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**Report of the Head of the Material and Technical Division of the Hungarian Ministry of Defense, prepared for the Staff Command Exercise, on the Consequences of the Nuclear and Air Strikes against Hungary, 6 June 1963**

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Report to the comrade chief of staff through the Operational Group Directorate

Subject: Evaluation of the consequences of the massive nuclear and air strikes delivered between 23.00 on May 10 and 03.00 on May 11.

I. The industrial situation

I report, on the basis of the reports received by the Headquarters of the Hungarian People's Army up to 03.00 on May 11, that the following damage has been sustained by the factories most important from the point of view of national defense:

In Csepel and district, the Csepel Iron and Metal Works, the Lamp Factory, the Telecommunications Enterprise, Gamma Optical Works, the Small Engine and Machine Factory, the Technical Works, the Budapest Chemical Works, ATRA, BHG, the Cable Factory, EMV, the Pálma Rubber Factory, and the Factory for Laboratory Equipment have been completely destroyed.

Substantial damage has been done to GANZ MÁVAG, MOM, REANÁL Refined Chemicals Factory, the Metal Plate Industrial Works, and the Budafok Enamel Ware Factory.

Damage has been done to the Pest District Machine Factory and light damage has been sustained generally by all the factories in the capital. Half the skilled workers have died or become disabled.

In Miskolc, the Diósgyőr complex has been severely damaged. About 60% of the workers have died as a consequence of the strike on Miskolc, since they were in Miskolc at night.

The Győr Machine-Tool Factory has been annihilated.

The Dunaújváros Danube Ironworks have been destroyed.

The Veszprém Metal-Processing Company has suffered slight damage, almost 100% of the workers have died or become disabled.

In Szolnok, the Tisza Chemical Works have been destroyed.

In Debrecen, the Medical Instrument Factory has suffered medium damage.

[...]

Conclusions:

1) It can be stated that the enemy's purpose with the 25 strategic nuclear strikes on the country was primarily to paralyze the functioning of the people's economy and the supplies of war materials for the army, and to demoralize the population. This goal has been largely achieved. More than half the factories of key importance have been destroyed. With the exception of Budapest, Ózd and Salgótarján, all significant industrial cities have been destroyed or seriously damaged. About 1 million people have died and 1 million injured.

2) The army can count mainly on the existing military equipment. In industry, we can only expect repairs and supplies of spare parts in the next half year, except in the case of a few articles.

3) Based on a preliminary assessment, of some 200 types of military industrial products, Hungarian industry will be able to produce only those listed, after a run-in period of 2–6 months: PPN-2 and NSP-2 infrared sights, range-finders, bridge and crossing material, winches, blades, infantry ammunition, 100 mm tank grenades, antitank grenades, 30 mm tracer rockets, nuclear protection gear, underground shelter suction filter sets, and aircraft emergency tanks.

Industry will be unable within a foreseeable period to produce, for instance, the following important items: guns, pistols, automatic pistols, infantry and some artillery firing caps, artillery ammunition, S-60 systems, BRDM [armored reconnaissance vehicle] truck and aircraft tires, radiation-measuring instruments, gas masks, *etc.*

4) The blow to the country's fuel stocks will not affect the army's needs, as the army's stocks did not suffer significant losses and the country's fuel stocks still satisfy the needs of several operations. (Enough for about four operations.)

5) The loss of about 15% of the electric power will not cause any disruption either as the decrease in consumer demand is proportionately larger.

6) Evaluating the situation of the national medical-material supplies and the number of hospital beds available, enough medical equipment is available to provide medical treatment for 3% of the national medical loss. Of the army's pharmaceutical and blood-substitute reserves, a quantity satisfying the needs for half a military operation remain intact.

#### Proposals:

1) Accepting our report as a starting point and involving the National Planning Bureau and industry, we must estimate the quantity of machinery remaining after the strike. In redistribution of this, we must devise a plan of what military industrial articles industry can produce, how many and within how much time, what help is needed from the friendly countries, what we can produce in cooperation with the friendly countries, and what we must obtain through imports by all means, or what articles must be dropped entirely from production.

2) To assess the above situation, technical operative groups must be formed in each specialist field, to draw up detailed proposals for reorganizing industry, based on on-site surveys, and detailing the scope and deadlines for making up the losses signaled by the front command.

3) Further assignments must be harmonized with the requirements of the Front and the Allies.

### III.

The material and technical situation of the HPA after the massive nuclear and air strikes dealt up to 04.00 on May 11, 1963

As a result of the 25 nuclear strikes dealt by the enemy, the following material losses have been suffered:

MIG-21 F-13 fighters	28
MIG-19 PM fighters	5
MIG-15 BIS fighters	20
LI-2 transport aircraft	1
IL-28 bomber planes	3
MI-1 helicopter	1
Air missile defenses	0.3 allowances
K-5 airborne missiles	2.2 allowances
K-13 plane missiles	0.3 allowances
Aircraft fuel	9.0 allowances
SA- 75 M. complex equipment	3 pieces of equipment
P-8, P-10, p-15 locators	1 each
P-12 and PRV-10 locators	2 each

One third of the air force was destroyed, the losses can be made up for only after regrouping the MIG-15 BIS aircraft (from the Kilián Aviation Officers' School), as the transfer of MIG-21 F-13 aircraft is not provided for under the present "M" [mobilization] agreements.

