

20th October 1967

To: Secretary General

cc: Deputy Secretary General
Directeur du Cabinet

From: ASG for Political Affairs

Subject: Future Tasks of the Alliance: Study of the issues

1978

To identify and study the major issues in the Harmel exercise, we have taken, as a basis, the Resumé of the Rapporteurs' Reports (PO/67/770). It seems to us that if the Special Group is to proceed in an orderly manner, it will be well advised to use this Resumé as the basis of discussion.

2. We have studied the Resumé point by point and have considered the probable areas of agreement on each. Enclosed at annex are our considered judgments. We have not divided the list into "negotiable" and "non-negotiable" points because we find they require more nuance comments. From this study, we conclude that:

a) The Resumé provides a possible basis of agreement among the Fifteen, and seems to us a negotiable document.

b) Divergencies on specific points will not be limited to the French, but the great majority of these divergencies may be overcome through negotiated drafting.

c) The chief divergencies specifically with the French are as follows:

i) p.11. Section III.A. Security. 1,2,3,4.

These paragraphs are related to integrated defence and are consequently not acceptable to the French. However, conceivably the French might accept to have a foot-note written on this Section indicating that these passages do not concern France and France therefore takes no position on them. To make this solution possible, it may be that, as in para. 3, explicit reference should be made to the fourteen members of the DPC rather than to the Alliance.

ii) p.14. B. 3.

It is doubtful that the French would accept the ideas of an "equilibrium between two groupings" and of the "vital importance" of the participation of Canada and the United States in "working toward a new peaceful order and in maintaining it afterward."

These two ideas are of course important. However, it is not certain that the first - that of equilibrium based on two groupings - will be solidly supported by the Fourteen

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and a compromise may therefore have to be found. The second - that of the importance of Canada and the United States to European security - will be strongly supported. How a compromise on this point can be worked out is not clear at this stage.

(iii) p.15. Section III. B. 4 (b).

The need for "close cooperation of the Allies" is a fundamental idea. For the Fourteen, it seems to us that this passage is essential to the cohesion of the Alliance. Possibly, the French may decide to interpret it as meaning voluntary cooperation without binding effect on their policies. If so, they might accept the present formulation.

(iv) p. 17. Section III. B. 7(a).

As in the passage above, it is doubtful that the French will accept the view that "the Alliance should be the forum where general guides (it should correctly read 'guidelines') regarding relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe are worked out." The next sentence indicating that "each member must have some latitude" may just meet the French objection, although more probably this qualification may have to be strengthened to satisfy them. Other countries may argue that this passage in effect describes the present practice of consultation within the Alliance and should therefore be generally acceptable.

(v) p. 18. Section III. C. 3(a) and (b).

We expect that there will be objections by several members to these passages on consultation outside the Treaty area and that consequently the French will happily be able to take a quiet back-seat in the discussion.

(vi) p. 19. Section III. C. 4(a).

The French will object to the phrase "active common policy" and their objection will be supported by other members.

ACCEPTABILITY OF RESUME OF RAPPORTEURS' REPORTS:Study on the Future Tasks of the Alliance

<u>SUBSTANTIVE PARAGRAPHS</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
II. <u>The Changing Environment</u>	
A. <u>In East-West Relations</u>	
1. The policy of "coexistence" reflects a significant shift in the Soviet challenge.	General agreement, with <u>caveats</u> from Germans, Greeks, Italians and Turks.
2. Soviet objectives continue to differ from those of the West.	General agreement.
3. Soviet military capabilities continue to grow.	Agreement on fact of growth of Soviet military power; (lack of agreement on consequences to be drawn).
4. The fundamental issues underlying the tensions between East and West are far from resolved.	General agreement.
5. Consequently, "coexistence" offers the Atlantic nations opportunities as well as risks.	Agreement, although with differences of emphasis.
9 6. Thus, Allied policy towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe must rest on two basic pillars.	General agreement. <i>not France</i>
B. <u>Outside the Treaty Area</u>	
1. Threats to the security of the member-nations now seem to rise more often from outside the Treaty area.	General disagreement on formulation but possible agreement on substance.
<i>should</i> 2. NATO is not the instrument for operational activities outside the area, but the members are forced to seek to co-ordinate their policies in their own interest.	General disagreement on formulation, and fundamental disagreement on substance, at least by Canada, Denmark, France, Norway and perhaps Italy.
3. The impact of events on the Alliance and the concern of the allies will vary in kind and degree.	General disagreement with such concepts as "long-term Alliance strategy"; "policy planning"; "co-ordinated approach"; and "some problems which require a response from Atlantic nations" - or disagreement at least with the commitment to these concepts.

SUBSTANTIVE PARAGRAPHS

REMARKS

B. (contd)

4. The Atlantic nations have a variety of instruments and agencies for concerted action on the wide range of issues of concern to some or all of them.

