


J. M. Chapman
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Return to ASS (O A) 

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12th June, 1967

I enclose a paper summarising our visit and, at annexe A, a "check-list" or syllabus of the proposals as noted by me. The list is not, I fear, exhaustive, but it may help to supplement your memory. A second annexe B, contains summary reports of the meetings at which I was present. With the exception of the record of meetings, I have omitted your introductory statements and your comments on the proposals advanced, partly in order to avoid delay and partly because I judged you would not require me to do so.

I have asked for a search to be made for the article of Altiero Spinelli, mentioned by Dr. Owen, and also for a text giving Lord Gladwyn's proposal regarding the creation within the Western policy of a group of sages independent of governments. When found, I will send you these texts.

This letter enables me to thank you most sincerely for your constant kindness and indulgence. It was a most interesting experience, the value of which will certainly increase with time. I trust that it served your purpose as Rapporteur.


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JV/cc

SUB-GROUP 4

Visit by the Rapporteur to Washington D.C.,
Ottawa and New York, 4th-10th June, 1967

The intention of the Rapporteur in undertaking the mission was to investigate at first hand assumptions currently held by policy-makers in the United States and Canada with regard to the tasks of the Alliance and inter-allied cooperation in regions outside the area guaranteed by the Treaty of Washington. Although the visit coincided with the Arab-Israeli war, practically all the appointments fixed for the Rapporteur were maintained. Indeed, the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East drew vivid attention to the inadequacies of present consultative practices within NATO and thereby conferred an urgent sense of purpose upon the area of study assigned by the Special Group to Sub-Group 4.

2. A process of accumulating decision has led the USA to incur increasing responsibilities in Vietnam. The USA is deeply aware that in this respect it has failed to obtain the consensus of its NATO allies, with the result that United States policy-makers are disposed to give earnest thought to ways and means of redressing this situation for the immediate future. Since European unity (on terms generally acceptable to the West) will be unlikely to come about as long as General de Gaulle is in power, alternative workable solutions must, in the United States view, be found to fill the policy-making void between the two sides of the Atlantic caused by the unreal

nature, at this juncture, of President Kennedy's dual pillar theory.

3. In Washington, various proposals were made. One was to establish a standing commission of "wise men", independent of Governments but entitled to propose policy measures on a world-wide scale; a second was to form contingents of armed forces from medium and smaller NATO members to be offered to the United Nations for service in times of crisis; a third was to constitute within NATO groups of countries willing to study given regions about which they had experience and with which they felt a sense of involvement. In short, the Americans, whilst eschewing any intention to extend NATO's commitments outside the Treaty area, desire to infuse into the Alliance procedures for dealing with crisis management. Awareness of the French position, as well as of the differing degree of response which may be expected on the part of several other countries, are inducing Washington to envisage the emergence of a pattern of different groups within NATO, each studying in depth a critical area (e.g. Africa) or problem (e.g. shipping). Somewhat similar ideas, it may be recalled, were proposed several years back by Mr. Spaak. Designed to make NATO the central policy-making organ of the West, these conceptions did not, at the time, meet with favour in Washington.

4. In the mind of the United States policy-making machine NATO, it would appear, has a considerable unused potential for study in depth leading to harmonisation of policies both with regard to the evolution of West-West relations, and in

connexion with proposing solutions to problems in other parts of the world. The conviction was clearly expressed that in order to realise its assets, NATO must reach beyond the protecting framework of government and civil servants. In the words of Mr. Rostow, the Alliance must break out of "the club of Permanent Representatives".

5. That impression that NATO will fail to obtain from Governments the new ideas it requires was expressed also in Ottawa. But this seemed to be the only common ground between the conceptions of NATO's role outside the Treaty area as outlined in the two North American capitals. In the view of Ottawa, NATO's concern should be directed above all to the protection of the NATO area, and in consequence to the development of East-West relations, or in other words at this juncture to promoting détente in Europe with the Soviet bloc. Preoccupation with concerting (or even studying) policy towards regions outside the Treaty area was likely, in the view of Canadian officials, directly to exacerbate divisions among the Allies and in consequence to constitute a real threat to its maintenance as an essential factor in the balance of power. The Canadian attitude seemed to be compounded of: desire to maintain its identity vis-à-vis the United States; anxiety not to jeopardize Canada's role at the United Nations, in particular in connexion with peace-keeping operations; and the delicate situation with regard to France implicit in Canada's internal situation. This may amount to a retreat from the advanced position once

taken by Canada with regard to consultation in NATO with a view to reaching a harmonisation of Allied policies (vd. the 1956 Report of the Committee of Three).

