Report by the Director of the Second Intelligence Group of the HPA Headquarters on the Staff Command Exercise of the Ministry of Defense, 11 March 1963

General Staff of the Hungarian

People's Army

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1) General situation

Due to political and military measures executed recently by the "Westerners," the international situation has become extremely strained and war tensions have arisen.

The "Westerners" have commenced partial redeployment of strategic strike forces from overseas to the European theater of war.

The number of B-47-type medium-range bombers stationed in Europe and North Africa has been increased recently from the usual 150–160 to 200–220. The number of B-52 bombers carrying out permanent patrol activity has been increased from 6 to 40–42, so that 10–12 are stationed at any one time in European air space.

The "Westerners" possess in total the following strategic strike forces for executing the first global-scale series of strategic nuclear missile strikes:

<u>US forces</u> :	ICBM ("Atlas", "Titan", "Minuteman")		206
	IRBM ("Thor", "Jupiter")		105
	"Polaris" (on 10 submarines)		160
	Strategic bombers (B-52, B-47, B-58))	1821
	Strategic naval bombers (A-3B, A-5	iA)	144
	Total:		2436
British forces:	Fighter bombers ("Vulcan", "Victor", "Va	aliant") 200	
	Grand Total:	2636	

The forces are ready in principle to make the strategic nuclear missile strike <u>at any time</u>. The expected time of the first strategic nuclear missile strike:

- If the strike is delivered without the prior advance and deployment into units

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<u>of the complete operational first echelon of the ground forces</u>, the first strategic nuclear missile strike can be expected from <u>May 5 onwards</u>.

- If the <u>strike occurs after the advance and deployment into units of the ground forces</u> participating in the offensive operation, <u>the strike can be expected from May 7–8</u> onwards.

With the <u>ground forces</u>, the NATO military forces are brought up to combat strength by secret mobilization and deployment of these forces into units commences under the pretext of various exercises.

Large quantities of live troops and supplies are transported to the theaters of war and from overseas.

The intention is probably to commence ground operations in the offensive war concurrently with the first strategic nuclear missile strike. Taking this into account—and assuming the strategic nuclear missile strike is executed on May 5—the offensive ground operations may start with smaller numbers of forces and limited goals on May 5, while the main forces are brought in from May 6.

If the first strategic nuclear missile strike is delivered on May 7–8, ground operations may start concurrently with the involvement of all the ground forces.

2) Expected extent and course of a strategic nuclear missile strike against the territory of the HPR by the "Westerners"

During the first world-scale strategic nuclear missile thrust delivered by the "Westerners", the US, Italian and West German air force and missile troops stationed in the Central and South European theaters of war may deliver conventional and nuclear missile strikes against the territory of the HPR.

The strategic forces may strike from two basic air operational directions:

a) The following forces can be expected from the "Western" air operational direction (MUNICH-LINZ-BUDAPEST), from the territory of Southern Germany:

- from the 11th West German "Matador" division

- total from the 32nd and 34th West German fighter-bomber wings (F84F)

- from the 53rd West German tactical regiment of reconnaissance air
wing (G-91R)

Total:

5-6 missiles,

100 aircraft,

36 aircraft

5-6 guided missiles and

Reckoning with 75% deployment of the air force from the above air operational direction, we may expect a total of:

- 5–6 guided missiles and 102 aircraft.

Of the above forces, <u>5–6 missiles</u> of the <u>11th</u> West German "Matador" division may be

used to carry out nuclear strikes.

b) From the <u>"South-Western" operational direction</u> (MILAN-BUDAPEST and NAPLES-BUDAPEST directions), from the territories of Italy, Spain and Morocco, the following forces may carry out actions:

- from the 36th "Jupiter" guided missile brigade	2-3 missiles,
- from the US strategic fighter squadron (B-47)	10-15 aircraft
- from the US strategic fighter squadron (F-100D)	18 aircraft,
- from one or two US carrier bomber squadrons (A3D)	12-24 aircraft,
- from the 5th and 6th Italian fighter bomber brigades (F-84F, G-91A)	150 aircraft,
- from the Third Italian reconnaissance brigade (RF-84F)	54 aircraft
Total:	244-261 aircraft
Of this forces, the following are able to deliver nuclear strikes:	
- guided missiles	2-3
- US strategic fighters and marine air force planes	30-42
- medium US bombers	10-15
- two Italian fighter bomber squadrons	50
Total:	2-3 guided missiles 90-107 aircraft.

