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**Report of Lieutenant-General Jenő Köteles, Chief Training Supervisor, to the  
Colonel-General Lajos Czinege, Minister of Defense, on the UAF Training  
Conference held in Moscow on October 22–23, 1963, 29 October 1963**

1. Report on the assessments of the supreme commander and chief-of-staff of the Unified Armed Forces.  
pp. 1–6.

Report by Lieutenant-General Jenő Köteles. October 29, 1963.

Ministry of Defense

Hungarian People's Army

Training Main Group Directorate

SECRET!

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To Comrade Colonel General LAJOS  
CZINEGE  
Minister of Defense of the Hungarian  
People's Republic

BUDAPEST

Subject : Report on the Moscow conference of Unified Armed Forces Headquarters

I report the following on the training conference held in Moscow on October 22–23, 1963.

On the first day of the conference comrade Army General Batov evaluated the achievements of the past training year, described the existing deficiencies and briefly summed up the tasks given in the Directive and the training instructions for the training year of 1964. Comrade Marshal Sudets evaluated the achievements of the national air-defense and air forces and described the forthcoming tasks. Comrade Admiral Gorshkov told the military navy forces about their assignments and set the tasks for 1964. Afterwards the heads of the delegations reported on the training situation in their armies and gave a short account of the main tasks for the training year 1964. At the end of the first day, Comrade Marshal Grechko summed up the essence of the conference, evaluated the present situation and pointed to the main tasks to be resolved.

On the second day of the conference, we listened to two lectures. One dealt with the question of using outer space for warfare, the other with the role of cybernetics in the conduct of armies and operations.

a) The report by Comrade Batov gave a basically positive evaluation of the results achieved by the armies in this year of training, he specially emphasized the great importance of joint exercises.

He dwelt at length on the deficiencies that were conspicuous in individual armies during the training year.

In relation to Hungary, the following were stressed:

- We must pay even more attention to technology being in a combat-ready state and we must ensure that there are fewer defects of tanks, traction engines and motor vehicles during exercises.
- We must pay more attention to secrecy leadership; the open circulation of radios during exercises should be strictly prohibited.
- Our pace of attack is still slow (4–5 km/h).
- The organization of movement is not satisfactory; columns sometimes happen to cross each other.
- The width and depth of engagements is small and does not meet modern requirements.
- We do not draw into the exercises the army's direct formations to the necessary extent.
- We should provide protective devices for the under-water crossing of tanks as soon as possible.

He continued by describing the tasks of the training year of 1964, which are included in the directive.

b) In his summary, Comrade Grechko emphasized the unity and friendly atmosphere that could be felt during the whole training year, especially in the joint exercises and at the conference itself. This is one of our main strengths with respect to our striking power.

Evaluating the international situation, he stated that a certain relaxation could be felt compared with earlier periods. But we must see clearly that there has been no question of disarmament so far. On the contrary, in one of his speeches, Kennedy had said that the Moscow Treaty basically meant nothing.

He said that in the training year 1963, our armed forces had achieved important results in increasing their military readiness. Our strength had increased substantially in connection with the quality of nuclear weapons, and we had greatly exceeded NATO's strength in missile technology and submarines.

But the Americans keep increasing their armaments. They carry out exercises such as their last air transportation drill, when they transported a tank division to Europe by air in 36 hours (with full technology, 16,000 people).

They have changed their strategic plans, giving up the Rhine line of defense, and drawn their units closer to the borders of socialist countries. We may count on the fact that they will continue the Adenauer-Erhard policy completely.

That is why we must do our best to supply our armies with the most modern facilities, and in the training year 1964, the main emphasis must be put on a further increase of military readiness. We must ensure that the regiments and divisions are able to carry out an alert in the shortest time

possible, attaining a state of readiness to march and learning the direct transition from marching to combat.

