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THE NATO SUMMIT  
LONDON

JULY 5-6, 1990

BOOK ONE

SCOPE PAPERS

1. General Scowcroft's Memorandum to the President
2. Secretary Baker's Memorandum to the President

SCHEDULE

THE PRESIDENT'S MAIN NAC INTERVENTION

SUMMIT DECLARATION

1. Current U.S. Text
2. President's Message to Allied Leaders
3. Replies to the President's Message

CONTINGENCY POINTS TO BE MADE IN SUMMIT SESSIONS

1. Future Political Role of NATO
2. German Unification (Objectives in the Two Plus Four)
3. German Unification (Dealing with Soviet Concerns)
4. NATO Strategy Review
5. Status of Current CFE Negotiations
6. CFE Follow-On Negotiations
7. SNF Arms Control Negotiations
8. CSCE Summit
9. Situation in the Soviet Union

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CASE No. 98-0142-F  
JGP, 5/25/99

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BOOK TWO

CONTINGENCY BILATERAL PAPERS

1. Secretary General Woerner
2. General Galvin
3. Prime Minister Thatcher
4. President Mitterrand
5. Chancellor Kohl
6. Prime Minister Andreotti
7. Other Allied Leaders

BACKGROUND PAPERS

Political Issues

1. NATO Political Role
2. The Future of the Warsaw Pact
3. Role of France in NATO
4. CSCE Process
5. CSCE Summit
6. CSCE: Meetings on Particular Topics
7. US-Soviet Relations
8. Baltics

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Germany

1. Update on Inner-German Relations
2. Two-Plus-Four Process
3. Two-Plus-Four and the Borders Issue
4. Germany and NATO
5. Germany and the USSR
6. Text of Soviet Proposal for a Final Settlement in the Two-Plus-Four
7. Secretary Baker's "Nine Points"

Arms Control/Security Issues

1. Conventional Forces: NATO and Warsaw Pact
2. CFE
3. CFE Follow-On Negotiations
4. SNF: US and Soviet Forces
5. TASM and Nuclear Strategy Review
6. SNF Negotiations
7. British and French Nuclear Forces
8. Open Skies
9. CSBMs
10. Non-Proliferation

BIOGRAPHIC MATERIAL

(heads of government and foreign ministers, listed alphabetically by country)

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## THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary  
London, England

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For Immediate Release

July 6, 1990

FACT SHEET

NATO's Conventional Forces and Strategy

Today, based on a proposal from President Bush, NATO set a new course for the size and structure of its conventional forces in Europe. The Alliance agreed to prepare a new NATO military strategy moving away from "forward defense," where appropriate, towards a reduced forward presence.

As Soviet troops leave Eastern Europe and a Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty is implemented, the overwhelming conventional imbalance which NATO has faced for over forty years will change fundamentally. Yet NATO's new strategy and force posture will continue to reflect enduring principles of Alliance security: NATO has always been and will remain a defensive Alliance. We will continue to provide for the collective defense of all of the territory of all NATO members. In this connection the President reaffirmed today his commitment to maintain a substantial U.S. military presence in Europe for as long as our Allies want and need them.

NATO will prepare for a new era of enduring peace and stability. Under the Alliance's new strategy and force structure:

- NATO will field smaller and restructured active forces. These forces will be highly mobile and versatile so that Allied leaders will have maximum flexibility in deciding how to respond to a crisis. NATO will rely increasingly on multinational corps made up of national units.
- NATO will scale back the readiness of its active units reducing training requirements and the number of exercises.
- NATO will rely more heavily on the ability to build up larger forces if and when they might be needed.

NATO's new strategy will be developed on the basis of decisions taken today with the advice of NATO military authorities.

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## THE WHITE HOUSE

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London, England

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For Immediate Release

July 6, 1990

FACT SHEET

NATO Nuclear Strategy in the New Age

Today, based on a proposal from President Bush, NATO leaders announced that the Alliance will prepare a new Allied military strategy reducing reliance on nuclear weapons and modifying "flexible response" to reflect the greatly diminished threat posed by the East. Allied leaders agreed to adopt a new strategy making NATO's nuclear forces truly weapons of last resort.

