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- 2 -

DOD's category of "non-central" systems includes French and UK SLBMs, French IRBMs and FB-111s for NATO, while Warsaw Pact "non-central" systems consist of Soviet M/IRBMs (including SS-X-20) and medium bombers. By choosing this approach, DOD's "central" vs. "non-central" categorization directly parallels the "strategic" vs. "Eurostrategic" divisions we have been seeking to avoid.

In line with the objectives set forth in our October 18 memo to you (Tab 1), we proposed amendments to DOD/ISA which would have altered this framework by merging the central and non-central systems to avoid the presentation of a distinct European regional sub-balance. (The principal DOD/ISA charts are at Tab 2; our proposed amendment at Tab 3.) DOD/ISA, on November 8, rejected the proposed amendments, arguing that the script of this briefing clears up any difficulties caused by graphic presentation of sub-balances of forces in that the text reassures the Allies that there is a spectrum of forces, and it is the total capability which needs to be assessed. However, we feel the DOD/ISA charts in the briefing do not support these reassurances, and the script in places encourages examination of exploitable asymmetries in nuclear forces. DOD/ISA also argues that the European balance, in longer range strike systems deserves serious attention, and that to mix it together with central strategic systems would lessen its visibility. Moreover, ISA argued that putting all long-range systems together could suggest that we intended or were willing to expand SALT to cover the European regional systems.

Our objections to a specific focus on the European balance, as stated in the memo of October 18, remain pertinent, and we do not believe that the arguments advanced by ISA are valid. On the question of the European balance, it is in our interest and that of the Allies, that the integrity of the NATO deterrent Triad not be divided into sub-balances. It is particularly important that we do not allow the introduction of new weapons by the Soviets, such as the imminent deployment of the SS-X-20, to create the illusion that Europe is subject to "blackmail," or that

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- 3 -

a major European "response" is required. In this regard, it is worth noting that since our memo of October 18, Embassy Bonn has had conversations with top-ranking German military officers who stressed that the FRG did not want to see a focus on a separate European balance or any division of the NATO Triad (Bonn 18556 attached, Tab 4).

With regard to DOD/ISA contentions that merging "central" and "non-central" systems in the presentation could have SALT implications, we would note, first, that the NPG meeting is not intended or understood as an arms control discussion, and there is no implication for SALT, or requirement to follow SALT terminology. In addition, there is little likelihood that the Soviets would find attractive inclusion of their "non-central" systems in SALT. Although the traditional NPG "balance briefing" has, in the past, been structured on the SALT definition of "central systems," this has been so primarily for convenience. While DOD has talked in past NPG Ministerials about individual "non-central" systems (e.g., SS-X-20), they have never provided a description of the balance of "non-central" systems which invites concern by Ministers over force disparities in this area.

The briefing as set up by DOD does prejudice another SALT issue, and that is the role of "Backfire." In the DOD/ISA draft, the Backfire is presented as a Soviet central system in a shaded area on top of other strategic systems. Projecting estimated Backfire deployments through 1986, the draft shows the Soviets well in excess of the Vladivostok 2400 ceiling at the end of the period. The DOD presentation shows that Backfire poses an increased strategic threat to the US and, at the same time, a threat to the European theater which is unconstrained by SALT limits. While the uncertainties surrounding Backfire's role could be dealt with by appropriate amendments to the text of the briefing, the problem is most cleanly dealt with by our proposed restructuring the briefing which would merge "central" and "non-central" systems, making the locus of the Backfire unimportant.

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by lm NARA Date 10/14/97

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AND, that you authorize the Counselor to follow-up as necessary with DOD and Mr. Scowcroft.

