


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DÉLÉGATION PERMANENTE DU ROYAUME DES PAYS-BAS AUPRÈS DU CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

No. 2953 II



Paris, 12th May, 1967.

Future tasks of the Alliance  
Subgroup 4

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

Further to my letter of 11th May, 1967, No. 2953, I now have the privilege to let you have the second document which I received today from Professor Patijn and which contains the second part of his draft report.

This is an outline of the points open for discussion.

I am sending copies of this letter and the attached document to all delegations.

I have the honour to be, dear Mr. Secretary-General, respectfully yours,

J.H.O. Insinger,  
Deputy Permanent Representative

His Excellency Mr. Manlio Brosio,  
Secretary-General of  
N A T O

15/5/67

S E C R E T

NETHERLANDS DELEGATION TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

No. 2953 II

Paris, 12th May, 1967.

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NATO

SUB-GROUP IVDevelopments in regions outside the NATO areaRapporteur's outline  
(continued)

15. For common study and - if possible - a common policy we shall have to examine the nature of contemporary situations, which require common action from the side of the Western world. NATO has at its disposal a wealth of information of Expert Working Groups with regard to specific areas. What seems to be lacking is a more deliberate effort to present the Council with policy implications for the members of the Alliance. For our present study we need an attempt to identify the most important issues and a discussion of political reactions which could be contemplated followed by conclusions and proposals for the organization and operation of the NATO Council.
16. The problems and events outside the Atlantic area which could affect the interests or the cohesion of the Alliance, or for which NATO should assume responsibility, can be distinguished into different categories:
- I. political events directly affecting the security of the Atlantic area
  - II. political events not directly affecting the security of the Atlantic area, but in which individual NATO members are involved
  - III. international problems of a universal character for which the Western world has to assume part of the responsibility.
- 17.I. Political events directly affecting the security of the Atlantic area.

For events in regions at the border of the Atlantic area we shall have to make distinctions between categories of danger. Within the Alliance there should be no misunderstanding with regard to the interpretation of the significance of possible events. In emergencies the Council must know especially which

developments would not be acceptable to the Western world. The Council must be able to decide what level of Soviet influence it would be prepared to accept in those parts of the world, and what incidents or conflicts could make intervention necessary. On such points fundamental agreement is of direct interest for the security of the NATO area itself. NATO policies with regard to those regions should be made public in due time, in order to avoid miscalculation from other sides. Such beneficial NATO activities would require an elaboration of policy implications for developments with regard to the following regions and problems:

18. a) Middle East

- the increasing influence of the Soviet Union in Egypt and other nations of the Middle East;
- arms deliveries;
- the conflict between the "progressive" and the "conservative" Arab states;
- the conflict between Israel and the Arab states;
- the future of Southern Arabia.

19. b) North Africa

- the relations between the Maghreb states;
- their relations with the E.E.C.;
- the security of these states and the military guarantees which they are prepared to accept from outside.

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20. II. Political events not directly affecting the security of the Atlantic area, but in which individual NATO members are involved.

Under this category we need a discussion of the special obligations of individual members of the Alliance, such as the United States' commitments in Latin America and East Asia, and the British commitments "East of Suez". For those cases a common NATO policy is not to be expected, nor will it always be necessary. The interests of Europe and America are not identical everywhere, and it may be possible to agree on a permissible range of divergence in the foreign policy of the members. However, one of the dangers of those commitments of individual members has been the disruptive effect of specific interventions on the cohesion of the Alliance.

In 1956 Foster Dulles has reserved the freedom of decision for his Government with regard to such commitments outside NATO. He accepted prior consultation in the NATO Council as a principle but within certain bounds, since the United States was not always in a position to consult 44 allies. The U.S.A. has many alliances and "we cannot have a sort of hierarchy of associations in which we try to rate them in importance and have consultations accordingly."

22. While this position of the U.S. Government can be understood as a reasonable and to a certain extent unavoidable desire from the side of a world power (especially in emergencies such as the Cuban missile crisis), it must be pointed out that the consequences for the Alliance could be serious. A complete freedom of action for individual members would greatly affect belief in the Alliance, and cannot be maintained by an American Government which desires to let the European allies share the burdens of world power. Under those circumstances prior consultation should be the rule, at least with those allies which are able

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and willing to participate in consultations and have special relations in some form or another with the area concerned. The Council, or Special Committees of the Council, must have the right to be consulted, to encourage and to warn.