The size and missions of the Alliance's nuclear deterrent forces will continue to reflect the fundamental nature of the Alliance as well as the changes underway in Europe. As a defensive alliance, NATO has always stressed that none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defense. NATO has always sought, moreover, to have the lowest level of nuclear forces needed to keep the peace. In the past, the threat of sudden and overwhelming conventional attack forced Allied planners to rely on the possible use of nuclear weapons soon after the outbreak of a major conflict. However, as a result of the new conditions in Europe, there will be a significantly reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, particularly those systems of the shortest range.

NATO's leaders firmly believe the peace that prevails in Europe reflects NATO's deterrent strength based on the sharing of risks and responsibilities and an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces, based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary. NATO's nuclear forces will continue to fulfill an essential role in the overall strategy of the Alliance to prevent war by ensuring that there are no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation in response to military action might be discounted. They also believe, however, that as Soviet forces return home and as the CFE treaty is implemented, NATO will not need to contemplate the use of its nuclear arsenal except as weapons of last resort.

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July 6, 1990

FACT SHEET

NATO Initiative on Nuclear Artillery

Today, based on a proposal from President Bush, NATO leaders decided that, once SNF negotiations begin, the Alliance will propose, in return for reciprocal action by the Soviet Union, the elimination of all its nuclear artillery shells from Europe. The U.S. maintains these nuclear artillery shells for its forces and for the forces of NATO allies.

The decision to plan for the withdrawal of nuclear artillery was made possible by the new political and military conditions in Europe, which will significantly reduce the role for theater nuclear systems of the shortest range. President Bush highlighted these conditions in his speech in Stillwater, Oklahoma on May 4. He announced then that the U.S. was cancelling any further modernization of U.S. nuclear artillery shells deployed in Europe, and he proposed that new U.S.-Soviet arms control talks on short-range nuclear systems begin shortly after the CFE treaty has been signed. Today, NATO leaders agreed to take this new step to reduce the levels of forces in Europe to the lowest level needed to keep the peace.

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SNF ARMS CONTROL DATA

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SNF Missile Systems

SNF Missile Lehrs - Ratio      SNF Missiles      Ratio

USSR/US

Stationed Forces	301/36	8:1	1488/1186	1.25:1
ATTU	1060/36	29:1	5404/2186	4.5:1
Global	1476/50	29:1	7588/1676	4.5:1

WP/NATO

Stationed Forces	N/A		N/A	
ATTU	1440/88	16:1	7386/1739	4.2:1
Global	1856/102	18:1	9570/2229	4.3:1

Artillery Tubes (152mm and larger)

USSR/US

Stationed Forces	2220/1109	2:1
ATTU	7865/1109	7:1
Global	10321/4119	2.5:1

WP/NATO

Stationed Forces	N/A	
ATTU	9303/5335	1.7:1
Global	11759/8345	1.4:1

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WARSAW PACT WORLDWIDE HOLDINGS

LAND-BASED NUCLEAR-CAPABLE SYSTEMS OF LESS THAN INF RANGE

TABLE 1: Missile Launchers and Artillery Tubes (152mm and above)

	<u>NSWP Forces</u>	<u>Soviets in NSWP</u>	<u>Total in NSWP</u>	<u>Total ATTU</u>	<u>Total Soviet (USSR+NSWP)</u>	<u>Glob:</u>
PROG	210	8	218	530	580	71
SCUD	149	159	308	627	634	71
SS-21	21	134	155	283	262	21
Msl Lchrs	380	301	681	1440	1476	181
152mm	1426	2180	3606	8760	9,548	10,91
203mm	0	40	40	285	411	41
240mm	12	0	12	258	362	37
Arty Tubes	1438	2220	3658	9303	10,321	11,71

