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To the
Rapporteur
and
the Members of the
Sub-Group 3

Please find attached the proposals by the German Delegation for Amendments to the US Draft.

(Schmückle)

Brigadier General

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Proposals by the German Delegation for Amendments to the US Draft, Future Task of the Alliance, Sub-group 3

- 1. We agree with the view that questions of strategy and force requirements should not be discussed in Sub-Group 3. If necessary, the relevant work of other bodies, such as the DPWG, could be made use of.
- 2. We feel that Sub-Group 3 should examine several important prolems, such as
  - (a) What is the significance of continuing integrated defence efforts on the one hand and armaments control measures on the other hand for the security of the Alliance?
  - (b) How can the security arrangements mentioned in (a) above be reconciled with the objectives of the Alliance?
- 3. We believe that parts A,B and C of the United States draft can be greatly shortened and summarized.
  - The suggested outline of the study, while maintaining the most important items of the American draft, might be divided into three parts:
  - (a) The first part (which might be entitled "The evolution of the collective and regional security of the West", see also the mandate of the Special Group) should be devoted to a fact-finding exercise and should, after a brief historical review of the principles of the Alliance's defence policy, contain the common defence concept and the resulting requirements for the strength and deployment of the forces. This part should end with the present item C 1, the substance of which could also be taken mainly from the work of other bodies (including para.s 2, 4, 7 and 8 of the Attachment to the American draft).
  - (b) The second and most important part of the study should deal with the "conditions for the future security of the West". Under this heading, the first thing that

should be examined should be the relationship of deterrence to détente (present para. D 1). The importance of continuing defence efforts, summed up in the principles of the Alliance of "integration, commitment, consultation", for internal European cohesion and for Atlantic partnership which, on their part, form the basis for deterrence as well as détente, would have to be given prominence (present para.s D2 and D3).

Armaments control measures would then have to be looked at under the same aspects. Among these, primary importance attaches to a non-proliferation treaty and, for instance, to a step-by-step, balanced reduction of forces on both sides of the Iron Curtain; the chances and risks involved in these measures for the security of the West, their implications for the defence posture and the defence policy of the Alliance would have to be examined (present para. D 5).

This might be followed by a study as to how foreseeable trends in defence technology will affect the defence capabilities and requirements of the Alliance as well as the evaluation of armaments control measures and disarmament (present para. B 3).

The second part could then outline the interrelationships between deterrence, armaments control, defence technology and détente.

(c) The third part could be termed "Conclusions" and go into the question of whether and how a modification in NATO defence policies including armaments control measures can not only continue to guarantee the security of the West as a basis for future political solutions, but also make a direct contribution to the comprehensive objectives of the Alliance, especially a lasting peaceful order in Europe (present para. D 6).

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ANNEX

#### Draft

# MODIFIED OUTLINE OF THE REPORT BY SUB-GROUF 3 The Defence Policy of the Alliance

### A. The Evolution of the Collective and Regional Security of the West

- 1. Brief historical review of the principles of the Alliance's defence policy.
- 2. The present defence concept and the resulting requirements for the strength and deployment of the forces.
- 3. The nature of deterrence in the mid-1960s; the role of the European partners in deterrence.

### B. Conditions for the Future Security of the West

- 1. The relationship of deterrence to détente.
  - (a) The defence policy aspects for Europe on the one hand and for Atlantic partnership on the other hand
    - of the principle of integration and commitment
    - of the principle of consultation.
  - (b) Chances and risks of armaments control for the security of the West; effects on the military posture and the defence policy of the Alliance
    - of a non-proliferation treaty
    - of various measures of armaments control, especially a step-by-step, balanced reduction of the forces stationed on both sides of the Iron Curtain.
- 2. Effects of the foreseeable trends of defence technology on the defence requirements and capabilities of the Alliance and on the evaluation of measures of armaments control and disarmaments.
- 3. Interrelationship between deterrence, defence technology, armaments control and détente.

## C. Can a Modified Defence Policy of the Alliance which includes Measures of Armaments Control

- continue to guarantee the security and freedom of the West as an indispensable basis for political solutions, and
- make a direct contribution to the comprehensive political objectives of the Alliance, especially a lasting, peaceful order in Europe?