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NATO SECRET  
NOTICE  
AC/261-N/13

SPECIAL GROUP ON THE FUTURE TASKS OF THE ALLIANCE

PROVISION OF ADDITIONAL TEXTS

Note by the Secretary

In response to requests received from several delegations, I am circulating herewith the reports of the four sub-groups in the AC/261 series. The reports are reproduced in their original languages only.

(Signed) F.C. MENNE

ORIGINAL: ANGLAIS  
2 novembre 1967

NATO SECRET  
NOTE  
AC/261-N/13

GROUPE SPECIAL SUR LES TACHES FUTURES DE L'ALLIANCE

PUBLICATION DE TEXTES SUPPLEMENTAIRES

Note du Secrétaire

En réponse aux demandes présentées par plusieurs délégations, je vous communique ci-joint les rapports des quatre sous-groupes dans la Série AC/261. Ces rapports ne sont publiés que dans leur langue originale.

(Signé) F.C. MENNE

OTAN/NATO,  
Brussels, 39.

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Future Tasks of the Alliance - Sub-Group I

The attached draft report, prepared by State Secretary Schutz and Mr. Watson will be the subject of discussion at the next meeting of Sub-Group I on 18th and 19th September.

German Delegation to NATO/United Kingdom Delegation to NATO  
11th September, 1967.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS, DETENTE AND A EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT

1. The Allies recognise that the present artificial division of Europe is unstable and the real hindrance to peaceful co-operation between states in East and West. The basic common aim of Allied policy towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe remains to provide effective protection for freedom, peace and security in the North Atlantic area, and at the same time to develop plans and methods for overcoming the division of Europe and for achieving a just and lasting peaceful order there.

2. The political objective of our Alliance is a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe which provides adequate and durable stability for all states of Europe, the members of our Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact and other states in neither grouping. This must include a just and durable settlement of the German problem. This objective could hardly be attained at a time of tension and hostile confrontation of blocs, but rather in a period of détente. Relaxation of tension is not the final goal but a step on the way towards a European settlement which in itself no longer gives rise to renewed tension.

3. Soviet objectives with respect to détente continue to differ from ours. The Soviet have in recent years come to see a certain relaxation of tensions as meeting their own national interests: but how far their ultimate aims in Europe have changed is arguable.

4. In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe Communist dogma and the conservatism of the party bureaucracies operate against a relaxation of tension and the achievement of a European settlement. So do fears that it would be difficult to limit the consequences of a change in the structure of Europe. On the other hand the world-wide responsibilities of the Soviet Union including the conflict with the People's Republic of China and the differentiations within the Communist world, especially the growing self-assertion of Eastern Europe may incline the governments of the Warsaw Pact towards further exploring the possibilities of a European settlement. A relaxation of tensions in Europe and limited co-operation with the West would also make it possible for them to meet growing economic and technological requirements in their own countries, as well as the desires for a higher standard of living and a somewhat more open society. Eastern governments have so far shown themselves able to control these forces; this gives ground for hope that Eastern governments can be persuaded of the advantages for them in co-operation and a stable settlement in Europe.

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5. In general these trends and influences have resulted in less rigidity in the attitudes of some Eastern governments towards various members of the Alliance. Although there is without doubt a genuine interest in a European détente the Soviet Government on the other hand still hopes, by relaxing tensions selectively, to weaken the cohesion of the Alliance, to drive wedges between the states of Western Europe, in particular to isolate the Federal Republic of Germany and open up differences between Western Europe and the United States. The East European governments would be well suited by a détente that perpetuates the present situation in Eastern Europe. But the hopes of these governments are probably tempered by what they think they can achieve; and they may come to realise that their more ambitious objectives are unattainable.

6. Thus the relaxation of tensions is a fluctuating process, and there are still objectives in the policy of East European states that in a period of détente run counter to ours. It may take a long time to reach significant results. A policy aimed at achieving a settlement through détente will ultimately succeed only if the other side too is willing to contribute towards a just and peaceful order in Europe. In particular, if a relaxation of tensions is to be effective it will have to be comprehensive and must include everybody. Nevertheless it remains an Allied interest to persist in our efforts to relax tensions, and to use to our best advantage such displays of reasonableness as the Eastern governments may show. In fact, a period of relaxing tension provides new opportunities for all the states in Europe.

7. NATO and a policy of détente are not alternatives which exclude each other. On the contrary, only the continued existence of the Alliance, its political weight and readiness for defence will convince the Soviets that a policy of engendering crises brings no advantage. The North Atlantic Alliance will not have fulfilled its military task until its political tasks have also been resolved. Until a lasting and just European settlement is assured the Alliance remains an irreplaceable guarantor of European security.

8. Although it is still too early to forecast the shape of a future peaceful order in Europe, we should already at this stage reach agreement on some of the basic elements to be considered in such a European settlement, e.g.

- The states united in the North Atlantic Alliance must be sure that a European settlement guarantees them (as is stated in the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty) "the freedom, common heritage, and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law".

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- Any feasible European settlement would have to accept the differing political, economic and social systems of the states comprising it, and the sovereignty of each government in internal matters;
- The right of every state to determine its own political, economic, social and cultural system;
- Renunciation of the use of force, the threat of force and all forms of intervention in the internal affairs of other states;
- Relations between states to be governed by the principles laid down in the Charter of the United Nations.

The members of the North Atlantic Alliance should, moreover, try to ensure that the right of free movement of persons and of free flow of information are as widely respected as possible in Europe.

9. In working towards a new peaceful order in Europe, the position of the United States is of vital importance. The European members of the Alliance are not in a position to maintain their freedom and independence alone in face of the presence and power of the Soviet Union. A corresponding North American presence remains as necessary as when the Alliance was founded, in order to preserve the freedom of its European members. The United States contribution must not be limited to defence and deterrence: its active participation is equally necessary in the process of utilising the détente for achieving a peaceful order in Europe. Moreover any European settlement, once achieved, will require the continuing support and co-operation of the United States.

10. On the other hand it is clear that no substantial progress can be made towards a European settlement without Soviet agreement or at least acquiescence; and it is also clear that in present circumstances the Soviet Government does not consider that it is in its interest to make a major change.

11. Many East European governments regard Soviet support as necessary to ensure their internal stability, and at their present stage of development close economic relations with the Soviet Union are essential to them. We should therefore take care that our policy could not be interpreted as setting Eastern Europe against the Soviet Union. Our aim should be to involve both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in more constructive forms of co-operation.

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12. The core of the problem is therefore to convince the East European states and the Soviet Union by means of a purposeful, patient and undramatic policy of the greater advantages to both sides inherent in East-West collaboration.

We will have to offer them a politically and economically attractive alternative to the present state of Europe.

## II. THE GERMAN PROBLEM

1. The existence of the two pact systems and the incorporation of each of the two parts of Germany in one or the other of these systems is the most significant manifestation of the division of Europe. It will be impossible to separate the German Problem from the division of Europe. They are indissolubly connected. The Soviet Union and some of their Allies claim that there exist two German states and that Berlin is a special political unit. The acceptance of this "reality" by the West cannot be accepted as a prerequisite for a détente.

2. Any solution of German problems contributing to a just and lasting European settlement:

- must start from the principle that the German people in both parts of Germany have the right of free decision;
- requires action of the Four Powers with special responsibility for Germany;
- requires the co-operation not only of our Allies but of those states of Europe which have a vital interest in establishing a lasting and peaceful order in Europe.

While, after the Second World War, peace treaties and similar agreements were concluded with all former allies of the German Reich and with Austria, there has been no peace treaty for Germany. All efforts of the Three Western Powers with special responsibility for Germany to bring about a solution of the German question in direct negotiations with the Soviet Union have so far been unsuccessful.

3. Berlin is still a cardinal point of Soviet policy in Germany. A crisis might flare up here at any time with implications and repercussions that could be worldwide. Moscow and East Berlin are constantly perfecting their means of creating and manipulating critical situations in this area.

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4. It is therefore necessary that:

- each member of the Alliance in its endeavour to overcome the division of Europe and achieve a relaxation of tension between East and West should at the same time strive for a just solution of the problems of Germany and Berlin;
- the Federal Republic of Germany in its efforts to overcome the division of the German people should strive for a relaxation of tension in its relations vis-à-vis the Soviet Union as well as the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.

5. As long as a part of the German people is denied the right of self-determination and has to live in a separated state-like entity, ruled by a régime imposed upon them by a foreign power and kept by force, that régime must be denied international recognition. There are not two German states. Nevertheless the Federal Republic of Germany is trying to include the other part of Germany in a policy of détente by retaining and strengthening the ties between the Germans in East and West. In this context the Federal Government accepts the fact that the authorities in the Soviet Zone perform administrative functions.

6. The relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the other part of Germany are of an internal nature, while the relations between other states and the Communist ruled part of Germany are not. In their efforts to solve German problems within the framework of a policy of détente the Federal Republic of Germany, the Allies (especially the Three Powers), and the Alliance as such have their parts to play.

7. It is up to the Federal Republic of Germany, by means of internal contacts with the authorities and with the people of the Soviet Zone, to make life more bearable for the East Germans and to ease the tension in relations between the two parts of Germany. The 16 proposals contained in the declaration of the Federal Government of April 12th, 1967, and the letter written by Federal Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger on June 13th, 1967, to Chairman Stoph in East Berlin are examples of this policy. A continuing increase of internal German trade which is a significant link between the two parts of Germany, and economic co-operation, would be an important instrument in this respect.

Furthermore, it is up to the Federal Republic of Germany, if significant results in inner-German relations have been achieved, to facilitate the participation of the population of the Soviet Zone in international life, in scientific, cultural and sporting exchanges without thereby furthering the political objectives of the East Berlin régime.

