

No. 3276

Paris, 31st August 1967

SECRET

Following his request I have the honour to forward to you enclosed Professor Patijn's report which will be the subject of discussion at the next meeting of Sub-Group 4 on the Future of the Alliance on September 14th, 1967.

Professor Patijn has informed me that a supplement concerning development aid will be inserted under paragraph 31 of the report at a later date.

I am sending copies of the report to all Delegations; I also enclose extra copies for the International Secretariat.

(Dr. H. N. Boon)

1 cc. Report Mr. Inceboth
1 cc. Report to
Mr. Tansever (11/9/67)

① Mediterranean Group (Patijn)
② Watson Security (Gen. Sec. European Security)

His Excellency Mr. Manlio Brosio,
Secretary General of NATO,
Paris.

SECRET

C O P Y

NETHERLANDS DELEGATION TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

No. 5276

Paris, 31st August 1967

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His Excellency Mr. Manlio Brosio,
Secretary General of NATO,
PARIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~*Secret*SUB GROUP IV: Developments in regions outside the NATO area.The role of
NATO in World
Affairs.

1. Although the main purpose of the Atlantic Alliance is to ensure the collective defence of its members within the area covered by the Treaty, it is evident that their security and wellbeing can be seriously affected by developments outside that area. Accordingly, in the Report of the Committee of Three of 1956 on Non-military Cooperation in NATO it was stated that the members

"should also be concerned with harmonizing their policies in relation to other areas, taking into account the broader interests of the whole international community ... (para 32)

"In following this course, NATO can show that it is more than a defence organisation ... It can prove its desire to cooperate fully with other members of the international community in bringing to reality the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It can show that it is not merely concerned with preventing the cold war from deteriorating into a shooting one; or with defending itself if such a tragedy should take place, but that it is even more concerned with seizing the political and moral initiative to enable all countries to develop in freedom, and to bring about a secure peace for all nations." (para 33)

2. On 13th December, 1956, the NATO Council approved this recommendation. The intention to harmonize the policies of the members in relation to other areas, and especially the appeal to the Alliance to bring about peace and security for other nations, has not, however, materialized. Public opinion today is even less convinced than it was in 1956 that NATO has an international organisation has a function outside the Treaty area. The harmonisation of policies of the NATO members in their relations to other areas has proved indeed to be a stubborn assignment. The Alliance was not designed to meet threats to peace coming from outside Europe; most of its members, moreover, are not prepared to accept any

additional commitments beyond the domain of the North Atlantic Treaty. Nevertheless, the threats to the security of the North Atlantic nations now seem to be greater outside the area than within it. The problem of communist expansion has shifted from Europe to other parts of the world while political instability is on the increase everywhere.

3. The member States are all the more reluctant to face developments outside the NATO area since the commitments of individual Allied Governments in those parts of the world and discordant situations around the globe (de-colonisation, Suez 1956, Vietnam, etc.) have often been a source of friction and irritation between them. Lack of unity in approaching such questions is one of the main reasons for the present weakness of NATO. A common policy for problems falling outside the competence of the Atlantic Alliance was never anticipated, but coordination of national policies of the members, in the interest of the cohesion of the Alliance, was one of the assumptions upon which NATO was built. The present conspicuous lack of harmony in the foreign policy of NATO members in international crises outside the NATO area reflects an ingrained disbelief in the possibility of Western collective diplomacy in the world arena. In this respect, the hopes of 1956 have not been fulfilled.
4. In the absence of effective international institutions for the maintenance of a decent world order, individual members of NATO have repeatedly been forced to take military action in international situations in the interest of peace and stability. The great differences of degree of international responsibility between the members has not facilitated NATO consultation and mutual understanding with regard to such interventions. This disagreement has lately taken the form of a public discussion between individual spokesmen in the United States and Europe

with regard to their respective roles in the preservation of peace and order throughout the world. This debate between the United States and its Allies - although largely unofficial - is significant for the present interpretation of the function of the Alliance with regard to events outside the NATO area.

