

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NOV 969000  
By 88 NARA Date 8-29-01



59

DEF 6 NATO

Department of State

TELEGRAM

46

SECRET 178

PAGE 01 NATO 02900 01 OF 02 032217Z

84  
ACTION EUR 20

INFO CIAE 00, GPM 04, INR 07, L 03, NEA 13, NSAE 00, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02,  
USIA 12, SS 20, NSC 10, PCH 04, ACDA 16, RSR 01, /117 W

P R 032122Z MAY 68  
FM USMISSION NATO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2078  
SECDEF WASHDC  
INFO USCINCEUR  
USCINCLANT  
USNMR SHAPE  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 2900

NATUS:

SUBJ: DPC DISCUSSION OF CAPABILITIES AND RISKS:

1. SUMMARY. 2 MAY DPC DISCUSSION OF FORCE GOAL PROPOSALS

PAGE 2, RUFHNA 2900/1 SECRET  
(SEPTEL) LED PERMREPS INTO USEFUL DISCUSSION OF US VIEW OF CAPABILITIES OF THE WARSAW PACT AND, AS A RELATED MATTER, OF THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN NATO POLITICAL-MILITARY DECISIONS. THIS OFFERED A CHANCE TO PUT BOTH IN FOCUS, AND CLEVELAND TRIED TO DO SO. IT WAS GENERALLY AGREED THAT DPC MINISTERS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY WISH TO CARRY ON THE DISCUSSION. SYG BROSIO SPECIFICALLY SUGGESTED THAT SECRETARY CLIFFORD BE READY TO EXPLAIN THE US FOOTNOTE (3) ON PAGE 4 OF DPCVD(68)10 (DRAFT), PREVIOUSLY POUCHED, WHICH DISSENTS FROM THE MC RISK ASSESSMENT.

2. DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) STARTED THE DISCUSSION ON THIS

SECRET

NATO 2900 5-368

RECORDED BY 57A

DECLASSIFIED

Authority AWO 969000  
By SP NARA Date 8-29-01



# Department of State

TELETYPE

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 02900 01 OF 02 032217Z

POINT BY CALLING ATTENTION TO THE FOOTNOTE. THIS FOOTNOTE, WHICH IS IDENTICAL TO LANGUAGE IN MCM-20-68, SAYS THAT QTE. THE UNITED STATES MILITARY AUTHORITIES REGARD THE MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS' VIEWS OF FORCE CAPABILITIES AND RESULTANT RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THEIR 1969-1973 FORCE PROPOSALS AS EXAGGERATING THE CAPABILITIES OF THE WARSAW PACT END QTE. DE STAERCKE FOUND THIS STATEMENT A VERY IMPORTANT ONE, PARTICULARLY IN ITS BEARING ON THE APPRECIATION

PAGE 3 RUFHNA 2900/1 SECRET  
TION OF THE MILITARY SITUATION FACING NATO THROUGH 1977 TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE DPC IN THE FALL OF THIS YEAR.

3. ONCKEN (FRG) CHARACTERIZED THE FOOTNOTE AS INCONSISTENT WITH THE MILITARY COMMITTEE VIEW THAT THE MILITARY RISKS WOULD INCREASE IF THE FORCE PROPOSALS FOR 1973 CANNOT BE ACHIEVED OR IF NATO'S OVERALL FORCE CAPABILITY IS REDUCED (PARAGRAPH 21(C) OF DPC/D(68)10(DRAFT)). HE SAW THE US FOOTNOTE AS LIKELY TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT A BALANCE HAD BEEN ATTAINED IN NATO AND WARSAW PACT, FROM WHICH SOME COULD DRAW THE CONCLUSION THAT NATIONS COULD EVEN REDUCE DEFENSE EFFORTS.