6. While Canada's position was Hamlet-like, Washington was in a mood to invite Europe to propose initiatives to improve world-wide consultative machinery within NATO, with particular reference to crisis-management. Mr. Rostow and others stated that they were relying on the Special Group's report to make concrete proposals in this sense. In Ottawa, on the other hand, the hope was expressed that by clarifying the limits of NATO consultation the Report would dissolve expectations beyond the reach of attainment by the Atlantic Alliance.

CHECK-LIST OF PROPOSALS

I. A permanent Commission to consist of three or four very eminent people, to be appointed by the North Atlantic Council, but responsible neither to it nor to Governments. The purpose of the Commission would be to supply the Alliance with the centre of initiative which, under its present constitution, it lacks.

- The Commission's recommendations will not be binding on Governments but the standing and the reputation of its component members would be such that their views would compel attention.

- The Commission, which should be assisted by a small staff, would be responsible to the Alliance as a whole. Commissioners, or "wise men", should be neither Civil Servant nor governmental experts. They should be free to cover all fields of consultation and be allowed direct access to Governments. They would be entitled to create ad hoc experts groups as they saw fit.

- The proposed role of the Commission might be closer to the League of Nations Mandates' Commission than to the EAC Commission in Brussels.

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(Henry OWEN)

- In connexion with this proposal, Ambassador Vinci expressed the hope that the "wise men" would be young. In his view, the Alliance labours under the burden of old patterns which are totally inadequate to meet contemporary circumstances.

II. Until such time as the United Nations will be able to function properly the United States will require the support of a concert of allied states. European unification is unlikely to come about for a decade or two. It would be rash to assume that the United States will be able or willing to act again alone, as it is doing in Vietnam. In the absence of a European authority, some intermediate solution with regard to United States-Allied consultation is urgent. The proposal was made therefore to establish several groups of NATO member countries, prepared to study with the United States problems concerning specific regions outside the North Atlantic area, and perhaps eventually to contemplate concerted action should the circumstances require it. These groups would meet without publicity or press releases and with a minimum of paper work. Each group would be limited to member countries possessing special knowledge of the region concerned, or acknowledging a genuine stake in and concern with it. In other words, the members of each group would be inspired by sense of common involvement in the destiny of the area of study. The groups would be political in character and served by a small secretariat. Some of their meetings should be held in North America.

- Analogous institutions, it was suggested, were the war-time United Kingdom-United States Combined Boards; the various aid consortia established within the orbit of the OECD, and in which participating countries have both a voice and an obligation to contribute; and Working Group Three of the OECD (This deals with monetary problems, and is parallel to the Group of Ten. It comes under the Economic Policy Committee of the OECD).

(Eugene ROSTOW)

III. In order to redress the lack of balance within the Alliance between the North America and the European members and, in the absence of a single European authority to provide the United States with a partner in the dialogue, the formation of a caucus of European members states within NATO was suggested.

(ROSTOW and OWEN)

IV. To Canada neither a permanent commission, nor small groups of countries, nor a European caucus would be readily acceptable. Ottawa thought that a feasible possible alternative would be the establishment by governments of a high-level Institute, financed through the NATO countries but not responsible to it, but towards which Governments would acknowledge a commitment and to whose recommendations they would pay attention. The Institute would receive information from Governments but would not act on their instructions.

- Ottawa agreed with the point of view that a policy ideas could not emerge from the present machinery of the Alliance and thought that in consequence an Institute of this kind could fulfil a useful function.

(DOBEL)

V. Standing peace-keeping contingents to be provided by medium or smaller member countries, e.g. Norway, Denmark, Canada and the Netherlands, with logistic support from the United States and the United Kingdom. Such contingents to be offered to the United Nations for peace-keeping missions.

(Robert BOWEN)

VI. Ottawa, on the contrary, believed that peace-keeping can best be obtained by cooperating with countries outside NATO, e.g. Sweden, Austria, Yugoslavia. In the Canadian view a distinction must be made between the general interests of the West and those of NATO. To attempt to develop common policies applicable to regions without the Treaty area might impose an intolerable strain upon the Alliance.

- Ambassador Vinci, on the other hand, did not turn down the idea of creating regional contingents to cooperate with the United Nations as the case arose.