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8. On the other hand, it is up to the Allies to assist these efforts for a relaxation of tension between the two parts of Germany. This can be done by counteracting attempts by Moscow and East Berlin to interpret these contacts as international relations between two German states. The Allies should use every opportunity, particularly in their contacts with the Soviet Union and East European states, to make it clear that the East Berlin régime is not legitimate and that it does not represent a sovereign state. Any action to enhance its international status would not only disregard the will of the people living under its power but would hamper internal German contacts and relaxation of tension between the two parts of Germany. The Allies should open up and facilitate, in co-operation with the Federal Government, private contacts with the East German population in the sphere of science, culture and sports. The link with progress in internal German relations should be kept in mind.

9. The Alliance as such should be instrumental in harmonising and co-ordinating the policy of the Federal Government and that of the other Allies.

10. It is also the task of the Alliance to ensure the freedom and viability of Berlin and to remain aware of the constant threat to Berlin even in times when the East is hoping for Western interest to wane and resistance gradually to flag.

### III. PRACTICAL STEPS AND PROCEDURES

1. The present chapter is designed to point out, with reference to the Alliance, the possibilities of East-West contacts in a period of relaxed tension. From time to time various measures have been proposed which might further this purpose, but their merits and demerits are complex and will need to be discussed in an appropriate forum within the Alliance. It is not possible at this stage to draw up a comprehensive solution for all the problems which divide Europe.

2. In order to overcome the present division of Europe and to promote peaceful co-operation between its states, both bilateral and multilateral contacts will be needed.

3. Bilateral contacts between Western and Eastern states are indispensable and can be of great value if they proceed from a basis of prior Allied consultation. But they will be harmful if Eastern governments get the impression that they could play off one Western state against the other. A bilateral approach makes possible direct and individual contacts with East European governments. The Allies should avoid treating the East Europeans as a single bloc led by the Soviet Union. We should value collaboration with them both for its own sake and also as a means of influencing the Soviet Union to accept a mutually beneficial settlement.

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4. There are practical limits to what can be achieved bilaterally. As contacts develop, conversations with Eastern governments will deal increasingly with problems of concern to all members of the Alliance. In order to shape a stable, larger European structure, in which both the United States and the Soviet Union participate, it will be desirable increasingly to work towards multilateral exchanges. They will probably develop more slowly than the bilateral ones.

5. They too have their limits. Proposals with a specific NATO label are at this stage liable to be received with suspicion by Eastern governments. An undue or premature emphasis by the Western Allies on multilateral negotiations could lead to an undesirable consolidation of the links which bind the East Europeans to each other and to the Soviet Union. We must also ensure that a multilateral approach to a European settlement does not perpetuate the existing division in Europe or allow it to crystallise on its present lines.

6. There is agreement in principle on the importance of consultation between the Western Allies on the central questions of East-West relations. But consultation in fact needs to go further than this, especially if the Allies are to use the present fluctuating relaxation of tensions to work in a co-ordinated fashion towards a general European settlement involving multilateral agreements. There should be agreement on the general aims which the Alliance as a whole is seeking to achieve in its dealings with the East, so that each Ally may harmonise its own actions with these common aims.

7. As bilateral contacts and agreements between individual Western and Eastern states frequently affect the interests of other states of the Alliance, it is important to harmonise our views on all matters which concern our Allies before they are discussed bilaterally with the East. The chances of fruitful results may indeed be enhanced if the Soviet and East European governments understand that individual members of the Alliance, while speaking for themselves, do so in agreement with their Allies. The closer the consultation, the clearer our adherence to common principles and to agreed basic positions, the more flexibility and initiative will be possible in bilateral contacts with the East.

8. The position of Allies taking part in multilateral East-West negotiations should be concerted/fully discussed in advance within the Alliance.

9. The Atlantic Alliance offers an excellent forum for establishing this harmonisation on our side and for maintaining a necessary degree of co-ordination in our bilateral and multilateral dealings with the East. This is one of the ways in which the Alliance can make an essential contribution to the organization of collective arrangements designed to remove East-West antagonisms and ensure peace and unity in Europe.

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10. Economic, technological and cultural collaboration with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe can contribute to a relaxation of tensions, and foster the concept that states and communities with differing social systems can not only co-exist but collaborate to their mutual benefit. But it will not by itself be sufficient to achieve a lasting settlement in Europe.

11. The development of economic and technological collaboration seems to be the aspect of détente which most interests the governments of Eastern Europe, and even perhaps which also most attracts the Soviet Government at this stage. And it has the advantage to the West that it can be made mutually beneficial, and if sufficiently attractive will induce the East European economies to become more closely involved with the West.

12. Cultural and personal contacts have a corresponding effect. They have a considerable impact on the artificially isolated societies of the East. We must therefore expect the Soviet and East European governments to limit these contacts which potentially weaken their hold over their countries.

13. We therefore invite the Allied Ministers to agree that the fields of economics, technology, cultural and personal contacts offer good prospects for significant steps towards the forging of mutually beneficial links between the divided halves of the European continent; and that within the framework of the Alliance continuous study should be given to the ways in which agreements and opportunities in these fields can help to further this objective.

14. In the field of political arrangements and security we should make it clear that while we welcome such mutually beneficial arrangements as the Soviet and particularly the East European governments are prepared to accept, we seek wider and deeper forms of co-operation between the temporarily divided parts of the continent. In this way we may be able to increase the readiness of Eastern governments to respond to our approaches.

15. In this context special consideration must be given to the prospect of a conference on European security. An overall European conference, such as the Soviet-sponsored "European Security Conference" does not at present promise success. But an East-West conference may be desirable, and indeed necessary, at the right time. For such a conference to succeed:

- (a) it must be properly prepared and have a satisfactory Agenda;
- (b) the Allies will need to reach agreement/discuss fully beforehand on all items on the Agenda;

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- (c) it must be clear from exchanges with Eastern governments that the participation of our American Allies is assured and that the Soviet Union and its Allies are also prepared to contribute to a lasting and equitable settlement in Europe, and do not regard the conference merely as a tool for propaganda, for cementing the status quo and for disrupting the Western Alliance.

16. What is required, in the present phase of bilateral exploratory exchanges with the Eastern governments on these subjects, is to give close and urgent study to the sort of European settlement towards which the Allies should work, as set out in the preceding chapter, and to the way in which they should approach this settlement.

17. In addition co-operation between East and West can take several forms which may prove valuable, depending on the circumstances and opportunity:

- (a) co-operation with those Communist states that have evolved sufficiently, in some aspects of existing Western multilateral institutions, thereby encouraging others to evolve in a similar fashion;
- (b) co-operation in existing international organization;
- (c) regional West-East cooperation, involving a few states from each side, in special ventures inside or outside Europe, thereby cutting across political and ideological divisions;
- (d) various semi-official or non-governmental activities in technical, scientific, cultural, athletic etc. fields;
- (e) utilisation of special West-East forums to develop additional means of dialogue and communication and, in time, to consider political and security issues.

18. [The composition and Terms of Reference of the groups to which the studies mentioned in paragraphs 13 and 16 should be entrusted are of concern to other rapporteurs and sub-groups also. Therefore it is necessary to discuss them at the next co-ordination meeting of the rapporteurs. Their proposals will be communicated to members of the sub-groups as soon as possible.]

"THE IDEALOGICAL BASIS AND THE UNITY OF THE ALLIANCE"

Report by the Rapporteur of Sub-Group No. 2

MR. P.-H. SPAAK

19th September, 1967.

INTRODUCTION

The Terms of Reference for the work entrusted to Sub-Group No. 2 involve first and foremost an examination of the ideological basis and the unity of the Alliance.

Discussions within the Sub-Group and between the rapporteurs have shown that the question could be expressed in the following terms: What did the Atlantic Alliance represent in 1949? What has it done since then? What form could it take?

In order to measure the divergency between yesterday's resolve and today's reality, it appears essential to recall the facts which led up to the creation of the Alliance, and to summarise its evolution.

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

- I. What did the Atlantic Alliance represent in 1949?
- II. What has the Atlantic Alliance done since 1949?
- III. The détente and its political implications.
- IV. What form can the Alliance take tomorrow?

I. WHAT DID THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE REPRESENT IN 1949?

In order to appreciate fully what happened, it must be borne in mind that the Alliance which sprang from the Treaty of Washington was not the kind desired by the leaders of the victorious Western powers during the Second World War and in the years immediately following the end of hostilities.

The hope entertained by responsible statesmen was to maintain the alliance with the USSR which had made victory possible.

The treaty between the USSR and the United Kingdom, between the USSR and France and the decisions taken at Yalta, were stages in this policy which culminated in the creation of the United Nations.

It was hoped that this Organization, which was to be world-wide and within which the five major powers had reserved special rights, could take over responsibility for keeping the peace.

This line of approach, although theoretically sound, soon proved to be wide of the mark.

It rapidly became clear that the USSR under Stalin was not prepared to contribute to the success of such a policy. Within the space of a few years the USSR frittered away the fund of goodwill it had built up. Soviet policy in the Balkans, Central Europe, Germany, Iran, Turkey, the abuse of its right of veto and a ceaseless stream of propaganda against its allies, made it impossible to continue nourishing any illusions in this connection.

Western Governments were reluctant and slow to give up hope.

The Soviet Union's refusal to participate in the economic rebuilding of Europe proposed by General Marshall in 1947, and the seizure of power in Prague in 1948, shattered any remaining illusions.

At this time, responsible statesmen in the West, representing all shades of political thought, became convinced of the need to unite in order to halt Communist expansionist policy in Europe. The Treaty of Washington was born of this conviction. Its prime purpose was to protect the democratic countries of Europe from aggression and to put a stop to Communist expansion.