4. CLEVELAND EXPLAINED THE US FOOTNOTE WAS NOT INTENDED TO, AND SHOULD NOT, ENCOURAGE THE REDUCTION OF NATIONAL DEFENSE EFFORTS. IT REFLECTS OUR BELIEF, BASED ON ANALYTIC EXAMINATION OF AGREED INTELLIGENCE, THAT THE PACT THREAT IS SERIOUS, BUT THAT A MORE REFINED AND REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF WARSAW PACT MILITARY POSTURE SUGGESTED THE MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE WAS NOT AS HOPELESS AS SOME NATO MILITARY ANALYSES

PAGE 4 RUFHNA 2900/1 SECRET  
WOULD INDICATE. ONCKEN THEN REMARKED THAT IN THIS LIGHT BOTH THE FRG AND THE US APPARENTLY AGREE THAT AN ACCEPTABLE BALANCE DOES NOT NOW EXIST, I.E., THAT NATO NATIONS CANNOT RELAX THEIR DEFENSE EFFORTS.

5. DE STAERCKE THEN SUGGESTED THAT THE DPC INVITE THE

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 969000  
By 88 NARA Date 8-29-01

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 02900 01 OF 02 032217Z

CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE TO BE READY ON 10 MAY TO DISCUSS THE MILITARY COMMITTEE VIEW OF THE THREAT AND ASSOCIATED RISKS. GENERAL DE CUMONT REPLIED THAT HE WAS HAPPY AT THE ADVANCE NOTICE, BUT NOT AT ALL CONFIDENT ABOUT THE UTILITY OF THE DISCUSSION. HIS FEAR WAS THAT COUNTRIES WOULD SEIZE ON THE US FOOTNOTE TO JUSTIFY A REDUCTION IN EFFORT. HE SAID (INCORRECTLY) THAT DISARMAMENT EXPERTS, MAINLY CIVILIANS, HAD REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT NATO AND WARSAW PACT "DIVISION SLICES" WERE EQUIVALENT, WHICH WAS A FORMULA TO DISMANTLE NATO DEFENSES. (CLEVELAND LATER CORRECTED THIS POINT, NOTING THAT THE DISARMAMENT EXPERTS HAD NOT, RPT NOT, CONCLUDED THAT "DIVISIONAL THEATER SLICES" WERE EQUIVALENT, THAT IN FACT THE SOVIET ARMY SLICES COMPARED TO OURS ABOUT THREE TO ONE.)

PAGE 5 RUFHNA 2900/1 S E C R E T

6. THIS IN TURN LED BOON (NETH) TO ASK WHETHER NATO INTELLIGENCE WAS PRODUCED OBJECTIVELY AS INFORMATION ON WHICH TO MAKE DECISIONS OR WITH THE CLEAR PURPOSE OF KEEPING NATO FORCES FROM BEING REDUCED. HE SUGGESTED THAT IN THE FUTURE THE DRC SHOULD MEET WITH INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS TO HAVE RATHER DETAILED DISCUSSIONS. AT THE MOMENT HE HAD NO WAY OF REVIEWING THE POSSIBLE POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF NATO INTELLIGENCE.

GP-3. CLEVELAND

NOTE: POUCHED BRUSSELS BY OC/T.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority WFO 969000  
By 88 NARA Date 8-29-01

*Draft Note*

Department of State

TELEGRAM

44

SECRET 972

PAGE 01 NATO 02900 02 OF 02 032225Z

84  
ACTION EUR 20

INFO CIAE 00, GPM 04, INR 07, L 03, NEA 13, NSAE 00, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02,  
USIA 12, SS 20, NSC 10, PCH 04, ACDA 15, RSR 01, 117 W.

P R 032122Z MAY 68  
FM USMISSION NATO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2079  
SECDEF WASHDC  
INFO USCINCEUR  
USCINCLANT  
USNMR SHAPE  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS UNN

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 2900  
NATUS

7. IN THIS CONTEXT, CLEVELAND THEN AGREED THAT THE APPROACH TO INTELLIGENCE WAS WORTH MOVING TO A HIGHER LEVEL OF DISCUSSION. DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE APPARENTLY TRADITIONAL.