5. From the American side the desire has been expressed to see their NATO allies take a greater share in the maintenance of international order, while many Europeans and Canadians show considerable hesitation to play a larger political role in world affairs. American spokesmen assume that there are real common interests outside the Atlantic area and the refusal, especially of some European NATO partners, to share the responsibility and the costs is sometimes interpreted in the United States as a reprehensible lack of solidarity. At the same time, in Europe large sectors of public opinion are apprehensive of being drawn into American wars outside the Atlantic area, while European understanding of the implications of "containment" or "wars of national liberation" in those regions is often different from that of the United States.
6. In this controversy a few points require additional clarification. While the Americans are anxious to re-engage the interest of Europe in the problems of world security, they have never clearly indicated in what form and to what extent their NATO Allies could participate in the political control and administration of a power which is largely in American hands. At the same time, many Europeans protest their reluctance to accept such political cooperation on the world level as long as they do not enjoy full equality in the sharing of decisions; but there is reasonable doubt as to their real desire to face new responsibilities outside the NATO area. On the contrary - as in the case of the British - they are busily disengaging themselves from the last remnants of colonial positions. The most fundamental problem is, however, that most

Europeans when asked about their world role must confess that they have no common view and even more no clear conception of a role for Europe outside the Atlantic area.

7. The interest of European nations in these problems has not disappeared (the Scandinavian countries and also Canada are more willing than before to accept United Nations tasks while several European countries are making impressive efforts in the new endeavour of development aid), but the loss by the former colonial powers of their imperial position and the traumatic experience of de-colonization have greatly reduced European means and the will to assume global responsibilities. European contacts with regions outside the Atlantic area are still maintained largely through the old and tried channels of communication. European commitments exist in different forms; surviving colonial responsibilities, institutional links through the British Commonwealth, aid to former colonial territories, a sense of responsibility for new nations sometimes in the form of treaty obligations, etc. The economic and cultural opportunities which the old relations with former colonial territories offer are welcomed in Europe and of great value for the newly independent States. But those contacts are historical in origin and mainly national in significance. They do not fully counter-balance the lack of an up-to-date conception of Europe's role in world affairs in terms of the future and the interests of world order.
8. Nothing short of a foreign policy conceived in global terms and planned over a long period will safeguard the stability of the Atlantic nations. For the Alliance the relevance of events outside the Atlantic area is a new experience. Since it is possible to

think in terms of "détente" in Europe, the importance of the prevention of conflicts elsewhere has increased. For "détente" is indivisible and for further steps towards a European settlement we will need global negotiations with the Soviet Union. Events outside NATO in which the Soviet Union and the United States are involved can therefore deeply affect the relationships within the Alliance and the security of Europe. In the Third World - in contrast with Europe - communist expansion has not yet come to an end. Many conflicts of a local character elsewhere have an inbuilt tendency to escalate or to bring about a confrontation of the two great powers. The real issue today is the maintenance of world stability, for which the American presence is required in Europe, and European influence will be needed in the regions outside the NATO area. War can erupt and spread both in Europe and elsewhere. A European refusal to admit such a possibility, or to accept corresponding responsibility, could be as disastrous as the American indifference to the maintenance of the European balance of power after the First World War.

9. While the NATO Alliance is the suitable framework for the preservation of the security of its members in the Atlantic area, it is less obvious that NATO would be the right instrument for cooperation outside the area. The objections against utilising NATO processes for extra-curricular purposes are well-known. It is not possible to make NATO omni-competent since the non-aligned nations refuse to be involved in the cold war. Nor is it advisable for NATO to intervene in conflict situations elsewhere in substitution for an ineffective United Nations organisation; indeed, NATO action might well provoke Soviet intervention and accordingly spread the danger. The legal objections against the extension of NATO responsibilities outside the NATO area are well founded. The Treaty contains no provisions for operational activities of the Alliance in other regions.

10. Members of an Alliance, however, who together produce more than one half of the world's total wealth, who share an even larger part of the world's reservoir of technical skill and facilities, who control the terms of trade and credit in most parts of the world, and who have made it a habit to deliver armaments to many new countries without going deeply into the local consequences, cannot pretend to be indifferent to events outside their own defence perimeter. If they desire to contribute to the peace of the Third World - as it would be in their own interest to do - they must seek to coordinate their policies in order to create an impact of Western standards of law and order upon a world in which situations of peril and injustice will be endemic.
11. It is probably an illusion for members of NATO to hope to obtain a certificate of "United Nations' virginity" by refraining from taking sides in conflicts elsewhere. Although the members of NATO proclaimed a policy of strict non-intervention in the latest Middle Eastern crisis they could neither prevent the outbreak of the conflict itself nor escape the charge of imperialism. The fear of committing NATO, or even of formulating any NATO position with regard to the Israel-Arab conflict, did not prevent commitment from the Soviet side. Nor did European impartiality safeguard any European interests. The main result has been, as Raymond Aron stated in the Figaro of 28th June, 1967, a demonstration of the political absence of Europe: "Au Moyen Orient il y a, d'une part, les acteurs locaux - Israel et les pays Arabes - d'autre part les deux Grands... L'Europe des Six s'occupait de betteraves pendant ces jours historiques".
12. The question must be faced whether the Western world can afford much longer the luxury of uncoordinated national