Approve: \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove: \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab 1 - October 18 Memo:  
Nuclear Balance Issues at NPG Ministerial
- Tab 2 - DOD/ISA Briefing Charts
- Tab 3 - State Revised Briefing Charts
- Tab 4 - BONN 18556:  
FRG-NATO Military Matters
- TAB 5 - Suggested Talking Points

Drafted: EUR/RPM: JHHawes/lm

11/10/76:x28050

Clearances: INR/STA - Mr. Henkin  
S/P - Mr. Bartholomew

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EUR



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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ACTION MEMORANDUM

S/S *MC*

*2X-1 TO 10/17/76  
CETS  
JH*

OCT 18 1976

*Action*

COPIES TO:

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S/S-S SECRET  
S/P  
EUR  
PM  
S/S-I (ws) EXDIS

TO: The Secretary  
THROUGH: C - Mr. Sonnenfeldt *27*  
FROM: EUR - Arthur A. Hartman *11*  
PM - George S. Vest *11/16/76*  
S/P - Winston Lord *W*

*If this still needs to be discussed with the Secretary, EUR should contact Mr. Moynihan to schedule a meeting. If it does not, let it drop.*

Nuclear Balance Issues at NPG Ministerial

The Problem

An FRG request for review at the NPG of what it suggests could be a potential imbalance in European theater-nuclear systems raises problems for the credibility of the NATO deterrent, current and future US arms control strategies, and Alliance solidarity. The German request appears to reflect some confusion concerning FRG interests. We need to begin considering strategies on the long-term aspects of the problem. In the shorter term, this memorandum describes the course of action we are following in working with DOD to prepare a US response to the German questions for Secretary Rumsfeld to use at the NPG in London, November 17-18.

What are the Germans Seeking?

Beginning at the Hamburg NPG session last January, the FRG has given increasing emphasis to trends in the theater-nuclear balance, with particular stress on longer range strike systems. At the June NPG Ministerial in Brussels, the FRG proposed that the traditional strategic balance briefing given by the

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*Ann  
JLL  
KRM*

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- 2 -

US be expanded at the November meeting to include separate discussion of a so-called "Eurostrategic balance." At the October 5 briefing to NPG PermReps by Donald Cotter on Warsaw Pact theater-nuclear systems, German Ambassador Pauls made a formal statement outlining what the FRG would hope to see covered in such an expanded balance briefing, including:

- A breakdown and East-West numerical comparison of categories of European theater weapons, according to range: battlefield (e.g. Lance, artillery); extended area (e.g. Pershing, Scaleboard, tacair); "Eurostrategic" (e.g. SLBM, MR/IRBM, medium bombers); other forces (e.g. ADMs, air defense).
- Discussion of whether, in the context of strategic parity, Soviet deployment of new theater systems such as Backfire and the SS-X-20 poses a qualitatively and quantitatively "new" threat to Europe which could offer opportunities for "blackmail;"
- Whether "new technologies" (read cruise missiles) offer a "solution" to these perceived problems;
- Whether there are prospects for new arms control negotiations with the USSR on theater systems.

#### Sources of German Concern

The German concerns arise from the matrix of the SALT negotiations, MBFR, and the continuing US proposals for European theater-nuclear force modernization.

- On SALT II, German and Allied concerns have related to potential provisions for non-circumvention and non-transfer, and to the treatment of weapons

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- 3 -

systems of particular interest to the European theater, especially cruise missiles and Backfire. The Germans have followed the intense and frequently public US debate on these issues, and appear to have absorbed at least some of the argumentation of US opponents of tight limits on cruise missiles. Their apparent fear that a significant theater imbalance may now exist or may develop as a result of new Soviet deployments of the SS-X-20 and Backfire, directly parallels similar arguments made by some US officials. The Germans, however, have long been concerned with the MR/IRBM question, going back to the early 1960s. The MLF proposals, and ultimately the formation of the NPG, were in part designed to deal with the problems of perceived theater imbalance at that time, by giving the FRG greater participation in the nuclear deterrent. In more recent years, the Germans reluctantly subordinated concerns over MR/IRBM in order to avert limitations on US FBS. The statements by some Administration officials may have helped to reawaken these long-standing concerns over the theater balance.