TABLE 2: Missiles and Artillery Shells

PROG	1260	48	1308	3180	3,480	4,74
SCUD	596	636	1232	2508	2,536	3,13
SS-21	126	804	930	1698	1,572	1,69
Missiles	1982	1488	3470	7386	7,588	9,57
152mm						2,05
203mm						45
240mm						38
Arty Shells						2,89

(Detailed data unknown)

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LAND-BASED NUCLEAR-CAPABLE SYSTEMS OF LESS THAN INF RANGE  
(French Forces Excluded)

TABLE 1: Launchers and Artillery Tubes

	<u>Allied</u>	<u>US In Europe</u>	<u>Subtotal Europe</u>	<u>CONUS</u>	<u>Other US</u>	<u>Total</u>
LANCE	52	36	88	12	2	102
8 INCH	716	342	1058	619	68	1745
155MM	3510	767	4277	2029	294	6600

TABLE 2: Missiles and Shells

	<u>Allied</u>	<u>US In Europe</u>	<u>Subtotal Europe</u>	<u>CONUS</u>	<u>Other US</u>	<u>Total</u>
LANCE	553	1186	1739	472	18	2229
8 INCH	473	314	787	399	12	1198
155MM	381	192	573	140	33	746

Sources: USArmy; NATO Nuclear Force Data Paper; Nuclear Weapons Deployment Plan

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CASE No. 98-0142-FSNF NEGOTIATIONS  
JG P, 5/25/99TALKING POINTS

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KEY THEMES

- The Summit Declaration should set out the Alliance's SNF arms control objectives only in the broadest terms.
- We should instead focus on the big picture -- i.e., broad negotiating objectives and the strategy review. Specific issues and decisions should be deferred until Alliance assessments can be carefully made.

KEY POINTS

- We fully share the Alliance consensus, which came out of the Turnberry Ministerial meeting, that the Summit should issue a general statement of intent and timing on SNF arms control, without specifics.
- On timing, negotiations on U.S. and Soviet short-range nuclear weapon systems in Europe should begin shortly after a CFE agreement is concluded.
- We also fully share the consensus at Turnberry that discussion of deployment issues -- i.e., the Tactical-Air-to-Surface Missile (TASM) -- is premature.

CONTINGENCY POINTS

(If allies raise the issue of whether to include in SNF arms control cooperative systems -- e.g., UK, FRG, Italian, Dutch, and Belgian Lance missile systems):

- These are bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiations.
- Whether to address in SNF arms control the systems owned and operated cooperatively by allies is an issue we will need to talk about with those allies who are directly affected.

(If the French or the British raise their intention to keep their independent nuclear forces out of SNF arms control):

- We fully agree that the independent French and British nuclear forces must be kept out of the U.S.-Soviet SNF negotiations.

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KEY THEMES

- Conventional arms control will have a role to play in promoting stability and security through the 1990s.
- Our broad objectives for the 1990s should be to seek further far-reaching reductions of the offensive capability of conventional armed forces in Europe, so as to prevent any nation from maintaining disproportionate military power on the continent.
- Using the mandate already in place for CFE, new conventional arms control talks should begin with the same membership, once a CFE treaty is signed.

KEY POINTS

- Our task today is to look beyond immediate problems and set the course for the Alliance in the 1990s.
- CFE I will go far to restore the conventional military balance in Europe, but it leaves most NATO forces at close to their current levels. As the Soviet threat recedes and budgetary pressures grow, most of you will probably want to make sharp defense cuts.
- Conventional arms control will be the best way to manage these adjustments in a stabilizing way. It will also be the best way to continue to push Soviet forces downward to a size more proportionate with other European powers. Our publics will expect that CFE I is not the end of the story; that the process of reductions will continue. The language we have suggested for the Summit Declaration tells them that we will do that, and that we have a goal.
- We should not decide today what the exact nature of our proposals will be. In part, that will depend on the outcome of the current negotiations. Instead, we should set broad objectives for the coming decade, and reaffirm our commitment to continue the CFE process, without interruption, after the current CFE treaty is signed.

