


VS-Vertraulich

DER STAATSSSEKRETÄR
DES AUSWÄRTIGEN AMTS

53 BONN, June 8, 1967

II A 3 - 86.60/1-636/67 VSV



Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

I thank you cordially for your letter of 11 May ^{no trace} which contains a large number of valuable comments and suggestions.

I cannot deal here with all the questions you raise, but will put your letter on the agenda for the next meeting of Sub-Group I and will ask the participants to comment on your ideas.

You rightly point out that the most important procedural problem is whether the Allies "should seek a European settlement between Western and Eastern Europe taken as separate groups", or whether they should "seek a continental security arrangement in which each European country would be represented individually and separately without any other links binding them together".

I agree with you that "any European settlement should be conceived and negotiated as a way of finding a serious degree of agreement between Western and Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, by ensuring a stable balance of power between the two which would be supported and guaranteed by Canada and the United States".

His Excellency
Mr. Manlio Brosio
Secretary-General of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization

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But what road should we take towards this objective? In point 3 of your letter you propose that we should first discuss questions of procedure and only then the wider question of a European settlement. I believe, however, and I hope you will agree with me, that the most expedient course would be for the Sub-Group first to discuss the principles on which a European peace order should be based. I would propose this, even at the risk of some of these problems, in view of the present political situation in Europe, at first appearing abstract.

It seems to me that our first step should be to ensure that the Allies agree on their aims and principles. The outcome of this discussion will show whether and how far we can make progress on questions of procedure.

We have included in our list of topics proposals which have come from the Warsaw Pact States, for example, the proposal for a "European security conference". The Alliance will have to continue to occupy itself with this proposal. For various reasons, such a conference can, I feel, be of no help to the Alliance at the present time.

It is certainly true that an East-West conference might be useful at the right time, although only on the following conditions:

1. The Allies must be agreed from the outset on the important problems which could be points on the conference agenda.
2. The participation of our American Allies must be assured.
3. There must be indubitable indications that the Soviet Union and its Allies too desire a lasting

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and equitable settlement and that they do not regard the conference merely as a tool for destroying the Western Alliance.

Inter-bloc negotiations, that is, between NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization, would not, in my opinion, serve any useful purpose. The question of whether, and in what form, the Communist-ruled part of Germany could be brought into the negotiations is important, I feel. But in this context this question is not decisive.

What is more relevant is that by a bloc-to-bloc approach we would encourage Soviet efforts to strengthen again the cohesion of East European countries in the Warsaw Pact. On the other hand, I am well aware of the dangers to our Alliance if we - each on his own and without any link with the Alliance - were to participate in a multilateral conference.

Thus we find ourselves in a dilemma. We can best get out of it by first and foremost establishing the largest possible measure of agreement between the Allies on the substantial problems. Once this is achieved it will be easier to solve the procedural question of how, and in what way, the Western standpoint should be put forward at a conference between East and West.

But if we cannot agree on the material questions to be debated at such a conference, then even strict procedural measures will not prevent differences of opinion among the Allies from deteriorating our position at the conference. I wish to draw your attention to these dangers.

I hope that my comments cover some of the questions you raise in your letter, which we shall certainly have to discuss in detail. I also hope that some of your ideas will also be taken up in the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Ministers

Yours sincerely,

SECRET

12/6/62

Walter Schindler