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With regard to deterrence of a deliberate nonnuclear attack, it is clear that in every region of NATO except North Norway, the Soviets would have to launch a huge attack involving large reinforcements from the USSR to have confidence of success at a nonnuclear level. As discussed above, such an attack is powerfully deterred by our theater nuclear forces.

The special intelligence study made for the tripartite talks estimated that the largest attack that could be launched in the Center Region with the objective of complete surprise would be some part of the twenty Soviet divisions (280,000 men) in East Germany. Because of maldeployment of NATO forces, the Pact could probably seize some NATO territory until a counterattack could be launched, but the ratio of NATO and Soviet forces (about 2 to 1 in NATO's favor in the Center Region) would be much too low for a continued Soviet offensive unless large reinforcements were brought in or the East Europeans were induced to attack also. Furthermore, under these circumstances the Soviets would sacrifice their potential advantage of reinforcing before NATO began to do so.

A more advantageous situation for the Soviets would be a concealed mobilization and reinforcement followed by a maximum scale attack. If they were able to attack with a maximum force while providing NATO with only eleven to fifteen days to prepare,* the Pact would have a force of about 1,500,000 men to NATO's 900,000 and NATO would probably have to respond fairly quickly with nuclear weapons. Mounting such an attack would require the Soviets to bring in thirty to forty divisions from the USSR. In evaluating this course of action, however, the Soviets would have to fear that NATO might detect the Pact build-up sooner, reinforce faster, and that some of the East European forces might not cooperate. Opposing forces might then be nearly equal, and even this maximum scale build-up would provide the Soviets only a moderate confidence of major success at the nonnuclear level. For these reasons, I believe the risk that we might be driven to use nuclear weapons in this unlikely case is acceptable.

Because the deterrence to a deliberate attack is so high, it is more likely that any war in Europe will arise from a miscalculation of intentions during a political crisis. Such circumstances are more favorable to NATO than a deliberate Pact attack, since the Pact would probably not have the initiative in deploying forces. NATO's deployed forces are roughly equal to the Pact's, and while the Pact can reinforce somewhat faster, this provides a maximum advantage of about 30 to 40% in combat capability around M+30 if both sides start at the same time, and if all allies on both sides cooperate.

Considering the uncertainty in the ratio of forces needed for a successful defense, no definite statement can be made concerning conflict outcome. (For example, the Israelis recently conducted a successful offensive campaign with numerically inferior forces.) However, I believe that in this situation the Pact could not count on making a large, rapid advance initially,

*DIA estimate.

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and probably not even if the conflict were to continue beyond the initial clash. Because of the great danger of escalation, the mutual pressures to end such a conflict would be great. Furthermore, NATO's ability to reinforce enables it to maintain a NATO/Pact force ratio during a buildup which is not very different from that in peacetime. For these reasons, I believe our planned forces provide reasonable confidence of meeting this contingency.

III. THE FUTURE U.S. PROGRAM FOR NATO

A. Forces Deployed in Europe

After extensive discussions with our Allies, we have decided to return to CONUS two brigades of the 24th Infantry Division and four squadrons with 96 aircraft from Germany (a total of 33,281 military personnel) and to rotate them periodically to their forward locations. This will reduce our foreign exchange expenditures in Europe and provide an opportunity to exercise our rapid deployment capability. In addition, during the past year we have completed relocation from France. This move cuts U.S. personnel in Europe by 18,000 (plus 21,000 dependents), and our employment of foreign nationals by 11,000. These two actions will save over \$170 million per year in gold flow.

I do not believe these changes will significantly affect NATO's ability to meet its military objectives. The most likely conflict in NATO is one beginning through miscalculation in a time of political crisis. In this case, we would be able to return our forces to Europe during the crisis. In the event of a deliberate nonnuclear attack, the size of the required Soviet force and the risks they would run are already so great that any change in the Soviet calculation of odds resulting from these redeployments is insignificant.