Contingency Points(If expanding the talks to all 35 CSCE countries is raised):

- We should begin, after the conclusion of this CFE treaty, with the same membership.
- We do not rule out expanding the negotiations to include other European states at an appropriate point, as observers and even full participants.

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(If negotiating a new mandate is raised):

- We should continue to use the existing CFE mandate. This is not a bloc-to-bloc document. At some point, we may wish to invite other CSCE participants to observe these negotiations or to join as participants.
- It would be premature to begin new mandate discussions now, while CFE follow-on negotiations are in progress.

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TALKING POINTS

KEY THEMES

- A CFE agreement will be the cornerstone of a new security structure for Europe.
  - By dramatically reducing conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals and codifying Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe, we remove the shadow that the Soviet military presence has cast over the continent for the past forty years.
  - A CFE agreement will set the stage for a CSCE Summit, where we can continue to chart the course for new relationships in Europe. We should not have a CSCE Summit without a CFE Treaty.
- We must move quickly to move forward to conclude a solid, verifiable agreement this year.

KEY POINTS

- A CFE Treaty will be a key part of the foundation for a new security architecture in Europe.
- We should spare no effort to complete a CFE treaty this year, which would open the way to a CSCE Summit.
  - I was pleased that we were able to set aside agreement last week on numbers for tanks and armored combat vehicles.
- But there is much left to do, and we cannot finish this treaty alone. We will continue to urge the Soviets to work with us to find realistic solutions to the problems which remain.
  - We are still opposed to a CFE provision which would single out the German armed forces for special reductions.

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	PERSONNEL	TANKS	ARTILLERY	COMBAT AIRCRAFT	Air Def. Intrcptrs	Armored Cmbt Veh.	(All) Helicopters
<b>NATO TOTAL</b>	2,722,405	24,414	18,487	6,030		25,493	4,726
<b>INDIGENOUS</b>	2,257,544	15,866	15,190	5,044		17,935	3,340
Belgium	51,912	159	292	179		783	24
Luxembourg	6,995	0	0	0		5	0
Netherlands	77,733	791	815	231		1,104	93
France	316,000	981	1,180	740		2,561	761
F.R.G.	443,754	5,236	2,492	736		3,132	882
U.K.	147,818	372	361	877		1,638	554
Denmark	25,310	389	553	106		267	22
Norway	28,080	217	527	98		112	14
Italy	371,671	1,533	1,955	610		3,636	303
Spain	250,111	856	1,310	260		1,258	259
Portugal	59,797	166	316	102		251	36
Greece	141,871	1,978	1,850	516		1,678	176
Turkey (ATTU)	342,792	3,188	3,539	589		1,510	216
<b>STATIONED (by)</b>	464,861	8,548	3,297	986		7,558	1,386
Belgium	25,064	200	86	0		438	37
Canada	6,953	77	36	48		205	13
France	44,000	522	157	0		719	51
Netherlands	8,327	122	27	1		80	0
U.K.	73,019	906	290	160		1,843	26
U.S.A.	307,498	6,681	2,701	737		4,273	1,245
Other	0	40	0	40		0	14
<b>W.I.O. TOTAL</b>	2,885,000	46,000	44,470	7,855	2,750	98,015	3,380
<b>SOVIET TOTAL</b>	1,845,000	31,990	33,760	6,025	1,830	73,975	2,590
Soviet in USSR	1,300,000	23,700	26,750	4,805	1,830	52,725	1,555
<b>STATIONED (in)</b>	545,000	8,290	7,010	1,220	0	21,250	1,035
G.D.R.	359,000	5,530	4,800	735	0	14,910	665
Czechoslovakia	78,000	1,380	1,140	70	0	2,500	180
Poland	52,000	520	460	270	0	1,660	90
Hungary	56,000	860	610	145	0	2,180	100
<b>WEST indigenou</b>	1,040,000	14,010	10,710	1,830	920	24,040	790
G.D.R.	156,000	2,050	1,590	160	160	5,210	175
Poland	288,000	3,560	2,710	620	215	5,770	185
Czechoslovakia	198,000	3,250	2,490	405	110	5,580	130
Hungary	93,000	1,080	720	10	115	2,010	75
Bulgaria	126,000	2,260	1,800	385	90	1,870	80
Romania	179,000	1,810	1,400	250	230	3,600	145