Reckoning with 75% deployment of aircraft, there can be expected from the above air operational direction activity from a <u>total</u> of:

- 2-3 guided missiles and

183-196 aircraft can be expected.

The "Westerners" have total the following forces available from the two air operational directions activity from a <u>total</u> of::

- guided missiles	7-9
- aircraft	380-397

Reckoning with the 75% deployment of air force from the two air operational directions, we may count on <u>total</u> of:

- 7-9 guided missiles and
- 285-298 aircraft.

Of these, the following may be used as <u>nuclear-capable</u> fighters:

- all the guided missiles 7-9,

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- US strategic fighter and marine air force planes	30-42,
- medium US bombers	10-15,
- two the Italian fighter-bomber squadrons	50 aircraft.
Total:	7-9 missiles,
	90-107 aircraft

The following initial assumptions can be made when determining the <u>quantity of nuclear strikes to be expected</u>:

- All guided missiles carry out nuclear strikes.
- Only some nuclear-capable strategic aircraft carry out strikes; the others cover the nuclear-capable bombers.

Correspondingly, there can be expected:

- 50% of the US strategic fighters and carrier bombers.
- 50–60% of the US medium bombers.
- 25–50% of the Italian fighter-bombers.

The <u>following strikes</u> can therefore be expected <u>against this country</u> during the first <u>nuclear missile</u> <u>attack</u>:

- guided missiles	7-9 nuclear strikes	
- medium bombers	7-10	
- US tactical fighters	8-9	
- US military naval aircraft	6-12	
- Italian fighter bombers	12-13	
Total:	40-53 nuclear strikes	

The expected Course of the nuclear missile strikes

The strike forces are likely to carry out the nuclear missile strike in two offensive echelons.

On the Western border of the Hungarian People's Republic, the hostile air force may attack in an airspace approximately 150–200 km wide. The aircraft of the hostile military air force will carry out their actions in pairs or groups (3–4 aircraft). The strategic nuclear bombers are expected to fly in groups and the ones attacking with conventional weapons in pairs, while the reconnaissance aircraft are expected mainly to fly alone. The pairs and groups of aircraft will be grouped into waves, with several waves making up the offensive echelon.

The <u>first offensive echelon</u> may consist of about 60–70 pairs or groups of aircraft, which will allow formation of a total of 12–14 waves. Two thirds of the total air force participating in the first strike are likely to be put into the first offensive echelon, *i.e.* about 160–180 aircraft.

So the depth of the first offensive echelon (the 12–14 waves) may reach <u>200–250 km</u>, which means, assuming a speed of 1000 km/h, that it will be able to cross the country's

border in about 15 minutes.

The order of battle of the <u>second</u> echelon may be similarly structured, except that it will contain fewer aircraft (perhaps 1/3 of the total force).

Thus the first offensive echelon will be able to deliver simultaneous strikes on targets in Transdanubia and the Danube-Tisza region. The aircraft heading the offensive echelon are likely to attack targets lying deeper, so that following aircraft do not have to pass through radioactive clouds or face fire from air defenses protecting distant objects.

The expected course of the first strike is as follows:

The first strike may start with the "Jupiter" strategic medium-range guided missiles reaching their targets. (This would mark the "B"[battle] itself.) Concurrently, the groups of aircraft and "Matador" guided missiles forming the first wave of the first offensive echelon of the military air forces would arrive, and fly over the limit of the reconnaissance of their own locators (about 150 km from the border) at a height of 4–7 km.