Even after these actions, the U.S. still has double the ratio of support of any other army in Europe (even excluding the 60,000 civilians we employ in Germany). With the excellent transportation capacity in the Benelux, the improved capability of the German territorial forces to perform such wartime tasks as rear area security and repair of war damage, and our improved ability to deploy troops back to Europe, we may be able to effect further consolidations of our logistics system. I intend to continue to review this subject carefully over the coming year.

B. Land Reinforcement for NATO

As shown in the table on page 9 we normally have large active and reserve land forces in CONUS which can be used to reinforce Europe, including two Marine Division/Wing teams committed to NATO. Most of these divisions are required for and can be used in other areas. (Some are in Vietnam now.)

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Thus, there is little extra cost in planning to use them in Europe if necessary. The main cost (some \$2 billion per year) arises from six heavy division forces we maintain principally for reinforcing NATO (three in the active forces and three in the priority reserves). All of these division forces are armored or mechanized and are provided logistics based on NATO employment.* These forces, when taken together with allied force expansion capabilities, would permit NATO to build up a land force of about 1,300,000 men and to attain a nearly equal balance of NATO and Pact forces in all regions.

C. Tactical Air Reinforcements for NATO

The U.S. maintains large tactical air forces capable of reinforcing NATO, as shown below.

	<u>Number of Aircraft</u>	<u>Five-Year Systems Cost</u> (\$ Billions)
Deployed in Europe or Dual-Based <u>a/</u>	880	\$12
Planned Augmentation <u>b/</u>	1,500	23
Other UE Aircraft Potentially Available for Europe <u>c/</u>	1,500	9
	-----	-----
TOTAL	3,880	\$44

a/ Includes 576 Air Force fighter/attack aircraft, 164 Air Force reconnaissance aircraft, and 140 fighter/attack and reconnaissance aircraft in the Sixth Fleet.

b/ Includes about 500 Air Force fighter/attack and 150 Air Force reconnaissance aircraft for which bases are or will be provided, and eight additional carrier wings and two Marine Air Wings committed to NATO.

c/ Includes Reserve and National Guard.

Many of these reinforcing aircraft are needed outside Europe. The additional cost of providing bases and stocks for their possible use in Europe is small and we should continue to do so. We are now establishing additional bases in the United Kingdom and the FRG to accommodate aircraft that were to be based in France. Our base structure will then permit rapid

*One division force is now provided logistics for indefinite combat to improve multi-mission capability, but I intend to review this decision next year.

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deployment of about 650 Air Force augmentation fighter/attack/reconnaissance aircraft. In evaluating our world-wide force structure, however, it is important to estimate the minimum number of aircraft that would be required to achieve our objectives in Europe.

I believe that in the Center Region, the seven fighter/attack wings (504 aircraft) we have committed to NATO are adequate to meet our strategic objectives. On the Southern Flank, the two aircraft carrier wings (140 aircraft) and three Air Force squadrons normally deployed there (72 aircraft) should be adequate. For Norway, some additional U.S. reinforcements may well be appropriate, but no detailed analysis is yet available on which to base an estimate. I believe that this minimum force will provide NATO with substantially more air capability than the Pact,* so the case for more U.S. tactical air forces rests mainly on the ability of air forces to substitute for U.S. land forces. This case has not yet been made. Therefore, until we have much better estimates of how an air advantage affects land force requirements in Europe, I believe we must plan our land forces against the Soviet land threat, and treat our air advantage as a safety factor. My reasons for these conclusions are summarized below.

We should buy tactical air forces mainly for their contribution in nonnuclear war. Their vulnerability to nuclear attack sharply limits their effectiveness in nuclear war. In the nonnuclear role, tactical air and air defense forces contribute to our overall objectives in two ways: first, they reduce damage by Pact air forces to NATO land forces and logistics systems; and second, they permit NATO to inflict damage on Pact land forces and logistics systems. There is no need to destroy the Pact air forces themselves except to the extent that doing so would contribute to these objectives.

