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THE FUTURE SECURITY POLICY OF THE ALLIANCE

Report of the Rapporteur
Subgroup 3

Mr. Foy D. Kohler, USA

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(Report of Subgroup 3)

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SUMMARY

A. Findings

1. The NATO countries cannot as yet consider themselves assured against the danger of armed conflict. While direct aggression is today unlikely, the Soviet Government continues to modernize and expand its already formidable military forces. Soviet leadership still hopes to derive political influence in Europe from this military power, and the threat of war resulting from miscalculation thus remains. Berlin continues to be a hostage and the situation in East Germany continues to be inherently unstable. Furthermore, instability in the less developed countries is a continuing threat to peace, and in today's world, conflict can spread rapidly. Recent events in the Mediterranean area demonstrate that the Soviets are intent on increasing their military strength and extending their influence there, a fact that poses a threat to NATO's southern flank.

2. Thus the NATO countries continue to require formidable military capabilities covering the full spectrum of potential conflict. Military strength serves to deter aggression, to counter the political influence of Soviet military power and thus to lay the basis for expanding detente. If there are

today a diminished Soviet threat and enhanced possibilities of mutual accommodation with Eastern Europe, this is a tribute to NATO's cohesion, determination and effective military strength in the past, and a lesson for the future.

3. No one nation -- not even the United States -- can successfully stand alone. An integrated defense effort will continue to make sense for both the European and North American members of the Alliance. The continuation of the Alliance not only is insurance against external threats, it also represents a means by which small and medium-sized states, which want to exercise a responsible role in assuring their own security, may do so by making their limited capabilities relevant to deterring the Soviet Union and by giving them a voice in the military policies and actions of the US. Moreover, the risk of national rivalries can be reduced if defense measures are coordinated in a spirit of mutual confidence through an alliance such as NATO.

4. NATO has confronted a changing environment and has adapted to it by modernizing the machinery of the Alliance. This must be a continuing process. More should be done to improve NATO's effectiveness in the field of arms control and to expand consultation on security threats arising from outside the NATO area. Finally, as opportunities emerge to

expand contacts with the East, the NATO consultative machinery can be used to assure that our individual approaches are consistent and mutually reinforcing.

B. Conclusions - The Future Security Tasks of the Alliance

1. Sustain and modernize our military strength in order to maintain deterrence and create the climate of security indispensable to progress toward a permanent political settlement in Europe. To this end, continue using and improving the force planning process to relate strategy, forces and resource capabilities.
2. Explore possibilities for maintaining effective deterrence at lower force levels through balanced mutual force reductions. To this end, strengthen the machinery of the Alliance for dealing with arms control measures. A permanent Arms Control and Disarmament Committee of NATO and a unit of the International Staff to support this Committee are proposed.
3. Maintain the machinery recently created for nuclear planning and strengthen national nuclear planning staffs so that the non-nuclear members can participate more effectively in this planning.
4. Carry through the steps already initiated to improve military consultation through the regular exchange of intelligence and related information in the Situation

Center. This can provide the basis for more effective crisis management, particularly if the Center provides early warning of worldwide events that may affect NATO security.

5. Increase intra-European cooperation in defense research, development and production and extend the inter-allied cooperation already in existence in these fields.

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INTRODUCTION

This report is concerned with the future security policies of the North Atlantic Alliance. These policies seek to keep the peace and maintain the independence of each member so that our peoples can develop to the fullest their spiritual and material resources.

Security for the members of NATO rests on two pillars. First, the maintenance of adequate military strength to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend NATO territory if aggression should occur. Second, realistic measures to reduce tensions and the risk of conflict, including arms control and disarmament measures.

The report will not attempt to deal in detail with military problems being considered elsewhere in the Alliance. Thus, it does not include a detailed assessment of the military threat, strategic concepts or force requirements. Rather, the purpose here is to develop a broad perspective of NATO's current security position, outline future directions and suggest the security policies required for the years ahead.