The following regions and issues could be made the object of common study and planning:

23. Latin America:

- the evaluation of revolutionary developments in Latin America.
- is it possible to indicate which developments would be unacceptable for the Western world?
- can the European states contribute to the stability of Latin America or the success of the Alliance for Progress?

24. East Asia:

- the necessity of a balance of power within Asia itself.
- where should new lines of power and influence be drawn in Asia?
- what is the function of military aid from the side of non-Asian states?
- the significance of "wars of national liberation" in Asia.
- the Chinese danger: potentially, actually, and the ways to meet it.
- the ambivalence of Asian nations which desire to remain non-aligned, but are in need of military protection.
- the possibility of ad hoc cooperation with the Soviet Union for the stabilisation of specific Asian situations.

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- the role of Japan.
- the future of Vietnam.
- the function of the S.E.A.T.O.

25. "East of Suez".

- what will be the consequences of a British withdrawal from commitments East of Suez?
- in what form should the Western world contribute to the stability of the Indian Ocean, and the integrity of India and Pakistan?
- would it be possible to engage the interest of the Soviet Union in the neutralization of certain areas, such as the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf?
- the security of the East coast of the African continent.

26. III International problems of a universal character for which the Western world has to assume part of the responsibility.

De-colonization. Since Portugal is deeply involved in problems of decolonization it will not be easy for the NATO Council to adopt a common policy with regard to this problem. The Portuguese Delegation takes the view that the Alliance should accept the following line of conduct:

"The vital interests of any one of the members of the Alliance should never be unnecessarily undermined or, a fortiori, openly attacked by other members for reasons which are not in the same degree vital to those other members; an ally should be recognised in right to pursue, in a field which does not affect vital interests of others, a special policy dictated by interests vital to that ally; such a policy, particularly when it serves useful purposes in terms of the social and economic welfare of the less-developed peoples affected by it, should receive from the other allies at least as much public tolerance as is shown, for the purposes of détente, towards communist regimes and Soviet domination in eastern Europe."

While this Portuguese desire commands full respect and should be followed as far as possible, it is not to be expected that the other members of the Alliance will always be able to give support to the Portuguese point of view in debates of the United Nations and other international organizations.

27. Racial relations.

In the eyes of the "Third world" Europe and the United States, although they cannot be blamed directly, are involved in the responsibility for the racial tensions in Rhodesia and South Africa. There is no escape from the white man's burden, and in the highly explosive atmosphere of the southern part of Africa we are expected to intervend in the interest of the coloured population through an active foreign policy. It would certainly be welcomed in the Western world, if racial discrimination could be gradually eliminated in those countries, in an orderly way. Since the present situation is dangerous, it is necessary for the Alliance to have a policy to prevent racial violence and to be able to act if a crisis occurs.

28. Protest and condemnation, the easy indignation of United Nations meetings, is both irrelevant and infra dignitatem for those who hold world power. Can NATO develop a foreign policy for its members which could influence the course of events? Only if we should be able to engage the interest and co-operation of the white population of the countries concerned. Accordingly the question should be studied, whether it would be possible for the Western Alliance to give a guarantee of non-intervention to the countries concerned, on one condition: that they gradually change their racial legislation, and establish in due time conditions of legal and social equality for the whole of the population.

29. Special attention should be given to a number of short term problems in this field:

- the positions of Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa.
- arms deliveries.



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- the intervention of white Africans in revolutionary situations elsewhere in Africa.
- subversive activities with communist support.

30. The nuclear position of states outside the NATO-area

What should be the position of the Alliance with regard to the desire of some states in Asia to develop a nuclear capacity, also in the military field?

- Is it in the interest of world stability to prevent Japan and India from developing nuclear striking forces?
- If so, what nuclear guarantee can be given to those countries?
- If NATO would support a nuclear capacity for some countries, how could the development of a nuclear striking force elsewhere (e.g. Egypt) be prevented?

31. Development aid.

(It may be in the interest of the present study to contact the O.E.C.D., and to invite members of its staff to attend one of our meetings).

32. Proposals for the improvement of NATO-consultation, contingency planning and crisis management

(This part of the outline will follow at a later stage. The rapporteur proposes to discuss a number of suggestions made by Alastair Buchan in his paper on "Crisis management", published by the Atlantic Institute in April, 1966).