VII. Current United States practice is wedded to the use of policy planning staffs. European Governments have found themselves compelled to set up similar planning groups in their Foreign Ministries. It might therefore be advisable for NATO's European members to establish an inter-governmental policy formulating body within NATO which, by engaging in a dialogue with the United States, would achieve some degree of common contingency planning both with regard to East-West relations and to critical situations outside the NATO area.

(Ambassador von Brent)

VIII. NATO studies connected with regions outside the Treaty area must keep the United Nations in mind and be framed, as far as possible, in terms which could be of use to the Delegations of NATO countries at the United Nations. In

this connexion, it was thought that such groups in NATO should contain at least one member able to consider the likely reactions of the United Nations.

(Ambassador de BEUS and Sir Leslie Glass)

IX. NATO as "Protector of the Free World", in conjunction with such other countries as Japan and Australia, was mentioned en passant by Mr. Rostow. It failed to enlist the support of anyone else in Washington, Ottawa or New York. For Ambassador Vinci it was a prime example of the sort of out-worn idea which was ventilated in time of crisis.

X. The Special Group studying the future of NATO should recommend the convocation by OECD of a new economic and financial conference to consider making recommendations with particular reference to 1) monetary reform and 2) improvement of the present unsatisfactory position of development countries. NATO was empowered to make such a proposal under Article 2: moreover, in considering peace it was impossible to ignore the bearing upon NATO's security of economic factors outside the Treaty area.

(John LEBBY and Eugene ROSTOW)

XI. The Canadian viewpoint was different. Ottawa attached importance to Article 4 of the NATO Atlantic Treaty and believed that NATO from time to time should take a look at economic problems in order to see whether there were any aspects which deserved particular consideration by NATO.

This did not mean, however, that particular measures of economic cooperation should ever be publicly proposed, let alone carried out by NATO itself. In consequence, Canada would be reticent and even opposed to a call by NATO for action in the economic or financial field tantamount to the convocation of a new Bretton Woods.

(David Kirkwood)

XII. In connexion with consultation at the United Nations, reference was made at the Ambassadors' luncheon on 9th June to the poor results obtained from the attempt to bring the Western powers together for the purposes of consultation and coordination of action. Despite the fact that the Soviet bloc, the Arab and African countries, as well as other groups, all meet in this way the experience of attempting to organize the Western countries has met with little success. The United Nations Permanent Representatives of Italy and the Netherlands, as well as the Observer of the Federal Republic of Germany, were in favour of any workable device which would increase Western consultation both in NATO and at the United Nations.

The Canadian view, as expressed by Mr. Barton at Ottawa, reflected the contrary tendency. Institutional consultation arrangements were, he said, unpopular with Western nations at the United Nations. The Western groups included "neutral" European countries and there was lively opposition among them to formal Western consultation at New York. This view, he said, was strongly shared by Canada and, of course, by France. In the Canadian judgement, there would be no gain for the Alliance in attempting to coordinate NATO members' positions at the United Nations.

A N N E X B

RECORD OF MEETINGS

NATO UNCLASSIFIED AND PUBLIC DISCLOSED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

Working Luncheon, Monday, 5th June, 1967

Present:	Mr. Eugene Rostow	Under-Secretary for Political Affairs;
	Mr. John Leddy	Assistant Secretary European Affairs;
	Mr. George S. Springsteen	Deputy Assistant Secretary European Affairs;
	Mr. Eugene V. McAuliff	Director of Office of NATO and Atlantic Political- Military Affairs;
	Mr. Jacob Myerson	Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs.

Invited to introduce the questions of particular concern to Sub-Group 4, Dr. Patijn first asked Mr. Rostow in what way he envisaged better European support in sharing world responsibility with the USA, the degree of co-operation the USA desired, and to what extent the USA was prepared to permit its European allies to share in the formulation of decisions regarding problems outside the Treaty area? He had in mind particularly the next ten or more years, during which period the emergence of a single European authority seemed to be unlikely.

2. With the great Powers divided, Mr. Rostow replied, the UN cannot function properly and therefore the USA required the support of a concert of allied states. European unification, the USA agreed, would take many years to achieve. It would be extremely rash to assume, however, that the USA will be able to continue acting alone any longer. In connection with the current Arab-Israeli crisis, for instance, it was out of the question for the USA to take unilateral action.

