
Principles of the Operational Group Directorate for Execution of the Staff Exercise of May and June 1963, 5 June 1963

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Prepared in 2 copies

1 copy – 9 pages

Copy No. 1

Number: A/1551.

BRIEFING

on execution of the staff exercises of June 6–7, 1963

I.

Evolution of the military situation

(The main contents of staff exercises Nos. 1 and 2)

1) In line with the command of the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces, the Hungarian People's Army assumed enhanced combat readiness from 22.00 on May 2, 1963, and by the morning of May 6, it had brought up the appointed troops and institutes to combat strength by secret mobilization.

The forces of the Southern Army Group had left the territory of this country by May 6, 1963. From May 6 onwards, the 8th motorized rifle division—after regrouping—carried out an exercise in full combat readiness, in the area vacated by Soviet forces.

From 23.00 on May 9, the Hungarian People's Army went on full military alert and at the same time started general secret mobilization.

On May 10, 1963, simultaneously with the execution of general mobilization:

- On the signal "SNOWDROP," given at 00.00 hours, the central bodies of the Ministry of Defense began to carry out their assignments for dispersing the bodies and institutions. According to the plans prepared, the dispersion was to begin on the morning of May 10, using own equipment for implementation, based on the plan for rolling stock supply.

- From 03.00 onwards, the 3rd Romanian Army crossed the border and assembled by evening in the district of Balassagyarmat–Miskolc–Rimaszombat.

- From 04.00 onwards, the 5th Army performed a march and picked up its Transdanubian grouping. The army came under the command of the Southwestern front at 24.00.

- The H-1 leading echelon, after deploying, went on full military alert at 23.00.

- At 22.30 on May 10, the supreme commander of the Unified Armed Forces informed the minister of defense of the HPR, through the air-defense system of the Warsaw Treaty, that a massive increase had been made in the numbers of strategic nuclear missiles and the air force in the US and other NATO countries.

- Following the instructions of the chairman of the National Defense Committee, the comrade minister of defense ordered a national alert at 22.35 on May 10 for the National Anti-Aircraft Defense Staff, and concurrently, following a command from the minister, the comrade chief of staff gave the signal "CARNATION," ordering the personnel of the bodies and institutions to occupy the civil-defense districts.

- [Passage excised in the original: The reserve group of leaders was ordered to be in readiness to move to the command post H-3 (Mátraháza) and left the territory of H-2 (the building of the Ministry of Defense) at 22.40.]

II.

Evaluation of the situation

1) The nuclear missile and air strikes dealt by the enemy between 23.00 on May 10 and 03.00 on May 11, 1963 caused significant losses of life in the HPR, of material resources for the people's economy, among troops carrying out the first day of general mobilization and those on constant military alert, and among deployed troops.

Assessment of the losses and the steps to be taken (assessment of the possible ways of taking them) is in progress. [Passage excised in the original: (Some data already established appears in Supplement No. 1.) At the same time, it is evident that there have not been losses in the lines of the advancing allied troops great enough to forestall the beginning of operations.]

In the period of assessment of losses and damage done by the strikes, we must be ready to ward off the enemy's second missile and air attack, whose commencement can be expected between 10.00 and 12.00 on May 11.

The armed forces' main assignment, primarily, is to enable the troops on the Southwestern front to deploy in units, in order to destroy the main forces of the enemy. To allow a reliable blockade of the Western borderline immediately, and with the approval of the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces, the 8th motorized rifle division must be withdrawn from the 5th Army for this, and the 4th motorized rifle division grouped into the advancing force as a replacement. At the same time, continuance of mobilization, to take steps towards air defense of the HPR and help for districts suffering by the strike. [Handwritten marginal note: Suggestion!]

2) In evaluating the consequences of the strikes, it is necessary to consider that they took place within a four-hour period. So—primarily from a military point of view—we were in a position to alleviate possible consequences of them with measures issued from 22.30 onwards. Thus:

- [Passage excised in the original: The first strikes, dealt between 23.00 and 23.10, did not cause losses [among the H-3 personnel] except in the zone of destruction; the losses decreased significantly for all military and civilian bodies and among the civilian population, where they were able to occupy the required civil-defense facilities (air-raid shelters) due to the alert.

