

No. 2953



DÉLÉGATION NÉERLANDAISE AUPRÈS DU CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

Paris, 11th May, 1967.

Future tasks of the Alliance
Subgroup 4



Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

I have the honour, acting upon the request of Professor Patijn, to enclose herewith the introduction of the draft report of Professor Patijn, President of Subgroup 4.

This document shortly will be followed by an outline containing points which could be discussed before the second part of the report will be drafted.

I am sending copies of this letter and the attached document to all delegations.

I have the honour to be, dear Mr. Secretary-General, respectfully yours,

J.H.O. Insinger,
Deputy Permanent Representative

His Excellency Mr. Manlio Brosio,
Secretary-General of
NATO

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NETHERLANDS DELEGATION TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

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SUB-GROUP 4

Developments in regions outside the NATO-area

Introduction

1. The terms of reference of sub-group 4 ("developments in regions outside the NATO-area") invite us to study a wide field of international problems under at least two aspects:
 - a) the task of the Alliance in regions outside the NATO-area and vis-à-vis the world order in general;
 - b) the bearing of events outside Europe on the effectiveness of the Alliance as a factor for durable peace.

Both aspects will need constant consideration in the discussion of specific developments outside the NATO-area.

2. The commitments of individual member-States of the Alliance in regions outside the NATO-area, and conflict situations in those parts of the world (decolonization, Suez, Vietnam, etc.) have often been a source of friction and irritation between the members of the Alliance. Lack of unity in our approach to those questions is one of the main reasons for the present crisis of the Alliance.

3. The problem of the task of the Alliance outside the NATO-area presents itself today in the form of the desire of the U.S. Government to let the European allies share her burden of world power, and hesitation at the European side to play a greater role in world affairs. American policy assumes that there are real common interests outside the Atlantic area, and the refusal of European NATO-partners to share the responsibility and the costs has sometimes been interpreted in the U.S.A. as a reprehensible lack of solidarity. In Europe large sectors of public opinion are afraid of being drawn into American wars outside the Atlantic area, while the European understanding of the implications of "containment" or "wars of liberation" in those regions is often different from the American one.

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4. The more fundamental problem is, that the Americans, while anxious to re-engage the interest of Europe in the problems of world security, have given no clear indication in what form the European nations could share the decisions about the burdens they are supposed to carry. And at the same time most Europeans, when asked about their world role, must confess that they have no common view and even more, no clear conception of a role for Europe outside the Atlantic area.

5. The interest of European nations in world affairs has not disappeared, but the loss of world power and the traumatic experiences of decolonization have reduced their capacity and the will to assume global responsibilities. European contacts with regions outside the Atlantic area are still maintained largely through the old channels of communication. European commitments exist in different forms: surviving colonial responsibilities, institutional links through the British Commonwealth, aid to former colonial territories, a sense of responsibility for new nations sometimes in the form of treaty obligations, etc. The economic and cultural opportunities which the old relations with former colonial territories offer, are welcomed in Europe and of great value for the newly independent states. But those contacts are historical in origin and mainly national in significance. They do not fully counterbalance the lack of an up to date conception of Europe's role in world affairs, in terms of the future and world order.

6. For European-American cooperation outside the Atlantic area we need strong and clear indications of common interests, requiring a common policy, and to be served through common means. Common interests are obvious in Europe and in East-West relations, but less selfevident outside the Atlantic area. The problem of cooperation should not be stated in the

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form of European nations sharing American burdens. The real issue is the maintenance of world stability, for which the American presence is required in Europe and European influence in regions outside the NATO-area. War can erupt and spread both in Europe and elsewhere. A European refusal to admit such a possibility, or to accept corresponding responsibility, could be as disastrous as the American indifference to the maintenance of the European balance of power after the first World War.

