


*Spoken to Mr Dickinson
He will inform
Mr Cleveland*



UNITED STATES PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
ON THE
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Paris, France

251 V *R*
May 22, 1967

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His Excellency
Manlio Brosio
Secretary General
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Dear Manlio:

As I think you know, I agree with the general drift of the arguments expressed during Friday's meeting of the Special Group on the Study of the Future of the Alliance to the effect that your Interim Report to the Ministers on this item should be essentially procedural in the interest of avoiding premature substantive debate at Luxembourg.

At the same time, I am increasingly impressed with the importance of seeing to it that the Soviets fail in their efforts to promote the idea that NATO expires automatically in 1969.

I am going on the assumption that the Ministers will decide against direct reaction to the Karlovey-Vary communique line. This, at least, would be my own judgment. But indirectly we must, I believe, take every opportunity to make it clear that we, for our part, are paying no attention whatsoever to that insignificant date.

In the course of discussions about the Future of the Alliance, several PermReps have stated explicitly that they are approaching this study on the foregone conclusion that NATO will continue to be necessary and valuable into the next decade. Several of the papers being considered in the SubGroups express similar sentiments.

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And I am not quite reconciled to the idea that the Interim Report should fail somehow to record this sentiment. Perhaps our confidence that the Alliance has a future is implicit enough in the very fact that we are studying seriously a broad spectrum of future activities. But I still wonder whether you might not want to include a paragraph along something like the following lines:

In this whole enterprise, the Special Group and the Rapporteurs take as their basing point their common interest in working together through the years ahead effectively to protect the North Atlantic area, to develop plans and means for achieving the European settlement, to work toward arms control and disarmament, to contribute to world order -- and to consult closely together in adapting changing policies on these subjects to a world of change.

If your judgment is that something like this would raise more problems than it is worth, I shall cheerfully withdraw the suggestion.

Warmest regards.

23/5/67

Sincerely,

Harlan
Harlan Cleveland

by the US delegation

*Les propositions, a
sentiments le reunion
depliation*

Dear Harlan,

*I have already said that
the suggestion you advanced in your letter of May 21st
I think it will certainly be an objective, but it is worth trying. You
may understand it later and it has a lot of objective aspects. But I
feel your basic message was sound and worthy of being tested.
I agree with you that the members will
not wish to drag directly the
we would I regard them to do so, but I feel to understand their history
could avoid considering the general line of broad policy of which that
message is only one of many expressions. The subject may get proper
treatment in the careful and warm way it should and succeed.*

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