-- In MBFR, the Germans were willing to go along with the US Option III nuclear offer, but fought vigorously in NATO consultations to avert the possibility of ceilings on all Allied nuclear systems in the NGA. Although the lengthy internal Alliance negotiations on the subject of Allied equipment limits ultimately proved successful, the intense bargaining and eventual compromise probably did not assuage longer-term German concerns over possible US intentions regarding the European theater-nuclear posture.

-- With regard to theater-nuclear force modernization, the Germans have been suspicious of US motives from the outset, believing--correctly--that some senior officials in DOD desired to remove large numbers of nuclear warheads from Europe, while seeking to shift away from theater-based nuclear-capable tacair towards coverage of theater targets with SLBMs. The Germans see grave implications of strategic decoupling and battlefield warfighting in

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- 4 -

the entire modernization effort. For the moment, the thrust of the original DOD TNF modernization effort has been blunted by German resistance, expressed in a thoroughly staffed FRG counterpaper tabled at the NPG last June, and by State intervention. The positive US decision on F-16 nuclear capability, and your insistence on retaining all existing F-4s in the FRG when the F-15 is introduced next year, have signaled to Bonn that the US is aware of German concerns over "denuclearization."

Where are the Germans Headed?

The nuclear-capable aircraft question has not been definitively resolved and other TNF issues such as Nike Hercules are still under study in the Alliance. The overall modernization exercise has accentuated German nervousness over US intentions and stimulated German thinking on possible successor systems for existing nuclear-capable tacair in the deep strike role. In this situation, some German MOD officials may view the cruise missile as opening the possibility of new theater-based force posture options which could keep viable deep strike systems in Germany indefinitely, even if future decisions ultimately should downgrade the role of nuclear-capable tacair.

The "Eurostrategic balance" argument which the Germans have advanced as a vehicle for discussing their fears holds that:

- the existence or potential existence of a significant disparity in levels of nuclear delivery systems at the theater level could give the Soviets opportunities for black-mail against Europe;
- because of strategic parity, to be codified in SALT, the ability of the US to offset regional imbalances with its strategic umbrella is less credible, at least in political terms; and

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- 5 -

- the mobile capability of the SS-X-20 makes it far harder to target than earlier MR/IRBMs; (we had specifically assured the Europeans in the 1960s that the MR/IRBM threat was balanced because the launcher sites were covered by external US strategic missile forces).

The Germans do not appear to have thoroughly thought out the implications of this line of argument. The logic of the "Eurostrategic" balance runs counter to the long-standing assumptions of US-European solidarity, and many of its potential corollaries could work against basic German interest in the coupling of US strategic forces to deterrence of war in Europe and in general East-West stability. At the staff level, FRG officers deny that they are interested in doing anything that would appear to divide the doctrinal and operational unity of the NATO triad of conventional, theater-nuclear, and strategic forces. Nor do they suggest the future creation of an independent European deterrent--which could be an implication of arguing the need for a European based cruise missile force to offset the SS-X-20. The evident implications of an independent German nuclear capability are daunting, and a relationship with the UK and France, even if possible, could never provide a satisfactory deterrent from the German viewpoint. Even a conventionally-armed long-range cruise missile force in German hands could be an unsettling factor given uncertainties on the part of other European countries both as to German intentions and as to what kinds of warhead was, in fact, mounted on such missiles.

The Germans are also aware of the acute difficulties and potential unattractiveness of negotiating on theater weapons systems. They were quick to inquire when ideas for TALT-type negotiations were floated this summer.

It is not clear that the FRG has decided that it must find a "hardware" solution to the yet ill-defined balance problem or that, if so, the hardware should be the cruise missile. They have been very cautious in evaluating the implications of cruise missile technology in NPG study groups and have avoided leaping on popular theories about "strategic-conventional" options or other slogans related to cruise missile development.

