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**Report of the Political Main Group Directorate of the Ministry of Defense on the Activity of the Political Bodies of the Fifth Army and the Third Army Corps during the War Game of the UAF Headquarters on June 12–18, 1967, 23 June 1967**

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Political Main Group Directorate

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Subject: Report on the activity of the political bodies of the Fifth Army and Third Corps in the war game of the Unified Armed Forces Headquarters between June 12 and 18, 1967.

The political divisions used the preparation period and the preceding exercises properly to prepare the political work of the war game, to make their "M" plans more specific, and to clarify their assignments expected during the war game.

On the part of the Political Main Group Directorate, two assignments were defined for the political divisions for the period of the exercise:

I) Organization of political work among the personnel participating in the exercise.

II) Planning special propaganda activity and organization of some specific special propaganda tasks, according to the operational situation evolving.

1) Political preparation of the personnel participating in the exercise took part at the appropriate level. During various Party and Communist Youth League programs and conferences, personnel were brought to understand the purpose and importance of the war game and the specific assignments of participants. They received the appropriate ideas and plans for political work to be done during the war game. Most attention was paid to:

- prevention of breaches of discipline and extraordinary incidents;
- looking after people from all aspects;
- maintaining alertness and secrecy;
- mobilization to execute assignments to a high standard and punctually.

The central political work of the effective force was organized in the spirit of preparation for the 7th Congress of the Communist Youth League. During the war game, the plan concerning activity among the effective force was implemented in an organized and consistent way. All this contributed to the fact that participants worked to their utmost in a very responsible way to execute the war game successfully. During the exercise, there were no extraordinary incidents or extreme breaches of discipline. Material and cultural supplies, relaxation and political briefing of the force were ensured properly.

2) According to the instructions of the Political Main Group Directorate, the political divisions executed the following specific tasks of special propaganda work:

- general economic, political, social and military-cum-political evaluation of Austria and North Italy, and analysis of the morale and political features of the West German, Austrian and Italian military forces;
- based on the above evaluation and analysis and specific operational situation, to form conclusions about the main contents, aim, methods and means of special propaganda activity, and elaborate on the part of the instructions from the political division in connection with special propaganda work;
- elaboration of general plans for special propaganda activity for the period until the end of the first operation;
- detailed planning and organization of leaflet action by air, radio program, loudspeaker program and a propaganda-grenade action (only the last two in the army corps), taking into account the specific operational situation that had evolved.

Evaluation of the special propaganda activity carried out:

The political divisions had the plans, documents, preliminary data, supplies and information about the target countries they required to organize special propaganda work.

They carried out the economic, political, social analysis of target countries at the appropriate level. The material devised by the political divisions is brief, clear, relevant and realistic and its conclusions are correct. The executed analysis and the conclusion are appropriate for informing the commanders. They provide enough help in making decisions, and offer a firm foundation for defining the contents, aim and methods of the specific, special propaganda activity of operations for the head of the political division.

Based on the executed analysis of the situation and conclusions, the political divisions defined the aim, contents, form and means of special propaganda activity in the correct way. The part of the instructions of the head of the political division referring to the organization and execution of special propaganda activity was prepared at the appropriate level, in due detail and with due attention to facts.

The general plan elaborated during the war game for organizing and executing special propaganda activity in both political divisions contains the most important assignments whose execution should be expected during the preparation and the first operation.

The plans pay due attention to the evolved operational situation, the forces and equipment at hand.

The planned assignments accord with the expected process of the operations and calculate the time factor in the correct way. They divided the forces and equipment at their disposal among subordinates in a considered and reasonable fashion. They determined the order and place of their location in the correct way.

They liaised on the planned activity with the chief of the service concerned.

They reckoned with and guaranteed the material and technical conditions and the time needed for preparing and executing the majority of the actions.

The working documents devised deserve special attention from the point of view of expediency and reasonability:

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- The operational map of the special propaganda sub-division (sector) contains, to the degree appropriate to the activity, the location and order of battle of own and hostile troops, points of command, location of special propaganda materials and participating bodies. It was continually revised.

- The graphic, operative plan of the special propaganda sub-division (sector) shows clearly and simply the execution mechanism, sequence, and spatial and temporal relations of the activities of the executive and participating bodies, from planning to conclusion.

- The documents prepared as supplements to the graphic operative plan (e.g. leaflet, text plan, etc.) ensure effective, purposeful, punctual execution of actions.

