

Authority 939000  
By AR NARA Date 4/10

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EUR ZNY SSSSS  
Info R 150205Z DEC 66  
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H ZE /AMEMBASSY LISBON  
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P ZE /AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG  
USIA ZE /AMEMBASSY OSLO  
NSC ZE /AMEMBASSY OTTAWA  
INR ZE /AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK  
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SECTO 70

SUBJECT: NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING - DPC MORNING AND AFTERNOON DEC 14 ITEM I, DEFENSE PLANNING.

1. AT BROSI0'S SUGGESTION MINISTERS CONSIDERED AS PACKAGE FOR ACTION FOLLOWING SUBJECTS: PROCEDURES FOR DEFENSE PLANNING REVIEW; 1966-1967 FORCE PLANS FOR GREECE AND TURKEY; ACCELERATED DEFENSE PLANNING PROCEDURES; TRILATERAL TALKS; PLIITICAL GUIDANCE; AND STATUS REPORT ON FORCE PLANNING STUDIES PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED.

2. FOLLOWING EXTENDED DISCUSSION, THE MINISTERS ACCEPTED BROSI0'S SUMMARY THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE NO DISAGREEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO THE DEFENSE PLANNING PROCEDURES (DPC/D(66)12) AND THE STATUS REPORT ON FORCE PLANNING STUDIES (DPC/D(66)37). WITH RESPECT OT GREEK AND TURKISH FORCE PLANS (DPC/D(66)34 AND 35), THE MINISTERS THEN NOTED THE DOCUMENTS AND AGREED THAT THE DEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEE WOULD STUDY THEM FURTHER, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT INFORMATION GIVEN THE COUNCIL ON EXTERNAL AID AND ALSO THE VIEWS OF THEMILITARY COMMITTEE EXPRESSED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF DPC/

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D(66)33 (REVISED). (THIS "NOTING" GIVES PARALLEL STATUS TO THE GREEK AND TURKISH FORCE PLANS; NEITHER HAVE BEEN ADOPTED AS "MINIMUM FORCE PLANS; WITH RESPECT TO POLITICAL GUIDANCE, THE MINISTERS ACCEPTED BROSIQ'S SUGGESTION THAT THEY REQUEST THE DPC FURTHER TO EXAMINE THE DRAFT "MINISTERS GUIDANCE" SO THAT THE SPRING

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MINISTERIAL SESSION COULD TAKE A FINAL DECISION. THE MILITARY COMMITTEE WOULD BE REQUESTED TO CONTINUE ITS PREPARATORY STUDIES AND TO TAKE THE DOCUMENT (DPC/D(66)30) INTO ACCOUNT AS BACKGROUND, IN THE LIGHT OF MINISTERIAL VIEWS. THE MILITARY COMMITTEE WOULD, HOWEVER, BE REQUESTED TO ADHERE TO ITS SCHEDULE OF SUBMITTING THE APPRECIATION OF THE MILITARY SITUATION BY THE FIRST OF APRIL, EVEN THOUGH FINAL MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN AVAILABLE.

3. IN PRECEDING DISCUSSION ON POLITICAL GUIDANCE, MOD HEALEY (UK) STRESSED TWO POINTS: (A) THAT MILITARY PLANS SHOULD BE BASED ON FORCES NATO COUNTRIES ACTUALLY HAVE OR INTEND TO PROVIDE, AND (B) POLITICAL GUIDANCE TO MILITARY PLANNERS SHOULD BE IN A TOTAL POLITICAL CONTEXT IN WHICH THE MILITARY ARE THE SERVANT AND NOT THE MASTER OF POLICY. HE DWELT ON NECESSITY TO CONSIDER ENEMY INTENTIONS AS WELL AS CAPABILITIES IN INTEREST OF REALISM. HE SAID THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, TO HAVE THE SAME DEGREE OF PRECISION ABOUT ENEMY INTENTIONS AS FOR ENEMY CAPABILITIES. HE NOTED THERE HAS ALREADY BEEN A LARGE MEASURE OF RISK ACCEPTANCE IN NATO INHERENT IN FAILURE OF MEMBER COUNTRIES TO MEET PREVIOUS FORCE GOALS. FORCES THAT MEMBER COUNTRIES ARE PREPARED TO PROVIDE ARE NOT, IN HIS OPINION, SUFFICIENT TO RESTORE THE INTEGRITY OF NATO TREATY AREA AS STATED IN THE GUIDANCE PAPER.