In principle, the <u>first offensive echelon</u> is able to <u>carry out its task in about "B" + 55-60 minutes.</u>

This results from the following:

- From the Western to the Eastern border of the country is a distance of 500 km + the limit of locator reconnaissance at 150 km makes a total of 650 km.
- The attacking military fighters are able to fly across the 650 km in 37–40 minutes (taking the mean of the flying speeds of F-84F and F-100 D at 17 km/minute).
- About 10% must be added for maneuvering, so that the flying time increases to 40-45 minutes.
- The 250 km depth of the battle order of the first offensive echelon must also be considered, which means 15 minutes of flying time, making 55–60 minutes in total.
- The aircraft grouped in the <u>second offensive echelon</u> take off at "B" at the latest, so that they can avert the danger of damage from the expected reply strike.

The aircraft in the <u>second offensive echelon</u> reach the limit of locator reconnaissance at about "B" + 45-55 minutes. The second echelon is likely to consist of only 6–7 waves, so that the depth of the order of battle is 100-140 km. The second echelon may <u>carry out its task in 40-45 minutes</u> (by "B" + 95-110 minutes).

So the NATO strategic forces are able to carry out the first strategic nuclear strike on the territory of our country in a total of about 95–110 minutes.

The first nuclear missile strike may occur so that the aircraft take off only at the time the guided missiles are launched. In that case, the duration of the strike increases.

The first wave of aircraft, in that case, reaches the limit of locator reconnaissance at "B" \pm 30, so that the first offensive echelon may complete the strike by "B" \pm 85-90, while the second echelon reaches the limit of locator reconnaissance by "B" \pm 75–85 and completes its strike by "B" \pm 125–140.

In that case, the strike forces are able to carry out the first strategic nuclear missile strike in 125–140 minutes.

3) Expected activity of "Western" ground forces against the Hungarian People's Republic

In case of war against the Hungarian People's Republic, West German, Italian, French and US forces in NATO's Central and Southern-European theaters of war may be used, perhaps with Austrian armed forces as well.

The following total forces are positioned in the South German/North Italian area of the theater of war and in Austria:

- a) Excluding Austrian forces (Austria remains neutral):
 - 17 divisions
 - 159 tactical-operational nuclear weapons,
 - 3267 tanks, and
 - 2623 guns and mortars.
- b) Together with Austrian forces (with Austria's active participation):
 - 20 divisions,
 - 159 tactical-operational nuclear weapons,
 - 3687 tanks, and
 - 3043 guns and mortars.

The expected operations of the above "Western" forces may begin from two basic operational directions. These are as follows:

- The Northwestern operational direction, MUNICH-LINZ-VIENNA-BUDAPEST.
- The Western operational direction, PADUA–KLAGENFURT–GRAZ–SZOMBATHELY.

The <u>timing of commencement of offensive operations</u> by "Western" ground forces, from the above operational directions, depends on when the first military nuclear missile strike is delivered.

a) If they do not wait for the complete advance and deployment of ground-force units before the first strategic nuclear missile strike is made, simultaneous ground operations will only be possible with fewer forces—maybe Austrian forces in the general VIENNA—GYŐR direction—and with a limited goal (from May 5 onwards), in which case deployment of the main forces can be expected from May 6 onwards.

In this case, direct ground operations by the main forces against the territory of the Hungarian People's Republic can only begin on May 6–7.

- d) [sic] If the first strategic nuclear missile strike is preceded by the complete advance and deployment of ground-force units, offensive operations by all ground forces may begin on May 7–8. If no resistance is met on the territory of Austria, the border of the Hungarian People's Republic may be reached on May 9 or by dawn on May 10.
 - a) The forces in the Northwestern operational direction:
- US, West German and French forces are positioned on the territory of Southern Germany. The following forces may be active in this operational direction:

Excluding Austrian forces:

8 divisions (1 2/3 US, 4 West German, 2 1/3 French divisions),

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119 tactical nuclear weapons,

2262 tanks,

1133 guns and mortars;

Including Austrian forces:

10 divisions (including 1 2/3 Austrian divisions),

119 tactical nuclear weapons,

2602 tanks,

1399 guns and mortars.

