

DRAFT

NATO

(Sp. Gr.)

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FUTURE TASKS OF THE ALLIANCEAnalysis of tendencies revealed in the discussion of
Permanent Representatives on 12th July, 1967

The above discussion revealed, grosso modo, a majority tendency aiming at a restriction in the field of both the objectives and procedures originally adopted for the Harmel Exercise, and a minority view which advocates their maintenance as originally laid down.

The majority view criticised what was called the "uneven progress" of the Sub-Groups. Sub-Group 2 in particular was blamed for not having brought out the European and Atlantic aspects of the Alliance. One Delegation questioned whether Sub-Group 3 could possibly be useful at all. In the field of objectives, the restrictive view was expressed that the Exercise should really concentrate on a study of East/West relations, with special reference to European security aspects of the matter and a study of the rôle of the Alliance, if any, outside the Treaty Area.

In the same order of ideas, a majority of Delegations attacked the work hitherto done by the Rapporteurs. The relatively independent course taken by certain Rapporteurs in the preparation of their reports was fairly generally criticised, because (a) political realities tended to be lost from sight, (b) certain aspects were not given full attention, and (c) their independence could only hamper the co-ordinating tasks of the Special Group. In these circumstances, the suggestion was made that countries prevail upon Rapporteurs to recognise the relevant political realities and, in the same line of thought, Delegations ^{should} ~~would~~ make as many contributions to the Exercise as possible, in written form.

It was also proposed that the Special Group meet at an earlier date than was originally foreseen.

In short, the majority, whose view is summarised above, and which includes the greatest powers of the Alliance, has clearly no need for a real and genuine confrontation of the various conceptions on the future tasks of the Alliance and the improvement of the Organisation. The implication of their thoughts, as expressed during this meeting, clearly aims at destroying the one original aspect of the Harmel Exercise: the independent rôle of the Rapporteurs in the first stage of the Exercise.

There was, however, a minority which opposed this attack on present objectives and procedures. It was pointed out that the task of this Exercise was not to resolve the problems of East/West relations or the German issue.

It was also pointed out that if there was a certain confusion between the work of the Rapporteurs, it was the inevitable consequence of the ^{ir}free and independent rôle, to the continuation of which the minority was strongly attached. It was agreed that, as one Delegation had pointed out, the attempt to create a rôle for NATO outside the Treaty Area might be potentially divisive. However, it was wrong to conclude from this that the Allies should lower their sights: no matter how much Allies might attempt to escape playing a rôle in the world outside the Treaty Area, circumstances forced such a rôle upon them. This was the kind of reality which should be squarely faced and not concealed by avoiding issues on which there was no agreement. While it was agreed that the Rapporteurs had no right to publish anything in connection with the Exercise, it was the minority view that public opinion considerations, in the present stage of the work, were irrelevant. The Allies had asked certain distinguished

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individuals, in whom they placed special trust, to say in all candour what they thought about questions which had been referred to them; as long as these reports ~~were~~^{are} not available, it ~~was~~^{is} surely inappropriate to indulge in any speculation as to what was likely to come out of the Exercise or to try to judge the work of the Rapporteurs. Only when these reports ~~had~~^{have} been made available to the Special Group should an effort be made to reconcile the views of Governments with those of the Rapporteurs.

The question of the hearings was also raised in the discussion. It was, however, pointed out that any comparison with the Exercise of 1956 was inappropriate. This did not, however, mean that such hearings, at a later stage, were excluded.

So much for this analytical summary of the currents (of thought) shown in this discussion.

You may wish to add the following ~~points~~ when presenting this analysis to the assembled Rapporteurs in Bonn. While it is perhaps not for the Secretary General to take part as and when Delegations split into two groups, The following point might be made: If the restrictive majority view prevails, if conflicting views are suppressed precisely because they may reveal basic disagreements, if, finally, the ~~the~~ freedom of the Rapporteurs to state their personal opinions and conclusions is curtailed or destroyed, the Harmel Exercise will inevitably go the way of all previous NATO exercises. The result would be yet another report on the basis of the lowest common denominator and nothing new will be added to the present content of the Alliance.

To be sure, this does not mean that the Rapporteurs should not make a greater effort at co-ordinating the contents of their reports, nor is a more intense contribution by Delegations in the form of written papers to be rejected.

While perhaps the date of the meeting of the Special Group should remain fixed at the beginning of November, another meeting of the same kind as the one of 12th July was not excluded. However, the basic issue ^{is} ~~was~~ whether or not the original aspects of the Harmel Exercise were to be maintained; and the Rapporteurs might also have something to say on that central issue.

VC/LMR.