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I. NATO AND THE CHANGING SOVIET CHALLENGE

If the Soviet Union is today seeking to consolidate the status quo in Europe, and in this connection is engaging in diplomatic approaches toward detente with selected NATO countries, this is due in large measure to the cohesion, the determination and the effective military strength of NATO over the years. As recently as 1962 NATO faced and met a Soviet challenge to the Western position in Berlin which included the use of limited force and the threat of unlimited force. When the Soviet leadership was then faced down in the air corridors and on the Autobahn, it attempted to affect a change in the general balance of power by secretly installing medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba targeted against the US.

Since the Cuban crisis the Soviets seem to have accepted the fact that they are unable to alter substantially the situation of mutual deterrence on the European Continent and globally. But throughout the entire period they have maintained undiminished their military deployments on the Continent and their MRBM/IRBM threat to Western Europe. They have also undertaken an urgent program to improve their nuclear capability against the US by dispersing, hardening and enlarging their deployments of ICBMs and

installing an initial ABM capability. Moreover, they have in recent years again been making a real effort to tip the balance in their favor by deploying increasing naval strength, particularly in the Mediterranean area; and building up their political-military influence in the Arab states of North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean, thus posing a growing threat to NATO's southern flank.

Moscow recognizes the military strength of our deterrent, and recalls the demonstrated firmness and preparedness of the Alliance under challenge in 1962. At the same time the Soviet leaders are preoccupied with their conflict with Peking and the attendant upsurge of nationalism in the Socialist camp; and with serious internal problems, notably the declining economic growth rate and the erosion of Communist ideology. All these factors make it unlikely that the Soviet Union will in the immediately foreseeable future initiate, or even wittingly risk, major hostilities. However, they will expect their military power to convey political influence in Western Europe, particularly if strains develop in the Alliance. Berlin remains a hostage and the situation in Eastern Germany remains inherently unstable. The record in the recent Middle East crisis can hardly increase our confidence in Soviet capability to avoid miscalculation.

Finally, in considering the future of East-West relationships, we would do well to bear in mind the Soviet leadership's views as to the nature of détente. Speaking at last year's 23rd Congress of the CPSU, Mr. Podgorny put it this way:

"The principle of peaceful coexistence is the principle of relations among states with different social systems. It is absolutely inapplicable in the class struggle between exploiters and those exploited, in the struggle between colonialists and the oppressed peoples, in the struggle between the socialist and bourgeois ideologies. Under present conditions the implementation of this principle facilitates victories by socialism in economic competition with capitalism and favors the successful struggle of all detachments of the world workers and national liberation movements."

In recent practice, Soviet moves towards "détente" have been characterized by a drive for the acquisition of advanced Western technology and by efforts to exploit centrifugal and divisive tendencies, to isolate the FRG from its allies, to reduce or eliminate the US and Canada as power factors in Europe and to propagate the theme that the Atlantic Alliance will reach a natural end in 1969.

Just as we should have no illusions about Soviet purposes, so should we be clear about our own. For the fact is that Soviet willingness to seek certain accommodations with the West, even on a selective basis, does provide opportunities

for us to foster a favorable evolution of public opinion and policy in Eastern Europe and inside the Soviet Union itself. It also may open new possibilities for finding arrangements in the field of arms control and disarmament which could alleviate the arms burden without jeopardizing our security.

As we move in this direction, however, we must keep in mind that the present Soviet posture was brought about in large part by our own unity, strength and determination, and realize that the maintenance of this unity, strength and determination is the essential foundation for effective exploitation of this new situation. A sound NATO defense policy and military structure, combined with close political consultation, can avert the following potential dangers:

- 1) giving Moscow the option of again stressing the availability of their military power in the context of Soviet pressure for Western political concessions;
- 2) permitting Moscow to play one NATO member off against another, dividing and weakening the Alliance.

In fact, despite some hesitations and setbacks, NATO has continued aware of the political importance

of maintaining its defense posture and adapting its policies and structures to changing circumstances and new problems.

