

WARSAW TREATY STATEMENT

ABOUT TALKS ON REDUCTION IN ARMED FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS IN EUROPE

The Warsaw Treaty Member-States believe that the interests of European and universal security urgently call for sizable cuts in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe - from the Atlantic to the Urals. They are for talks on this issue to open without delay, in 1988.

The allied states are convinced that the priority objective of these talks is securing a radical reduction in the military potentials of both alliances and such a situation in the continent as would leave the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries with the forces and systems needed for defense but insufficient for a surprise attack and offensive operations. This would enhance military-political stability and security in Europe in conditions where the Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles is in effect, and facilitate continued movement along the path of promoting disarmament, strengthening trust and lowering the threat of war.

The Warsaw Treaty Member-States proceed from the premise that cuts in armed forces and conventional armaments will be accompanied by a corresponding curtailment of military spending.

Acting on the basis of their joint programme for reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, which was put forward by them in Budapest in June 1986 and elaborated in Berlin in May 1987, the Warsaw Treaty Member-States are for the following matters to be resolved during the first phase of the relevant talks:

1. Achieving equal lowered levels

The ultimate goal of the first phase of the talks should be achieving roughly equal (balanced) collective levels as regards troop strength and the amount of conventional weaponry for the states grouped in the two military-political alliances. These levels would be lower than those currently existing on either side.

The process of attaining such levels would be pursued in phases on Pan-European and regional scales. First of all, it would be expedient to concentrate on the issues of mutually eliminating the imbalances and asymmetries in individual classes of conventional arms and in the armed forces of the two military-political alliances in Europe.

The imbalances and asymmetries would be removed by withdrawing forces from the reduction area and subsequently disbanding them or by disbanding them on the spot, as well as through other possible measures. The arms and military equipment to be reduced would be eliminated at specially assigned sites or be turned over by agreement to be used for peaceful purposes. Provision could be made for storing part of the arms and equipment on a temporary bases. Such storage sites would be kept under continuous international control.

The attainment of the final goal of the first phase would lay the groundwork for significant further mutual cuts in troops and armaments. At the second phase the armed forces of each side would be slashed by approximately 25 percent (by some 500,000 men) with their complement of arms. At the third phase the reduction of the armed forces and conventional arms would be continued and the armed forces of both sides would be lent a strictly defensive nature.

The Warsaw Treaty Member-States consider it expedient that all the participants in the talks should not, from the moment the negotiations begin and until the agreements achieved at them become effective, take steps running counter to the objectives of the talks, in particular should not build up their armed forces and conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals.

With the agreement's entry into force, all the participants in the negotiations would pledge not to build up their armed forces and conventional armaments in the territory that could be left uncovered by the initial cuts.

2. Preventing a surprise attack

Measures to reduce and eliminate the risk of a surprise attack would be an integral part of the process of cutting back armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe.

With this aim, starting from the first phase, lowered-arms-level strips (zones) would be created along the line of contact between the two military-political alliances, from which the more dangerously destabilizing kinds of conventional arms would be removed or reduced. As a result, military potentials in these strips (zones) would be kept at a level ensuring only a defensive capability but ruling out the possibility of a surprise attack.

The depth of the lowered-arms-level strips (zones) could be agreed on the basis of geo-strategic factors, the combat characteristics of the principal types of arms and other criteria.

These steps would be accompanied by agreed confidence-building measures which would limit military activity in the strips (zones), providing correspondingly a stiffer regime closer to the line of contact. They would cover, in particular, the scale and number of simultaneous exercises and the duration and frequency of exercises, as well as a ban on major exercises and restrictions on troop movements.

3. Data exchanges and verification

With the aim of determining the correlation of forces between the two military-political alliances and identifying imbalances and asymmetries in the armed forces and conventional armaments on Pan-European and regional scales early in the talks or, if possible, even before their commencement, relevant

initial data essential for conducting the negotiations would be mutually exchanged. Provision would also be made for the possibility of verifying this data with the start of the talks by means of on-site inspections.

An effective system would be created for verifying compliance with the accords to be reached at the talks, by using national technical means and international procedures, including on-site inspections without the right to refuse them. Entry-exist monitoring points would be set up both along the perimeter and inside the lowered-arms-level strips (zones) and in the reduction area (at railway stations and junctions, airports and ports).

Verification arrangements would cover the process of reducing, eliminating (dismantling) and storing arms and of disbanding military units as well as troop activities and the limit on the number of troops and armaments left following the cuts.

An international verification commission would be formed and vested with extensive powers (in terms of monitoring, inspections, dealing with contentious issues, etc.).

The Warsaw Treaty Member-States believe that a considerable reduction and subsequent elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, including munitions for dual-capable systems, would be an important measure towards reducing the risk of outbreak of war and creating a more stable situation in Europe. They reaffirm their proposal for opening relevant talks soon and conducting them to conclude a mutually acceptable agreement.

The Warsaw Treaty Member-States proceed from the premise that there is a close relationship between the process of reducing armed forces and conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals and the continued development and broadening of confidence- and security-building measures in Europe within the CSCE frameworks. They take the view that the second phase of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe should continue to examine the issues left unresolved at the Conference's first phase, particularly those concerning the extension of confidence-building measures to cover air forces and navies, and to hammer out new-generation confidence-building measures, including such as have a restricting nature. All these measures would contribute to lowering the risk of a surprise attack and promoting openness and predictability in the military field.

The Warsaw Treaty Member-States are prepared to discuss other possible measures and proposals for strengthening stability in Europe at ever lower levels of armed forces and armaments, with the principles of equality and equal security being observed and the agreements reached being made effectively verifiable.

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