The pace of attack is of great importance. But we must see clearly that the enemy is strong and not stupid, so that we cannot increase the distance covered in a day without limits, and 80 km a day must be considered a very high requirement. We must pay serious attention to the training of divisions and army staff and we must ensure that the commanders and their staff are always near their troops and lead them from that position. (In the relation of army divisions, army staff at 10–20 km.) The staff should have up-to-date communications, and by all means it must be secured that the advanced post, and post and point of command of military supply services, have appropriate communication devices, so that the command of troops remains possible even if one should fail.

Training must be organized and exercises carried out in the aggressive spirit of our military doctrine. Our fighting is characterized by attack.

He drew our attention to the fact that we should take care to replenish the divisions of the first echelon to 100%. Technical reinforcement should be concentrated on these divisions and not divided proportionately over the whole army. It will be prescribed for us what should be understood by enhanced and full combat readiness. We must be careful not to reveal our real plans at exercises.

In the new training year, he will continue to visit the armies. He will move individual units and superior units again, as he did in Hungary in January 1963. This visit was really good and taught a lot of useful lessons. He evaluated the activity of the tank division, caught in cold of 25 degrees in a violent storm, as good, and he specially set Comrade Czinege's attitude toward the winter exercises as a good example for the leaders of the other armies, and especially the fact that he executed the alarm of a new division and a division exercise in the Hungarian Army to do away with the deficiencies found and to help to accustom them to hard winter conditions. His January stay was very useful and fruitful, and so he plans to carry on with it in the coming training year. He demands that in the training year 1964, we carry out a division exercise with all divisions, a regiment exercise with all regiments, and two battalion and two squadron exercises with the whole personnel strength. The organization and execution of combat without nuclear support must be practiced. We must take great care to keep technical conditions always ready for combat.

He considers it extremely necessary to supply the armies with armored personnel carriers as soon as possible. Organization (squad, section) must be adjusted to the holding capacity of transporters. He suggests 300 tanks per tank division and 200 tanks per motorized rifle division. In addition, there are 3 missiles available per division.

He requests us to carry out the plans according to the agreement and pay careful attention to the preparation of the theater of war.

By 10 December, he requests submission for his approval of the plan of the war game to be conducted by the comrade minister in January. The accounts of Comrades Sudets and Gorshkov contain the same training instructions.

A new feature of the preparation for the new training year was the fact that the Directorate of the Unified Armed Forces should give not only the directive, but also training instructions to all services.

In the new training year at least 10 months of training are prescribed, with 5 training days a week, 6 hours fight training a day and 2 hours of individual learning.

I submit the translated version of the directive enclosed.

Supplement: 1 Directive.

Budapest, 29 October 1963

Lieutenant General Jenő Köteles  
Deputy Head of the Main Group of Training of the Hungarian  
People's Army

Lieutenant General Jenő Köteles  
Deputy Head of the Main Training Group of the Hungarian People's Army

Supplement a):

Directive for the operational and battle drill of the training year of 1964

Exclusively to:

Comrade Colonel-General Lajos Czinege, minister of defense  
of the Hungarian People's Republic

A. Grechko, Marshal of the Soviet Union, supreme  
commander of the Unified Armed Forces

Army General P. Batov, chief of staff of the Unified Armed  
Forces

In the introduction, the leaders of the UAF accused the members of the US and NATO of preparing for a new world war, starting with surprise nuclear strikes against the countries of the socialist camp. In NATO's armed forces, they carried out the intensive military training of troops and staff. During numerous large-scale exercises, they trained in the implementation of a nuclear attack and transportation of troops on air and sea routes.