Specific recent improvements have included:

- 1) revised and improved force planning procedures that correlate strategy, force requirements and resources,
- 2) a newly revised political directive to the military authorities that has provided the basis for revision of NATO strategic concepts,
- 3) an enhanced role for the non-nuclear powers in nuclear planning through the NDAC and NPG,
- 4) proposals for improved procedures and facilities for exchange of intelligence and other data resulting from the work of the Special Committee of Defense Ministers,
- 5) reorganization and streamlining of the Military Committee and the NATO command structure,
- 6) proposals for improving NATO's decision-making process in times of crisis,
- 7) a substantial improvement of NATO's communication capabilities,
- 8) recognition of the special vulnerabilities of the northern and southeastern flanks through agreed NATO

common funding for the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force, and

- 9) recognition of arms control as an important element of NATO business through regular meeting of disarmament experts who have engaged in extensive discussion of arms control proposals and their relation to the security interests of the Alliance.

The current study is, itself, part of the broad effort to adapt the Alliance to a changing environment.

II. FUTURE SECURITY POLICIES

While much progress has been made in modernizing the policies and machinery of the Alliance, this is a continuing process. Several current issues have important implications for the future political and security policies of the Alliance as a whole and its individual members. These are discussed below.

A. Defense Issues

1. Force Levels - One of the major defense issues we face in the Alliance is the size and type of forces we shall need to maintain in the years ahead and how the burden of maintaining forces for the common defense will be distributed. This is not a new issue. However, it has been given new urgency by the growing pressures in all of our countries to reduce defense burdens at a time when the immediate threat of conflict in Europe appears to have diminished. While balanced and gradual revision of force levels on both sides could, together with other steps, help to shape a new political environment, uncoordinated force reductions could weaken our defenses, create political dissension in the Alliance and actually impede development of a stable detente with the East. We cannot permit this to happen.

There have been, and there continue to be, differences among us on the specific forces required and how the burdens will be shared. It now is both urgent and timely that we attempt once again to resolve these differences.

The general postulates for the development of a modernized strategic concept for NATO on which rational force plans can be based were outlined in the recent Political Directive approved by the Defense Ministers, which has laid the basis for a fundamental revision of the NATO strategic concept. In addition, the military staffs have recently developed imaginative new strategic concepts and plans, notable SACEUR's recent study of alternative strategic concepts and SACLANT's plan for a standing naval force. These important measures must now be translated into forces which the members of the Alliance are willing to support for an agreed period; we should use the consultative means at our disposal and the force planning process to assure that any force adjustments are coordinated and planned to assure the continued security of the NATO area.

2. Nuclear Planning - Another issue of continuing concern in NATO has been how to involve the non-nuclear members of the Alliance more fully in the critical decisions relating to the nuclear forces of the Alliance. Significant progress

has been made in this area over the past two years, particularly with the establishment of the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee (NDAC) and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). These bodies have undertaken studies which are intended to develop new guidelines for policy on several critical issues. Probably the most important is the development of improved policies and procedures for the use and control of the large and varied arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons available to the Alliance. They also have undertaken an examination of the implications for NATO of the constantly changing strategic capabilities, particularly the implications of the development of anti-ballistic missile systems.

Several important strategic issues should be explored further. For example, mutual deterrence at the strategic level is likely to exist for the foreseeable future. Under these conditions the Soviets will probably continue to observe caution in avoiding direct conflict with the US or its major allies, but they could come to believe that they had new opportunities to generate political pressures on the Alliance, or conceivably even to employ low levels of violence if the capabilities of NATO to meet lesser contingencies were permitted to atrophy.

The NPG discussions with respect to tactical nuclear forces reached the conclusion that the tactical nuclear weapons available to major NATO commanders appear to be sufficient in quantity, although the mix of weapons and the circumstances in which they might be used require further detailed study. The main question in this area remains the great uncertainty as to what would occur once a tactical nuclear engagement began. It is difficult to predict when it would be of net advantage to NATO to initiate the use of tactical nuclear weapons in response to aggression less than general war. Further studies are now under way in the NPG to help to clarify this question.