approaches to problems of this kind. Many of the issues which confront us in regions outside the Atlantic area are of global dimensions and require multinational remedies. A refusal to harmonise policies will in the end alienate the Allies one from another. In that case, the European partners should not be surprised if they are faced with a revival of American isolationism. Among the smaller nations, moreover, such a lack of unity of purpose will provoke a rapid spread of neutralism. It seems justified, therefore, to ask the more reluctant members of NATO to reconsider their objections against fresh efforts to extend coordination of policy, contingency planning and common diplomatic action in the NATO context to developments in regions outside the NATO area.

13. NATO's task beyond the Treaty area is not to operate outside it, but to devise common policies for its members. The new relevance of events outside the NATO area requires Western European and North American cooperation in those parts of the world; the structure of the Alliance and our sovereign equality oblige us, however, to follow a process of mutual persuasion before common policies can be adopted. In political affairs the Alliance has no supra-national pretensions. Nor can it serve as an instrument for hegemonic leadership by the United States. We cannot ignore the renewed awareness of their national identity amongst European nations, nor can we anticipate at this juncture a European political federation to serve as the European pillar in an Atlantic partnership. A new effort in political consultation must be based on contemporary realities; improvements in the mechanics of consultation can only be grafted upon the unsatisfactory political structure of the present world.
14. For simultaneous and parallel action on both sides of the Atlantic strong and clear indications of common interests are required, demanding a common approach and served through common means. The function of NATO in this field is to serve

as a clearing house for mutual information, and as a braintrust for the identification and formulation of the common interest. If the interests of members of the Alliance are not identical - as they sometimes will not be - a distinction can be made in responsibility. Between the poles of a complete common policy for the Alliance (which cannot be expected outside the Treaty area) and no common policy at all (unavoidable consequence of an Alliance in which it would be forbidden to give advice concerning matters outside the Treaty area) there lies a wide field for study and contingency planning for those members who are prepared to coordinate their efforts, who possess the capability to raise the means and are prepared to apply them.

- Categories of 15. Events outside the NATO area which could affect the security or the cohesion of the Alliance and for which coordination of the policies of the members is required, can be distinguished into different categories:
- problems which could affect the interests of the Alliance.
- I. Political events directly affecting the security of the Atlantic area;
 - II. Political events not directly affecting the security of the Atlantic area, but in which NATO members are involved;
 - III. International problems of a universal character in which the Western world has to take a clear stand.
16. I. Political events directly affecting the security of the Atlantic area.

Problems which will always be of major importance for the Alliance are the following:

- a) Developments on the borders of the NATO defence perimeter which could directly affect the security of the area; or conflicts elsewhere which could escalate and provoke a confrontation of the great powers.
- b) Nuclear developments which could affect the world nuclear equilibrium.
- c) The relations with China.

17. It is not possible to review in any detail the crises which can arise in the Third World and which the NATO Council eventually will have to face. The period of de-colonisation in Asia and Africa is coming to an end, and in many of the new nations the struggle for independence and the unifying impulse of militant nationalism has been followed by a crisis of consolidation. The new states - and the same applies to large sectors of Latin America - are faced with terrific problems of external vulnerability, domestic instability, and human poverty. The United Nations Charter provides them with the legal guarantee of their independence and the basis for a policy of non-alignment, but in many cases their weakness and lack of cohesion engender conflict and the need for support from outside. It will be unavoidable for members of NATO - especially for the United States in its world role and its system of alliances - to intervene from time to time in attempts to consolidate the status quo. It will be equally unavoidable that there will be interference from the side of communist powers, aware of a fertile field of expansion. The instability of the new configuration of power in the world is a potential source of local conflict, regional escalation and confrontation of the great powers.
18. The Alliance will need adequate diplomatic responses especially to dangerous developments in regions on the border of the NATO defence perimeter. In emergencies it will be necessary to make distinctions between categories of danger. The Council should know what developments would not be acceptable in view of the security of the members. The persistent Soviet penetration in a number of countries in the Middle East and North Africa requires close attention. The NATO Council will need