Agreement, with possible French question on "concerted action".

Crisis management and contingency planning?

C. In Inter-Allied Relations

1. From the start, the Alliance has faced an internal problem of balance among the allies.
2. As Europe has recovered and fear has receded, the situation has changed.

General agreement.

General agreement(1).

III. The Rôle and Future Tasks of the Alliance

A. Security

1. All members of the Alliance are convinced that it must continue.
2. The Alliance requires a full spectrum of military capabilities, including strategic nuclear forces, tactical nuclear forces and conventional forces.
3. To ensure stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area, the members of NATO must continue to unite their efforts for the preservation of peace and security.
4. In the period ahead, the allies should make full and effective use of their improved defence machinery to plan, organize, and manage NATO forces and strategy.

General agreement, but uncertain whether France will accept the supporting argument. Each Alliance member will probably have its own reasons for agreeing with the basic proposition.

(see A.4. below)

(see A.4. below)

Disagreement between France and the Fourteen. French will take exception to "close political consultation"; but on points related to integrated military defence, France may possibly take the position that these points do not concern her, and she may therefore abstain on these passages.

(1) Sentence 4 (C.2.) might better read, "Others question the validity of this objection as far as the NATO area is concerned."

<u>SUBSTANTIVE PARAGRAPHS</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
A. (contd)	
5. In addition, the Alliance should seek to develop more effective arms production.	General agreement, but probably needs reformulation to be acceptable.
6. While maintaining effective means of deterrence, the Alliance should formulate concrete disarmament propositions which will afford renewed evidence of the political will of the Alliance to realise an effective détente with the countries of the East.	General agreement on principle of formulating concrete disarmament measures. French position to be ascertained. Wide divergencies will arise over subparagraphs (a) - (d) on specific measures.
B. <u>East-West Relations</u>	
1. The long-term aim of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe.	General agreement. ?
2. The difficult problem is to assure that détente serves this long-term aim.	General agreement.
3. The Alliance and a policy of détente are not contradictory as experience has shown.	General agreement but France may take exception to the following sentences: "Indeed, a European security system may be more effective and involve less risks if it is based on an equilibrium between two groupings." "The participation of the U.S. and of Canada is of vital importance both in working toward a new peaceful order and in maintaining it afterward."
4. It is not possible now to draw a blueprint for a peaceful order in Europe or for a solution of the German problem.	(a) General agreement. (b) Will probably give rise to French dissent.
5. The German question	(a) Probable general agreement except Italian objection to phrase "right of self-determination". (b) General agreement. (c) General agreement. (d) General agreement. (e) General agreement. (f) General agreement.

SUBSTANTIVE PARAGRAPHSREMARKS

B. (contd)

5.

(g) General agreement

(h) General agreement "in this context".

6. The appropriate forms and channels of East-West contacts will be various.

(a) Probable general agreement, provided that "multilateral" is not necessarily equated with "Alliance".

(b) General agreement.

(c) General agreement.

(d) General agreement.

7. The allies should now give further detailed study to the various measures proposed to extend the détente and to achieve a European settlement and security system.

(a) French dissent is likely but not certain. It is equally likely that there will be an effort on part of some, e.g. Canada, Germany, to reformulate the paragraph to meet French objections.

(b) An ad hoc special body may be supported. However, it is doubtful that a permanent special body will be acceptable to a majority of nations.

8. Strengthening NATO's arms control machinery

(a) General agreement. French position unknown.

(b) General agreement. French position unknown.

C. Problems Outside the Treaty Area

1.

General agreement.

2. It is not advisable for NATO as such to intervene in conflict situations outside its own area.

General agreement.

3. (a) and (b)

Likely to give rise to sharp discussions. Possible agreement provided groups are open-ended.

4.

(a) French dissent on phrase "active common policy". French objection on principle request for reformulation will come from various quarters.

SUBSTANTIVE PARAGRAPHSREMARKS

C. (contd)

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| 4. | | (b) Not an important issue; agreement possible. |
| 5. | NATO consultation between the members' Permanent Missions to the United Nations should be strengthened. | A certain measure of disagreement is likely. |

D. Inter-Allied Relations

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| 1. | The ultimate remedy to the problems arising from the disparity in power and influence between the United States and its European partners, is for the Europeans to develop the unity for acting and speaking with one voice. | Agreement with the French not to be excluded if certain editorial changes made. French may possibly also take the position that the construction of Europe is not a proper subject of discussion in the Alliance. |
| 2. | Hence, for the next stage, interim methods will have to be found to cope with the existing disparity. | <p>(a) Probably acceptable.</p> <p>(b) Probably acceptable.</p> <p>(c) Objectionable if not carefully worded.</p> <p>(d) Objections likely for a variety of reasons, political and technical.</p> <p>(e) Since concerned with the longer-term, difficulties with this paragraph probably will be manageable.</p> |