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It is sometimes difficult for a new generation to understand the state of mind of the preceding generation. Changes take place, the facts of political problems alter. It is impossible to prove that events which did not take place, although they were possible and even probable, would have occurred if certain precautions had not been taken. It is obvious that those who did not experience certain fears cannot react in the same way as those who were in their grip.

What is true is that the main objective of the authors of the Atlantic Treaty has been achieved. In Europe, since 1949, there have been no Communist conquests. Communism has made no further progress. No country of the Atlantic Alliance has suffered the fate of those countries which between 1945 and 1948, came under Communist control against the wishes of the majority of their inhabitants.

The Atlantic Alliance has thus solved the specific political problem which confronted Europe in 1949. It has proved equal to the task of containing the threat of Stalinist imperialism.

There can be no doubt that the will to resist possible aggression existed. The wording of the Treaty is quite definite on this point; at the signing in Washington on 4th April, 1949, all those who spoke laid stress on this aspect.

This resolve to overcome a specific and pressing problem was, however, approached from a wider political angle.

The countries of Western Europe, the United States and Canada, were at this time aware of the Communist threat to the world at large and of the need for unity in the defence of democratic principles.

Traces of this outlook are to be found in the articles of the Treaty. In the preamble, for example, where the contracting parties state that they are "determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law".

Article 2 is even more explicit; "the parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being".

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Such a goal is a blueprint for a policy which goes beyond the solution of the immediate problem of how to resist the threat of aggression.

It was these general and long-term aims which gave the Treaty of Washington its fullness and meaning and made the Atlantic Alliance different from any other previous alliance in history.

## II. WHAT HAS THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE DONE SINCE 1949?

The first years of the Atlantic Alliance were entirely taken up with the gigantic and urgent task of military organization.

It slowly became apparent, however, that the scope of the Alliance would have to be widened. It was becoming increasingly clear that common defence was meaningless without a common foreign policy, while it was borne in upon the leaders of the Alliance that it was difficult to be allies in one part of the world and rivals elsewhere. Geographically the Alliance was too restricted.

As early as 1956, the Foreign Ministers of the member countries felt the need to clarify, in the light of seven years' experience, the aims of their Alliance and the means of achieving them. Three Foreign Ministers, Mr. Pearson, Mr. Lang and Mr. Martino, were asked to study the question. In NATO parlance, the result of their work became known as the Report of the Three Wise Men. This is a basic document which sheds light on the thinking of the leaders of the Alliance at the time and on the direction in which they hoped the Alliance would progress.

The general introduction is worth quoting in full, but the ideas it contains may be faithfully summarized as follows:

- (a) The policy of defence against possible aggression must be continued no matter what interpretation is placed on the events which have occurred since 1949. Each member must retain its will and capacity to play its full part in discharging the political commitment for collective action against aggression which it has undertaken.
- (b) This aim can only be achieved if the political and economic relations between the members of the Alliance are co-operative and close. An alliance in which the members ignore one another's interests or engage in political or economic conflict, or harbour suspicions of one another, cannot be effective either for deterrence or defence.

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- (c) Such a policy is only possible because "while fear may have been the main urge for the creation of NATO, there was also the realization - conscious or instinctive - that in a shrinking nuclear world it was wise and timely to bring about a closer association of kindred Atlantic and Western European nations for other than defence purposes alone; that a partial pooling of sovereignty for mutual protection should also promote progress and co-operation generally. There was a feeling among the governments and peoples concerned that this close unity was both natural and desirable; that the common cultural traditions, free institutions and democratic concepts which were being challenged, and were marked for destruction, were things which should also bring the NATO nations closer together, not only for their defence but for their development. There was, in reality, a sense of Atlantic Community, alongside the realization of an immediate common danger."
- (d) Such a policy leads to the "development of an Atlantic Community whose roots are deeper even than the necessity for common defence". This implies nothing less than the permanent association of the free Atlantic peoples for the promotion of their greater unity and the protection and the advancement of the interests which, as free democracies, they have in common.
- (e) Such a policy is designed to meet the political threat of Communism. This threat "comes from the revolutionary doctrines of Communism which have, by careful design of the Communist leaders over many years, been sowing seeds of falsehood concerning our way of life and our democracy".
- (f) In order to succeed such a policy should remind members of the Alliance that their influence and interests "are not confined to the area covered by the Treaty, and that common interests of the Atlantic Community can be seriously affected by developments outside the Treaty area".

All this is clear and intelligible. In 1957, the Three Wise Men, whose report was approved by their colleagues, were dealing with a military, political and economic alliance against possible Communist aggression, a group of countries united in defence of the principles of Western civilisation. They saw this Alliance as leading step-by-step to the creation of an Atlantic Community.

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The practical means for achieving this goal were dealt with at length in the report. It is worth recording that the Three Wise Men advocated a significant strengthening of political consultation. It was recommended that political consultation should take place prior to any action, regardless of the problem concerned and whether it fell within or outside the geographical area of the Treaty.

After very full discussions in December 1956, the conclusions of the Three Wise Men were adopted unanimously. It is therefore clear that their report was an accurate expression of the purpose of the fifteen member governments.

For several years, the majority of member countries sought to implement the guidelines which had been adopted. Full and regular consultation took place on such questions as German reunification, the status of Berlin, disarmament and, in a more general way, relations with the USSR.

With regard to problems outside the Treaty area, political consultation turned out to be less fruitful. Most of these problems arose not from the Communist challenge but from a variety of reasons.

Regional economic integration, decolonization and co-operation with the developing countries were among the issues where national interests did not necessarily coincide and where public opinion in member countries did not always react in the same way. The result was that a number of governments decided to go their own way without prior consultation with their Allies. This was especially true in the case of decolonization.

At the end of 1958, the French Government suggested to the United States and the United Kingdom that a triumvirate should be set up to deal with world problems on behalf of the West. The United States and British Governments turned down this proposal.

From then on, the French Government changed its policy and gradually withdrew from the NATO organization, finally leaving altogether in 1966. Moreover, since that time, the French Government has been pursuing a foreign policy which has been more and more at variance with that of the United States Government and with that of most of the members of the Atlantic Alliance.

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### III. THE DETENTE AND ITS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

No one would think of denying that changes have occurred in the policy of the USSR since the death of Stalin.

It may, however, be asked to what extent the very existence of the Atlantic Alliance has been a factor in this evolution, and what the consequences might be if it were weakened or were to disappear.

An attempt must be made to understand clearly what peaceful coexistence means for the Communists, and to sum up its results.

In this connection there can be no possible doubt. The Communists have made themselves very clear. For them, peaceful coexistence is not a consequence of their principles. It is a policy which is forced on them by the facts. Peaceful coexistence is the latest manifestation of a "policy of expediency", which led the Russian leaders to ally themselves with Hitler in 1939, with the Western democracies in 1941, and to wage the cold war as soon as the Second World War ended.

There can be no doubt whatever about this. Khrushchev expressed himself very frankly and very clearly. In a speech made early in 1960, he declared that the USSR, although militarily more powerful than she had ever been, was determined not to make war, since it was impossible to protect her population against an atomic attack.

The situation is dominated, and doctrines upset by the Bomb. Khrushchev said: "The class struggle cannot be settled by the atomic bomb".

This being the case, Communism cannot hope to impose itself by war but, while abandoning this method, it has renounced none of its aims and still hopes to defeat its opponents in every other field - political, economic, social and cultural. That is what peaceful coexistence means for the Communists.

The West cannot reject peaceful coexistence. To the extent that its civilisation is based on the exchange of ideas, peaceful coexistence represents the application of its most essential principles.

In any case, the West has no reason to reject it. The West has no need to fear a comparison between its achievements and those of the Communists. In the material sphere, its successes are indisputably greater and life as a whole is infinitely more pleasant in the West than in the East. The Berlin Wall is both the proof and a symbol of this fact.

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We must not be surprised, therefore, if the results of peaceful coexistence are modest. Commercial and cultural exchanges between the East and West have developed satisfactorily but, from the military and political stand-point, no really important result has been obtained. The Russian armed forces have not been reduced and the Soviet attitude to the German problem has not altered.

Furthermore, it is most unwise to think that the Communist danger has disappeared. The policy of China appears to be at least as dangerous as was that of the USSR twenty years ago, and a conference like the one in Havana shows to what extent revolutionary forces are still active. Admittedly, the danger to Europe has receded geographically into the past, but it would be unduly optimistic to imagine that it had disappeared. Any European countries which committed themselves at the present time to a policy of neutrality would be sacrificing their future security for an immediate advantage. The encirclement of Europe by hostile countries is still a possibility. The fact that it may occur under the direction of China rather than that of the USSR makes no fundamental difference.

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#### IV. WHAT FORM CAN THE ALLIANCE TAKE TOMORROW?

The Atlantic Alliance should not be content, in my view, to continue to be, as it was twenty years ago, a union of countries which have joined forces to defend themselves against possible aggression, but should become a union of countries which come together to seek solutions to the major world problems of the present time: the survival of a democratic society, its economic and social developments and the assistance to be given to the emergent countries.

The most important fact is that all the members of the Alliance believe that it must continue. Most, if not all, say that it must continue after 1969. What the governments are looking for are the deep-seated reasons for their decisions. These reasons must be understood and accepted by the general public which no longer seems to have the same fears as in 1949 and which, in its desire for better relations with the Communist countries of the Eastern bloc, is anxious that the Alliance should not constitute an obstacle.