a study in depth to decide what forms and what level of Soviet influence would seem unavoidable and acceptable in those parts of the world, and what forms of Soviet influence (e.g. arms deliveries, military bases, etc.) would create problems of security for the Alliance. If the Soviet Union is prepared to use its position in cooperation with other great powers to stabilize a situation of local conflict or dangerous fluidity, Soviet influence could be beneficial. If on the contrary the purpose is to weaken NATO, to stir up difficulties for the Western world and to continue the cold war outside Europe, the situation requires an active policy of containment and close cooperation at the Western side. The same applies to local conflicts elsewhere of such importance that they could threaten the peace in a wider area and involve the great powers. In such cases the Council will have to decide what level of turbulence can be tolerated and what should be done to localize the danger, together with the Soviet Union if possible, in opposition to the Soviet Union (mutatis mutandis: China) if necessary.

19. Remedial action in dangerous situations outside the NATO area will have to be taken in an environment and under a responsibility different from those of the NATO Council. In most cases the framework for diplomatic action in conflicts of this kind will be the United Nations. For the members of NATO it is essential that, whatever the international forum, a just and fitting response be given to the challenge of the danger, in the context of the relevant legal framework and the actual constellation of power. The main NATO interest and the purpose of all diplomatic activity will be that the dangerous fires outside the NATO area be quenched, and threats to the peace dealt

with on their own merits, in order to prevent their spread and escalation. This implies that it would be a mistake for NATO members to approach situations of this kind from the angle of their national interests only, and even more to take advantage of the situation by damaging the interests of Allies.

20. It may be unavoidable for NATO members to take individual action, in the United Nations, in the countries concerned, or elsewhere. Where common action is not possible the NATO approach should always be (to use a slightly too dramatic military metaphor) "getrennt zu marschieren aber vereint zu schlagen" (to proceed separately, but to strike together) The NATO interest requires that the freedom of the members in such matters will be a freedom according to plan, subordinate to the concern for the right response to the problem itself. No such harmonized freedom will be possible without careful preparation, both in the analysis of the situation and the presentation of policy implications for the members.
21. When it comes to political action the responsibilities for the members of NATO will differ widely. In situations outside the NATO area one or more of the great powers - permanent members of the Security Council and heavily committed elsewhere - will in most cases be directly involved. Other NATO members (e.g. Scandinavian countries and Canada) have repeatedly accepted special responsibilities for participation in peacekeeping activities of the United Nations, and can in this way effectively contribute to the settlement of conflict. There are advantages in this pluriformity of international conduct on one condition: that the members of NATO will be guided by the same views on the merits of the case and its solution. For this purpose NATO will need a policy and constant consultation, both in the NATO Council and in those international

institutions where the members are confronted with the debate and the policy formulation for conflicts of this kind. It is for the NATO Council to present the members with the advise for the right approach to the conflict. Their representatives in other international bodies will have the task to transpose the NATO-view in e.g. United Nations' policy in order to be able to respond adequately to the challenge of the occasion and environment. Danger can arise if the NATO Council does not give guidance and the Permanent Representatives of the NATO countries in New York are reluctant to consult effectively.

22. Problems in regions outside the NATO area requiring a long-term political strategy, policy planning and a system of crisis-management from the side of the members of the Alliance will be the following:
- a) The evaluation of communist expansion in specific regions. The kind and the level of Soviet influence which would create dangers for peace, the stability of the area concerned, or the interests of NATO members. The policies to be adopted in order to neutralize the disruptive effects of Soviet pressure or communist subversive activity.
 - b) The necessity of a regional equilibrium of power in Asia and in the Middle East. The question where new lines of power and influence should be drawn in Asia, and the ways and means to assist in creating the necessary stability. The consequences of a British withdrawal from commitments East of Suez. The problem of military guarantees for non-aligned nations.
 - c) The need of an international control of arms deliveries in order to prevent local or regional disturbances of the peace.