Forces on the territory of Southern Germany may begin offensive operations:

- In the direction MUNICH-CESKE-BUDEJOVICE-BRNO-OSTRAVA (Version "A"), or
- In the general directions MUNICH-LINZ-VIENNA, BRNO-OSTRAVA, and VIENNA-GYŐR-BUDAPEST (Version "B").
 Version "A"

<u>Version "A" assumes positive neutrality on the part of Austria.</u> In this case, the offensive operation by the <u>main NATO forces</u> may begin in the direction MUNICH-CESKE-BUDEJOVICE-BRNO-OSTRAVA, with the goal of detaching the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and transferring the military operations to the territory of the Polish People's Republic.

In this direction (main thrust), the following forces may be used in total:

5–6 divisions,

95 tactical nuclear weapons,

1576 tanks,

850 guns and mortars.

To forestall successful counter-activity by us in the directions PLZEN–MUNICH or BUDAPEST–GYŐR–VIENNA–LINZ–PASSAU, a <u>smaller part of the NATO forces</u> (about 1–2 divisions) is likely to breach Austria's neutrality, occupy the area PASSAU–SALZBURG–INNSBRUCK ("Alpine Fortress") and so cover the right wing of the main forces.

To carry out this task, they have in total:

1 2/3 divisions (2/3 Italian (mountain) brigade, 1 West German division)

8 tactical nuclear weapons,

292 tanks,

260 guns and mortars.

If the offensive of the "Western" main forces gains ground successfully and forestalls our own counter-activity by deploying the forces regrouped in the "Alpine Fortress" and the operational reserves, which have advanced in the meantime (1–2 French divisions), the offensive may be taken in the main direction LINZ–VIENNA–BUDAPEST (a total of 3–4 divisions) and maybe the auxiliary direction INNSBRUCK–KLAGENFURT–GRAZ—SZOMBATHELY (about 1 division), to cover the right wing of the Northeastern main strike and start realizing their intentions of detaching the Hungarian People's Republic.

If there were a simultaneous thrust by our own forces, their breakthrough would not

encounter major resistance until the area of LINZ-SALZBURG-PASSAU, but there the activity of "Western" forces prepared for defense must be expected.

After the arrival of the operational reserves (French forces), the defense forces may start a counterstrike, during which close combat may take place in the LINZ basin.

Version "B"

The conditions for realizing NATO plans are more favorable under <u>Version "B"</u>, in which <u>Austria</u> joins actively in the operations <u>on the side of the "Westerners."</u>

The <u>main thrust</u> in the offensive operation (with the force of about 6 divisions) may begin in the general direction MUNICH-LINZ-VIENNA, with the task of developing the thrust from the VIENNA basin, by deploying the operational reserve (2–3 divisions (French)) in the directions of VIENNA-BRNO-OSTRAVA and VIENNA-GYŐR-BUDAPEST, eliminating the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and at the same time making it possible to eliminate the Hungarian People's Republic.

The Austrian military may carry out military defensive activity until the arrival of "Western" forces, to delay the advance of our forces and close the Czech, Hungarian and Yugoslav borders. Then, in cooperation with the "Western" forces, it will participate in the offensive operation. The Austrian forces may perhaps carry out an offensive with a limited target, in the general VIENNA–GYŐR direction.

To strengthen the defensive activity of the Austrian military forces, NATO may deploy air commandos in the southern district of VIENNA (parts of the 1st West German air commando division—with a strength of about one strengthened brigade.)

If the defensive activity of Austrian forces requires at least one day, the "Western" main forces may reach the VIENNA basin and an encounter occur with our own forces.

The following Western forces may participate against the Hungarian People's Republic in the encounter and in the offensive operation planned afterwards in the direction VIENNA–GYŐR–BUDAPEST:

3–4 divisions,

36-48 tactical nuclear weapons,

1000–1200 tanks,

450–530 guns and mortars.