3. Continuing, Mr. Rostow said that there was no need to extend the NATO organization to cover other parts of the world. The NATO organization was not for extension. The problems outside the NATO area were quite different and, in a sense, less acute than the situation prevailing in Europe in 1948/1949. A SHAPE-type military solution was unsuitable for other parts of the world. Moreover, there could be no question of waiting for Europe to unite: the two-pillar theory was not practically relevant today.

4. In Mr. Rostow's view, what was required at this juncture was the association with the USA of groups of NATO allies, prepared to study together the problems of various specific areas, and to contemplate concerted action should such be called for by circumstances. These groups, he went on, should meet without any publicity, should publish no communiqués and should be dispensed so far as possible from laborious paper-work. They must, however, be inspired by a sense of common involvement. Membership in the groups should be confined to countries which acknowledge a genuine stake in or concern with the area. They should be political in character and served by small secretariats. Ideally, they should meet principally in Washington. However, this might raise difficulties and they would sit in different places, as does the Group of Ten.

5. Illustrating further his thought, Mr. Rostow referred to Working Group 3 of the OECD (to which, he said, the USA sent some of its best people), as well as to the various aid consortia in which all participants have a voice and the obligation to contribute. He also mentioned the success achieved by the UK-USA Combined Boards during the last war.

6. Mr. Leddy agreed with Mr. Rostow. In his view, the possibilities afforded by NATO for consultation in depth had been insufficiently exploited. The USA believed that Europe must assist it in keeping peace. NATO was an instrument to help maintain the balance of power. There was no thought of extending the Treaty area, but NATO was the most convenient, if not the only forum for multilateral discussion with regard to the third world. There must be, he believed, a breakthrough in institutional problems - Mr. Rostow here interjected that it might be salutary to break up the club of the Permanent Representatives - and this goal might be achieved by establishing limited groups of countries imbued with a sense of "engagement" and sharing a common purpose with regard to specific regions outside the Treaty area.

7. Passing to the economic sphere, Mr. Rostow hoped that among their recommendations the Special Group would propose the convening of a conference on Development Aid. He pointed out the urgency of (a) reforming the monetary system, and (b) making a greater concerted effort to overcome the difficulties being experienced by the developing countries. The conference would be for the OECD to arrange, but the impulse to hold it would be given by the Special Group. He referred to Article 2 of the Treaty but added that in any case NATO was the only forum where any and every topic of international interest could be discussed.

8. Mr. Leddy thought it was logical for NATO to propose action in the sphere of economic aid. In considering peace and stability outside the Treaty area it was impossible to ignore the bearing of economic factors upon security. Suggestions in the economic field stemming from NATO could, he agreed, cause difficulties with public opinion.

9. Turning to non-proliferation, Dr. Patijn asked if selective proliferation, for instance in the case of India and Japan, might not prove to be in NATO's interest? Mr. Leddy thought not; it would be impossible, in his view, to hold the line and would lead to immediate trouble with Germany and other countries.

10. In connection with the draft non-proliferation treaty, Mr. Rostow acknowledged that the USA had committed a cardinal error in failing at the outset to consult its allies. Subsequent consultation in NATO had been excellent. It could serve as a model for the future.

11. The principal idea emerging from the discussion was the establishment within the NATO framework of "in-groups" of countries, in parallel committees, to study with the USA regions and situations outside the Treaty area in which they have a genuine concern and towards which they acknowledge an element of involvement. Whether this development would be accepted by the USA as limiting its own freedom of choice in time of emergency was not said. In this connection, however, Mr. Rostow did draw a parallel with the French request of 1958.

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The purpose of "in-groups" could be defeated, it was acknowledged, by the tendency of all member countries to wish to take part in all committees. Examples of successful limited groups do, however, exist, e.g. the 1965/1966 Macnamara Committee.

12. Secondly, it was suggested that under Article 2 the Special Group should recommend convoking within the OECD orbit a new "Bretton Woods" conference with particular reference to (a) monetary reform, and (b) improvement of the present unsatisfactory position of developing countries.

13. Finally, the US representatives laid considerable stress on NATO as being an organization which can and does meet regularly at the highest level and where no subject is forbidden. Mr. Rostow also referred to conference diplomacy as exercised in the 18th and 19th centuries as being the indispensable requirement for the present time. For this, NATO was the best forum.

