

NATO UNCLASSIFIED AND PUBLIC DISCLOSED

18th April, 1967

To: Secretary General

c.c. A.S.G.(F.A.) on return, —
Directeur du Cabinet,
Mr. Newton,
Mr. Mainland.

From: C. Chapman

Subject: Draft letter and questionnaire to Rapporteur
of sub-group 1 (East-west relations).

In accordance with your instructions please find enclosed a questionnaire on Soviet foreign policy in Europe based on Mr. Mainland's paper. I am also attaching a draft letter to Ambassador Watson, under cover of which you might wish to send this questionnaire.

QUESTIONNAIRE - SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND EUROPE

1. What is the predominant element in the Soviet concept of détente: is it a vigorous political struggle towards certain fixed goals, or a respite from the expense and effort of the "cold war"?

2. To what extent do the Soviets, as before, portray détente in terms of a gradual Western acquiescence to a concrete Soviet or "socialist" political programme? What are the elements of this programme?

3. What reasons do Soviet spokesmen express for the stepped-up "détente" political activity of the USSR in Europe?

4. How does the Soviet desire to operate in a climate of reduced tension affect the German problem?

5. What are the implications of Soviet political action? Is it directed at freezing the Central European status quo? Does it envisage the indefinite division of Germany into two or three states? Does it evoke differences within the Bonn Coalition and distrust and hostility between the Federal Republic of Germany and its Allies?

6. What are the implications of the Soviet "return to Potsdam" détente theme with regard both to Germany and to the wider European context?

7. Has the Soviet Union sought to induce the FRG to reorient her ties in the direction of a Soviet-formulated status quo arrangement in Central Europe? If so, in what ways?

8. What are the Soviet pre-conditions for allowing the reunification of Germany?

9. Is there any evidence that the Soviet concept of "détente" includes a Soviet desire for compromise on major East-West issues, for example, on the question of Germany's future?

10. What part does NATO play in the Soviet view of détente?
11. Is the concept of détente through "pan-Europeanism", promoted by the USSR as a security alternative to NATO, making headway?
12. Do the Soviets continue to oppose the European Communities and other forms of Western integration?
13. To what extent does the USSR wish a diminished U.S. presence in Europe? By what methods has Soviet policy attempted to induce Western European states to follow a line "independent" of the U.S.? What success has it achieved?
14. In what ways have the "bourgeoisie" and its particular nationalist susceptibilities, rather than the European working classes, become the political target and effective lever of Soviet political action? What are the implications of this shift of emphasis?
15. What kind of Europe do Soviet political and economic actions seek to form?
16. Could Soviet political moves by themselves affect the stability of the relative power balance between the Western and Soviet camps?
17. What are the political implications of changes and prospective changes in Soviet defence expenditures and recent missile deployment?

Draft

(by Mr. Chapman - 18.4.67

18th April, 1967

see GAS(67)41 in Lg.PA)

Dear Mr. Ambassador,

I was delighted to have had an opportunity to meet with you this morning and discuss the work of your sub-group.

As I mentioned, I found your preliminary paper excellent and most stimulating, and a very good basis for the start of your undertaking. Since you were courteous enough to ask my views and since I have recently had a staff paper completed on Soviet foreign policy, I am taking the liberty of enclosing a list of questions on this subject. While the elements that produce Soviet decisions should rightly be examined, I believe that in the final analysis we must base our judgments and actions on the known and definable lines of Soviet policy as it affects the external world.

His Excellency
J.H.A. Watson
United Kingdom Delegation
on the North Atlantic Council.

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I leave it entirely to you as to what use you make of this paper. I very much appreciated your desire for cooperation, and I can assure you that you will always find me ready to help you in any way possible, and look forward to our maintaining close working relations through ^{/out} this study.

Let me finally express my appreciation more formally that I could this morning for your very courteous letter and call.

Very sincerely yours

Manlio Brosio.

Encl. Questionnaire