The NATO air forces, especially the U.S. forces, are well-suited for these objectives. The Pact air forces are not, since they are largely designed to shoot down nuclear bombers. The U.S. and some allied air forces have much bigger payloads; more support to sustain sortie rates; and more modern, effective and costly nonnuclear munitions. Also, our pilots are better trained and hence more accurate. When all these factors are combined, it is not surprising that our overall target destruction capability turns out to be far greater than the Pact's.

A recent study by my staff, after allowing for major improvements in Pact forces by 1971, estimates this advantage at some 9 to 1 in potential destructive power, broken down roughly as shown in the table on the next page. The table also shows comparable Air Staff estimates for these factors.

* The Air Force and the JCS believe that NATO has no air advantage and that the forces are inadequate. The Army and the Navy believe NATO has an advantage, but that it is not as large as I estimate. The Navy further believes these forces would be adequate only until reinforcements arrive.

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RATIO OF NATO TO PACT OFFENSIVE AIR CAPABILITY a/

	<u>Number b/ Aircraft</u>	x	<u>Sortie Rate</u>	x	<u>Effective Payload</u>	x	<u>Average Effectiveness of Ordnance</u>	x	<u>Pilot Bombing Accuracy</u>	=	<u>Overall NATO/PACT Ratio</u>
OSD											
Estimate	.53	x	1.45	x	2.1	x	3.1	x	1.8	=	8.9
Air Staff											
Estimate	.53	x	.51	x	2.1	x	1.6	x	1.0	=	.92

a/ The figures shown here are aggregate summaries of a very detailed analysis based on individual aircraft, weapons, and targets.

b/ This includes only the 504 Air Force fighter/attack aircraft recommended for the Center Region. It excludes French aircraft, but includes Soviet tactical air reinforcements from the Western USSR. Thus, in this analysis, the Pact used 2,993 aircraft compared to 1,591 for NATO. This is about 15% of NATO's worldwide payload capability and 36% of the Pact's. Heavy and medium strategic bombers were not considered.

As the table shows, the Air Staff does not believe that NATO will have an overall advantage. They believe the Pact will have a 2 to 1 advantage in sortie rate; NATO will probably have no net advantage in bombing accuracy; and NATO will have only a 60% advantage in ordnance effectiveness. Moreover, they believe this comparison of close air support capability is inadequate since other significant factors concerning objectives and strategy and counter-air, interdiction, and air-to-air effectiveness have not been addressed. They believe such factors would dominate over those considered.

Although each of these factors has been very carefully investigated, there obviously is still uncertainty, as is shown by the far different estimates. Assuming all other factors are as estimated by my staff, if our sortie rates were equal to the Pact's, we would have a 6 to 1 advantage. If our pilot accuracy were only equal we would have a 5 to 1 advantage. If all NATO and Pact factors were equal except effective payload and number of aircraft (on which we are relatively certain), we would have a 1.1 to 1 advantage. On balance, my own view is that it is very unlikely that our advantage in offensive power, with these deployed forces, could be lower than about 4 to 1; and, of course, the Pact may also improve less than we have assumed, so our advantage could also be larger than 9 to 1. (If we added the 500 aircraft that we make provision for, we would have about a 1.5 to 1 advantage even with the Air Staff calculations.) In any case, I believe it is clear that we have a large offensive air advantage over the Pact.

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Moreover, although we estimate that the Pact's offensive capability is low, both absolutely and relative to our own, we still plan massive countermeasures to reduce it further, as a hedge against an underestimate. These countermeasures include offensive air strikes against Pact airfields; F-4E interceptors; NIKE, HAWK, CHAPARRAL, and REDEYE surface-to-air missiles; VULCAN anti-aircraft guns; and vehicle-mounted machine guns.