7. The same applies to the problem of development of the underdeveloped nations of the world, the scope of which requires a common Western approach. We cannot afford the waste of uncoordinated efforts in this field, since result will be dependent upon world planning, coordinated policies and joint operations from the side of the Western donor-countries.
8. While the Alliance is the suitable framework for European-American cooperation in the Atlantic area, it is much less certain that NATO would be the right vehicle for cooperation outside the area. It is not possible to make NATO universal, since the non-aligned nations refuse to be involved in the cold war. Nor is it possible for NATO to police the world, in substitution for the failing United Nations. NATO intervention elsewhere might well provoke Soviet intervention and accordingly spread the danger. Nor could NATO be used as an institution for economic operations in the Third World. The legal objections against the extension of NATO responsibilities outside the NATO area are well founded, and seem to be supported by a number of political impediments.
9. But in view of the common interest - the preservation of law and order throughout the world - and the common task - especially development - the denial of an operational function for NATO in world affairs cannot be the last word. The Alliance is in fact of tremendous importance for the new nations, since NATO represents the Western side of the world balance of power, under the aegis of which large parts of the world enjoy the possibility of freedom and non-alignment. However, this part

of NATO's function cannot easily be institutionalized, except for some consultative arrangements with international organizations such as SEATO, CENTO, etc.

10. NATO's task beyond the Atlantic region is not to operate outside the area, but to devise common policies for its members. World order requires the full impact of Western European and North American cooperation in emergencies and dangerous developments in those parts of the world. Our common interest requires the weight of a common foreign policy, but our sovereign equality obliges us to follow a process of mutual persuasion before common policies can be adopted. The Alliance has in political affairs no supra-national pretensions, nor can it be used as an instrument for ^{ge}hemonial leadership of the United States. We cannot ignore the political structure of the world, especially in a period of renewed awareness of their national identity in European nations. Nor can we anticipate a European political federation which could serve as the European component in an Atlantic partnership. But all this should not make us blind for the transnational identity and global dimensions of some of the problems and challenges which confront the Western world in regions outside the Atlantic area.

11. A common foreign policy for problems emerging in the Third World can proceed only from a confrontation with common dangers and common tasks. The function of NATO in this field is to serve as a braintrust for the identification and formulation of the common interest. If the interests of members of the Alliance are not identical - as they sometimes will be - distinction can be made in direct responsibility. But where members are faced with common threats, NATO has a unique task: to serve the common cause, to be the voice of the common view, and eventually to be the instrument for the pursuit of the common policy, in specific cases and at specific moments.

12. Such unity of purpose can only be expected after a convincing presentation of the common interest, followed (or preceded) by a process of contingency planning, and supported by machinery for crisis management and decision making.

13. Improved consultation and the development of a common policy by the Western countries in respect of extra-European questions are definitely feasible. The foreign policy of each of the Western countries in respect of these issues is strongly influenced by the formulation of ideas within the United Nations, and here the West is usually on the defensive and gives little evidence of unity. There is no reason why the countries of the Alliance - for which the period of de-colonization belongs more or less to the past - should not come to meetings of the U.N. with clearly conceived common standpoints, instead of reacting individually to "faux problèmes" brought forward by other countries, as so often happens.

14. In the future other possibilities may present themselves. For instance there is the question whether the Western world, as a bloc, might not have the task of acting outside NATO territory as a guardian of the peace and as a protector of the free non-aligned countries of the "Third World" ¹⁾. For such ideas to become reality, however, a number of conditions would have to be met, but this, at present, lies outside the realm of possibility. For this, a far greater measure of unanimity within the Alliance would be needed, as also the willingness of a number of important non-aligned countries to lend their co-operation in this matter. If the political unification of Europe and an Atlantic partnership should be realized at an earlier date than at present seems likely, the idea of maintaining world stability through agreements between strong groups of closely collaborating like-minded states could become important. For the time being, however, these are utopian ideas and we must limit ourselves to improving procedures within NATO and to developing common policies for the Western countries in respect of urgent questions outside the Atlantic area.

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1) A possibility mentioned by Eugene V. Rostow in the Report of the Transatlantic Colloquium held at Royaumont, July 7-10, 1966, p. 93: "A strong coalition of the industrialized free nations, including Japan and India, to stabilize world politics, and conduct policies of détente and peaceful coexistence with China and the Soviet Union, through the United Nations and otherwise. On this footing, the free industrialized nations would have the primary burden of protecting the so-called Third World, and supplying it with the capital, entrepreneurship, education and skills needed to assure its economic development."

(It is a good introduction - careful and yet optimistic, because it suggests a possibility of shaping a common policy with the A.A. about outside areas, possibility which is denied by some and considered unlikely by others, about the NATO area itself - It may suggest at least a North Atlantic policy.

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