- d) The evaluation of local or regional political controversies and their significance for the future of the area concerned. (e.g. the conflicts within the Arab world, in Nigeria, and elsewhere).
- e) The meaning of "wars of national liberation" in Asia and Africa and the question whether local conflicts of this kind should be ignored, or would justify international interference.
- f) The evaluation of revolutionary developments in Latin America. The problem where to draw the line between creative social processes and disruptive subversive activities.
- g) The problem of peace keeping activities of the United Nations and other international organisations, their function, possibilities and limitations. The support to be given to such activities by members of the Alliance.
- h) Vital economic interests of the Western world in parts of Asia and Africa and how to safeguard them (e.g. oil, the Suez Canal, etc.).

23. Nuclear developments outside the NATO area which could affect the world's nuclear equilibrium will always be among the most important points of deliberation in the NATO Council. In the context of this section of the Report the political aspects of the spread or the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons must be mentioned. A world policy of non-proliferation will meet resistance, also of Asia, in countries desiring to develop a nuclear capacity in the military field. It may be that the Alliance will have to choose between general considerations of world nuclear control, and the more specific political question whether it would be in the interest of world stability to prevent countries like Japan and India from developing nuclear striking forces. If the general consideration prevails, the question what nuclear guarantee can be given to such countries is not only a technical matter, but a political one of great

consequence. The nuclear situation puts a constant pressure upon the political structures of the future. What these structures should be is a problem of an order which requires not only technical or strategic answers, but political study in depth. This kind of long-term political thinking is not necessarily a task for the NATO staff only, but sooner or later the NATO Council should be presented with the result of studies enabling it to understand fully the political implications of the matter under consideration.

24. Finally, one of the major problems of the next few years will be how to relate China to the rest of the world. This is not merely a matter of China's representation in the United Nations, but also of a "présence Chinoise" in other international frameworks of cooperation to which the Chinese nation is entitled on the strength of its size and importance. Chinese participation will be unavoidable for world control of nuclear power and limitation of armaments. Nor will it be possible to make final political and territorial arrangements in East Asia without the signature of the Chinese Government. The attempts of NATO members in the past few years to use their diplomatic relations with Peking in the interest of world peace, or even for their own national interests, have not been too successful. This is not a matter for one or more nations, not even for the NATO Council, but clearly a problem in which members of the Alliance should consult with other Asian states and the Soviet Union. The world interest, to see China participate through normal channels of communication and in normal diplomatic fashion in every major international activity, is also the NATO interest. The members of the Alliance will need from the side of the NATO Council the best possible information and interpretation of Chinese events and motives. In view of the importance of the subject a common NATO approach would be advisable in every major policy decision with regard to China, and in emergencies on the Chinese border.

25. 11 Political events not directly affecting the security of the Atlantic area, but in which NATO members are involved.

For events of a local character and minor significance, and for special obligations or interests of individual members of the Alliance, a harmonization and coordination of the policies of the members is not required. No one expects a clearly defined NATO position with regard to United States' commitments in Latin America and East Asia, British positions east of Suez, or Portuguese colonial obligations, as long as those commitments do not give rise to major trouble or threats to the peace. The interests of the members are not identical everywhere and it must be possible to agree to a permissible range of divergence and freedom of action for problems in this category. It cannot be denied, however, that such commitments of individual members can have a disruptive effect on the cohesion of the Alliance. The reserved domains of international action have often been a source of trouble both for the Alliance and the individual member.

26. The members have full freedom of decision with regard to their commitment outside the NATO area; prior consultation in the NATO Council is not obligatory, nor can it in all circumstances be expected. A world power cannot consult at every turn its numerous allies. There may come moments in which e.g. the United States has to act alone quickly and vigorously in order to face a confrontation of strategic power. The Cuban missile crisis was such a moment and none of the NATO allies expected at that time prior consultation or common contingency planning. Nevertheless, if this unavoidable freedom is not used with the utmost

care and consideration - and this applies to all members - the consequences for the Alliance could be serious. A complete freedom of action for the individual members would undermine the belief in the Alliance. World order is a common responsibility, and no member can expect policies to be shared which have not first been made object of discussion. The cost of non-consultation must be measured before any unilateral action is taken, since the harm in international confidence can be serious. Prior consultation, therefore, should be the rule, at least with those allies which are able and willing to participate in consultation. The Council, or special groups appointed by the Council, must have the right to be informed, to encourage and to warn.