We estimate that our countermeasures would reduce the Pact's gross offensive capability immediately by about 75%. This reduction results from the Pact's need to use part of its force defensively to protect against NATO aircraft, from reduced sortie rates because of the need to disperse and protect their aircraft from NATO airfield strikes, and from NATO defensive interceptor screens. After thirty days, attrition from NATO surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), guns, and interceptors would reduce Pact offensive capability to near zero if Army study estimates are right, or to about 15% of gross capability if our defensive weapons are only as effective as North Vietnam's.

Just the U.S. defensive systems in Europe (F-4E interceptors, SAMs, and guns) will cost us \$1.5 to \$2.0 billion over the next five years. As discussed above, this provides a hedge even if our estimates of Pact capability are too low. Furthermore, these defensive systems will provide a defense for special high value targets like our airfields and Army depots, should the Pact attempt to concentrate its tactical effort on them or use long-range bombers against them.*

As for NATO's offensive air requirements, I indicated above that the gross capability of the NATO force is much greater than the Pact's. I further believe NATO could convert this to an even bigger advantage in the net support of the land forces, provided that NATO does not attempt a massive and costly deep interdiction campaign.

The Pact's air-to-air defensive capability in the front lines is limited because their planes cannot loiter long enough to have a high chance of intercepting NATO planes doing close support. By contrast, Pact defensive capabilities increase sharply thirty to fifty miles back from the front lines. At this depth their interceptors have time to "scramble" on alert. Their surface-to-air missiles would require us to fly very low, sharply reducing the payload of penetrating aircraft. And the attrition from anti-aircraft artillery would increase because of the higher number and heavier caliber of weapons encountered.

The most demanding need for costly deep penetrations into Pact territory would be an interdiction campaign against the transportation network in Eastern Europe. This transportation system has a very large

* As I have recommended in prior years, aircraft shelters are an essential component of this defense. Without them, our aircraft will be so easy to kill that the Pact force, while far weaker than the NATO force, could destroy hundreds of airplanes in the first few days of a war as the Israelis did to the Arabs. Aircraft shelters are also an inexpensive item. For example, we can shelter our whole force in Germany for about \$20 million.

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capability. Even if it could be reduced by 90% (the maximum feasible reduction), the remaining capacity would be enough to reinforce and resupply an eighty-division Pact force. Furthermore, an effort of this type would require at least hundreds, and in my view probably thousands, of aircraft. Moreover, whatever supply limitations and disruptions were caused would not immediately affect the Pact's forward land forces, since they would at first be using stocks already in the forward area. A smaller interdiction campaign would have even less identifiable effects. For these reasons, I do not share the Air Force view that we should maintain tactical air forces for conducting a massive deep interdiction campaign in Central Europe. Rather, we need to do enough interdiction and airfield attacks to force the Pact: (1) to devote a major effort to air defense; (2) to disperse its aircraft and move them to the rear; and (3) to have their land forces take precautionary measures.

Thus, I believe that about 75% of the NATO air forces would remain after providing for defensive needs and limited interdiction, and most of these could be used to attack the Warsaw Pact ground forces in the forward areas.

The net result is that we can be confident that the NATO land forces will have much more effective air support than the Pact land forces. We do not have any confident estimates of how much this air advantage improves our land capability. Very rough comparisons of the damage capability of air forces with historical casualty rates required to stop an attacking division suggest that air forces may be a relatively expensive way of defending against Soviet divisions in Europe (at least with current aircraft types). Therefore, we cannot count on needing any fewer land forces if we add more air forces. Instead we must plan our land forces to meet the land threat, and treat the air advantage as a bonus safety factor. Under these conditions, I see no reason to increase our air advantage still more by providing for a bigger force than that recommended above.

In the Southeast Flank, the offensive air threat is even more limited than in the Center Region. It consists of 475 Bulgarian and Rumanian tactical aircraft, potentially augmented by about 400 Soviet tactical aircraft, plus naval bombers from the Black Sea Fleet. NATO has available over 700 aircraft, including about 140 U.S. aircraft from the Sixth Fleet and 72 from three U.S. Air Force rotational squadrons. This would provide roughly the same ratio of NATO to Pact capability as in the Central Region, which we have already shown is adequate.