The fundamental reason for the governments' belief probably lies in military considerations and the realisation that every country of the Alliance, with the exception of the

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United States, is incapable of defending itself effectively if it has to rely on its own forces. This is the conclusion that will very probably be reached by Sub-Groups Nos. 1 and 3. However, there is a deep-seated desire to justify the existence of the Alliance by other than military considerations. These are what Sub-Group No. 2 must put into words.

Therefore, assuming that, despite the détente, the Atlantic Alliance is still the only right answer to the problems raised today by the relative strengths of the military forces in Europe, we should try to make it clear what the Alliance demands from the political stand-point and how it can contribute to the consolidation of peace.

To this end, it may be of some help to draw a distinction between the short- or medium-term justifications for the existence of the Alliance and the long-term possibilities for its development.

A. The continued existence of the Alliance depends on a common and not merely concerted, policy on the problems raised by the reunification of Germany and the status of Berlin.

It is highly desirable that the Germans should themselves define the areas of negotiation in which they plan to pursue their efforts to achieve their reunification and that the members of the Alliance confirm their readiness to give them their support and do what they can to assist the Germans in following the path chosen by common accord.

Divergencies of views on German policy would speedily bring the Atlantic Alliance to an end.

B. The NATO countries must work out a common policy on disarmament and on security and defence problems.

It seems advisable to take stock of what has been done in this field and, in putting forward proposals, to take account of the situation as it is seen to stand today.

It should be possible, with an effort of imagination, to suggest new ideas which might prove to be so many stepping stones towards disarmament. The slightest progress in this direction would be welcomed by public opinion.

The important thing is to preserve the closest cohesion between the members of the Alliance. The controversy over the non-proliferation treaty shows how essential it is to adhere to a concerted policy.

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C. It is within the Atlantic Alliance that general rules for relations with the USSR and the European Communist countries should be laid down.

As regards their application, each country must undoubtedly be left some latitude, but it should keep its NATO partners continually briefed on the actions it decides to take. In these matters, the North Atlantic Council should be a kind of "clearing house" ensuring that the new ideas can be examined and discussed at any time.

D. The fact must be highlighted that co-ordinated relations between two groups of powers are much more effective than those which might be established with one another by some twenty countries acting individually. A settled scheme of things in Europe will not be created by adding one bilateral agreement to another. It will be achieved much more surely through a policy applied by groups of countries acting together. It is in this way that true equilibrium can be established for the common good. The days of individual action are over. The time has come for collective action.

E. It is within the Atlantic Alliance that the guidelines for a common policy towards the emergent countries should be laid down.

So far, this idea has always been rejected. The Atlantic Alliance includes nearly all the countries that could do something positive in this field. Logically, they should co-ordinate their intentions, leaving of course the implementation of the broad directives to other organizations.

F. It is only within the Atlantic Alliance that the countries of Europe can hope to influence the policy of the United States.

Ideally, of course, Europe should be able to speak with one voice within the Alliance. The implications of this will be discussed later in this paper. Until Europe can act as one unit, some account could probably be taken of the "fact of Europe" by giving the European countries of the Alliance a broader measure of joint responsibility in the field of defence and more particularly in regard to their nuclear defence.

Sub-Group No. 4 will be asked to give its opinion on the difficult, but vital question of the extent to which political consultation between NATO members should cover parts of the world lying outside the geographical area defined by the Washington Treaty. No one attempting to determine what the short- or medium-term tasks of the Alliance should be can afford to disregard this problem.

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It now only remains to consider the long-term possibilities for the Alliance.

We must take account of the psychological change in Europe. In 1949, she was poor and apprehensive. In 1967, her fears have been allayed, perhaps too well, and she is rich.

Part of European opinion is suffering from an inferiority or frustration complex in regard to the United States. Its spokesmen complain that this country plays an unduly dominant rôle within the Alliance. They appear to feel that the freedom of action and political independence of the European countries are hampered by the overwhelming power of their American partner.

Personally, although I am aware of this admittedly prevalent feeling, I cannot share these views.

Within the geographical area covered by the Treaty, I cannot call to mind any political or military course of action imposed by the United States on the other NATO member countries, nor can I remember any occasion on which a move towards a rapprochement with the USSR was prevented by the United States.

Within the geographical area covered by the Alliance, international policy has always been pursued by the countries concerned in perfect unison.

The same cannot be said of the policy pursued outside the geographical area of the Treaty. In several important matters, the United States has acted alone and sometimes contrary to the wishes of its western allies. This cannot be denied and it is a threat to the cohesion of the Alliance, but it must be admitted that by their protests the European countries are passing judgment on their own weakness. It is because their partnership no longer counts in the solution of world problems that this situation is possible.

The remedy is not, of course, for each country to withdraw into an antiquated form of nationalism and an illusory attitude of neutrality.

The only remedy for the European countries is to unite so that they can speak with authority.

The long-term future of the Atlantic Alliance depends on the progress which will be made towards the unification of Europe. This is why the question whether or not the United Kingdom will become a member of the Common Market is of paramount importance.

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The course logic dictates to those who wish to see Europe play a more significant rôle tomorrow than today, is to aim first at establishing Europe on the broadest possible basis and then to bring this new Europe to follow the example of the United States and the USSR in shouldering world-wide responsibilities.

Europe of the Six, although it is a major economic entity, cannot carry any weight as a political force between the USSR and the English speaking world.

On the other hand, Europe of the Six, plus the United Kingdom and such other countries as might join the Common Market, by going beyond an economic union and by making a reality of the political goals implicitly in the Rome Treaty, would become, within the Atlantic Alliance, a partner worthy of the United States and one of the great forces capable of influencing world politics.

If this were to be achieved in Europe, the work of the Alliance would be profoundly affected. In the present circumstances, the path seems to be beset with difficulties, not because of the technical problems, all of which can be overcome if the political will to do so exists, but because a united Europe is visualised in some circles as a third force instead of an element of the Atlantic Alliance.

As long as this fundamental divergency of views exists, no real progress can be made.

FUTURE TASKS OF THE ALLIANCESUB-GROUP 3(Future Defense Policy)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Honorable Manlio Brosio, Chairman  
Special Group  
Future Tasks of the Alliance

SUBJECT: Sub-Group 3 Status Report

Sub-Group 3 has held two meetings - 18th April and 18th May, 1967. We have had a general discussion of the topics which we shall address in our report, and this discussion has been very helpful in determining the approach which will be taken in this portion of the study. As a result of our discussions, I have developed an expanded outline for the report of this Group which is attached. I believe it reflects a general consensus of the discussion as to the issues that we should address.

Taking into account the nature of detente, its relationship to deterrence and its implications for Alliance defense policies, we will try to explore the continuing need for an integrated defense effort and its importance to broader political objectives of the Alliance; we will also examine the potential benefits and risks of arms control measures in relation to the security requirements and political objectives of the Alliance; we intend to examine whether political developments suggest the need to further review NATO defense policies in the future. We intend to focus particularly on the relation of NATO defense policies to such broader political objectives as Western Europe unity, Atlantic partnership, future political settlement and a lasting peaceful order in Europe.

As rapporteur, I intend to prepare an initial draft of our report, based on the attached outline, that will be available no later than mid-September. We then intend to meet again in early October to discuss this draft. We plan to have a final report ready for the Special Group to consider soon thereafter.

I believe our study is well launched, and that we can make a useful contribution to identifying the future defense tasks of the Alliance.

(Signed) Foy D. KOHLER  
Rapporteur, Sub-Group 3

THE FUTURE TASKS OF THE ALLIANCESUB-GROUP 3(Future Defense Policy)(Outline)INTRODUCTION

The security policy of the Alliance is first, foremost and always to keep the peace and maintain the independence of its members. It is possible to do this in a way which

- provides a basis for detente,
- furthers Atlantic ties,
- aids European unity,
- helps arms control and disarmament, and
- supports a leading rôle in worldwide peacekeeping on the part of the respective members.

How the Alliance is organized and the arrangements it makes to fulfill these tasks are problems to be tackled not with the expectation of perfect solutions, but with the purpose of serving the foregoing ends. In a period of partial detente and growing prosperity, the Alliance must recognize that it will be subject to centrifugal pressures and divisive efforts that will tug against the need to maintain the Allied military strength. However, the need for multilateral defense arrangements continues. Essential above all are common trust, steadiness of purpose and policy and a continuing will to maintain and use whatever force is necessary to defend freedom. The above are the fundamental premises on which this study is based.

PART I. THE CURRENT POLITICO-MILITARY SITUATIONA. Trends in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

(A brief review, to be coordinated with and draw upon work of other Sub-Groups where appropriate.)

B. Trends in Western Europe and North America

(A brief review, to be coordinated with and draw upon work of other Sub-Groups where appropriate.)

C. The nature of the threat

Assessment of the threat to NATO involves evaluation of both the military capabilities and political intentions of the Warsaw Pact nations. The military threat is under continuous review in various Alliance bodies, providing a useful point of departure for our study. We should, however, assess the implications for NATO security policy of developments within the Soviet Union and among the Communist countries and the possibility of future changes in the threat in light of Soviet political objectives vis-à-vis NATO and the implications of such changes for NATO security policy. Of particular importance are recent indications of a Soviet campaign against NATO in 1969.

D. NATO's security policy

There is no disagreement in the Alliance on the need to maintain strong military force in the face of a continuing danger. The general postulates on which NATO strategy and force posture should be based have been examined recently by the Defense Planning Committee; and the Defense Ministers have approved certain propositions as guidance for force planning. Much progress has been made toward a common NATO strategy and an agreed basis for force planning. However, we have not reached, nor are we soon likely to reach, that millennium in which there is complete agreement among us on these issues. Examination of strategy and force requirements should be the subject of continuing intensive consultations like those in the Nuclear Planning Group and Defense Planning Working Group. However, we can, from a broader and more political perspective than the force planners, examine the political purposes and implications of NATO's over-all deterrent posture and its major components and how they might change in the future. For example: What are the political implications for NATO of mutual deterrence at the strategic level? What are the political implications for NATO of changing assessments of the rôle of nuclear and non-nuclear forces? What are the relative rôles of the nuclear and non-nuclear members of the Alliance in deterrence? What are the implications of changing technology for NATO's security policy?