- Speedy dispersion during the strikes dealt between 23.10 and 03.00 on May 11 made it possible to mobilize civil-defense personnel—bearing in mind the dispersal of contamination [handwritten correction of infection].

So, when assessing the consequences of strikes, the evaluation must be done case by case, with consideration for the following: the time of the strike, the force of the strike, the tasks performed under instructions issued up to 22.35, the specific features and situation of the specific body, and the norms of the contingency plans for their movements.

3) When evaluating the situation and before measures are taken, there must be clarification not only of the losses suffered as a result of the strikes, but of the degree of contamination [handwritten correction of infection] in districts that may become contaminated further due to the direction and speed of the wind. Proposals must be made about the need for troop withdrawals, so that the personnel suffer the least radioactive contamination possible.

Accordingly, temporary losses of working time and delayed execution of tasks have to be expected.

III.

Main assignments of the central Ministry of Defense bodies during the staff exercise:

1) To enable the troops on the Southwestern front (3rd, 5th armies) to advance on the territory of the HPR, based on the commands of the commander-in-chief of the Unified Armed Forces. To continue supplying the Fifth Army in the political, personnel, material and technical, and health fields. In detail:

- To provide routes and means of transport for the further movements of the 3rd Romanian and 5th Hungarian armies. To provide a railway and one main and one reserve road for both armies, for supplies and for back transportation.

- To provide help to withdrawn forces suffering from the strike. The personnel and material and technical replenishment and supply of the Fifth Army. [Handwritten note: Mobilization!]

- Based on the orders of the commander-in-chief of the Unified Armed Forces, to implement temporary withdrawal of the 8th motorized rifle division from the command of the 5th Army and assignment of the 4th motorized rifle division in its place. While the withdrawal and assignment are being executed, defense of the Western border must be reinforced by the 8th motorized rifle division.

- Depending on the state of readiness, location of the Supply Material Stocks of the Ministry of Defense must commence. Until the institutions have reached a state of readiness, supplies must be provided directly from the stores in the rear and from the designated bodies.

2) The consequences of the strikes must be assessed. Losses must be ascertained and proposals made where necessary (with the involvement of the Organizational and Mobilization Group Directorate, the Operational Group Directorate and the Material Planning Group Directorate). [Handwritten marginal note: HPA, people's economy, civilian population.]

- On the changes in implementing the order of battle "M", the reasonable time for formations to be assembled to attain "M" readiness.

- On the completion and regrouping of the mobilization by manpower reserves and operational-cum-military, material-cum-technical reserves.

- On the help to be given to the civilian population (coordinated by the LOT).

- On clarifying the situation of the leadership and reorganization to the extent necessary [Passage excised in the original: (bringing H-2 up to strength, etc.)]

3) In addition to the measures taken and proposals made for tackling the consequences of the first strikes, all central bodies of the Ministry of Defense must:

- be ready for the enemy's second and subsequent air attacks and maintain reliable alert links with subordinates;

- be continuously informed about radioactivity conditions (through the main center for evaluating radioactivity conditions, in the Chemical Protection Group Directorate). Based on the existing plans of the maneuvers—live forces must be temporarily evacuated from districts where the release of dangerous quantities is expected.

To brief subordinates, it is necessary to know the 4, 8 and 12-hour preliminary reports on radioactivity. There must be maps and records for subordinates that show both the losses suffered as a consequence of strikes and the degrees of radioactive contamination.

- The scope for road and rail transportation must also be known (based on communications from the Department of Military Transport), as well as the dispersion and mobilization of the means of transportation, as far as the subordinates are concerned.

