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The JCS recommend, because of the inadequacies of the analysis in the NATO Strategy paper, that the DPM be revised in its entirety. Specifically, the JCS contend:

- . Until satisfactory relationships are achieved with the USSR, the US must maintain substantial military forces in Europe to protect its own fundamental interests. The limited progress to date does not justify the unilateral reduction or degradation of US military capability or posture.
- . NATO must retain the capability to deter and, if deterrence fails, to oppose, neutralize, or repel Soviet-Warsaw Pact adventures or any aggression that might follow. There is no military justification, derived from degradation of the threat, optimization of allied capabilities, and reliance on "political warning," for a reduction of either US or allied forces in Europe.
- . While the initial US military objective in NATO is the deterrence of aggression, the US objective must also include the provision of NATO military capabilities to deal with any type of aggression, should it occur, and keep the level of conflict as low as possible by maintaining strong, forward-deployed forces in Europe.
- . NATO and US nonnuclear force capabilities recommended in the DPM are not sufficient to achieve the objective, as stated, of making "any kind of aggression grossly unprofitable for the Warsaw Pact."
- . That a state of mutual deterrence does not now exist at the nonnuclear level, as implied in the DPM.
- . That NATO should have the capability to deal successfully with a conflict arising out of an unexpected event or miscalculation of intentions. However, they do not agree that such a conflict, especially one arising out of an unexpected event, would necessarily be preceded by an extended period of "political warning." Nor do they agree that, in those situations where "political warning" is available, the NATO nations would necessarily make an early accurate political assessment and the rapid decisions required for timely reinforcement of NATO.
- . That NATO capabilities have been overstated while Warsaw Pact capabilities, particularly those of the USSR, have been understated from the estimates accepted by the intelligence community. Specifically, the JCS cannot agree with:
 - The basic assumption that NATO and the Warsaw Pact would begin mobilization at the same time.
 - The application of US intertheater movement factors to Soviet movements.
 - The analysis of relative force capabilities resulting from the simplified and static examination of the highly complex factors involved.
 - The conclusion that NATO has a major tactical air advantage over the Warsaw Pact.
- . This DPM has generated uncertainties as to what strategy is in fact being proposed for NATO. It sets forth a combination of concepts such as an effective nonnuclear response to conflicts arising from miscalculations, an ability to reinforce nonnuclear capabilities in time of crisis, and the threat of a NATO nuclear response to a very large deliberate attack. These concepts are not joined by a unified strategy that states clearly how they are related.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958

Per ASD (PA) - J = OFSR

FEB 13 1998

01/26/98

94-M-0123

Chief, Declass Br

Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

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94-MDR-0123 (16)

Attack 18a 4

(Attack 21a

ARMY COMMENTS ON DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM
ON NATO STRATEGY AND FORCE STRUCTURES

Memo from Mr. Resor
9 June 1967

Concurrences:

- . Agrees war in NATO is most likely to begin through miscalculation in time of political crisis or heightened tension.
- . Agrees NATO has a "decided tactical air advantage over the Pact."

Non-concurrences:

- . Believes we should not permanently abandon long range objective of repelling all types of nonnuclear aggression with nonnuclear forces; premeditated full scale nonnuclear aggression cannot be ruled out completely.
- . Believes we should not rely heavily on political warning, as this is too risky.
- . Believes analysis in DPM does not show forces are adequate for objectives; instead concludes that "the force ratios which the Soviets can confidently expect to generate in nonnuclear conflict seem adequate to assume their leaders that at the end of any short period of combat they will have made substantial tactical gains which NATO forces will not, during the time period analyzed, be capable of eliminating by nonnuclear counteroffensive."
- . Disagrees with continuing 90 days logistics guidance for NATO forces, Army position is 180 combat days.

General Comments:

- . Believes objectives set forth for nonnuclear capabilities are too vague; need more specific definition of nonnuclear situations.
- . NATO does not have a big training advantage, except during a limited period of the year.
- . NATO's qualitative advantage in tanks cannot offset the Pact's quantitative advantage.
- . NATO's tactical air advantage has not been proven to improve significantly the balance of NATO and Warsaw Pact land forces.
- . French forces should not be included in NATO, and only DIA reinforcement times should be used for the Soviets.
- . The DPM does not give the problem of the North German plain enough weight.

DECLASSIFIED BY 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

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Attach 18b
(Attach 21b)

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NAVY COMMENTS ON DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM
ON NATO STRATEGY AND FORCE STRUCTURE

Memo from Mr. Nitze
9 June 1967

Concurrences:

- .. Agrees with stated objectives for nuclear and nonnuclear forces.

Non-concurrences:

- . Disagrees that Allied naval plans are excessive; instead should persuade Allies to concentrate on patrol aircraft, ASW escorts and mine countermeasure forces.
- . Believes adequacy of nonnuclear forces is not demonstrated in DPM (particularly land forces).

General Comments:

- . Believes NATO tactical air advantage "may be as low as 2:1 depending on the scenario employed," compared to 15:1 in DPM.
- . DPM tables should show Marine wings with the divisions, and should not confine Marine units to Southern Region.
- . Believes yardsticks used in DPM for comparing NATO and Pact may not be valid, and should be improved.
- . DPM concentrates too much on "large scale actions," thus ignoring lower level hostilities where war at sea might be a "possible tool."
- . Importance of naval forces is increasing because of weakness of flanks, possible denial of bases, loss of France, and need for deployments from CONUS.

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DCD 10

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Attach 18c

(Attach 21c)

AIR FORCE COMMENTS ON DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM ON
NATO STRATEGY AND FORCE STRUCTURE

Memo from Dr. Brown
7 June 1967

Concurrences:


- Agrees with "DPM's goal for NATO of rapid termination without loss of territory in the event of limited conflict."

Non-concurrences:

- DPM as written should not be used "for making force structure, strategic, tactical, or budgetary decisions."
- DPM does not outline a NATO strategy that can be used for force planning.
- DPM does not show adequacy of forces for stated objectives because analysis is dependent on following too optimistic assumptions: political warning will be available; NATO and Pact mobilize at same time; NATO Allies will use aircraft in nonnuclear mode; Pact land reinforcement capabilities are understated (only DIA estimates should be used); force comparisons do not include 2,500 USSR aircraft in "reserve status" and 758 medium bombers which are not included in threat to U.S. in Strategic DPM.
- NATO/Pact tactical air comparison is invalid; damage capability could be 10 to 50 times DPM estimate; value of interdiction is understated, as full LOC closure is not required; comparison is sensitive to force employment; problem of air superiority is underestimated.
- DPM minimizes tac air nuclear role; should consider new systems like VSTOL to reduce vulnerability.

General Comments:

- Deterrence of nonnuclear war cannot be accomplished principally by fear of escalation and nonnuclear forces can deter only if they can fight a major war successfully.
- DPM objectives do not provide for satisfactory conflict termination; this requires a military advantage.
- Need overall DPM to address worldwide defense objectives and concepts.



Attach 18d

(Attach 171d)