The weaknesses of the analyses, documents and plans elaborated:

- The analysis of the armies of individual countries, their morale and political condition, the controversies within the given army and the conclusions are not detailed or specific enough. They tell little about the situation of the Italian army; they do not contain the necessary material and data about this. (For the army corps instructors, Italy is not marked as a target country.)

- They have not differentiated or specified to the required extent the directions of larger towns and sectors within the zone of the army and the army corps, either in the evaluation or when forming conclusions.

- They do not pay enough attention to the progressive forces of target countries. They ignore them in the evaluation and the conclusions and do not make necessary plans for encouragement, mobilization or activation of them.

- The planned continuous cooperation with all chiefs of the services concerned, to specify and continuously complete data, supplies and information about the target countries and the hostile military forces (state, mood of the population, character, contents, expected effect of hostile propaganda, etc.) is not satisfactory.

- They have not planned and organized the collection of the requirements for special propaganda of services and service branches. As a consequence, they are unable to determine concretely enough the aims of the special propaganda work, for example, to say whether they should mobilize the local population in the first place in the given sector for the protection of its material, technical, health, cultural facilities and base.

[Handwritten note: This should be coordinated with the operational division within the limits of feasibility.]

- Some initial discouragement could be felt in launching certain assignments. People wanted to be too certain. Sometimes they waited for approval of the commander's decision and successive new details of the evaluation of the enemy, when they could have started organizing the implementation of the given assignment.

- The political division of the army corps did not pay attention, either during the evaluation of the situation or when defining conclusions and assignments, to the fact that a Soviet division was active in the zone and under the command of the corps. The political division and its special propaganda section are not prepared enough for such a situation.

Problems that have arisen during the war game—and need solving by the higher leadership:

- It is not unambiguously clear what the role and assignments of army corps, political divisions, front political bodies and the HPA Political Main Group Directorate are in the planning, direction, coordination and execution of special propaganda activity during the period of "M."

- It is not sufficiently clear whether, depending on changes in the operational assignment, the army corps may use the civilian facilities assigned to it, what other facilities it may use, or what the fate of the facilities assigned to it will be. (During the present war game, for example, the regrouping meant that the army could not count on the Szombathely press assigned to it, it was only able to organize conditionally the use of facilities in the zone it occupied only conditionally, while the corps did not utilize the relieved facilities in Szombathely either).

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- The question of relations with the political bodies of the border guards is not sufficiently clarified. Nor are the possibilities and procedures for using their knowledge, facilities and bodies useful for special propaganda activity.

- It is not sufficiently clear what contents and system of activity are to be carried out among prisoners of war, or the mutual assignments and obligations of participants required in this sphere. (No station for collecting prisoners of war has been set up in the "M" organization of the army corps.) [Handwritten note: Directive.]

- It is not adequately clarified what mutual obligations the special propaganda bodies and the various service directorates have in peace and war. (Which service covers which technical facilities, for what assignments it trains people, when, what data and matter it supplies, how the special propaganda bodies learn of the needs of the services, how they fulfil the requirements, etc.) Consequently, the execution of assignments expected in connection with special propaganda work cannot be considered guaranteed in some aspects. (For example, there are no propaganda grenades in the ammunition stocks of the artillery. There is no corresponding training for the artillery troops.) [Handwritten note: This is a central planning and supply assignment, it is under progress. Directive and Rules (Army and Division) military rules.]

Conclusions:

- The political divisions are well prepared for the organization, execution and continuous direction of special propaganda activity. They are able to organize purposefully and direct continuously the activity of the forces and equipment assigned to them.

- They executed the assignments defined by the Political Main Group Directorate at the required level during the war game, despite the deficiencies signified.

Proposals:

- The Agitation and Propaganda Group leader should evaluate in detail the experience of the war game for the special propaganda workers of the corps, in the presence of two heads of political divisions. The full force of the sixth division of the Political Main Group Directorate should participate in the evaluation.

- The sixth division of the Political Main Group Directorate should clarify the problems that have arisen and require central measures. It should make proposals for sorting out the questions concerning other bodies.

- The comrade head of the Political Main Group Directorate should make an official commendation of Lieutenant-Colonel Kálmán Bányai and to Captain István Szatai, the head of the Agitation and Propaganda Group, for their successful work during the war game.

Budapest, June 23, 1967

Colonel Antal Halász  
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*[Archives: War History Archive, Ministry of Defense Political Main Group Directorate 1967 Unit 102/05/426 pp. 1–8]*