If the defensive activity of Austrian forces fails, our forces may engage directly with the main grouping of the "Westerners" in the district LINZ-SALZBURG-NORTH PASSAU.

Direct air support for operations

Air support for the ground troops on the operational territory concerned will be provided primarily by the West German and French fighter-bombers. The US tactical fighter forces may also be drawn into the tactical support, but they are likely to be used to support the forces acting in the main NATO operational directions. (The potential of the Austrian air force is insignificant as they have only 15 obsolete J-29F fighter-bombers at present.)

The following may be reckoned with for air support:

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- 2 West German fighter-bomber regiments (32nd and 34th), with a total of 100 F-84F-type aircraft, and
- 2 French fighter-bomber brigades (3rd and 11th), with a total of 150 F-84F and F-100D-type aircraft. This gives a total of 250 fighter-bombers.

b) Forces in the Western operational direction:

In this operational direction can be expected the Italian forces positioned on the territory of Northern Italy and the US South-European Task Force Airborne (SETAF), and (in the case of Austria's active participation) the Austrian forces positioned on the territory of South Austria (2nd brigade group).

The following <u>total</u> forces and equipment can be expected <u>in the Western operational</u> direction:

- 10 divisions (9 Italian and 1 Austrian),
- 40 tactical nuclear weapons,
- 1085 tanks,
- 1644 guns and mortars.

The assumption of Austria's neutral behavior (Version "A") alters this force to the extent of reducing it by 1 division, about 80 tanks and 154 guns.

The expected activity of forces

The NATO forces on the territory of Northern Italy intend to carry out an offensive operation simultaneously with the first strategic nuclear missile strike. This offensive operation with the main forces could develop mainly in the direction of VERONA–UDINE–LJUBLJANA–ZAGREB or LJUBLJANA–SZÉKESFEHÉRVÁR, while the auxiliary strike could begin in the direction of PADUA–KLAGENFURT–GRAZ–SZOMBATHELY. This kind of activity may take place over the territory of Yugoslavia.

However, immediate commencement of the offensive could be accomplished only if:

- the first strategic nuclear missile strike of the "Westerners" had outstanding results, and at the same time,
 - our return strike had relatively little effect on the main grouping of the Italian forces;
 - Yugoslavia did not resist the attack taking place over its territory.

Commencement of the offensive operations is impeded by the fact that:

- There will not be enough forces for large-scale offensive operations if only 3 divisions and 1–2 mountain brigades are available in the first operational echelon, and the strength of the operational reserve can also be estimated at 3 divisions and 1–2 mountain brigades. This force is too small for such a large-scale offensive operation, while mobilization of further forces would be possible only within limits.
- The natural features of the terrain are unfavorable for the offensive operation: in the direction of the possible main thrust, the Gorzia gate is relatively narrow and easily blocked, there are only three mountain passes for the auxiliary strike, destruction of which could prevent movements for a long period.

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The NATO forces will do their utmost to start the offensive operations, but at present it is expected that they will be obliged, because of power relations, geographical features and the politico-economic situation, to <u>carry out defensive operations at the beginning of the war</u>, from the territory of Northern Italy.

This defense, however, would be <u>temporary and active</u>, in which time would have to be allowed for switching to the decisive counter-offensive.

Again, two versions of the commencing defense operations are most likely.

Version "A"

In the case of Austria's neutrality, the defense may rely primarily on the system of fortresses built up along the Italian-Yugoslav and Italian-Austrian borders and the rivers lying in the lowlands, in the following grouping:

In the first echelon:

- in the TRIESTE-TARVISIO sector, the 5th army corps (3 divisions);
- in the district of the Italian-Yugoslav-Austrian triple border, 1–2 mountain brigades ("Julia," "Cadore") under the command of the Headquarters of Carnia Troops;
- on the Italian-Austrian border, the forces of the 3rd mountain corps (2nd mountain brigade) would prepare for defense.

In the second echelon:

The forces of the 3rd army corps (3rd division) may prepare for defense along the Western banks of the rivers Tagliamento and Piave, blocking the PORDE–NOVE-VICENZA direction.

