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NATO CONFIDENTIAL

19 May, 1967

To: Dr. Bühling
From: D. Vincent
c.c.: Mr. Hookaday

JMV

Subject: Meeting of Sub-Group No. 3 on 18 May, 1967.

As you requested, I have prepared a summary report of the discussions of Sub-Group No. 3 yesterday. I have tried to concentrate on the more important points raised, leaving aside minor drafting suggestions.

You may wish to attach a copy of the Greek statement, when available, before forwarding this to the Secretary General.

D. Vincent.

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FUTURE TASKS OF THE ALLIANCESub - Group III

Sub-Group III held its second meeting on Thursday, 18 May 1967, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Foy Kohler, to discuss the revised outline for a study on future defence policy tabled by the U.S. Delegation.

Comments on the Introduction

2. The Chairman explained that the introductory passage was intended to summarise the main themes of the paper and suggested that substantive discussion of these paragraphs could only be undertaken once the paper as a whole had been examined. Delegations agreed to this procedure. However, Mr. de Staercke asked that a clear exposition should be made at the beginning of the paper of the reasons why it was necessary to maintain a multilateral alliance. He recalled the discussion in the Council on the previous day of reports that Warsaw Pact countries were to negotiate a series of bi-lateral defence agreements between themselves. Thus the Communist countries might soon be in a position of being able to propose a simultaneous abolition of NATO and the Warsaw Pact while, at the same time, maintaining their own military strength and cohesion. It was important for NATO to forestall any such propaganda manoeuvre and to explain clearly the problems which required a multilateral solution and which cannot be resolved by bi-lateral pacts.

3. The French Representative, Mr. Renard, disagreed; he thought this was essentially a question of public relations. Furthermore, he pointed out that the views expressed in the Council on the subject had been "nuancé".

4. Mr. Nisio, referring to the first sentence of the introductory passage, said that the objectives of NATO were not only to keep the peace and maintain the independence of its members, but also to expand the principles of the treaty by

peaceful means. The German Representative commented that the task of the Sub-Group was not to define the overall objectives of NATO, but to concentrate on defence aspects. The Netherlands thought that the introductory passage should form part of the general report of the Special Group. The study of the Sub-Group should be devoted to developing a general defence policy for NATO in the future.

Comments on Part I

5. There was general agreement that the paper should be made shorter if possible. Sir Bernard Burrows supported by Germany and the Netherlands warned against duplicating the work of other sub-groups, particularly as regards the topics covered by sections A, B and C. Several delegations thought these sections could be either telescoped or summarised more briefly. Mr. Birgi, while not disagreeing with this judgement, pointed out that some overlapping was inevitable and even desirable. The Chairman suggested that the study should concentrate on the military aspects of these questions (e.g. developments in Eastern Europe, changes in the Soviet Union, etc.), whereas other groups would tackle other more political aspects. The question to be asked in all cases should be - how does such and such a development affect our military posture?

Comments on Part II

6. The French Representative thought that section B (the contribution of NATO defence policy to European unity) was "hors sujet". The promotion of European unity was not one of the objectives of the Alliance and should not be dealt with in the paper. He agreed that B (3) (political advantages and limitations of an integrated military command structure) should be developed, but not in connection with European unity. Similarly, it was not one of the objectives of the Alliance to contribute to Atlantic co-operation, (~~see~~ section C) although there could be some discussion of the effects of NATO defence policy on Atlantic co-operation. The Netherlands Representative agreed that NATO defence policy could only make a small contribution to European unity and Atlantic co-operation.

7. The Canadian Representative expressed doubts about section H, particularly the references to a NATO rôle in international peace-keeping. He thought it would be dangerous if the impression got abroad that NATO was considering rivalling the United Nations in this field. He suggested that the title of the section might be changed to "NATO as a Regional Defence Organisation under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter". The reference to a NATO rôle in international peace-keeping should be suppressed as well as the last phrase in paragraph 2. This did not mean that the rapporteurs should not have complete freedom to explore these questions in the study, but he would prefer the main headings to be less specific. The French Representative agreed. The German Representative supported by the Netherlands suggested that another aspect to be considered under this heading should be the effect of developments in the third world on NATO defence policy. Some delegations were concerned lest this section overlap with the work of Sub-Group IV, but it was finally agreed that the military aspects of this problem were within the competence of the Group.

8. The Greek Representative announced that he would be circulating the text of a statement. He thought that the study should draw, to a large extent, on the material contained in the DPC's document on political guidance to the Military Authorities as well as on the "appreciation" of the Military Committee. Referring to Mr. de Staercke's comments on the move in the Warsaw Pact towards bi-lateral defence treaties, he wondered whether the West too, while firmly maintaining NATO, should not also envisage a series of bi-lateral defence pacts. This might make it less advantageous for the Communists to call for the abolition of NATO. Mr. de Staercke commented that this would imply 225 separate defence pacts which was hardly a simplification. The French Representative pointed out that it was the Communists, not NATO, who always proposed the equation, Warsaw Pact = NATO; it was the Communists who always referred to 1969 as a date at

which the Alliance might be terminated. We should not fall into this trap. He could not approve the Greek Representative's views in bi-lateral pacts.

9. There was also discussion on the emphasis given in the paper to disarmament and the relation between defence policies and disarmament. The Netherlands thought the paper concentrated rather too much on this aspect. The U.K. and Danish and Norwegian Delegations explained their views on the relationship between disarmament or arms control and defence.

Comments on Part IV

10. After some delegations had made suggestions concerning drafting points on Part III, it was agreed that the conclusions could not profitably be discussed at this stage since the substance of the paper itself was not yet known. The Group then discussed the draft status report to the Chairman of the Special Group which had been circulated by the Chairman. It was finally agreed that the Chairman would decide on the form of the report to be made after meeting with the Chairman of the Special Group and after learning the procedure to be followed by other rapporteurs. The majority of the Group was in favour of attaching a revised outline of the study to the status report.

11. The Chairman suggested that the Group might meet at the beginning of October, possibly in Washington, to discuss the first draft of a report. If, after seeing the revised outline, delegations thought that a free discussion would be useful before the draft report was produced, he would see whether this could be arranged.