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- 6 -

State and DOD have received conflicting signals on whether the FRG considers the application of the cruise missile to Europe to be primarily for close range interdiction (up to 600 kms) or for long range strike into the USSR. It is possible that, as in the mid-60s with the NPG, the FRG could ultimately be satisfied with a "consultational" rather than hardware response to its concerns. In any case, with the MLF history in mind, we will want to be careful about flashy "solutions" to a long-standing problem.

By advancing the "Eurostrategic balance" argument, the Germans may be signaling less a fear of specific theater imbalance -- although that should not be ignored -- than a general malaise with the course of US and Western nuclear defense deployments and thinking in a period of strategic parity. Throughout the postwar period, the Germans have feared that the systems analysis approach to military problems advanced by some in the Pentagon, without due attention to political aspects, could ultimately come to drive US policy and thereby damage FRG interests. This concern continues to be fed by an intense campaign by some in DOD, in official and unofficial channels, to convince the Germans that they face a new and greater nuclear threat from Soviet theater forces.

In sum, there is considerable confusion in FRG statements to date on the European nuclear balance, suggesting that the Germans are still thinking the issue through. This may afford us an opportunity to get across the US viewpoint at the NPG Ministerial before the FRG concerns harden.

#### US Interests and Options for November Ministerial

US interests in the European balance question are both immediate and long range, and include:

- maintaining Allied confidence while avoiding potential difficulties for SALT II over cruise missiles and theater systems;

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- 7 -

- ensuring that the Germans and other Allies continue to perceive effective coupling of the US strategic deterrent to Europe;
- avoiding unnecessary disagreements with the Allies over nuclear employment policy, and the gradual and pragmatic modernization of theater nuclear forces.

We believe that these interests can best be pursued by a US approach to the November NPG Ministerial which talks candidly about the current state of NATO and Warsaw Pact systems, including the controversial SS-X-20. However, it should place all nuclear systems within the context of a global balance of forces and explicitly reject the logic of single numerical sub-balances for particular elements of the Triad. We would reaffirm our commitment to deter Soviet attack on NATO, including nuclear attack, and reiterate the continuing logic of common deterrence and shared risks within the Alliance. We would need to counter the assumption that strategic parity has led to a weakening of this commitment and point to the enhanced flexibility of US strategic targeting doctrine and improvements in all aspects of the NATO Triad as an indication of our seriousness in maintaining it. We would also have to describe specifically the capabilities of the SS-X-20 and Backfire, placing them in the context of evolutionary development of Soviet capabilities against the theater. While acknowledging that the SS-X-20's mobility could make it far more difficult to target, we would point out that the real counter to such missiles, as to SLBMs, is not counterforce targeting, but assured retaliatory capacity which the US and NATO continue to possess. There is no way that the USSR could employ or threaten to employ the SS-X-20 against NATO Europe without risking totally unacceptable levels of retaliation by NATO, including US strategic forces.

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- 8 -

With regard to the cruise missile, we believe that the Secretary of Defense should focus his remarks on a description of the state of technical development of the weapons system, and avoid discussion of hypothetical operational roles it might fill, or of the state of play of the SALT negotiations regarding cruise missiles. This may not meet the expectations of the Germans, and the issue will remain alive for future discussions, but it would be the surest approach given the present state of play. It would also avoid exacerbating internal US arguments over the merits of the system. Finally, we would deny that we contemplated any new negotiations on European theater systems.

In addition to preparing for the November Ministerial, we need to begin thinking about longer term approaches to the problem. This could, for example, entail bilateral consultations with the FRG (and perhaps the UK and others). Considerable interagency work would be required here, however, to iron out present sharp differences of perception of the nature of the European regional threat and our preferred options for dealing with it. Much of this latter question is now being debated in the context of work on the NSSM 246 response. We may be in a better position to make recommendations for further work and consultations as we see how NSSM 246 develops and we work with DOD in preparing for Secretary Rumsfeld's participation in the Ministerial.