27. Colonial obligations of members of the Alliance have been a source of difficulty from the beginning. Today only Portugal is still deeply involved in a process of decolonization, and it will not be easy for the NATO Council to adopt a common policy with regard to this problem. The Portuguese delegation takes the view that the Alliance should accept the following line of conduct:

"The vital interests of any one of the members of the Alliance should never be unnecessarily undermined or, a fortiori, openly attacked by other members for reasons which are not in the same degree vital to those other members; an ally should be recognised in right to pursue, in a field which does not affect vital interests of others, a special policy dictated by interests vital to that ally; such a policy, particularly when it serves useful purposes in terms of the social and economic welfare of the less developed peoples affected by it, should receive from the other allies at least as much public tolerance as is shown, for the purposes of détente, towards communist regimes and Soviet domination in eastern Europe."

While the Portuguese desire commands full respect and should be followed as far as possible, it is not to be expected that the other members of the Alliance will always be able to give support to the Portuguese point of view in debates of the United Nations and other international organisations.

28. III International problems of a universal character in which the Western world has to take a clear stand.

In the Third World we are faced with the challenge of a few problems of a general character and global significance. It may well be that the future prestige of the Western world is less dependant upon its power and wealth than upon its response to problems of human rights, racial relations and economic development. In our contacts with the peoples of Asia and Africa a new paradox is building up: a sharp resentment from the side of the Third World against any interference in its affairs, and at the same time the desire that the Western powers shall proclaim and enforce respect for human rights, racial ~~non~~-discrimination, freedom and economic development throughout the world. In view of the national over-sensitivity of the new nations the Western powers have in many instances followed a scrupulous policy of non-intervention. There is a wide-spread impression, however, that they will be prepared to set aside their objections to intervention as soon as communist influence raises its head. The diplomacy of the Western world must try to avoid the trap of appearing to be more interested in checking the progress of communism than in helping to establish conditions of human dignity. In their relations with the Third World the NATO members should clearly strive for more than anti-communism; they need a political strategy which will command respect and sympathy. Here again study in depth, consultation and co-ordination of policy are required, especially in two fields: racial relations and economic development.

29. In the next few years it will be of the utmost importance what will be the attitude of the Western nations with respect to tensions and conflicts emanating from racial discrimination, especially in Rhodesia and South Africa. Although Europe and the United States cannot be blamed for policies and events in those countries, there is in the eyes of the coloured peoples no escape from the collective responsibility of the white race. In the highly explosive atmosphere of the southern parts of Africa we are expected to throw our political weight into the scale of the human interests of the coloured population. It would certainly be welcomed in the Western world, if racial discrimination could be gradually eliminated in those countries, in an orderly way. Since the present situation is dangerous, it is necessary for the Alliance to have a policy to prevent racial violence and to be able to act if a crisis occurs.
30. Protest and condemnation, the easy indignation of United Nations' meetings, is both irrelevant and infradignitatem for those who hold world power. Can NATO develop a foreign policy for its members which could influence the course of events? Only if we should be able to engage the interest and co-operation of the white population of the countries concerned. Accordingly the question should be studied, whether it would be possible for the Western Alliance to give a guarantee of non-intervention to the countries concerned, on one condition: that they gradually change their racial legislation, and establish in due time conditions of legal and social equality for the whole of the population.

31. (At this place the rapporteur hopes to insert a brief section on development aid, after due consultation with the NATO Directorate of Economic Affairs and the OECD).

Proposals
for impro-
ving poli-
tical con-
sultation.

32. In view of the changes in the international situation since 1949 (especially the fact that the main threats to the security of the North Atlantic nations have shifted from Europe to other parts of the world) we need a better alliance system for contingency planning to control crisis situations outside the Atlantic area. This purpose can be attained on two conditions: our Governments must demonstrate the political will to make NATO the active centre for the co-ordination of the policies of the Western world, and the NATO machinery must be adapted to the new tasks. The fundamental point, of course, is the strength of the resolution of the members to make use of the Alliance as an instrument for the co-ordination of their policy. If they believe to have better means for the tasks described in this Report, NATO has no function. Since this is probably not the case it seems not to be entirely superfluous to suggest a few adaptations in the processes of consultation.
33. NATO is in need of a greater variety of forms of consultation in order to mobilize the potential for study in depth and to present the Council with proposals for coordinated action. This would require gradations in the consultation process, both with regard to the participants and the issues singled out for study. The best procedure for questions outside the NATO area would be discussion in groups performing a narrow function, restricted to closely defined subjects. Not all members are equally interested in the study of specific areas or

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specific issues outside the NATO area. Special responsibility rests on those members who are directly involved or have a special experience of the problem or the regions concerned. A different degree of response can be expected from members with world responsibility and those without it; from those who are ready and capable to engage in contingency planning for action and those who do not want to be involved through their NATO membership in matters which are not of direct concern to NATO. There should be no objection to the use of the organization for this purpose. While there are clearly no military obligations for members outside the NATO defence perimeter, the Treaty nowhere implies that there are subjects which fall outside the consultation processes of the Alliance.