3. Crisis Consultation - The Special Committee of Defense Ministers, which preceded the NDAC/NPG, developed a number of recommendations related to improving the arrangements and procedures for information exchange, many of which are being implemented. However, each member state will have to improve its methods of handling and analyzing data and provide more information to NATO before there can be a truly effective system of information exchange.

Improved procedures for exchange of information in peacetime are a vital prerequisite to improving crisis

consultation; but the procedures that would be used in time of crisis also need to be re-examined. The International Staff (IS) has initiated action on this front. This work should proceed expeditiously.

The Council has a modern situation center to serve as the focal point for receiving, analyzing and presenting all kinds of intelligence. The new Center at Evere provides a substantially improved capability for crisis consultation through its situation and consultation rooms, data handling and modern communications facilities. The Center's staff, on duty twenty-four hours a day throughout the year, should develop a well-trained cadre for keeping pace with developing situations.

For its regular work, above all in time of crisis, the NATO military and civil authorities need to be linked by the most modern kinds of communications systems. The Alliance in the past year or so has made substantial progress in this field. An advanced system is being established that will make NATO operations independent of main lines passing through any member country. Looking ahead, the Alliance is also working on a satellite system to provide additional assurance for the future.

B. The Alliance and Arms Control

1. Introduction - Future European security arrangements ultimately should involve agreed East-West force and armaments levels, joint arms control measures and concrete progress toward the solution of the German question. It is difficult to establish priorities or a time schedule for arms control and disarmament measures that would lead to these goals. Much will depend on the willingness of the East to enter into arms control arrangements. The first stage probably would have to rest largely on tacit understandings and mutual example, but thereafter, progress toward normalization would in many cases require formal political and arms control agreements. Measures which might be considered in future stages of a developing European security arrangements are:

- a. agreements between the FRG and the states of Eastern Europe, renouncing **the use of force**,
- b. balanced reductions or redeployments of armed forces on both sides,
- c. reductions in tactical nuclear weapons with a view to working toward the reduction of Soviet MRBM/IRBMs targeted on Western Europe. Progress in this area may be possible only in the larger framework of

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limitations on US-Soviet strategic nuclear delivery vehicles,

- d. East-West non-aggression pacts in the context of concrete progress toward a European settlement,
- e. establishment of special military liaison missions on both sides with maximum freedom of movement, or a few regional and mobile observation posts. Even if no early multilateral agreement can be reached about military missions and/or observation posts, the several allies should continue to seek increased bilateral exchanges in the military field, including observation of maneuvers on a reciprocal basis with individual East European nations, including the Soviet Union. There should, of course, be full consultation in NATO on such arrangements. Properly coordinated among ourselves, such exchanges would make some contribution over time to breaking down walls of secrecy which still stand in the way of progress on arms control.

2. Mutual Force Adjustments - At the present time, certain changes are taking place in Alliance military dispositions, in part for economic and technological reasons, and also on the basis of a widely shared judgment that changes in the political posture of the other side have reduced the immediate military threat to NATO. The several allies

undertaking or contemplating these measures, and the Alliance as a whole, must, however, assure that such adjustments are related to a feasible strategy and that our military options are not dangerously narrowed. However, if we can induce reciprocal reductions or redeployments* from the East by "mutual example," force adjustments might serve NATO's security interests by:

- a. revising the Alliance's military posture to conform to current perceptions of the threat from the East, and doing so in a manner which fosters the development of favorable political tendencies in the East and between East and West, and thereby contributing to a further easing of the rivalry and ultimately to a political settlement,

* We distinguish between reductions and redeployments. A reduction is a cut in the existing active forces available to the Alliance. A sizable reduction can be reversed only in grave circumstances, and if it is, would very likely induce responses on the other side, even though it had been in the first place stimulated by some perceived change in the security situation. On the other hand, actual reductions in NATO commitments offer the best promise of inducing reciprocal actions from the other side. A redeployment moves troops back from the front but clearly keeps them in being. These units may be earmarked for return under certain circumstances.