E. Current efforts to adapt NATO to a changing environment

NATO has not been standing still. Steps are being taken now to adapt NATO to changing circumstances, and we should be aware of these. They include:

- (1) Revised and improved force planning procedures that relate strategy, force requirements and resources.

- (2) A newly revised political directive to the Military Authorities that provides the basis for revision of NATO strategic concepts.
- (3) An enhanced rôle for the non-nuclear powers in nuclear planning through the NDAC and NPG.
- (4) Proposals for improved procedures and facilities for exchange of intelligence and other data resulting from the work of the Special Committee of Defense Ministers.

Many of these proposals will be implemented in connection with the move of NATO Headquarters to Brussels.

- (5) Reorganization and streamlining of the Military Committee and the NATO command structure.
- (6) Proposals for improving NATO's decision-making process in times of crisis.

These are impressive advances in recent months. What conclusions can be drawn from these recent developments? Do foreseeable political developments suggest the need to further modify NATO security policies in the future?

PART II. THE RELATIONSHIP OF NATO SECURITY POLICIES AND PROGRAMS TO THE BROADER POLITICAL OBJECTIVES OF THE ALLIANCE

The very existence of NATO as a defensive Alliance, with coordinated security policies and an integrated military command structure is a reality which affects international politics profoundly. The way in which the Alliance conducts its business affects political relationships among the members and between members and other states. The security policies and programs of NATO are designed primarily to keep the peace and maintain the independence of the member states, but they also can serve broader political goals. For example, we will want to examine whether the Alliance can, through agreed policies and actions, bring about further evolution in the Soviet bloc favorable to NATO.

A. The relationship of deterrence to detente

- (1) What do the Soviets see as the objectives of their policy of "Peaceful Coexistence?"
- (2) How far has detente been reflected in the military sphere?

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- (3) How does NATO's military strength serve as a counter-balance to Soviet political influence now and in a situation where political tensions would be further reduced?
- (4) What are the implications of partial detente for NATO's security policies? Can we modify our security policies in the light of current international developments?
- (5) What future developments in East-West relations might affect NATO's security policies and force posture and how?

B. The contribution of NATO defense policy to European unity and Atlantic cooperation now and in the future

- (1) What is the importance of NATO defense arrangements today as both a symbol and a practical example of Western European and Atlantic cooperation, and what rôle can they play in the future?
- (2) What are the political advantages and liabilities of an integrated military command structure?
- (3) Are there ways in which current procedures can be modified to strengthen consultation and give national governments a greater voice in the defense policy of the Alliance?
- (4) What should be the nature of the military relationship between Western Europe and North America in the future politico-military environment? In what ways will each side of the Atlantic continue to be militarily dependent on the other? In what ways is this relationship changing?
- (5) How do improvements in communications and transportation alter the trans-Atlantic relationship?

C. Arms control and disarmament prospects and their implications for the Alliance

There is an inevitable relationship between arms control and defense policy. A balance of forces is a necessary basis for meaningful progress toward disarmament. Conversely, disarmament measures must take account of the need for a continued force balance.

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- (1) What NATO objectives might be achieved by arms control and disarmament measures affecting the NATO area?
- (2) What specific measures including collateral measures appear practical at the present time and might have some promise of being negotiated with the Soviets?
- (3) What are the prospects for and risks of balanced force reductions? (Under study by DPC.)
- (4) What future European security arrangements can be envisioned and what might be their effect on present NATO arrangements and security policies?
- (5) What impact would specific measures have on the security of the NATO area?
- (6) What impact would specific arms control measures, including the NPT, have on intra-Alliance political relationships? On the prospects for European integration? On the prospects for a European political settlement, including German reunification?
- (7) What particular arms control measures are worthy of further study in NATO, and how might such study be conducted?
- (8) Can NATO better organize and coordinate arms control policies in the future?
- (9) What impact does changing technology have on stability and on arms control prospects?

D. Trends in technology and their impact on the Alliance

The technology of defense is becoming increasingly complex and costly, and it is changing at an ever-accelerating rate.

- (1) Are NATO defense policies and forces keeping pace with technological changes?
- (2) What are the implications for NATO defense policy of the increasing cost and complexity of defense technology?

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- (3) What, broadly speaking, are the prospective technological developments which will have a bearing on future defense policy of the Alliance and its forces?
- (4) What are the implications for NATO of the rising costs of modern military equipment in terms of maintaining force levels and their quality?

E. Organization of the Alliance defense machinery

- (1) What further improvements might be made that will strengthen the politico-military rôle of the Alliance, and which will better assure an equitable sharing of burdens and responsibilities?

F. The relationship between NATO security policies and world-wide developments

- (1) How might NATO security policies contribute to stability in the world, consistent with Article 51 of the UN Charter?
- (2) What are the general criteria for defense programs NATO might consider which would contribute to stability in the world, especially those areas on the NATO periphery?
- (3) What are the consequences of developments outside the NATO area for the security policies of the Alliance?

PART III. SUMMARY

A. What rôle can NATO security policies play in moving toward and eventually achieving a future European political settlement?

- (1) In what ways do NATO defense policies contribute toward East-West reconciliation and German unification? In what ways do they impede such developments?
- (2) Are there changes that can be made in NATO defense policies, structure and programs which would improve chances for East-West reconciliation and German unification?

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- B. What are the major elements of a security policy for the Alliance including appropriate measures of arms control which will:
- (1) continue to guarantee the security and freedom of the West as an indispensable basis for political solutions;
  - (2) make a direct contribution to the comprehensive political objectives of the Alliance, especially a lasting, peaceful order in Europe?
- C. What should be the major future defense tasks of the Alliance given our estimate of political and military trends over the next several years?

DEVELOPMENTS IN REGIONS OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA

Report of Sub-Group 4

SUMMARY

- The rôle of NATO in world affairs
  - Introduction paragraphs 1 - 14
- Categories of problems which could affect the interests of the Alliance paragraph 15
  - I Political events directly affecting the security of the Atlantic area paragraphs 16 - 24
  - II Political events not directly affecting the security of the Atlantic area, but in which NATO members are involved paragraphs 25 - 27
  - III International problems of a universal character towards which Western nations have to take a position paragraphs 28 - 34
- Proposals for improving political consultation paragraphs 35 - 41
- Conclusion paragraph 42

DEVELOPMENTS IN REGIONS OUTSIDE THE NATO AREAReport of Sub-Group 4The rôle of NATO in world affairs

1. Although the main purpose of the Atlantic Alliance is to ensure the collective defence of its members within the area covered by the Treaty, it is evident that their security and wellbeing can be seriously affected by developments outside that area. Accordingly, in the Report of the Committee of Three of 1956 on Non-military Co-operation in NATO it was stated that the members:

"should also be concerned with harmonizing their policies in relation to other areas, taking into account the broader interests of the whole international community; particularly in working through the United Nations and elsewhere for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the solution of the problems that now divide the world (paragraph 32).

In following this course, NATO can show that it is more than a defence organization ... it can prove its desire to co-operate fully with other members of the international community in bringing to reality the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It can show that it is not merely concerned with preventing the cold war from deteriorating into a shooting one; or with defending itself if such a tragedy should take place, but that it is even more concerned with seizing the political and moral initiative to enable all countries to develop in freedom, and to bring about a secure peace for all nations." (paragraph 33).

2. On 13th December, 1956, the NATO Council took note of the Report and approved its recommendations. The intention to harmonize the policies of the members in relation to other areas, and especially the appeal to the Alliance to bring about peace and security for other nations, has not, however, materialised. Public opinion today is even less convinced than it was in 1956 that NATO as an international organization has a function outside the Treaty area. The harmonization of policies of the NATO members in their relations to other areas has proved indeed to be a stubborn assignment. The Alliance was not designed to meet threats to peace coming from outside Europe; most of its members, moreover, are not prepared to accept any additional commitments beyond the domain of the North Atlantic Treaty. Nevertheless, the threats to the security of the North Atlantic nations now seem to rise more often from outside the area. The problem of Communist expansion has shifted to other parts of the world while political instability is on the increase everywhere.

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3. The member states are all the more reluctant to face developments outside the NATO area since the commitments of individual Allied Governments in those parts of the world and discordant situations around the globe (de-colonisation, Suez 1956, Vietnam, etc.) have often been a source of friction and irritation between them. A common policy for problems falling outside the competence of the Atlantic Alliance was never anticipated, but co-ordination of national policies of the members, in the interest of the cohesion of the Alliance, was one of the assumptions upon which NATO was built. The present conspicuous lack of harmony in the foreign policy of NATO members in international crises outside the NATO area reflects an ingrained disbelief in the possibility of Western collective diplomacy in the world arena. In this respect, the hopes of 1956 have not been fulfilled.

4. In the absence of effective international institutions for the maintenance of a decent world order, individual members of NATO have repeatedly taken military action in international situations in the interest of peace and stability. The great differences in degree of international responsibility between the members has not facilitated NATO consultation and mutual understanding with regard to such interventions. This disagreement has lately taken the form of a public discussion between individual spokesmen in the United States and Europe with regard to their respective rôles in the preservation of peace and order throughout the world. This debate between the United States and its Allies - although largely unofficial - is significant for the present interpretation of the function of the Alliance with regard to events outside the NATO area.