34. Present NATO procedures for developing adequate policies are not satisfactory. NATO has at its disposal a wealth of information and political analyses from expert working groups, the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group and other bodies with regard to specific international problems. What seems to be lacking is a more deliberate effort to present the Council with policy implications for the members of the Alliance. This hesitation is not the fault of the NATO Secretariat. The Council's dislike to draw conclusions for action results in atrophying the intermediate processes in the NATO machinery to work out policy proposals. The implied wish to avoid embarrassment and dissension prevents the development of a political strategy in terms of the challenges which confront the Western world outside the NATO area. For the future of the Alliance it is essential to make the tasks, that is the things that should be done in the interest of peace and stability, the starting point of all deliberations, followed by attempts to cooperate by as many members in as many issues as will be possible.

35. The NATO Council should, therefore, create a number of restricted groups working on specific regions or subjects outside the Atlantic area. The groups should be limited to member countries possessing special knowledge of the subject, or acknowledging a genuine stake in and concern with it. Their main task would be contingency planning for the prevention of conflict: the study of situations before they present acute danger, and advice about the political measures to be applied in order to prevent a deterioration of the situation. Such groups should meet without publicity or press releases, with a minimum of paper work, and should be served by a small secretariat. Their main task would be to produce adequate proposals for remedial action, to be reported to the Council or committees of the Council constituted on the principle of open-endedness (accessible to all members). The main purpose of this proposal is to facilitate collective brain work in bringing together the countries which are able and willing to produce proposals for policy and eventually to apply them, without excluding any member from taking cognizance of them in the normal NATO frame-work where all members have full liberty to accept or reject them.
36. The NATO Council should consider also how to make better use of the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group (APAG), which has the task to provide the Council with studies on long-term policy problems and suggestions for future action. The task of all policy planning is to turn latent common interests into active common policy, and accordingly APAG was meant to be composed of the chiefs of the planning staffs of the foreign offices of the member countries. Meetings of APAG have proved to be very useful for informal consultation and mutual information; it has all the characteristics of a potential planning machinery. The difficulty, however, for bodies of this kind is the practical impossibility for the most responsible policy making

people to attend many committee meetings. The object of APAG will be defeated if the meetings have to take place without the presence, the authority and the freedom of intellectual initiative of the real policy makers. If they have to be replaced by alternates without such powers and necessarily limited in their effectiveness by instructions, the process of consultation will produce information and understanding, but no policy. The same applies to the regular meetings of the Committee of Political Advisors (POLADS), staff members of the Permanent Representatives, overburdened with work and constantly at the receiving end of the cables from fifteen sovereign governments. No policy can easily spring from consultations under such frustrating conditions. For the initiation of new policies the level of the policy makers must be very high.

37. One more requirement for long-term policy planning should be considered. The intermediate machinery for policy planning should contain a centre of initiative for highly qualified independent study, advice and policy suggestion, without instruction or interference of governments. NATO cannot change its intergovernmental character: it is not possible to think in terms of the powers of initiative and stimulation of the European Commission of the EEC. Therefore the two conditions for effective policy planning cannot easily be met.
38. Ideal solutions do not exist in our loosely knitted Alliance, but if an indispensable function cannot be suitably fulfilled for legal or structural reasons, attempts should be made to remedy the weakness in the NATO structure by other means. A purely pragmatic use of outside advice could have a stimulating effect. Independent advisors or working parties of experienced politicians and scholars could from time to time be invited to present the NATO Council with confidential

proposals for policy and diplomatic action. They should have full liberty of advice and the Council should be entirely free to make use of recommendations of this kind, or not. A similar task of study and advice could be entrusted to one or more international institutes. It may well be in the interest of NATO to mobilize the knowledge and the resources of outsiders in order to revitalize the consultation processes of our governments.