PAGE 2 RUFHNA 2900/2 S E C R E T  
VIEW IN NATO THAT IT IS GOOD FOR OUR DEFENSE EFFORT TO PROVE THAT THE MILITARY SITUATION IS HOPELESS -- THAT THE ENEMY WOULD HAVE AND HOLD AIR SUPERIORITY OVER WEST GERMANY AND THAT HE WOULD BE AT THE CHANNEL IN THREE DAYS -- CLEVELAND SAID THAT IF A NATO POLITICAL LEADER ACTED ON THIS BASIS, HIS POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THAT OF FINLAND OR BURMA. LUCKILY OUR GOVERNMENTS DO NOT TAKE SERIOUSLY THIS TRADITIONAL EXAGGERATED INTELLIGENCE VIEW AND ARE MAINTAINING A USEFUL DEFENSE LEVEL. PROPERLY HANDLED AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL, THE VIEW THAT WE ARE AT A REASONABLE DISTANCE FROM AN ACCEPTABLE BALANCE BETWEEN WARSAW PACT AND NATO

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *MWD 969000*  
By *88* NARA Date *8-29-01*

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 02900 02 OF 02 032225Z

CAPABILITIES WOULD BE A VERY USEFUL INCENTIVE TO COMPLETING THE BALANCE. THIS WOULD THEN GIVE US THE POSSIBILITY OF INSTITUTIONALIZING THE PEACEKEEPING STALEMATE AT LOWER LEVELS THROUGH MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS. WHEREAS IF WE REALLY BELIEVED THE CONCLUSIONS TRADITIONALLY DRAWN FROM MOST NATO INTELLIGENCE, CONSIDERATION OF MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE INCONCEIVABLE, SINCE WE WOULD BE ADOPTING A POLICY OF INSTITUTIONALIZING THE ADVERSARY'S

PAGE 3 RKHNA 2900/2 S E C R E T

SUPERIORITY. IN SUM, OUR VIEW IS THAT THE ADVERSARY IS NOT SO POWERFUL THAT A MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF THE SIZEABLE RESOURCES NATO IS PLANNING TO SPEND (SOME HUNDRED BILLION DOLLARS INVOLVED IN CURRENT FIVE-YEAR DEFENSE PLANS) CANNOT BRING BALANCE WITH WARSAW PACT CAPABILITIES WITHIN REACH. OUR INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS SHOULD NOT BE DISTORTED TO BE A BASIS FOR EITHER MILITARY BUILD-UP OR REDUCTION. THEY SHOULD REFLECT AN EFFORT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT IMPROVED INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGY, TO GIVE A BETTER PICTURE OF WHAT THE ADVERSARY HAS, NOT (FOR EXAMPLE) MAXIMIZING THE THREAT BY TAKING THE TOP OF EVERY RANGE OF ESTIMATES. CLEVELAND CONCLUDED THAT THIS IS INDEED A GOOD SUBJECT FOR MINISTERS TO DISCUSS.

8. BROSID SUMMED UP THIS PHASE OF DISCUSSION BY EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT SECRETARY CLIFFORD WOULD REAFFIRM ON 10 MAY THAT THE US VIEW IS INTENDED TO SUPPORT RATHER THAN REDUCE CONTINUED DEFENSE EFFORT, WITH THE AIM OF ATTAINING AND MAINTAINING BALANCE. HE DESCRIBED THE DISCUSSIONS AS CENTERED AROUND NON-NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES.

PAGE 4 RUFHNA 2900/2 S E C R E T

AND NOTED THAT NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES WERE UNDER STUDY IN THE NPG. HE AGREED THAT INTERPRETATION OF AGREED INTELLIGENCE SHOULD BE A MATTER OF DISCUSSION BY MINISTERS.

9. THERE IS AN OPPORTUNITY HERE TO EMPHASIZE, AT THE RIGHT LEVEL AND IN THE RIGHT FORUM, THAT WE ARE WORKING

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *MWD 969000*  
By *88* NARA Date *8-29-01*

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03. NATO 02900 02 OF 02. 032225Z.

FOR ACCURATE APPRAISALS AS BEST BASIS ON WHICH WE CAN  
IMPROVE OUR COLLECTIVE DEFENSES -- AND NOT,  
REPEAT NOT, DOCTORING THE FACTS TO PAVE THE WAY FOR US  
FORCE REDUCTIONS OR DENUCLEARIZATION. (HEALEY HAS PRIVATELY  
ALLEGED THIS, AND GERMANS HAVE BEEN WONDERING OUT LOUD  
ABOUT IT.) THE MAY 10 MEETING SHOULD BE USED TO EXERCISE  
THIS GHOST ONCE AGAIN. GP-3. CLEVELAND

NOTE: POUCHED BRUSSELS BY OC/T.

SECRET