

26th September 1967

To : Directeur du Cabinet
From: ASG for Defence Planning & Policy
cc. DSG
ASG for Political Affairs
Deputy Executive Secretary



Subject: Future Tasks of the Alliance - Meeting of Sub-Group 3

On Thursday and Friday, 21st and 22nd September, I attended a meeting in Washington of Sub-Group 3 of the Special Group on the Future Tasks of the Alliance. The document for discussion was the "Final Draft" circulated by Mr. Kohler on 1st September.

2. Everybody complimented Mr. Kohler upon his draft report and upon the balance that he had achieved between the various factors bearing upon the future security policy of the Alliance; but the majority of representatives proceeded from this to criticize those portions which did not sway the balance in the particular direction that they wished. This approach made possible a good and vigorous discussion. A selection of the most salient points made is as follows:-

- (a) The reconciliation of the argument that the basic Soviet political threat remains, with statements about the Soviet interest in détente, arms control, etc., should be developed so as to make clear that the contradiction is more apparent than real, since the Soviets might well think that they could more easily advance their political aims in the context of a military balance at a lower level than at present (Canada and International Staff).
- (b) The stabilizing influence of an overall military balance between East and West should be stressed (Denmark).
- (c) Care should be taken not to reduce forces beyond the point at which a balance ceased to exist or at which the degree of calculated risk that we could accept was exceeded (Turkey).
- (d) Without dissenting from the stress on force reductions in Mr. Kohler's draft, several thought that there should also be references to the need to strengthen our forces where necessary in order that we might embark upon the process of détente from a position of adequate strength (Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey).
- (e) Reference should be made to the importance which the Fourteen attach to integration and to the essential interdependence of NATO Europe and North America (Netherlands).
- (e)bis The French Representative questioned the statement in the draft that "no one nation - not even the United States - can successfully stand alone".

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- (f) The subject of crisis consultation, especially on matters arising outside the NATO area, should be approached pragmatically (Denmark, Norway).
- (g) The section on the relationship between NATO security policies and world-wide developments might refer to the extent to which a strong NATO might be able to affect the attitudes of countries in the "third world" (Netherlands).
- (h) The Belgian Representative suggested that the report might discuss the implications of the existence of the nuclear deterrent upon the hypothesis of alliance and the hypothesis of neutrality; and that public opinion might welcome a passage on the impact of a possible non-proliferation treaty upon the strategy of non-nuclear powers.
- (j) In the context of a reference to giving small and medium-sized states a voice in the military policies and actions of the United States, the German Representative said that the important thing to stress was that all the allies should have a voice in the policies of the Alliance.
- (k) The section about the impact of technological developments upon weapon development and force structure within an alliance might with advantage be more fully developed (Belgium, Norway, International Staff).
- (l) The Greek Delegate suggested that mention should be made of the recognition by the Alliance that its economically less developed members required help to enable them to contribute to the common defence.
- (m) Several speakers agreed with Mr. Kohler that the report should be written as a frank document solely for the consumption of the Special Group; the question of what should be published could be considered later by the Special Group and/or the Council. In this context the Canadian Delegate felt that any possible duplication with other reports should be left to be ironed out either at the Ditchley meeting or later.

3. Mr. Kohler promised to take note of all the points that were raised and to incorporate as many as possible in a "final final draft". I am sure that he and his staff will do what they can, but at the same time the last draft adopted so central a line that I think it will be difficult for him to make any very far-reaching modifications. The intention is that the "final final draft" will be circulated on 26th or 27th September, with a request that final comments should reach Washington not later than 4th or 5th October, with the intention that the final version should be distributed to the other rapporteurs about 6th October.


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