Taking these circumstances into consideration, the main endeavor of the UAF leaders was directed, during the operational and combat training, at further reinforcement of the military readiness of the superior units and units of the forces and services, counting on a nuclear missile war. In the training year of 1963—in their opinion—the generals and officers deepened their knowledge of the use of modern military equipment. They increased their proficiency in planning and executing joint military actions, taking the special features of war theatres into account. They

achieved positive results in the training of staff, the organization of cooperation between the services and forces, the superior units of the allied armies. The UAF staff set out in practice the set training tasks. Then they listed under ten heads the deficiencies that could not be overcome in numerous superior units:

- Guaranteeing permanent combat readiness.
- Learning to use new military techniques.
- Nuclear and chemical exemption of troops.
- Deficiencies of staff and troop leading.
- Slow pace of advance of ground forces and their maneuvers.
- Military readiness of national air-defense units did not reach the required standard.
- Support action of the air force and military navy was not well organized.
- The provision of military supplies and services were on a low level.
- In numerous armies, maintenance, repair and storing of military technology were unsatisfactory.

They considered the main task of the training year of 1964 to be to ensure in practice the permanent combat readiness of the superior units of all forces, and acquisition of the ability to engage in combat action as early as possible. To realize this, they elaborated a 12-point plan of proposals, the prescriptions of which—up to the level of heads of divisions—were to be made known in the armies of the member-states.

Supplement b): Basic plan of measures of the UAF Headquarters for the 1964 training year of the HPA

TOP SECRET

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"I APPROVE"

A. Grechko, the Marshal of the Soviet Union

The supreme commander of the Unified Armed Forces

October 21, 1963

The basic plan of operational and training measures of the Headquarters of the Unified Armed Forces for the Hungarian People's Army for the training year of 1964

1. Number	2. The measure	3. The date of execution
1.	Operational war game to be conducted by the Minister of Defense of the HPR on map: Into the war game are drawn the following: From the side of the Hungarian People's Army—the 5th Army	January

	Headquarters. From the side of the Armed Forces of the Romanian People's Republic—an army headquarters. From the side of the Soviet Army—from the Carpathian military district—army corps, from the Southern Army Group—the commander of the Southern Army Group, in the role of deputy leader of the exercise, the staff's generals and officers—as arbitrators.	
2.	Participation of the Fifth Army Headquarters of the Hungarian People's Army at the commanders' and staff command (operational) exercises, on terrain with means of communication to be conducted by the Southern Army Group.	August
3.	Cooperative tactical-troop exercise to be conducted according to the plan of the Southern Army Group Headquarters with the participation of a motorized rifle division (tank division) of the Southern Army Group and a motorized rifle division (tank division) with reduced strength of the Hungarian People's Army. (The division and regiment staff, a motorized rifle regiment and division are assigned with full strength.)	April
4.	Cooperative tactical-troop exercise to be conducted according to the plan of the Hungarian People's Army Headquarters with the participation of a motorized rifle division of the Hungarian People's Army and a motorized rifle division (tank division) of the Southern Army Group with reduced force (the division and regiment staff, a motorized rifle regiment and division are direct with full force)	October
5.	Joint tactical-professional exercise of the subordinated radio units of the Hungarian People's Army and the Southern Army Group to be conducted under the leadership of the head of communications of the Southern Army Group.	July
6.	Participation of a group of generals and officers of the staff of the Unified Armed Forces in control of the process of combat training and in providing help at a motorized rifle division and missile brigade	May
7.	Live-fire maneuver of the missile units of the ground troops of the Hungarian People's Army on the Soviet Union's shooting ground.	September
8.	Participation of the HPR's National Air-defense Center, air-defense staff, forces and facilities at the air-defense exercise to be conducted by the commander of air-defense troops of the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty	March
9.	Live-fire maneuver of air-defense missile units and capturing fighter pilots on the Soviet Union's shooting grounds	According to a separate plan

1^.	Conference of the representatives of the air force and air-defense staff of the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty concerning the organization of co-operational communications and the measures to be taken concerning air security - Prague	May
11.	Conference of the leading force of the armies of the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty summarizing the operational and combat-training achievements of the training year 1964 and setting the tasks for the year 1965	October

12 October 1963

Army General Batov

Chief-of-Staff of the Unified Armed Forces

*[Archives: War History Archive, 102/05/426, Pages: 1-32.]*