To carry out defensive operations, they could form the following main sectors of resistance:

- the system of fortresses built in the Yugoslav-Italian border zone,
- the line of the rivers Tagliamento and Piave,
- and as the final, main sector of resistance, the line of the river Adige, which may concurrently form the sector for launching the counterattack after the attacking forces have been crumbled.

With <u>Version "B," if Austria joined with NATO</u>, the defense could be organized in North Italy in a similar fashion to the above version, except that the cover for the Italian-Austrian border would not be necessary and the forces freed by this (4–5 mountain brigades) could be used elsewhere. Of these forces, 2–3 mountain brigades could push into Austrian territory in the direction KLAGENFURT-GRAZ, with the task of covering the right wing of the NATO forces advancing along the Danube valley in the Central European theater of war.

At the same time, another 1–2 mountain brigades, pushing forward into the area of INNSBRUCK ("Mountain Fortress") could cover the link and operational cooperation of forces acting on the territory of Northern Italy and Southern Germany.

Direct air support for the operations

The air support of the North Italian ground forces may be carried out by the fighter-bombers

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of the Italian air force and some of the US tactical air force and air companies of the US 6th Fleet acting in the Mediterranean.

The Italian air force has 2 fighter-bomber brigades (5th, 6th) with a total of 150 aircraft (F-84F and G-91A types), including 50 aircraft that may be used as nuclear-capable bombers.

With the US tactical air force, there is stationed a tactical fighter squadron (352nd) on a 4-month rotation at the airfield of AVIANO, with 18 F-100D-type aircraft. All of these are nuclear-capable bombers belonging to the NATO strategic forces.

From the US navy, an aircraft carrier may also participate in the offensive, with a force of 1–2 air squadrons.

So the tactical-operational support for the Italian ground forces may be carried out by a total of about 180–192 fighter-bombers, tactical fighters and bombers.

4.) Conclusions

- 1) The political, military and economic steps taken by the "Westerners" prove that they are preparing to wage <u>war of an offensive nature</u>.
- 2) The "Westerners" are likely to start the offensive war with a <u>strategic nuclear missile strike</u>, which they are capable of delivering <u>at any point of time</u>, *i.e.* it may be expected at any time from May 5 at the earliest.
- 3) The first military nuclear missile strike against the Hungarian People's Republic can be expected <u>from two air operational directions</u>, namely from the West (MUNICH–BUDAPEST) and the Southwest (MILAN–BUDAPEST and NAPLES–BUDAPEST). During the strike, <u>40–53 nuclear strikes of various explosive forces</u> can be expected.
 - The duration of the nuclear missile strike against the HPR:
- Depending on the air-force takeoff times, the first strike may last for "B" + 95–110 or "B" + 140 minutes.
- 4) The offensive operations of the "Western" ground forces against the HPR may develop mainly from two operational directions. These are as follows:
 - the Northwestern operational direction (MUNICH-LINZ-VIENNA-BUDAPEST); the Western operational direction (PADUA-KLAGENFURT-GRAZ-
- SZOMBATHELY).
- 5) The beginning of the ground operations of the offensive war can be expected from May 5 onwards, depending on the delivery of the first strategic nuclear strike.
- 6) In the given area of operation, the "Westerners" have a force totaling about <u>20</u> <u>divisions</u> and <u>159 tactical nuclear weapons</u> and they may draw in <u>about 430–442 tactical</u> aircraft for the direct air support of ground forces.
- 7) Depending on the evolution of each side's ground operations, close combat may take place between our forces and the "Western" forces in the VIENNA or LINZ basin.
- 8) Execution of the "Western" plans may be <u>significantly influenced by the degree of success of our strategic nuclear missile strikes.</u> These may cause delay in offensive ground operations and even force the "Western" ground forces into temporary and active defense.

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Note

[1] Reckoning with a 40–50 km distance between groups or pairs of aircraft, and a 15–20 km distance between waves.