With staff exercise No. 3, the following questions must be clarified first of all, in order to execute the main assignments:

a) Organizational questions:

- What changes are needed in forming the "M" order of battle of the Hungarian People's Army (deployment, new bodies, *etc.*)
- The situation of auxiliary bodies and the possibilities available from the system of local replenishment (e.g. filling up the 8th motorized rifle division from specified districts, *etc.*)
- The points of time of "M" readiness that can be reasonably guaranteed based on the first strikes and the complicated situation expected subsequently.
- Possible losses of draftees conscripted and possibilities for replacement of these.

b) Cadre reinforcements:

- Monitoring of the replacement of losses among officers from the central organs of the Ministry of Defense to the units. Taking into consideration the losses of officers in the troops in a constant state of readiness and in the rear, and of "M" formations suffering losses of officers during the formation.
- The possibilities of the formation of "M" reserves taking retention into consideration.

c) Material-cum-technical questions:

- The situation of operational and strategic material and technical reserves, the scope for replenishment of these.
- The scope for material-cum-technical supplies after losses. The material-cum-technical requirements of the "M" order of battle.
- The situation with the bodies for providing material-cum-technical assistance (military and civil) after the strikes (reductions in capacity, scope for compensating for these).
- The specific possibilities and characteristics of the people's economy for transfer to a war economy.
- The prospects of material-cum-technical assistance by the Hungarian People's Army until the recovery of industrial capacity.

d) Public-health cover:

- The specific scope for public-health cover in the light of the resolution HB [National Defense Committee] 2/148/63 (simultaneous public-health cover for the civilian population and the armed forces through district hospitals in the rear).
- Calculation of possible health losses in the civilian population and the armed forces.

e) The state of civil defense:

- The consequences of the strikes on the population and the air-defense bodies.
- The readiness of air-defense bodies and the specific scope for them, bearing in mind the strikes.
- What possibilities there are for mass use of civilians for clearing rubble, eliminating consequences, managing such work, *etc.*

- The question of evacuation of civilians.
- The main content of the assistance to be provided to civil bodies by the armed forces.

f) Questions concerning the armed forces:

- The state of armed-forces units and special corps, the consequences of the strikes suffered and the scope for rapid improvement of the situation
 - Proposals for the specific use of troops, in view of their "M" readiness and state. Examining the possibility of making earlier use of some subordinate units, *e.g.* to provide help to the civilian population, clear crossing places, seal the border, *etc.*
 - The possibilities of implementing exemptions.

g) Leadership cover:

- The consequences of strikes on the system of communications, the scope for elimination of such consequences by existing and mobilizing bodies of the Ministry of Transportation and Postal Services and the Ministry of Defense.
 - Proposals to the National Defense Committee in connection with involving ARVB [atomic-radiology-chemical-biological assurance].
 - The scope for the leadership and evaluation of these from individual command posts (0-1, 0-2, H-1, H-2, H-3, between the bodies at the front and in the rear).

h) Political cover:

- The main assignments of political cover to ensure that the "M" order of battle of the Hungarian People's Army is formed as early as possible and to help the 5th Army enter the war as soon as possible in an organized fashion.
 - The political assignments to cover rear activities, relations with military and civilian organizations, the order and methods of providing information, *etc.*

i) Operational cover:

- Primary cover of the further action of the 3rd and 5th armies (opportunities for complementing, replenishment).
 - Ensuring the defense of the Hungarian People's Republic: reorganization and complementing of the national air-defense system; reinforcement of the border guard in the Austrian sector; readiness to prevent diversions and commando actions; radio counter-activity, *etc.*
 - Grouping of the supplies echelon of the Ministry of Defense according to degree of readiness and state (army, garrison and central military-supplies services).
 - Coordination and management of evacuation from radioactive contamination and expected strikes.
 - Guaranteeing the full functioning and reorganization of the national alarm and communications system.
 - Covering country-scale maneuvers while taking losses suffered already into consideration (personnel losses at the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Workers' Militia forces, damage done to road bridges and railways, *etc.*)
 - Continuation of dispersion.
 - Maneuvers with reconstruction formations and equipment to enable primary execution of the main assignments.

* * *

I request the comrade liaison officers to appear here in the same place in 30 minutes, where we will hold a detailed briefing for them.

In future, information will be provided from two places: the information group of the Operational Group Directorate is stationed here, while the main center for evaluating the radioactivity situation operates at the Chemical Defense Group Directorate in Room No....

The system of reporting to the comrade chief of staff will be detailed later.

[Archives: War History Archive, Hungarian People's Army Headquarters First Group Directorate 1964 Box 9 Unit 3, pp. 1–9]