessing its counterpart in gold or solid currency. This brings up the delicate problem of deciding on which questions and to what extent we could take the risk of issuing the currency of "détente" without a solid "couverture".

In other words, this is the problem of the calculated risk which must be examined with great realism and caution in each case. In this respect, the choice of problems for which partial solutions could be sought is as important as the question of how and when to stop in progressing without "couverture".

9. In the name of the pragmatism mentioned above, it would be logical to refrain from setting forth firm and limitative lists of problems. However, in this connection, there is a principle which should not be kept out of sight : that is

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that partial solutions should be sought in problems which can be assessed by means of precise facts and figures (i.e. disarmament, nuclear questions). Conversely, one should try to avoid questions which might give way to vague definitions and prepare the ground for demagogy and subversive propaganda (i.e. Treaty of friendship or of renunciation to the use of force).

10. In any case, whatever the field where attempts would be made for partial solutions or the scope of the attempts (bilateral or multilateral) the closest consultation within NATO remains as the absolute rule.

11. In the process of analysing the future tasks of the Alliance for the consolidation of peace and security, we should avoid, to the extent possible, engaging ourselves in theoretical studies and speculations about the intentions and the tendencies of the adverse party with a view to draw from it a theory for action, because, by definition, the enemy conceals its hand and shuffle the cards as and when it fits its interests and in many case, the enemy follows a pragmatic method according to the circumstances independent of its will.

12. By saying this I do not mean to pretend that no studies should be carried out for arriving at a sort of "vue d'ensemble" concerning the directions towards which the East, or certain countries of the East, might be heading for. Such studies must be undertaken; but they should be used only as a kind of "réservoir" from which only some undisputably well established facts should be selected for being used for practical purposes of drawing a pragmatic line of action.

13. Chapters II and III confront us with the question to know, to what extent in the Harmel Exercise we should dwell on :

a) The study of the principles which should be at the foundation of the European Settlement and the settlement of questions relating to the German problem as well as on,

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b) The study of the political developments, present and future.

In this respect, may I suggest the following :

i) The Harmel exercise is more for :

- identifying the problems;
- determining those which are of a nature to justify the keen attention of NATO (to what extent)
- finally for devising best method in dealing with them;

rather than for making an extensive study on the political situation present and future.

ii) The Harmel exercise is a task to be completed by the end of this year, whereas political events are to be followed and analyzed continuously. Therefore in the Harmel exercise we must confine ourselves to examining political events only to the extent necessary for the purposes mentioned under (i) above. Consequently it seems to me that statements like those on Pages 6 and first half of 7 could be reduced. Moreover the chapter about Germany should be written in the same spirit in case an additional paper on that subject is to be issued.

14. Chapter IV on "Practical Steps and Procedures" is more astride between Sub-Groups I and II than the other three chapters since it touches upon in many respects the question of the relations between the Allies and the functioning of the Alliance.

However, here are some observations about this problem as presented on pages 8, 9 and 10 of the joint paper of the rapporteurs of Sub-Group I.

a) I think it is wise to indicate some methods for exploratory contacts with the Soviet and Eastern European Governments on condition to consider these indications as subject to constant adjustments on a pragmatic basis according to the developments in the political field.

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b) It is also necessary to stress once again that whatever the nature of the contacts, the rule of constant consultation in NATO must be faithfully respected.

c) Contacts or soundings on a bloc to bloc basis - that is to say from NATO to Warsaw Pact - is to be avoided because of the fundamental difference between the two blocs in terms of their origin and nature and of the advantage Russia might take in the propaganda field to advocate for the dissolution of NATO in exchange of the dismantlement of the Warsaw Pact.

d) Bilateral activities, coupled with a constant consultation in NATO, seem, for the time being, to be the less dangerous method. Of course, this does not preclude multilateral attempts, again coupled with constant consultation in NATO, through existing international bodies.

e) No other machinery is necessary to be set up for the time being. (This must not preclude the system of consulting experts on a personal basis or by setting up ad hoc working groups concerning a particular problem).

f) In the light of above-mentioned observations here are my thoughts about several methods suggested from (a) to (g) on page 9 :

a) cannot be excluded " a priori" but cannot be accepted either as a panacea.

b) Is to be **excluded** for the time being.

c) Is impossible to be accepted " a priori" although such a method according to circumstances might occasionally prove practical on a given field. (Of course, always coupled with the strict implementation of the method of closest consultation in NATO).

d) Same observation as for (c)

e) Is still to be studied in the light of developments.

f) Same observation as for (e).

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