D. Naval Forces

I stated last year my belief that our Allies' naval forces programmed for the Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean Seas were excessive compared with their need for better land forces. Germany alone, for example, could save \$700 to \$900 million over the next five years by cutting plans for naval forces. Yet she claims that budget limits may cause reductions in her land forces. Although political considerations

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limit our ability to influence our Allies' allocation of funds, I noted that SACEUR's study of NATO Defense in 1972 contained the statement: "In this study, the German naval resources planned for 1972 are considered to be excessive to requirements and reductions have therefore been made to provide increased capability for land and air forces." We will continue to encourage our Allies to use their resources more efficiently.

IV. U.S. FORCE COMMITMENTS TO NATO

This year, after a detailed review, the U.S. made what I believe is a realistic and appropriate commitment of forces to NATO. (Commitment of forces is not required by the North Atlantic Treaty, but was provided for by subsequent agreement.) Our U.S. commitments indicate two degrees of availability to the NATO Commanders.* Assigned forces are under the operational command or control of NATO Commanders during peacetime. Forces Earmarked for Assignment come under NATO Commanders' operational command or control at a time specified by each country. These times usually relate to a particular state or stage of the NATO Alert System. Generally, NATO (and U.S.) land and air forces in Europe are earmarked for assignment at M-Day, which is normally assumed to be the time at which a nation agrees to a declaration of NATO Reinforced Alert. Naval forces are committed by category, depending on how long it is after Reinforced Alert before they are available to the NATO Commander: Category A, within 48 hours; Category B, within thirty days; Category C, longer than thirty days. Related to the time of assignment is the question of availability; our committed Marine Corps forces and our in-place and dual-based Army and Air Force forces (except for a few assigned forces) are earmarked for assignment at M-Day, although some are not available to the NATO Commanders at M-Day. Army M-Day Strategic Reserve forces are normally earmarked for assignment by M+30 days; availability depends upon arrival date in the theater.

This year we committed the following major forces for 1968.

A. Army a/

	M-Day		M-Day Strategic Reserve	
	Divisions	Brigades	Divisions	Brigades
Armored	2	3 <u>b/c/</u>	2 <u>d/</u>	1 <u>b/</u>
Mechanized	3 <u>c/</u>		1 <u>d/</u>	
Infantry				1 <u>e/</u>

- a/ Certain U.S. Army air defense units (four HAWK battalions, six NIKE battalions) are assigned to SACEUR in peacetime.
- b/ Armored Cavalry Regiments (ACRs).
- c/ One ACR and two-thirds of a Mechanized Division are based in CONUS, but are under the control of USCINCEUR.
- d/ Normally available in Europe by M+30; temporarily available later due to Southeast Asia. During the period of delayed availability, two airborne divisions are made available if needed.
- e/ Brigade for Iceland.

*Definitions are those found in MC 57/2. It is a frequent practice, although imprecise usage, to refer to M-Day "Earmarked" forces in Europe as being assigned.

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	<u>Category A</u>	<u>Category B</u>	<u>Category C</u>
Attack Carriers	6	4	0
ASW Carriers	4	3	4
Destroyer Types	105	39	91
Submarines	90	0	0
Land-Based Maritime			
Patrol Aircraft	147	96	0
Other Ships	27	17	73

C. Marines

Two Marine division/wing teams are earmarked for assignment at M-Day; one is to be available at M+30 and another at M+60.

D. Air Force b/

<u>Fighter Bomber</u>	<u>Reconnaissance</u>	<u>Air Defense</u>
458	138	98 <u>c/d/</u>
	<u>Transport</u>	<u>Cruise Missiles</u>
	80	18

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- a/ Includes three submarines (SSBNs) assigned to SACEUR in peacetime.
b/ Includes all European-based and dual-based aircraft, excluding those in Spain.
c/ Includes 86 European-based air defense aircraft assigned to SACEUR in peacetime.
d/ Includes one squadron in Iceland.

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