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NOTE: Due to the fluid situation in Eastern Europe, all Warsaw Pact figures are changing rapidly. Western manpower data 4/89 (NATO HLTF); Western equipment data 1/90 (NATO HLTF); Eastern data 4/90 (IC)

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CFE: Proposed Ceilings for Each Side

	PERSONNEL (Stationed, US and USSR)	TANKS	ARTILLERY	COMBAT AIRCRAFT	Air Def. Interceptors	Armored Cmbt Veh.	(All) Helicopters
<b>WEST PROPOSAL</b>	195,000 (Cent. Zone) 30,000 (Outer Zone)	20,000	16,500	4,700 (NATO has indicated flexibility on figs.)	500	30,000	1,900
<b>EASTERN PROPOSAL</b>	195,000 (Cent. Zone) 30,000 (Outer Zone)	20,000	20,000	4,700*	1,500*	30,000**	1,900**

Soviets continue to seek additional manpower limits.

\* The similarity of aircraft figures masks a wide disagreement between East and West on definition of what should be limited in CFE.

\*\* Counting rules have not been agreed.

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CFE: Proposed Ceilings for Each Side

	PERSONNEL (Stationed, US and USSR)	TANKS	ARTILLERY	COMBAT AIRCRAFT	Air Def. Intrcptrs	Armored Cmbt Veh.	(All) Helicopters
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NATO STRATEGY REVIEW

Case No. 98-0142-F TALKING POINTS  
JGP, 5/25/99

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KEY THEMES

- The Summit should establish broad principles which will guide the review of NATO's military strategy.
- The Summit should reaffirm certain fundamental principles of Alliance defense policy, which it does in our proposed Summit Declaration.
- But it should also give political direction to how our strategy and force posture could change in a radically different European security environment.

KEY POINTS

- As Soviet troops leave Eastern Europe and a CFE treaty is implemented, we will face a significantly reduced military threat. NATO can respond to that reduction.
- I believe we can help facilitate Soviet withdrawal by announcing that NATO will respond.
- Launching a review of our strategy and highlighting some specific important changes to our forces shows the people of Europe, and the Soviet Union in particular, that we have no intention of threatening anyone's security as Europe changes.
- I also believe that the guidelines we establish for a strategy review should reaffirm some fundamental principles of this Alliance. These are mentioned, for example, in the Summit Declaration we have proposed.
- We should let NATO institutions work out the details of our new strategy and force plans. Countries that are not in the Alliance's military structures should be able to contribute to the review in a way they consider appropriate.
- The big task for us is to give this review political direction. We should tackle the tough questions.
- In looking at conventional defenses, we should say that we are moving away from our strategy of forward defense as we have understood it in the past. The new elements in our strategy should include lower levels of standing forces, a reduced forward presence, greater flexibility in the disposition of our forces -- forces to defend the border do not have to be at the border, an emphasis on mobility and countering concentrations, the use of multinational forces,



and more reliance on reinforcement and recreation of larger NATO forces as needed.

- In modifying our strategy of flexible response, we no longer have to plan for the early use of nuclear weapons in order to deal with the threat of a sudden and overwhelming conventional attack. We can retain flexibility in planning the use of nuclear weapons, including the possibility of first use, but stress that now we can make our nuclear forces weapons of last resort.
- We will still need an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces, kept up to date. But our nuclear force posture can change -- starting with the removal of nuclear artillery shells as Soviet stationed troops return home.
- These are important changes. But if the Soviet threat does recede, they will be a sensible adjustment to a radically different security environment in Europe.
- We should consider the results of our strategy review at another NATO Summit as soon as possible next year.

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