Because of the mass destruction and depletion of aviation fuel, immediate steps are required urgently to procure kerosene by imports, as national production cannot solve the problem, because of the destruction of the Szóny refinery.

The NADH, in the present situation, possesses the following stocks:

Air missile defense	1.7 allowances
57 mm S-60 ammunition	1.6 allowances
Plane ammunition	0.9 allowance
Air defense machine gun ammunition	0.9 allowance
aviation fuel	2 allowances (covering needs of about 1 military operation)

Artillery supplies:

Concerning firearms, mortars and guns and taking substitutions into consideration, we have one operational reserve beyond the stock-table requirement. Exceptions are TT pistols and RPG tank-destroyer handguns, and ZU-2 anti-aircraft machine guns.

Of the SON-9/A battery locators and anti-aircraft firing-instruction gear, we have one operational reserve, while we have no reserves of the other locator materials.

The ammunition stocks of the HPA are 100%, considering one operational reserve, with the following exceptions:

14.5 mm tank-destroyer infantry light signal cartridge	38.9%
anti-tank hand grenades	87.6%
PG-2 grenade	20%
grenades under 57 mm caliber	77%
85 mm smoke-shells	25%
122mm cumulative grenade	62%
57 mm anti-aircraft fragmentation grenades	88.7%
57 mm anti-aircraft and tank fragmentation grenades	16%
anti-aircraft artillery missiles	69.2%

We have no operational-tactical missile ammunition.

For the LUNA division missile class, we have 12 pieces of conventional ammunition.

At the No. 1 Ammunition Depot, the rifle ammunition and shell grenades stored above ground became unusable for military purposes. Deliveries from the No. 1 Ammunition Depot can start only after 3–4 days by motor vehicle, as the serious damage precludes rail transportation.

Motor-vehicle situation:

The motor vehicle stock of the HPA was 90% immediately before the hostile nuclear strikes.

Not counting the losses, the stock is 87%.

Losses:	Motor vehicle	Tank
From the stock of the Fifth Army	111	20
NADH stock	179	-
NDM direct troops' stock	314	10
Total:	604	30

The losses do not influence significantly the supplies to the superior units.

Taking into consideration the motor-vehicle losses suffered by the people's economy, replenishment of the HPA with motor vehicles to the planned 85% can be ensured only to 73%.

The material supplies of signal-corps:

Material	HPA	Fifth Army in percentages	NADH	NDM direct
Low and medium-frequency radio stations (of which, modern)	100 (47)	100 (64)	72 (34)	100 (45)
High-frequency stations	71	40	94	75

radio relay stations	17	21	31	8
various radio receivers	76	72	88	87
controlling technical equipment	65	88	75	49
wire materials	96	97	75	100
mobile information-center elements	34	37	-	35
generator equipment	62	48	72	64
radio reconnaissance and jamming devices	34	38	28	40

The 5th Army is capable of making up from its own reserves for the losses suffered.

In the Central Stores, as a result of the nuclear strikes, the following have been destroyed: 46th independent brigade staff crossing battalion, 53rd independent motor vehicle transporter battalion, 120th, 121st cable-reconstruction squadron, 122nd, 123rd., 124th, 125th air cable reconstruction squadron radio material. Replenishment of communications materials for the formations planned to be formed up to M-10 can be ensured. The central stocks possess no reserves at all, so that we cannot ensure supplies.

Technical equipment:

The formations formed up to M-1 received their supplies. As a result of the nuclear strike, the technical supplies held at the Central Stores for the 15th motorized rifle division, 46th independent brigade staff crossing battalion, 150th, 151st, 152nd, 153rd public road and bridge-construction battalion, 69th independent motor-vehicle transporter battalion, the health formations planned for the 3rd hospital, the 85th reserve motorized rifle division (with the exception of the 96th reserve technical regiment), which were planned to be set up by M-10. Manning of these is only possible through conscription from the people's economy.

The technical, material losses resulting from the strikes suffered by the troops do not affect essentially the continuation of military action.

We have no reserves of crossing equipment and military bridges, and minimal reserves of other technical devices.

Chemical-defense supplies:

The nuclear strike on the Central Stores destroyed about 30% of the supplies stored there (35,000 gas masks, 5000 combined-service defense stocks, 3000 troop-relief devices).

The troop losses caused by the nuclear strike can be replenished mainly from the central reserves and the army stores.

The degree of supply of the HPA after the nuclear strikes:

	HPA total	Fifth Army	NADH	NDM direct
Gas mask	100 + 2days res.	100+2days r.	100+ 1	100+1 day
Skin-protectors	100	100+2days	80	30
Chemical protection equipment	60%	62%	62%	48%
Chemical reconnaissance devices	80%	90%	95%	55%
Radiation measuring instruments	20%	45%	42%	15%
Chemical radiation relief eqipment	60%	70%	70%	43%
Chemical defenses special maneuvers	71%	79%	70%	56%
Relief material	1/2 operation	1 op	2 days	1 day

*[Archives: War History Archive, Hungarian People's Army Headquarters First Group Directorate 1964 Box 9 Unit 3, Pages: 1-9.]*