4. CONTINUING, HEALEY OBSERVED THAT SOVIETS HAVE SHOWN NO SIGNS OF EXPLOITING NATO WEAKNESS RESULTING FROM MEMBER COUNTRIES FAILURE TO MEET FORCE GOAL LEVELS DESIGNATED BY THE MILITARY.

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IN HEALEY'S VIEW, ALTHOUGH IT IS PROBABLY NOT POSSIBLE IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO ATTAIN AN ARMAMENTS REDUCTION, NO STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN NOW THAT WOULD BLOCK POSSIBILITY FOR FUTURE. HE STATED THAT FIVEN NATO'S ARRAY OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES, TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ALLIANCE IS NOT FACED WITH AN ALL-OR-NOTHING CHOICE. HEALEY STRESSED NECESSITY FOR POLITICAL SOLIDARITY IN ACHIEVING CONTINUED DETERRENCE, PARTICULARLY IN NUCLEAR FIELD.

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5. HEALEY CRITICIZED POLITICAL GUIDANCE PAPER ON THREE GROUNDS: TREATMENT OF POLITICAL WARNING; THE NATURE AND DURATION OF POSSIBLE MILITARY OPERATIONS; AND POSSIBILITY OF A MAJOR SOVIET ATTACK BY MISCALCULATION. RE FIRST POINT, HE BELIEVED THERE WOULD BE AT LEAST MONTHS OF WARNING BECAUSE A CHANGE OF SOVIET INTENTIONS WOULD RESULT FROM VISIBLE CHANGE IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIPS OR VISIBLE CHANGES IN NATO POLITICAL SOLIDARITY. RE SECOND POINT, HE DESCRIBED AS LUDICROUS SUGGESTIONS WE COULD "RESTORE INTEGRITY OF NATO AREA AFTER USE OF 7,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS. RE THIRD POINT, HE THOUGHT MORE STUDY NEEDED ON CHANCES OF SOVIET MISCALCULATION, FOR EXAMPLE, HEALEY DESCRIBED AS FANTASTIC SUCH POSSIBILITIES AS A HAMBURG GRAB IN FACE OF NATO'S CAPABILITIES. IN CRITICIZING POLITICAL GUIDANCE PAPER ON CERTAIN GROUNDS, HEALEY NEVERTHELESS CONSIDERED IT A GOOD STEP FORWARD.

6. MOD TIEDEMAND (NORWAY), ALTHOUGH GENERALLY SUPPORTING HEALEY'S IDEAS, POINTED OUT THAT NATO CAN NOT RELY FOR ITS FORCE PLANNING GUIDANCE ON SOVIET INTENTIONS ALONE. HE EMPHASIZED NEED FOR STRONG ATLANTIC TIES AND CONTINUED EUROPEAN PRESENCE OF US AND CANADIAN FORCE.

7. BRANDT (GERMANY) EXPRESSED A VIEW THAT ATTACKS ON NATO AREA ARE UNLIKELY, BUT NOT AS YET COMPLETELY IMPOSSIBLE. HE AGREED WITH HEALEY'S POINT THAT PRESENT SOVIET LEADERS IN THE PRESENT SITUATION WOULD PROBABLY NOT ATTACK. HE ARGUED, HOWEVER, THAT WE COULD NOT EXCLUDE A CHANGE OF THEIR ATTITUDE IN A PERIOD OF TENSION OR IN RESPONSE TO WESTERN ACTIONS. SOVIET MILITARY POWER COULD ALSO BE USED FOR POLITICAL PRESSURES AGAINST NATO COUNTRIES.

8. CONTINUING, BRANDT NOTED A POSSIBLE CONSENSUS IN TRILATERAL TALKS ON THE EXTENT OF THE THREAT AND THE NEED FOR MAINTENANCE OF BALANCED FORCES. HE ALSO APPLAUDED UK WILLINGNESS TO AVOID UNILATERAL FORCE CUT AND RECOGNIZED US ROLE THEREIN. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF NATO'S HAVING CAPACITY TO CONDUCT CONVENTIONAL WAR BUT ALSO SAID THE AGGRESSOR MUST KNOW OF OUR INTENT AND WILLINGNESS TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IF NECESSARY. RISK OF ESCALATION MUST BE PRESERVED IN ENEMY'S MIND. BRANDT ARGUED AGAINST HEALEY THAT NATO FORCES MUST AIM AT RESTORING THE INTEGRITY OF THE NATO AREA IF IT CAME TO THAT. BRANDT ADVISED CONTINUED WORK ON POLITICAL PGUIDANCE PAPER LOOKING TOWARD A FINAL DECISION IN THE SPRING OF 1967.