5. From the American side the desire has been expressed to see their NATO Allies take a greater share in the maintenance of international order, while many Europeans and Canadians show considerable hesitation to accept for themselves or for the Alliance a larger political rôle in world affairs. American spokesmen assume that there are real common interests outside the Atlantic area and the refusal, especially of some European NATO partners, to share the responsibility and the costs is sometimes interpreted in the United States as a reprehensible lack of solidarity. At the same time, in Europe large sectors of public opinion are apprehensive of being drawn by their American partners into conflicts outside the Atlantic area, while European understanding of the implications of "containment" or "wars of national liberation" in those regions is often different from that of the United States.

6. In this controversy a few points require additional clarification. While the Americans are anxious to re-engage the interest of Europe in the problems of world

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security, they have never clearly indicated in what form and to what extent their NATO Allies could participate in the political control and administration of a power which is largely in American hands. At the same time, many Europeans protest their reluctance to accept such political co-operation on the world level as long as they do not enjoy full equality in the sharing of decisions; but there is reasonable doubt as to their real desire to face new responsibilities outside the NATO area.

The most fundamental problem is, however, that most Europeans when asked about their world rôle must confess that they have no common view and even more no clear conception of a rôle for Europe outside the Atlantic area.

7. The interest of European nations in these problems has not disappeared (the Scandinavian countries and also Canada are more willing than before to accept United Nations tasks while several European countries are making impressive efforts in the new endeavour of development aid), but the loss by the former colonial powers of their imperial position and the traumatic experience of de-colonisation have greatly reduced European means and the will to assume global responsibilities. European contacts with regions outside the Atlantic area are still maintained largely through the old and tried channels of communication. European commitments exist in different forms; surviving colonial responsibilities, institutional links through the British Commonwealth, aid to former colonial territories, a sense of responsibility for new nations sometimes in the form of treaty obligations, etc. The economic and cultural opportunities which the old relations with former colonial territories offer are welcomed in Europe and of great value for the newly independent states. But those contacts are historical in origin and mainly national in significance. They do not fully counter-balance the lack of an up-to-date conception of Europe's rôle in world affairs in terms of the future and the interests of world order.

8. Nothing short of a foreign policy conceived in global terms and planned over a long period will safeguard the stability of the Atlantic nations. For the Alliance the relevance of events outside the Atlantic area is a new experience. Since it is possible to think in terms of "détente" in Europe, the importance of the prevention of conflicts elsewhere has increased. For "détente" is basically indivisible and a viable European settlement implies a more general understanding with the Soviet Union extending to all areas of the world. Events outside NATO in which the Soviet Union and the United States are involved can therefore deeply affect the relationships within the Alliance and the security of Europe. Many conflicts of a local character elsewhere have

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an inbuilt tendency to escalate or to bring about a confrontation of the two great powers. The real issue today is the establishment of world stability, for which the American presence is required in Europe, and European influence will be needed in the regions outside the NATO area. War can erupt and spread both in Europe and elsewhere. A European refusal to admit such a possibility, or to accept corresponding responsibility, could be as disastrous as the American indifference to the maintenance of the European balance of power after the First World War.

9. While the NATO Alliance is the suitable framework for the preservation of the security of its members in the Atlantic area, it is less obvious that NATO would be the right instrument for co-operation outside the area. The objections against utilising NATO processes for extra-curricular purposes are well known. It is not possible to make NATO omni-competent since the non-aligned nations refuse to be involved in the cold war. Nor is it advisable for NATO to intervene in conflict situations elsewhere in substitution for an ineffective United Nations organization; indeed, NATO action might well provoke Soviet intervention and accordingly spread the danger. The legal objections against the extension of NATO responsibilities outside the NATO area are well founded. The Treaty contains no provisions for operational activities of the Alliance in other regions.

10. Members of an Alliance, however, who together produce more than one half of the world's total wealth, who share an even larger part of the world's reservoir of technical skill and facilities, who control the terms of trade and credit in most parts of the world, and who have made it a habit to deliver armaments to many new countries, cannot be indifferent to events outside their own defence perimeter. If they desire to contribute to the peace of the Third World - as it would be in their own interest to do - they must seek to co-ordinate their policies in order to create an impact of Western standards of law and order upon a world in which situations of peril and injustice will be endemic.

11. It is probably an illusion for members of NATO to hope to obtain a certificate of "United Nations' virginity" by refraining from taking sides in conflicts elsewhere. Although the members of NATO proclaimed a policy of strict non-intervention in the latest Middle Eastern crisis they could neither prevent the outbreak of the conflict itself nor escape the charge of imperialism. The fear of committing NATO, or even of formulating any NATO position with regard to the Israel-Arab conflict, did not prevent commitment from the Soviet side. Nor did European impartiality safeguard any European interests. The main result has been, as Raymond Aron stated in the Figaro of 28th June, 1967, a demonstration of the political absence

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of Europe: "Au Moyen Orient il y a, d'une part, les acteurs locaux - Israël et les pays Arabes - d'autre part les deux Grands ... L'Europe des Six s'occupait de betteraves pendant ces jours historiques".

12. The question must be faced whether the Western world can afford much longer the luxury of unco-ordinated national approaches to problems of this kind. Many of the issues which confront us in regions outside the Atlantic area are of global dimensions and require multinational remedies. A failure to harmonize policies will in the end alienate the Allies one from another. In that case, the European partners should not be surprised if they are faced with a revival of American isolationism. Among the smaller nations, moreover, such a lack of unity of purpose will provoke a rapid spread of neutralism. It seems justified, therefore, to ask the members of NATO to reconsider their objections against fresh efforts to extend co-ordination of policy, contingency planning and common diplomatic action in the NATO context to developments in regions outside the NATO area.

13. NATO's task beyond the Treaty area is not to operate outside it, but to devise common policies for its members. The new relevance of events outside the NATO area requires Western European and North American co-operation in those parts of the world; the structure of the Alliance and our sovereign equality oblige us, however, to follow a process of mutual persuasion before common policies can be adopted. In political affairs the Alliance has no supra-national pretensions. Nor can it serve as an instrument for hegemonic leadership by the United States. We cannot ignore the renewed awareness of their national identity amongst European nations, nor can we anticipate at this juncture a European political federation to serve as the European pillar in an Atlantic partnership. A new effort in political consultation must be based on contemporary realities; improvements in the mechanics of consultation can only be grafted upon the unsatisfactory political structure of the present world.

14. For simultaneous and parallel action on both sides of the Atlantic strong and clear indications of common interests are required, demanding a common approach and served through common means. The function of NATO in this field is to serve as a clearing house for mutual information, and as a brain-trust for the identification and formulation of the common interest. If the interests of members of the Alliance are not identical - as they sometimes will not be - a distinction can be made in responsibility. Between the poles of a complete common policy for the Alliance (which cannot be expected outside the Treaty area) and no common policy at all (unavoidable

consequence of an Alliance in which it would be forbidden to give advice concerning matters outside the Treaty area) there lies a wide field for study and contingency planning for those members who are prepared to co-ordinate their efforts, who possess the capability to raise the means and are prepared to apply them.

Categories of problems which could affect the interests of the Alliance

15. Events outside the NATO area which could affect the security or the cohesion of the Alliance and for which co-ordination of the policies of the members is required, can be distinguished into different categories:

- I. Political events directly affecting the security of the Atlantic area;
  - II. Political events not directly affecting the security of the Atlantic area, but in which NATO members are involved;
  - III. International problems of a universal character towards which Western nations have to take a position.
- I. Political events directly affecting the security of the Atlantic area

16. Problems which will always be of major importance for the Alliance are the following:

- (a) developments on the borders of the NATO defence perimeter which could directly affect the security of the area; or conflicts elsewhere which could escalate and provoke a confrontation of the great powers;
- (b) nuclear developments which could affect the world nuclear equilibrium;
- (c) the problem of China.

17. It is not possible to review in any detail the crises which can arise in the Third World and which the NATO Council eventually will have to face. The period of decolonisation in Asia and Africa is coming to an end, and in many of the new nations the struggle for independence and the unifying impulse of militant nationalism has been followed by a crisis of consolidation. The new states - and the same applies to large sectors of Latin America - are faced with terrific problems of



external vulnerability, domestic instability, and human poverty. The United Nations Charter provides them with the legal guarantee of their independence and the basis for a policy of non-alignment, but in many cases their weakness and lack of cohesion engender conflict and the need for support from outside. It will be unavoidable for members of NATO - especially for the United States in its world rôle and its system of alliances - to intervene from time to time in attempts to consolidate the status quo. It will be equally unavoidable that there will be interference from the side of Communist powers, aware of a fertile field of expansion. The instability of the new configuration of power in the world is a potential source of local conflict, regional escalation and confrontation of the great powers.

18. The Alliance will need adequate diplomatic responses especially to dangerous developments in regions on the border of the NATO defence perimeter. In emergencies it will be necessary to make distinctions between categories of danger. The Council should know what developments would not be acceptable in view of the security of the members. The persistent Soviet penetration in a number of countries in the Middle East and North Africa requires close attention. The NATO Council will need a study in depth to decide what forms and what level of Soviet influence would seem unavoidable and acceptable in those parts of the world, and what forms of Soviet influence (e.g. arms deliveries, military bases, etc.) would create problems of security for the Alliance. If the Soviet Union is prepared to use its position in co-operation with other great powers to stabilise a situation of local conflict or dangerous fluidity, Soviet influence could be beneficial. If on the contrary the purpose is to weaken NATO, to stir up difficulties for the Western world and to continue the cold war outside Europe, the situation requires an active policy of containment and close co-operation at the Western side. The same applies to local conflicts elsewhere of such importance that they could threaten the peace in a wider area and involve the great powers. In such cases the Council will have to decide what level of turbulence can be tolerated and what should be done to localise the danger, together with the Soviet Union if possible, in opposition to the Soviet Union (*mutatis mutandis*: China) if necessary.