NATO UNCLASSIFIED AND PUBLIC DISCLOSED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

Tuesday, 6th June, 1967

Present: Mr. Henry Owen Chairman, Policy Planning Council
Mr. Edward W. Doherty Counselor, Policy Planning Council

Inter-governmental organizations cannot function efficiently, Mr. Owen said, without a centre of initiative. As examples he cited the Commission of the EEC and the position of SACEUR at SHAPE. The Atlantic Alliance, in its constitution, lacked an organ composed of people of recognised substance who at the same time were not servants of their own governments. If consultation in NATO is ever to become authoritative, ways must be found to achieve an organism similar to the EEC Commission. In his view this could be attained by the establishing of a standing commission of "wise men", assisted by a small staff, and designed to make recommendations to both the North Atlantic Council and member governments. Although their recommendations would not be binding, the reputation and standing of the Commission would compel governments to pay attention to their views. In addition, the focus of consultation in the Council would inevitably be directed to what the Commission proposed.

2. A commission was required to force the pace of consultation leading directly to contingency planning around the globe.

3. Mr. Owen believed that the Commission should be enabled to cover all fields of consultation as well as to set up different expert groups according to subject.

4. The Commission and its staff should be responsible to the Alliance as a whole. They should not be civil servants or government experts. He believed that the "Harmel Exercise" would have amply justified the hopes placed in it if it were able to propose the establishment of such a high-level commission.

5. Mr. Doherty was of the opinion that progress in East-West consultation would inevitably lead to similar practices with regard to areas outside the Treaty. This was not to say that present levels of East-West consultation in NATO were satisfactory. In this field, the burden was as much on Europe as on the USA. Nevertheless, the process of détente was going on in an unregulated fashion. The USA would like to see much greater co-ordination so as to preserve essential Western interests.

6. This raised the idea of a European caucus. Mr. Owen believed that if the caucus idea could be accommodated to work within an Atlantic framework it might help to improve the atmosphere. However, he thought that the Canadians and perhaps some others would have difficulty in accepting it. Despite its concern with France, Germany, in his view, would join such a caucus.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA7th June, 1967

Present:	Mr. Peter Dobel	Head, NATO Department
	Mr. Klaus Goldstein	Head, Far East Department
	Mr. Barton	Head, UN Department

I. Professor Bowie's peace-keeping proposal

1. Canada is unlikely to enter into peace-keeping operations which do not have the endorsement of the UN.

2. Canada, if faced with a proposal in NATO recommending the contribution of peace-keeping contingents by smaller member countries, backed logistically by the larger powers, would certainly oppose it. Such a proposal would:

- (a) endanger the primary purpose of NATO in East-West relations by involving it outside the Treaty area;
- (b) be unfavourably considered by the UN;
- (c) - diminish Canada's peace-keeping rôle in the UN;
- (d) be opposed by France, and, in consequence, become an additional divisive force in the Alliance.

Canada fully accepted the requirements of peace-keeping. Peace-keeping can best be attained by co-operation with countries outside NATO, e.g. Sweden, Austria, Yugoslavia and, as in the past, the US will help with equipment and other logistic aid.

In the Canadian view, a distinction must be drawn between the interests of the West and those of NATO. The Alliance was set up to defend the area in Europe and North America against armed attack. To attempt to develop common policies for regions outside the Treaty area is likely to place an intolerable strain upon the Alliance. As the détente progresses in Europe it will become increasingly difficult to justify the maintenance of the NATO defence effort; it is equally evident that the continuance of the détente depends upon the continuation of the defence effort. In consequence, Canada believes that if the Alliance attempted to harmonise policies in areas where the security of NATO was not directly threatened, it would do so only at the risk of jeopardising its future.

II. The "In-Group" Proposition

The US position is ambivalent. Although it is easier to study in depth if numbers in committee are reduced, it would seem unlikely that the resulting analysis would effect a change in US attitudes, e.g. on China. Moreover, the policy conclusions would depend on the countries participating in the exercise. It is doubtful if Canada would accept the idea of caucus-groups; Canada has consistently opposed the idea that smaller groups within NATO should be empowered to policy (e.g. Mr. Martin was not in favour of the Macnamara Committee).

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It might, however, be feasible for governments to set up a high-level Institute, financed through NATO but not responsible to it, but towards which governments would acknowledge a commitment. Recommendations emanating from such an institute might carry weight with governments. The institute would need to be well-informed, but it would not act on government instructions. It might fulfill a function since it was clear that ideas on policy could not come out of the present NATO machinery.