9. MOD KOSTOPOULOS (GREECE) MADE UNEXCEPTIONAL COMMENTS ON NEED FOR GP-3 RUSK  
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SUBJECT: NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING - DPC MORNING AND AFTERNOON  
DEC. 14 ITEM I, DEFENSE PLANNING.

DEFENSE OF FLANKS. HE RESERVED THE GREEK POSITION ON POLITICAL  
GUIDANCE PAPER PENDING COMPLETION OF FULL STUDY BY HIS GOVERNMENT.  
ON GREEK FORCE PLANS, HE POINTED OUT NEED FOR ADDITIONAL  
161.5 MILLION DOLLARS OVER A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD TO IMPLEMENT  
CURRENTLY PROPOSED PLANS.

10. MOD DE JONG (NETHERLANDS) MADE A PLEA FOR NATO SOLIDARITY IN  
THE FACE OF FRENCH WITHDRAWAL. HE CALLED FOR MAINTENANCE OF NATO  
INTEGRATION AND AVOIDANCE OF ACTIONS WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE  
WITHDRAWAL OF SUBSTANTIAL FORCES FROM EUROPE. HE CONSIDERED HEALEY  
TOO OPTIMISTIC ON WARNING TO ME AND ADVISED SENDING POLITICAL  
GUIDANCE PAPER TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE NOW ONLY AS A PRELIMINARY  
INDICATION OF COUNCIL VIEWS.

11. MOD POSWICK (BELGIUM) SAID BELGIUM WILL MAINTAIN ITS 1966 FORCE  
LEVELS IN 1967. ALTHOUGH THERE WOULD BE SOME ADJUSTMENT IN 1968 AND

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THEREAFTER, THE PERCENTAGE OF GNP FOR DEFENSE WOULD REMAIN AT 1967 LEVEL.

12. MOD TREMELLONI (ITALY) STRESSED NEED FOR ADEQUATE CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO RAISE THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD AND FOSTER A CREDIBLE DETERRENT. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE MOST POWERFUL DETERRENT WAS THE RISK OF ESCALATION TO ALL-OUT WAR AND THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE TO DECREASE THE FEASIBILITY OF NATO RESPONSE OR ENEMY UNCERTAINTY.

13. KRAG (DENMARK) CONCLUDED THE MORNING DPC SESSION BY STATING THAT THE POLITICAL GUIDANCE PAPER APPEARED TO BE A STEP FORWARD, ALTHOUGH IT HAD SOME WEAK POINTS. HE TOOK EXCEPTION TO ANY IMPLICATION THAT SOVIET POLICY WITH RESPECT TO EUROPE WAS UNCHANGED, WHEN IN FACT HE BELIEVED THAT IT WAS IN THE PROCESS OF ADAPTATION BY VIRTUE OF THE INFLUENCE OF CHINA AND THE SATELLITES. HE OBSERVED THAT AN EFFECTIVE MILITARY BALANCE OF NATO VERSUS THE WARSAW PACT HELPS TO MAINTAIN A NON-AGGRESSIVE LINE IN SOVIET POLICY AND THAT THIS MILITARY BALANCE MUST BE RETAINED UNTIL REPLACED BY OTHER MEANS OF SECURITY.

14. AFTERNOON SESSION WAS OPENED BY MOD TOPALOGU (TURKEY). WHILE WELCOMING POLITICAL GUIDANCE AS A FIRST STEP, HE STRESSED THE PRIMARY IMPORTANCE OF IMPROVEMENTS IN LOCAL FORCES WITH RESPECT TO FORWARD DEFENSE. BALANCE OF HIS ARGUMENT WAS THAT EXTERNAL REINFORCEMENTS AND MOBILE FORCES ARE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR FORCES IN BEING ON THE SPOT.