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- b. preventing the unraveling of the Alliance's military posture which could result from inadequately coordinated decisions and actions regarding national force levels motivated by budgetary, balance of payments and political pressures,
- c. minimizing military risk by achieving an agreed framework for coordinated and orderly reductions in armed forces in the manner most likely to elicit reciprocal reductions by the other side.

The Russians have shown interest in the past in a mutual Soviet-US thinning out of forces, and eventual Soviet interest in matching moves may be considered good. Recently, however, they have been inhibited from pursuing the matter by political considerations. They are not likely to associate themselves with a formal agreement which may appear to their allies to permit the US to redeploy men and equipment from Europe to Vietnam. Additionally, they may believe that NATO countries will reduce armed forces strength irrespective of any compensating Soviet action.

Since formal agreement on force adjustments is probably not achievable in the immediate future, they would have to

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be made by a process of mutual example, on the basis of a general tacit understanding at best. Existing intelligence capabilities may suffice for determining the general magnitude and authenticity of withdrawal activity. However, if agreements, whether tacit or formal, involved specific types of weapons or forces, the question of verification would be more difficult. In the last analysis, the success or failure of the measure would rest, not on treaty obligations and monitoring, but on the extent of fundamental mutuality of interest in lessening the confrontation.

Even if significant adjustments by mutual example were implemented, NATO forces in Europe would still have to be of sufficient strength to contribute to the deterrence or aggression and be capable of dealing with civil disorders, local clashes, harassments and border incidents. Forces in Europe would also have to be large enough to make NATO's tactical nuclear capabilities credible and to serve as a convincing link to strategic nuclear forces. A significant visible US presence, which could be rapidly reinforced, if necessary, would be **required** to provide a continuing credible US commitment to Europe's security and to maintain the pattern of the Alliance's deterrent posture.

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There are, of course, risks in making adjustments even if they are mutual. Although NATO's capabilities for rapid deployment will improve, it might be politically difficult to restore or strengthen NATO military capabilities on a timely basis. Furthermore, a developing crisis might be sensitive to, and exacerbated by, crash Western efforts to build up our strength.

In sum, mutual adjustments would involve both risks and advantages. Political as well as military issues are involved. Furthermore, there are many possible kinds and degrees of adjustments that could be envisioned. What constitutes a "balanced" reduction on the other side is a complex problem that requires careful analysis. What seems indicated is a careful study of the military and political consequences of alternative schemes for mutual force adjustments. Such a study has recently been initiated in NATO and should be pursued. It should provide a good test of NATO's ability to work out common policies and plans in the arms control field.

3. Complementary Arms Control Measures - An arms control measure which might accompany substantial force adjustments would be the establishment of an emergency "hotline" communications link between military headquarters in Western and

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Eastern Europe. This might be supplemented by increased exchanges of military missions. These measures would require formal agreements, but their political sensitivity is low enough that such agreements might be possible.

4. Strengthening NATO's Arms Control Machinery

It seems clear that the Alliance should give increasing concern to arms control issues. Problems of arms control and possible security arrangements should be examined with as much continuing care and attention as NATO devotes to force planning, strategy and nuclear questions.

The Council has often discussed questions of arms control. Disarmament experts are considering these problems at the technical level during regularly scheduled meetings. These efforts, although valuable, have not proven adequate. The Alliance should establish regular and continuing machinery to examine and evaluate all aspects of proposals or suggestions in this field.

This could be accomplished by establishing a separate, permanent committee, called the Arms Control and Disarmament Committee. The members of this Committee might be the Permanent Representatives to NATO reinforced, when appropriate, by high-level representatives from capitals during

the Committee's meetings. This Committee would be supported by an expert staff section established within the International Staff under the Secretary General.