III. Consultation and co-ordination between NATO members in the UN

Institutional consultative arrangements are not popular among Western representatives at the UN. They prefer to consult and co-ordinate on an ad hoc basis. They are opposed to consultation on a NATO basis. It is not likely that an attempt to co-ordinate policy at the UN on a NATO basis would result in a gain for the Alliance. In any case, the necessity for consultation depends on the issue.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

8th June, 1967

Present: Mr. Peter Dobel Head of NATO Department

A discussion took place on the basis of the Canadian memorandum.

2. Mr. Dobel reiterated the Canadian opinion that the best way to arrest the deterioration of the Alliance is to set down clearly the limits of allied co-operation within NATO. Ottawa hoped that this would be one result of the Harmel Exercise.

3. With regard to Sub-Group 4, it should explore to what extent and with what means the Alliance can act outside the Treaty area. Canada believes that the conclusions of this investigation need not be wholly affirmative. It should be recognised that it is a public problem for the Alliance and also a weakening factor. The investigation should also determine where in the Alliance the balance of opinion on this problem lies, i.e. between the two extreme positions of the USA and France.

4. Importance was attached by Canada to the principle of accepting the objection that NATO has no commitment to co-ordinate policy beyond the Treaty area. Beyond this attitude there is some latitude of behaviour. Truly candid consultation on given issues would serve the formulation of Alliance policies. For instance, if it turns out that there is a consensus of policies between the members this would be reflected in the harmonisation of national actions. However, it is essential that no member who disagrees should feel put under pressure for so doing. Harmonisation is desirable only if it does not damage habits of co-operation among the Allies.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

8th June, 1967

Present: Mr. David Kirkwood, Head of Economics Department

Canada attached importance to Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, explained Mr. Kirkwood, and accordingly believed that from time to time NATO should examine whether economic co-operation deserved particular consideration within the Alliance. This did not mean that measures of economic co-operation should ever be carried out within the NATO sphere.

With regard to the idea expressed in Washington of moving towards a new Bretton Woods, Canada would be extremely reticent if not opposed, certainly for such a proposal to issue from a NATO inspired operation.

Mr. Kirkwood expressed the hope that in his report Dr. Patijn would, in connection with this question of economic collaboration, describe the negative view-point as regards action under the North Atlantic Treaty.

WORKING LUNCHEON, NEW YORK9th June, 1967

Present:	Amb. Schuurmans	Belgium
	Amb. von Braun	Germany
	Amb. Liatis	Greece
	Amb. Vinci	Italy
	Amb. Boesch de Boer	Netherlands
	Amb. Hambro	Norway
	Amb. Eralp	Turkey
	Sir Leslie Glass	UK

Amb. Schuurmans (Belgium) recalled the "grand design" advocated by M. Spaak several years ago, when it was opposed by the USA. Present US thinking suggests similarities with M. Spaak's conceptions, specifically his advocacy of shaping an overall Western policy within the NATO orbit.

Amb. Liatis (Greece) mentioned the disappointment he had experienced when attending NATO Experts Groups on the Middle East to find so little unity of purpose among the NATO members. Devices of smaller groups or of "Wise Men" would not, in his view, advance common Western policies.

Amb. Vinci (Italy) put in a good word for the NATO Experts Groups. However, the aim should be policy agreement, the poverty of Western planning was appalling. If there are to be "Wise Men", then let them be young. We labour under the burden of old patterns to meet new circumstances. The old ideas are always aired at every new crisis, e.g. that the Alliance should be the protector of the third world was entirely out of date. With regard to "in-groups", he wondered if they would not be an additional factor of discord in the Alliance. The UN, it was true, could not undertake properly peace-keeping operations. It might be an idea to create regional groups to co-operate with the UN as occasion necessitated. He favoured deeper and wider consultation in NATO. If the 15 were able to agree the task of the West in the UN would be enormously assisted.

Amb. von Braun (Germany) agreed with Amb. Vinci. Moreover, since the US was wedded to the practice of policy advisers it might be very useful for NATO, or at least the European members, to create some kind of policy formulating body which could engage in a dialogue with the US. This was the way Washington worked and Europe could help it by having its own contingency planning.

Amb. ^{de Boer}Boesch (Netherlands) and Sir Leslie Glass (UK) thought that studies on the outside areas in NATO should keep the UN in mind and, as far as possible, be framed in terms which could be used by member delegations at the UN. The NATO groups, in any case, should contain members able to consider the UN reaction.