15. SECRETARY RUSK SPOKE AT THIS POINT (SEE SEPTTEL)

16. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MCNAMARA ADDRESSED SPECIFIC REMARKS TO TWO PAPERS, POLITICAL GUIDANCE (DPC/D(66)30) AND THE TURKISH FORCE PLANS (DPC/D(66)35). HE AGREED WITH THOSE MINISTERS WHO POINTED OUT THAT THE POLITICAL GUIDANCE PAPER IS A MAJOR STEP FORWARD IN OUR FORCE PLANNING WORK. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE DID NOT BELIEVE A DECISION NOW WAS APPROPRIATE. THE SUBJECT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AT THE SPRING MEETING OF MINISTERS. HE RECOMMENDED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO FORWARD THE CURRENT DOCUMENT TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE FOR INFORMATION. MCNAMARA SHARED THE UK VIEW THAT POLITICAL AND MILITARY WARNING ASPECTS REQUIRE MORE STUDY. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE DISAGREED WITH HEALEY'S VIEWS IN MANY RESPECTS. FOR EXAMPLE, ON HIS PESSIMISM REGARDING NATO'S CAPABILITIES VERSUS THE WARSAW PACT; THE IMPLICATION THAT CONVENTIONAL FORCES NO LONGER SERVED A USEFUL PURPOSE; AND THE SELECTION OF 15 DAYS AS A POSSIBLE COMBAT PERIOD ON WHICH TO BASE LOGISTICS PLANNING.

17. WITH RESPECT TO THE TWO VERSIONS OF PARAGRAPH 30(F) OF THE POLITICAL GUIDANCE PAPER, HE SAID THAT THE PROBLEM RESULTED

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FROM A FAILURE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN FORCE PLANS AND OPERATIONAL PLANS AND THAT ADDITIONAL STUDY WAS NEEDED TO CLARIFY THIS MATTER.

18. ON THE TURKISH FORCE PLANS, MCNAMARA NOTED THAT IT WAS INAPPROPRIATE TO ADOPT THEM AS A MINIMUM FORCE PLAN, SINCE THEY COULD NOT, AS STATED IN DPC/D(66)35, BE SUPPORTED BY RESOURCES KNOWN TO BE AVAILABLE, AND RECOMMENDED THAT THE DPC REVIEW TURKISH FORCE PLANS AGAIN TO INSURE THAT THEY CAN BE DEVELOPED AT A FEASIBLE LEVEL.

19. THOMPSON (UK), IN A BRIEF SUMMARY OF TRILATERAL TIMETABLE PROBLEMS, STATED THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE IN UK TROOP LEVELS PENDING COMPLETION OF TRILATERAL TALKS. IF, HOWEVER, BY THE END OF JUNE 1967, THE TRILATERAL TALKS HAD NOT PROVIDED USEFUL RESULTS, THE UK WOULD HAVE TO MAKE DECISIONS AS NECESSARY WITH RESPECT TO THOSE FORCE LEVELS, BUT WOULD FOLLOW NATO AND WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION PROCEDURES IN SO DOING. HE SAID THAT THE US GOVERNMENT'S OFFER TO PLACE \$35 MILLION OF PURCHASES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM WAS HELP IN THIS CONNECTION. WHILE NOT NOT UNDER-ESTIMATING THE PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE TRIPARTITE TALKS, WHEN THEY RESUME EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR, THOMPSON HOPED FOR A RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS AND A VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO AN UP-TO-DATE AND EFFECTIVE FORCE POSTURE FOR THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE.

20. MOD HELLYER (CANADA) AGREED WITH MCNAMARA'S STATEMENT ON THE POLITICAL GUIDANCE PAPER. HE PROVIDED A FORECAST THAT THE RE-ORGANIZATION OF CANADIAN MILITARY FORCES INTO A SINGLE SERVICE WILL NOT DETRACT FROM CANADA'S ABILITY TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE ALLIANCE, BUT WITH SAVINGS EFFECTED WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE A BETTER CONTRIBUTION.

21. MOD HEALEY (UK) IN REBUTTAL TO SECRETARY MCNAMARA'S COMMENT ON HIS STATEMENT, SAID THAT IF MCNAMARA WERE RIGHT AND NATO FORCES WERE A BETTER MATCH FOR PACT FORCES THAN HE (HEALEY) BELIEVED, THIS WOULD PROVIDE EVEN MORE SCOPE FOR REDEPLOYMENT POSSIBILITIES. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF MCNAMARA WERE WRONG, HE WOULD THEN CORRECT THE SECRETARY'S INTERPRETATION OF HIS REMARKS TO POINT OUT THAT A CERTAIN QUANTUM OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES WERE NEEDED DESPITE THE OVERALL DISPARITY IN FORCES. THE PROBLEM WAS HOW TO DETERMINE THIS QUANTUM. HEALEY BELIEVED THAT CONVENTIONAL FORCES SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT IN NUMBER TO CREATE A CREDIBLE RISK BY ENGAGING AN ENEMY LONG ENOUGH TO PERMIT OUR SIDE TO TAKE DECISIONS ON THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

GP#3 RUSK

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