Establishment of this Committee with International Staff support would institutionalize the consideration of arms control measures as an element of NATO strategy. It would develop arms control concepts and proposals for consideration by NATO governments. It would serve as a point through which member governments could get initial NATO reactions to unilaterally formulated disarmament proposals.

The Committee would seek the advice of NATO military planners in formulating its recommendations. The existing force planning machinery, adapted as necessary, would be utilized to evaluate the military implications of arms control proposals. This would ensure that the Council and member governments have available the carefully considered military, as well as political, views necessary for decisions on these sensitive matters.

C. Trends in Technology and their Impact on the Alliance1. The Relation of Technology to Security

Among the changes fast transforming our society, none has had greater impact than the scientific-technological revolution, and nowhere has the impact been more striking than in the field of military technology. Increasingly an essential component of an effective military establishment is the qualitative excellence and quantitative sufficiency of the arms and equipment borne by the armed forces.

2. Trends and their Impact

Three characteristics in the trend of military hardware are particularly evident. First, the rate of innovation in advanced systems is extraordinarily high. It took only a decade to go from subsonic to supersonic fighter aircraft; the entire cycle of the heavy jet bomber development was completed in less than two decades. The requirement for timely decisions is equally important, since with development times equalling or even exceeding the expected useful life of the weapon, the effectiveness of the decision-making process becomes central to the problem.

Second, as the effectiveness of weapons has grown, so also has their complexity, requiring higher levels of education

and training in design, production and operation of weapons systems.

Third, costs continue to rise, either because technology allows more to be done by a system of a given weight, size or volume; or because more must be done and a new system developed to do it. A fighter plane, which cost \$50,000 in 1944, would cost \$2 million today to perform the same function. These costs are buried in all phases of the weapons life cycle: research, development, production, maintenance and operations. The net effect is to price some weapons almost beyond the means of even the most advanced industrial states, which find it most difficult to buy them, or even to operate them.

3. Problem Areas

NATO continues to profit from the extraordinary technological resources of all its members. However, we must continue to seek efficient and equitable ways to share the costs and the benefits of defense technology.

As the effectiveness and complexity of modern weapons grows, quantities required decline. For many weapons, small national markets no longer provide a base for economies of scale in production. Without such a base, and the hope of an efficient production run, there is less incentive to engage

in expensive research. Without research, able talent disperses to new fields, and an entire industry may founder and disappear. Thus, the technological gap widens.

Efforts to enlarge markets and share costs by joint development or production projects have had only limited success. The cooperative production projects attempted, although highly useful, have encountered problems in management, funding, division of production and agreement on specifications. The basic problem is the extent to which national considerations must be sacrificed in the interest of a common effort to produce modern hardware at a reasonable cost. In our experience so far, national considerations (which are by no means trivial) have taken precedence over the laws of comparative advantage.

4. On Solutions

There is no simple solution to these difficult problems. On the one hand, efficient use of limited resources clearly seems to suggest that the technological tasks should be performed largely by those best qualified to do so at the least cost. On the other hand, this approach, carried to a logical conclusion, only widens the gap between those who contribute and those who do not.

In the search for healthy long-term solutions, scale of markets and industry, management techniques, availability of risk capital, government-industry relationships and investment in education all play a major role. All must be considered.

As far as the Alliance is concerned, a two-fold approach seems indicated:

First, there is an urgent need to increase intra-European cooperation, if the European members of the Alliance are to cope with the problems of maintaining high-technology industries on the scale necessitated by their complexity and cost. Europe has already demonstrated its capacity to handle comparable issues in its civilian industrial sector. Defense deserves a similar effort.

Second, is the need to continue the inter-allied cooperation already in existence in such forms as the Conference of National Armaments Directors, the bilateral and multilateral production programs, the SHAPE Technical Center, AGARD, the SACLANT ASW Center and the activities of the NATO Science Committee.

