



UNITED KINGDOM PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
OTAN/NATO
PLACE DU MARÉCHAL DE LATTRE DE TASSIGNY
PARIS XVII^e
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17 July 1967

Dear Manlio

I have been asked by Adam Watson to convey to you the enclosed paper on the Future Tasks of the Alliance with the explanation that it is a tentative and personal suggestion by Watson designed to provide a starting point for the discussion between the Rapporteurs and yourself at Bonn on July 21st. Watson believes that some of the points in this paper should perhaps be included in one or other of the reports, while others may be better stated as general propositions common to all four Rapporteurs. Copies of the paper are being sent to the other Rapporteurs.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Representatives of the countries from which the other Rapporteurs are drawn, namely the Belgian, Netherlands, German and U.S. Representatives.

Yours sincerely
Bernard Burrows
(Bernard Burrows)

Signor Manlio Brosio,
Secretary-General,
OTAN/NATO.

17/7/67

CONFIDENTIALFUTURE TASKS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

(Draft suggestions for basic ideas underlying the papers of all rapporteurs.)

Continuation

We agree that the Alliance is as necessary to-day as ever: and that it should continue after 1969.

2. Atlantic Character

We attach special value to the Atlantic character of the Alliance. In particular the inevitable presence and power of the Soviet Union in Europe continues to make as necessary as ever a corresponding North American presence there to ensure the freedom of the European members of the Alliance and help maintain a balance of forces in the northern hemisphere.

3. Europe

It is important to ensure that the disparity between the power and influence of the United States and that of other members of the Alliance does not lead to European fears of American domination or American impatience with the capacity of the European Allies to assume responsibilities. We also recognise that national loyalties and capacities are not by themselves enough to deal adequately with the problems and opportunities of the modern world. We therefore welcome moves designed to draw the European members more closely together within the Alliance: notably in the appropriate aspects of economics, politics and defence. We believe that such integration will not weaken the Atlantic Alliance: indeed by correcting the disparity between its American and the European members it will help to ensure a smoother working partnership.

4. Détente

The Alliance was formed to deal with the Soviet Union and its satellite countries at a time when under Stalin they represented an active military and ideological threat to the free societies of Europe and the world. This gave special prominence to the defensive aspects of the Alliance, both military and ideological. At present the Soviet military threat is less conspicuous. There are hesitant signs in the Soviet Union and more definite ones in some East European countries of a willingness to relax certain tensions and to move towards a détente at least with some members of the Alliance. To predict how this détente will develop over the next few years, or to estimate what the prospects are of progress from a relaxation of tensions to firm agreements with the Soviet Union about a general European settlement, must be guesswork. But there is

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general agreement among the Allies that the best hope of solving the more difficult problems of a European settlement, and notably the German question, seems to lie in an extension of the present détente. In the period ahead the Allies are therefore likely to have increasing contacts with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We believe that the Alliance, and the machinery of the Organisation, have as vital a part to play in dealing with diplomacy of détente and with possible negotiations for a European settlement as they had in providing a more static shield against the Soviet aggressiveness of Stalin's day.

expans of middle east?

Because certain members of the Alliance are less able to commit themselves than others to an agreed political strategy, it may not be possible to lay down binding rules or to elaborate a firm joint policy which would commit all the Allies. But we believe that the Alliance should recommend principles and objectives which will serve to guide their members in their dealings with the Soviet and East European governments. Our report contains suggested guidelines of this kind.

Within this general framework of accepted policy it will sometimes be appropriate to use multilateral methods of negotiation: possibly between the two groups as such. On other occasions, and especially in the early stages, it is inevitable and right that bilateral contacts with these governments should provide opportunities for investigating the chances of consolidating and extending the détente, and for discussing certain measures. Both types of contact should be subject to the fullest possible exchange of information and co-ordination within the Alliance.

5. Defence

The Soviet Union and its associates retain a high military potential both in and outside the North Atlantic area. We accept the judgement of the relevant organs of NATO that they do not at present intend to use this potential for aggressive action within the area: and that if the Soviet intention changed we should have evidence of this development. We also believe that the defensive and deterrent capacities of the Alliance are one of the chief inducements to the Soviet and East European governments to adopt a more moderate policy: and that therefore any extension of détente which may prove possible will depend on the maintenance of adequate allied defence. Thus adequate and integrated defence measures by the Alliance remain essential: though technological advances have altered and will doubtless continue to alter the precise meaning of this term. European members are now, and are likely to remain for some time, unable to provide

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adequate defence by themselves.

6. Other Areas

We recognise the major and possibly decisive impact of events outside the North Atlantic area on the stability of that area, and on the relations of the Allies with the Soviet Union and its European associates. Both the military and the ideological threats to stability now seem to be greater outside the North Atlantic area than within it. Closer and more effective consultation between the Allies on these extraneous dangers, through the machinery of the Organisation, seems necessary if the Alliance is to fulfil its task of securing the peace and safety of the Treaty area.

differences about binding areas?

7. Open-endedness

We accept the principle of open-endedness, which permits each Allied Government to participate in the activities and policies of the Alliance in so far as it is willing and able to do so. This principle applies equally to consultation and to implementation of policy. But we should recognise that there must be certain minimum requirements for membership of the Alliance: these include participation in the North Atlantic Council, which is imposed by the Treaty, and contributions proportional to the benefits received.

8. Public Opinion

A mere decision by Allied Governments will not be enough to ensure that public opinion in our democratic societies accepts as a matter of course that NATO will or should continue indefinitely after 1969. Indeed the constructive function of the Alliance in promoting the détente is insufficiently realised by the public. Moreover there is a body of opinion which considers that the Alliance should ultimately be dissolved as the purposes for which it was originally founded become assured: and a related opinion looks forward to the gradual absorption of both the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact into a new combined European security system.

Public opinion will therefore need to be convinced that the tasks of the North Atlantic Alliance are not yet fulfilled and that it ought to continue at least until these objectives have been realised. Our report contains suggestions designed to achieve this purpose.

Baughin please include this paper, with the record of the next meeting of July 12th, and Hoff's Wilson letter, and all other relevant papers of all 10 groups, in a dossier for Bonn. 17/7/67