19. Remedial action in dangerous situations outside the NATO area will have to be taken in an environment and under a responsibility different from those of the NATO Council. In most cases the framework for diplomatic action in conflicts of this kind will be the United Nations. For the members of NATO it is essential that, whatever the international forum, a just and fitting response be given to the challenge of the danger, in the context of the relevant legal framework and the actual

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constellation of power. The main NATO interest and the purpose of all diplomatic activity will be that the dangerous fires outside the NATO area be quenched, and threats to the peace dealt with on their own merits, in order to prevent their spread and escalation. This implies that it would be a mistake for NATO members to approach situations of this kind from the angle of their national interests only, and even more to take advantage of the situation by damaging the interests of Allies.

20. It may be unavoidable for NATO members to take individual action, in the United Nations, in the countries concerned, or elsewhere. Where common action is not possible the NATO approach should always be (to use a slightly too dramatic military metaphor) "getrennt zu marschieren aber vereint zu schlagen" (to proceed separately, but to strike together). The NATO interest requires that the freedom of the members in such matters will be a freedom according to plan, subordinate to the concern for the right response to the problem itself. No such harmonized freedom will be possible without careful preparation, both in the analysis of the situation and the presentation of policy implications for the members.

21. When it comes to political action the responsibilities for the members of NATO will differ widely. In situations outside the NATO area one or more of the great powers - permanent members of the Security Council and heavily committed elsewhere - will in most cases be directly involved. Other NATO members (e.g. Scandinavian countries and Canada) have repeatedly accepted special responsibilities for participation in peace-keeping activities of the United Nations, and can in this way effectively contribute to the settlement of conflict. There are advantages in this pluriformity of international conduct on one condition: that the members of NATO will be guided by the same views on the merits of the case and its solution. For this purpose NATO will need a policy and constant consultation, both in the NATO Council and in those international institutions where the members are confronted with the debate and the policy formulation for conflicts of this kind. It is for the member countries to consult within the NATO Council on the right approach to the conflict. Their representatives in other international bodies will have the task to transpose the NATO-view in e.g. United Nations' policy in order to be able to respond adequately to the challenge of the occasion and environment. Danger can arise if the NATO Council does not give guidance and the Permanent Representatives of the NATO countries in New York are reluctant to consult effectively.

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22. Problems in regions outside the NATO area requiring a long-term political strategy, policy planning and a system of crisis-management from the side of the members of the Alliance will be the following:

- (a) The evaluation of Communist expansion in specific regions. The kind and the level of Soviet influence which would create dangers for peace, the stability of the area concerned, or the interests of NATO members. The policies to be adopted in order to neutralise the disruptive effects of Soviet pressure or Communist subversive activity.
- (b) The necessity of a regional equilibrium of power in Asia and in the Middle East. The question where new lines of power and influence should be drawn in Asia, and the ways and means to assist in creating the necessary stability. The consequences of a British withdrawal from commitments East of Suez. The problem of military guarantees for non-aligned nations.
- (c) The need of an international control of arms deliveries in order to prevent local or regional disturbances of the peace.
- (d) The evaluation of local or regional political controversies and their significance for the future of the area concerned (e.g. the conflicts within the Arab world, in Nigeria, and elsewhere).
- (e) The meaning of "wars of national liberation" in Asia and Africa and the question whether local conflicts of this kind should be ignored, or would justify international interference.
- (f) The evaluation of revolutionary developments in Latin America. The problem where to draw the line between creative social processes and disruptive subversive activities.
- (g) The problem of peace keeping activities of the United Nations and other international organizations, their function, possibilities and limitations. The support to be given to such activities by members of the Alliance.
- (h) Vital economic interests of the Western world in parts of Asia and Africa and how to safeguard them (e.g. oil, the Suez Canal, etc.).

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23. Nuclear developments outside the NATO area which could affect the world's nuclear equilibrium will always be among the most important points of deliberation in the NATO Council. In the context of this section of the Report the political aspects of the spread or the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons must be mentioned. A world policy of non-proliferation will meet resistance, also of Asia, in countries desiring to develop a nuclear capacity in the military field. It may be that the Alliance will have to choose between general considerations of world nuclear control, and the more specific political question whether it would be in the interest of world stability to prevent countries like Japan and India from developing nuclear striking forces. If the general consideration prevails, the question what nuclear guarantee can be given to such countries is not only a technical matter, but a political one of great consequence. The nuclear situation puts a constant pressure upon the political structures of the future. What these structures should be is a problem of an order which requires not only technical or strategic answers, but political study in depth. This kind of long-term political thinking is not necessarily a task for the NATO staff only, but sooner or later the NATO Council should be presented with the result of studies enabling it to understand fully the political implications of the matter under consideration.

24. Finally, one of the major problems of the next few years will be how to relate China to the rest of the world. This is not a matter for one or more nations, not even for the NATO Council, but clearly a problem in which members of the Alliance should consult with other Asian states and the Soviet Union. The world interest, to see China participate through normal channels of communication and in normal diplomatic fashion in every major international activity, is also the NATO interest. The members of the Alliance will need from the side of the NATO Council the best possible information and interpretation of Chinese events and motives. In view of the importance of the subject a common NATO approach would be advisable in every major policy decision with regard to China, and in emergencies on the Chinese border.

II. Political events not directly affecting the security of the Atlantic area, but in which NATO members are involved

25. For events of a local character and minor significance, and for special obligations or interests of individual members of the Alliance, a harmonization and co-ordination of the policies of the members is not required. No one expects a clearly defined NATO position with regard to United States' commitments in Latin America and East Asia, British positions East of Suez, or Portuguese colonial obligations, as long as

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those commitments do not give rise to major trouble or threats to the peace. The interests of the members are not identical everywhere and it must be possible to agree to a permissible range of divergence and freedom of action for problems in this category. It cannot be denied, however, that such commitments of individual members can have a disruptive effect on the cohesion of the Alliance. The reserved domains of international action have often been a source of trouble both for the Alliance and the individual member.

26. The members have full freedom of decision with regard to their commitment outside the NATO area; prior consultation in the NATO Council is not obligatory, nor can it in all circumstances be expected. A world power cannot consult at every turn its numerous allies. There may come moments in which e.g. the United States has to act alone quickly and vigorously in order to face a confrontation of strategic power. The Cuban missile crisis was such a moment and none of the NATO Allies expected at that time prior consultation or common contingency planning. Nevertheless, if this unavoidable freedom is not used with the utmost care and consideration - and this applies to all members - the consequences for the Alliance could be serious. A complete freedom of action for the individual members would undermine the belief in the Alliance. World order is a common responsibility, and no member can expect policies to be shared which have not first been made object of discussion. The cost of non-consultation must be measured before any unilateral action is taken, since the harm in international confidence can be serious. Prior consultation, therefore, should be the rule, at least with those allies which are able and willing to participate in consultation. The Council, or special groups appointed by the Council, must have the right to be informed, to encourage and to warn.

27. Colonial obligations of members of the Alliance have been a source of difficulty from the beginning. Today only Portugal is still deeply involved in a process of decolonisation, and it will not be easy for the NATO Council to adopt a common policy with regard to this problem. The Portuguese Delegation takes the view that the Alliance should accept the following line of conduct:

"The vital interests of any one of the members of the Alliance should never be unnecessarily undermined or, a fortiori, openly attacked by other members for reasons which are not in the same degree vital to those other members; an ally should be recognised in right to pursue, in a field which does not affect vital interests of others, a special policy dictated by interests vital to that ally; such a policy,

particularly when it serves useful purposes in terms of the social and economic welfare of the less developed peoples affected by it, should receive from the other allies at least as much public tolerance as is shown, for the purposes of détente, towards Communist régimes and Soviet domination in Eastern Europe."

While the Portuguese desire commands full respect and should be followed as far as possible, it is not to be expected that the other members of the Alliance will always be able to adhere to the Portuguese request in debates of the United Nations and other international organizations.

III. International problems of a universal character towards which Western nations have to take a position

28. In the Third World we are faced with the challenge of a few problems of a general character and global significance. It may well be that the future prestige of the Western world is less dependant upon its power and wealth than upon its response to problems of human rights, racial relations and economic development. In our contacts with the peoples of Asia and Africa a new paradox is building up: a sharp resentment from the side of the Third World against any interference in its affairs, and at the same time the desire that the Western powers shall proclaim and enforce respect for human rights, racial non-discrimination, freedom and economic development throughout the world. In view of the national oversensitivity of the new nations the Western powers have in many instances followed a scrupulous policy of non-intervention. There is a wide-spread impression, however, that they will be prepared to set aside their objections to intervention as soon as Communist influence raises its head. The diplomacy of the Western world must try to avoid the appearance of being more interested in checking the progress of Communism than in helping to establish conditions of human dignity. In their relations with the Third World the NATO members should clearly strive for more than anti-Communism; they need a political strategy which will command respect and sympathy. Here again study in depth, consultation and co-ordination of policy are required, especially in two fields: racial relations and economic development.