D. The Relationship Between NATO Security Policies and Worldwide Developments

1. The Impact of External Developments on NATO Security

Clearly our interests and responsibilities outside the

NATO area differ in kind and degree, but to some extent we will be affected by conflicts that erupt elsewhere in the world; and there is always the risk that a conflagration that starts in a distant part of the world - especially one in some way involving the USSR - can spread to affect the NATO countries.

The recent Arab-Israeli conflict has emphasized how the interests of the NATO members can be threatened by conflict in the Middle East area. The military map of the Mediterranean is changing as a result of the Soviet decision to maintain substantial naval forces in the area indefinitely, their large-scale arms resupply operation and the possibility of deeper Soviet penetration into the Arab armed forces, as well as Soviet activities in Algeria. Dispatch of Soviet naval units to Arab ports while tensions still ran high suggests the future possibility of greater risks than heretofore of direct Soviet military involvement should large-scale incidents occur along the Suez Canal. This effort by the Soviets to extend their influence, particularly in the Mediterranean Basin, directly involves the interests of all NATO countries.

Recent developments in the Middle East also have important arms control implications for NATO. We have already begun consultations in the NAC with the view to coordinating

arms supply policies in the Middle East, and these should be continued. In addition, in considering the question of balanced force reductions, we should take into account the growing Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern area. We would not wish to reduce our defenses unduly in one sector of the NATO area while the Soviets were increasing their capabilities in another, particularly as forces on the Central front are, at present, a major source of military strength for rapid reinforcement of the flanks.

2. Implications for NATO Security Policies

Conflicts outside the NATO area will have different implications for different members of the Alliance. However, we should use the NATO machinery, if possible, to work out a common view and approach on threats to peace which could directly affect the security interests of all NATO members. With respect to global developments of general interest to the Alliance, we should continue to exchange views and consult together in the Council and in the regional experts groups.

The question arises as to when a particular conflict or threat to the peace is of sufficient concern to the Alliance as a whole to warrant more intensive consultation or consideration, or joint action. It is not possible to specify in

advance whether, and if so how, NATO should react to a particular crisis. However, we should be able to improve the machinery for identifying, at an early stage, developing situations that are of concern to Alliance members, and measures for dealing with them. The new situation center at Evere should help us to accomplish this. In addition, it is suggested that the review of crisis consultation procedures, which has recently been proposed by the Secretary General, should include the consideration of machinery for identifying crises that are of interest and concern to the Alliance as a whole and develop specific consultative procedures for dealing with them.

3. NATO and the UN

NATO security policies also could contribute to world stability by encouraging members to participate in UN peacekeeping, harmonizing NATO responsibilities with members' commitments to the UN. Commitments to the UN are not incompatible with commitments to NATO, and, in fact, can be mutually reinforcing.

NATO might explicitly endorse the concept that participation in UN peacekeeping and earmarking forces for UN service is desirable. There should be no great difficulty in reconciling NATO and UN commitments. In practice,

national troop contingents and facilities engage in UN operations only on the express decision by the contributing country case-by-case. In the event of overriding national interest, the contributing country is at liberty to withdraw its contingent.

Earmarking and commitment of forces to UN operation can be undertaken in a manner that does not impair the ability of national forces committed to NATO to fulfill NATO requirements if called upon. Planning for participation in UN activities should even enhance military capabilities. While budget implications need to be carefully considered, the advantage of added military strength consequent on training an additional contingent for peacekeeping would generally tend to outweigh possible budget problems.

Another advantage of participation by NATO countries in UN peacekeeping is that it makes manifest the political acceptability of certain NATO troops as impartial peacekeepers in the third world. Thus, the presence of Canadian, Norwegian, Danish and other NATO troops in the Middle East, Cyprus and the Congo serves to demonstrate the desire of NATO members to contribute to the maintenance of global peace.

In any event, NATO in the future will have to take into consideration the outlook of certain members which see their national defense role as encompassing world peacekeeping responsibilities as well as responsibilities for collective self-defense in the NATO framework.

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