Recommendation:

In working with DOD on the development of Secretary Rumsfeld's presentation for the November NPG Ministerial, we intend to follow the course outlined above which would (a) describe European theater systems but integrate them into the overall strategic balance; (b) reaffirm the US commitment to the integrity of the NATO Triad; (c) focus discussion of cruise missiles on technical description of system development; and (d) deny interest in European theater-nuclear arms control talks. We request your approval of this course.

Approve: \_\_\_\_\_

+K

Disapprove: \_\_\_\_\_

Drafted: EUR/RPM:JHHawes NOV 5 1976  
10/15/76:x28050

Concurrence: S/P: Mr. Bartholomew *by K*  
PM: Mr. Goodby *by K*

*Wish also to discuss*  
*HJK*

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
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By (s) NARA Date 10/14/97

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U.S.S.R. CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS  
DELIVERY VEHICLES (LAUNCHERS)



BACKFIRE Bombers  
 Nuclear-Capable Tanker and Reconnaissance Aircraft

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
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U.S. CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS  
DELIVERY VEHICLES (LAUNCHERS)



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
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U.S.S.R. IR/MRBMs AND MEDIUM-RANGE BOMBERS  
DELIVERY VEHICLES (LAUNCHERS)\*



- W Western-based LRA Bombers oriented against NATO.
- E Eastern-based LRA Bombers oriented against non-NATO areas.
- M Nuclear-capable Tanker and Reconnaissance Aircraft.

\* Assumes SS-X-20 replaces SS-4 and 5 and BACKFIRE replaces some Badger, Blinder.

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
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U.S., NATO, FRANCE: OTHER LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS  
DELIVERY VEHICLES (LAUNCHERS)



\* Does not include Poseiden committed to NATO

\*\* Includes U.S. FS-111s

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
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SOVIET MISSILE DELIVERY



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
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NATO MISSILE DELIVERY VEHICLES

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
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SOVIET MEDIUM AND LONG RANGE BOMBERS




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NATO MEDIUM AND LONG RANGE BOMBERS



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AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ECNN 18556  
DEFENSE FOR ISA-GLITMAN AND GENERAL PUSTAY

EMO. 11052: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, NATC, MNUC, NPG, AWACS, MILI  
SUBJECT: FRG-NATO MILITARY MATTERS

REFS: (A) USWATO 5422 (B) STATE 269949

SUMMARY: IN CONVERSATIONS TODAY, TWO SENIOR GERMAN  
MILITARY OFFICERS HAVE TOLD US THAT AMBASSADOR PAULS'  
REMARKS AT THE OCT 5 NPG PERMDEPS' MEETING SHOULD NOT  
BE OVER-INTERPRETED, THAT COSTS OF THE AWACS GROUND  
SYSTEM NEED TO BE BETTER UNDERSTOOD BEFORE A DECISION  
ON THE OVERALL SYSTEM CAN BE MADE, AND THAT LEEPER TOLD  
BRITISH DEFENSE MINISTER MULLEY THAT THE FRG WOULD TRY  
TO HELP THE BRITISH ECONOMY BUT COULD NOT COMMIT ITSELF  
TO OFFSET FOR THE BAORM END SUMMARY

1. DURING SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS TODAY, GENERALS MUST  
(ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL OF FRG ARMED FORCES) AND  
BRANDT (HEAD OF THE DEFENSE MINISTRY POLITICAL DEPT)  
STATED THE FOLLOWING WITH REGARD TO NPG PLANNING, AWACS,

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PAGE 02 BONN 18556 01 OF 03 031816Z

AND THE LEBER-MULLEY MEETING OF NOVEMBER 2:

2. NPG PLANNING.

WUST SAID PAULS' REMARKS WERE NOT INTENDED TO QUESTION NATO'S BASIC STRATEGY OR TO SUGGEST THAT THERE COULD OR SHOULD BE A EUROPEAN STRATEGIC BALANCE SEPARATE FROM THE GENERAL STRATEGIC BALANCE. HE SAID THE FRG WAS FULLY COMMITTED TO THE TRIAD AND DID NOT WISH TO IMPLY ANY INTEREST IN DECOUPLING.