29. In the next few years it will be of the utmost importance what will be the attitude of the Western nations with respect to tensions and conflicts emanating from racial discrimination, especially in Rhodesia and South Africa. Although Europe and the United States cannot be blamed for policies and events in those countries, there is in the eyes of the coloured peoples no escape from the collective

responsibility of the white race. In the highly explosive atmosphere of the southern parts of Africa we are expected to throw our political weight into the scale of the human interests of the coloured population. It would certainly be welcomed in the Western world, if racial discrimination could be gradually eliminated in those countries, in an orderly way. Since the present situation is dangerous, it would be in the interest of the members of the Alliance to promote the development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

30. Protest and condemnation, the easy indignation of United Nations' meetings, is both irrelevant and *infra dignitatem* for those who hold world power. Can NATO develop a foreign policy for its members which could influence the course of events? Only if we should be able to engage the interest and co-operation of the white population of the countries concerned. One example of possible action may suffice. The question could be studied, whether it would be possible for Western nations to give a guarantee of non-intervention to the countries concerned, on one condition: that they gradually change their racial legislation, and establish in due time conditions of legal and social equality for the whole of the population.

31. The problems of economic development are of no direct concern of NATO. For the members of the Alliance the best framework for the harmonization of their development assistance policies will be the OECD, and especially its Development Assistance Committee. In their report on non-military co-operation in NATO the Committee of Three of 1956 rightly concluded that economic co-operation must remain wider than NATO. And according to a later study on the competence and objections of NATO in the economic field (document C-M(61)30, Part II, paragraph 17) the function of NATO with regard to the less developed countries outside NATO is strictly limited:

"NATO provides a forum for a frank exchange of views, where necessary, on policies for countering the Sino-Soviet economic offensive in the less-developed countries. For example, if it were felt that these policies are not developed with sufficient sense of urgency in the Development Assistance Group or other international organizations, there could be an exchange of views on this point in NATO. Any remedial action that might be considered necessary should be promoted by the NATO member countries in the Development Assistance Group or other international organizations concerned .... When carrying out any measures recommended in NATO, member countries should continue to act in their individual capacity; for any attempt to make NATO into an operating agency for countering Sino-Soviet economic penetration would have grave psychological repercussions in the less developed countries."

32. It may be time to reconsider the assumption, that an exchange of views in NATO should be limited to occasional failures of other organizations in developing policies for countering Communist economic offensives. The problem of aid to the less developed nations should not be approached only from the angle of the containment of Communist expansion. It should be solved on its own merits, and a NATO discussion would seem indicated if the dangers of economic stagnation in developing countries would require a special effort and a high priority in the policies of the Western world. The OECD and other international organizations provide the members with analysis, theory and advice on the general scope of the action which would be needed to meet the most urgent problems. The rôle of the NATO Council should be to underline the urgency and importance of recommendations made by such organizations in view of the general world situation.

33. The latest data of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD are not very encouraging and indicate a decline in the net flow of development aid in percentages of the national income of the members of the OECD. At the same time political disturbances in several under-developed countries are beginning to slow down the process of development. In view of the real danger of a serious deterioration in the development situation the recommendations in the 1967 Review of the DAC are of special importance.

34. Attention should be drawn to the following points(1):

- The failure of the overall development assistance effort to expand more rapidly reflects the lower priority given to aid as against other claims on national resources.
- The net official flow of assistance from DAC members to less developed countries has been slowly increasing in 1966 but
  - (a) the disbursements for assistance have not kept up with the growth in national income of the last six years,
  - (b) the increase in the net official flow in 1966 was more than offset by a drop in private foreign investment,
  - (c) much higher levels of support will be necessary if the multilateral agencies are merely to maintain their present levels of commitment.

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(1) cf. the introductory statement by Williard C. Thorp, Chairman of the DAC at its meeting of 19th and 20th July, 1967.



- The terms of aid financing are very unsatisfactory. It will not be possible to maintain the present net flow of assistance in the face of growing interest and amortisation payments, and the growing weight of external debt in the borrowing countries.
- It will, therefore, be necessary to soften the terms of lending and to anticipate debt crises before they develop.
- These problems cannot be dealt with by the members individually and separately, but require common action.
- The members should consider the possibility of multi-year aid programmes in each donor country.

#### Proposals for improving political consultation

35. In view of the changes in the international situation since 1949 (especially the fact that the main threats to the security of the North Atlantic nations have shifted from Europe to other parts of the world) we need a better alliance system for consultation in crisis situations outside the Atlantic area. This purpose can be attained on two conditions: our governments must demonstrate the political will to make NATO an active centre for the co-ordination of the policies of the Western world, and the NATO machinery must be adapted to the new tasks. The fundamental point, of course, is the strength of the resolution of the members to make use of the Alliance as an instrument for the co-ordination of their policy. If they believe to have better means for the tasks described in this Report, NATO has no function. Since this is probably not the case it seems not to be entirely superfluous to suggest a few adaptations in the processes of consultation.

36. NATO is in need of a greater variety of forms of consultation in order to mobilise the potential for study in depth and to present the Council with proposals for co-ordinated action. This would require gradations in the consultation process, both with regard to the participants and the issues singled out for study. The best procedure for questions outside the NATO area would be discussion in groups performing a narrow function, restricted to closely defined subjects. Not all members are equally interested in the study of specific areas or specific issues outside the NATO area. Special responsibility rests on those members who are directly involved or have a special experience of the problem or the regions concerned. A different degree of response can be expected from members with world responsibility and those without it; from those who are ready and capable to engage in contingency planning for action and those who do not

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want to be involved through their NATO membership in matters which are not of direct concern to NATO. There should be no objection to the use of the organization for this purpose. While there are clearly no military obligations for members outside the NATO defence perimeter, the Treaty nowhere implies that there are subjects which fall outside the consultation processes of the Alliance.

37. Present NATO procedures for developing adequate policies are not satisfactory. NATO has at its disposal, a wealth of information and political analyses from expert working groups, the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group and other bodies with regard to specific international problems. What seems to be lacking is a more deliberate effort to present the Council with policy implications for the members of the Alliance. The hesitation is not the fault of the NATO Secretariat. The Council's dislike to draw conclusions for action results in atrophying the intermediate processes in the NATO machinery to work out policy proposals. The implied wish to avoid embarrassment and dissension prevents the development of a political strategy in terms of the challenges which confront the Western world outside the NATO area. For the future of the Alliance it is essential to make the tasks, that is the things that should be done in the interest of peace and stability, the starting point of all deliberations, followed by attempts to co-operate by as many members in as many issues as will be possible.

38. The NATO Council should, therefore, create a number of specialised groups working on specific regions or subjects outside the Atlantic area. The groups should preferably be limited to member countries possessing special knowledge of the subject, or acknowledging a genuine stake and interest in it. Their main task would be contingency planning for the prevention of conflict: the study of situations before they present acute danger, and advice about the political measures to be applied in order to prevent a deterioration of the situation. Such groups should meet without publicity or press releases, with a minimum of paper work, and should be served by a small secretariat. Their main task would be to produce adequate proposals for remedial action, to be reported to the Council or committees of the Council constituted on the principle of open-endedness (accessible to all members). The main purpose of this proposal is to facilitate collective brain work in bringing together the countries which are able and willing to produce proposals for policy and eventually to apply them, without excluding any member from taking cognizance of them in the normal NATO frame-work where all members have full liberty to accept or reject them.

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39. The NATO Council should consider also how to make better use of the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group (APAG), which has the task to provide the Council with studies on long-term policy problems and suggestions for future action. The task of all policy planning is to turn latent common interests into active common policy, and accordingly APAG was meant to be composed of the chiefs of the planning staffs of the foreign offices of the member countries. Meetings of APAG have proved to be very useful for informal consultation and mutual information; it has all the characteristics of a potential long-term planning machinery. The difficulty, however, for bodies of this kind is the practical impossibility for the most responsible policy making people to attend many committee meetings. The object of APAG will be defeated if the meetings have to take place without the presence, the authority and the freedom of intellectual initiative of the real policy makers. If they have to be replaced by alternates without such powers and necessarily limited in their effectiveness by instructions, the process of consultation will produce information and understanding, but no policy. The same applies to the regular meetings of the Committee of Political Advisers (POLADS), staff members of the Permanent Representatives, overburdened with work and constantly at the receiving end of the cables from fifteen sovereign governments. No policy can easily spring from consultations under such frustrating conditions. For the initiation of new policies the level of the policy makers must be very high.

40. One more requirement for long-term policy planning should be considered. The intermediate machinery for policy planning should contain a centre of initiative for highly qualified independent study, advice and policy suggestion, without instruction or interference of governments. NATO cannot change its inter-governmental character: it is not possible to think in terms of the powers of initiative and stimulation of the European Commission of the EEC. Therefore the two conditions for effective policy planning cannot easily be met.

41. Ideal solutions do not exist in our loosely knitted Alliance, but if an indispensable function cannot be suitably fulfilled for legal or structural reasons, attempts should be made to remedy the weakness in the NATO structure by other means. A purely pragmatic use of outside advice could have a stimulating effect. Independent advisers or working parties of experienced politicians and scholars could from time to time be invited to present the NATO Council with confidential proposals for policy and diplomatic action. They should have full liberty of advice and the Council should be entirely free to make use of recommendations of this kind, or not. A similar

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task of study and advice could be entrusted to one or more international institutes. It may well be in the interest of NATO to mobilise the knowledge and the resources of outsiders in order to revitalise the consultation processes of our governments.

### Conclusion

42. In order to improve the effective functioning of NATO with regard to developments outside the Atlantic area, the following next steps are recommended:

- (1) The Council should create special groups to carry forward active consultation on the implications for NATO of specific security situations. Two groups should be established as soon as possible:
  - (a) on the security situation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East;
  - (b) on the Chinese problem.
- (2) The Council should improve the NATO capacity for long-term policy planning. The following points are recommended:
  - (a) the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group (APAG) and other advisory bodies should be instructed to present the Council with more specific advice regarding policy implications;
  - (b) arrangements should be made for the occasional assistance of independent advisers.
- (3) NATO consultation between the members' Permanent Missions to the United Nations should be strengthened.

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