3M WUST ADDED THAT HE EXPECTED TO SEE PAULS AGAIN BEFORE THE NPG MEETING, AND THAT HE WOULD ALSO BE TALKING IN DETAIL WITH LEBERM. HE WOULD MAKE SURE THAT ANY GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE NPG DISCUSSIONS WOULD REFLECT THE GENERAL GERMAN DESIRE TO HANDLE STRATEGIC PROBLEMS THROUGH AN OVERALL ALLIANCE EFFORT RATHER THAN THROUGH A EUROPEAN EFFORT.

4. GENERAL BRANDT SAID PAULS' REMARKS WERE INTENDED TO REFLECT FRG CONCERN OVER THE IMPBALANCE IN EUROPEAN THEATRE STRATEGIC FORCES WHICH WILL RESULT FROM THE INSTALLATION OF THE SOVIET SS-20'S. HE SAID THAT SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES NOW BEARING ON THE EUROPEAN BALANCE WERE FULLY TARGETTED AND THAT THEIR LOCATION AS WELL AS PROBABLE TARGETS WERE KNOWN FACTORS. THE SS-20'S, HOWEVER, WOULD BE MOBILE AND WOULD NOT BE SO CONFIGURED THAT THEIR TARGETS COULD BE CALCULATED IN ADVANCE. THIS REPRESENTED A GREAT THREAT TO EUROPE, A THREAT WHICH THE RUSSIANS MIGHT EXPLOIT FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES AS THEY HAD DONE AGAINST GREAT BRITAIN DURING THE 1956 EGYPTIAN CRISIS. BRANDT ADDED THAT THE SALT TALKS DEALT WITH INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS AND THE MEFR TALKS DEALT WITH FORCES LOCATED IN THE NGA. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE THREAT FELL BETWEEN THESE TWO FORA AND HAD TO BE ADDRESSED SEPARATELY SINCE IT DID NOT APPEAR TO BE REDUCIBLE BY NEGOTIATIONS. HE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT THE WAY TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM WAS BY COORDINATING ALL STRATEGIC FORCES AND, WHERE APPROPRIATE, BY RETARGETING, NOT BY TRYING TO ESTABLISH A SEPARATE EUROPEAN BALANCE.

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By WJD NARA Date 10/14/97

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BOTH GENERALS LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT PAULS' OCTOBER 5TH REMARKS SHOULD NOT BE OVER-INTERPRETTED, SINCE HE DID NOT YET HAVE GREAT EXPERIENCE WITH EUROPEAN NUCLEAR MATTERS.

6. AWACS.

IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION (REF B) REGARDING GERMAN VIEWS ON THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A NATO GROUND SYSTEM TO SUPPORT AWACS, MUST SAID HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY.

*Remainder of cable on other 7551131*

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by W333 NARA Date 10/14/97

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SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS  
for use with Secretary Rumsfeld

-- We are concerned that the draft of your presentation to the NPG on the nuclear balance separates central and non-central systems, thus making possible a focus on the European regional balance. You will recall our discussion of that subject at breakfast last month.

-- It is essential that the Allies continue to perceive the unity of the NATO Triad and the US strategic commitment to Europe.

-- Focusing on a separate balance of non-central, peripheral or gray area systems can only feed European anxieties about their strategic position and suggest that a military and political weakness exists in the Alliance when this is not the case.

-- This Administration should leave to its successor a functioning foreign policy in all fields including our military relationship with the European Allies and the possibility of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. The focus on a European regional balance can only damage both of those areas.

-- We believe that a satisfactory solution to this problem would be to merge the so-called non-central systems into the central systems for presentational purposes. We recognize that your script makes the point that central and non-central systems are part of a continuum of forces. We feel that the graphics you use as illustrations should be consistent with this point. In addition, we believe this merging of central and non-central systems would not have any SALT implications since we would not be presenting a SALT briefing at the NPG and would not use SALT terminology.

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